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ABSTRACT 
FEAR, FRUSTRATION AND THE WILL TO OVERCOME: 
a social history of Poliomyelitis in Western Australia. 
This thesis investigates community responses to Poliomyelitis, and 
the impact of the disease on those who experienced it, particularly 
during the epidemics that occurred in Western Australia between 
1938 and 1956. The research sources are W.A. Health Department 
records, held mostly at the Battye Library, records held by 
Australian Archives and Royal Perth Hospital, newspaper reports, 
comparative studies from several states in Australia and overseas, 
oral history interviews, biographies and personal records. 
The history of polio has several layers and the presence or the 
disease in the community evoked varied and ambiguous reactions, 
summarised here as fear, frustration and the will to overcome. I 
have examined the discussion the virus generated amongst 
members of the public, researchers, health professionals and polio 
survivors, in order to draw conclusions about the relationship 
between disease and western society. 
Polio evoked greater level of fear amongst all members of the 
community, compared with other infectious diseases which had a 
far higher mortality rate. The behaviour of the polio virus 
challenged theories of infection current during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Health and scientific professionals, and the 
general public, were frustrated by a lack of accurate knowledge 
concerning the disease. Uncertainty led to the implementation of 
a variety of preventative measures, some of which, such as 
quarantine, were unpopular while others, such as nasal clips, were 
ineffective. Research aimed at developing a vaccine to conquer the 
virus was maintained but scientific and medical professionals 
disagreed amongst themselves, while members of the general public 
questioned their capabilities and offered their own homespun 
solutions. At the same time polio survivors were often noted for 
their determined efforts to recover from the effects of paralysis. 
Epidemics of polio in Australia, which were most severe between 
1937 and 1956, peaked in 1951. Once the employment of Salk 
vaccine, discovered in 1952, removed the threat of polio, interest in 
the disease declined in western societies while survivors continued 
to live as if their had no disability. Considering the impact it 
made made on the community at the time there has been little 
ongoing discussion of polio. However the memory of polio is being 
revived at present, particularly amongst polio survivors, due to the 
after effects of the virus itself. A condition known as "Post-Polio 
Syndrome" (PPS) has been identified, and research into this field 
5 
continues. Alarm at the current drop in the rate of immunisation 
in Australia, and the reappearance of 'conquered' diseases such as 
whooping cough, has also acted as a reminder of the social havoc 
epidemics of polio and other dangerous infectious diseases once 
created. Although the this thesis refers to PPS, the primary 
interest is in the responses of the community and individuals 
during the polio era, and their memory of that period. 
*** 
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CHAPTER 1: History, memory and polio 
Many people have a Polio story to tell and mine is part of this 
thesis. I am a survivor of the first major polio epidemic to occur in 
Western Australia. Just before Christmas 1948, aged two and a 
half, I had become feverish and complained of pains in my right 
knee. I My parents took me to the doctor in the country town near 
our farm but he dismissed their concerns, subjected them to the 
humiliation of a lecture on spoiling their child, and sent them on 
their way. An epidemic of polio had raged in Western Australia 
since January 1948 and, although there had been only two 
notifications from our district,2 by this stage of the year over three 
hundred cases had been reported and almost twenty five people 
had died. As summer came on the epidemic revived. After the 
school year ended on December 2 the number of notifications rose 
and did not decline until the end of the month .3 My infection 
occurred in the thick of the new wave, and under the 
circumstances one could have expected even a country doctor to be 
alert to the symptoms of poliomyelitis in a child, but it was not so. 
Reports of misdiagnosis and insensitive treatment by doctors have 
proved to be surprisingly common amongst polio survivors. 4 
The next day, at a farm further out, our extended family gathered 
for a Christmas celebration. I continued to be listless and 
I Letter, Dr C Christie to RMO, PMH, 21 January 1949, and PMH Records for 
patient A32220, in possession of Author. 
2 Reportofthe Public Health.Department 1948, (1949), Government Printer: Perth, 
p. 51. BL, 614.09WES. 
3 Public Health 1948, ( 1949). p. 63, BL, 614.09 WES. 
4 Six of the twelve people interviewed for this thesis reported erroneous diagnosis 
in the early stages. See Chapter 9 below. 
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miserable, and sat on my uncle's knee most of the day. Before 
many days had passed my right leg was half an inch shorter than 
my left, and due to lost muscle function, I threw it out as I walked. 
On 8 January 1949, my parents returned to the doctor who 
diagnosed poliomyelitis - it was visible by then. 5 I was referred to 
Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH), for physiotherapy and 
orthopaedic care administered under the direction of Dr R. 
McKellar Hall. I remained in Ward Two of PMH for seven months. 
Even though my rtght leg was not gravely affected, there followed 
months and years of treatment involving physiotherapy, the use of 
various sorts of calipers, and at least two operations, the last of 
which occurred in 1961. Once I began work, in 1962, I lived a 
"normal" life, and certainly did not regard myself as disabled, even 
though I had never played sport, and there were some things I 
could not easily do. It was many years before I began to 
understand how deeply my life had been affected by the months of 
hospitalisation and years of adjustment to polio. 
The memory of my polio experience was severely jolted in 1988 
when the news of Post Polio Syndrome began to break in 
Australia. 6 In the late 1970s and early 1980s individuals who had 
suffered from polio, particularly during the period 1930-1960, 
began to report a variety of symptoms such as loss of muscle 
function, unaccustomed fatigue and pain. A condition now known 
as "Post-Polio Syndrome" (PPS) or the "Late Effects of Polio" (LEP) 
5 Letter, Dr C Christie to RMO, PMH, 21 January 1949, PMH Records for patient 
A32220, copy in possession of the author. 
6 Egan, C. "Polio comes back to haunt", WeekendAustmltan, 12-13 November 
1988, p.10. 
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was identified. Many who presented with PPS found that doctors 
knew little or nothing of polio and, at first, did not take their 
symptoms seriously. But the weight of evidence for PPS mounted 
and research into this field continues. 7 Many polio survivors 
found the coming of PPS revived painful memories of their original 
experience.a and aroused fears concerning their future. I was one 
of these. For others the identification of PPS brought welcome 
relief9 because it named something they knew to be part of their 
life, but which doctors, and friends, did not know about or would 
not take seriously. 
In Australia alarm at the drop in the lmmunisation rate has acted 
as a social reminder of the havoc epidemic polio, and other 
diseases, once created. A campaign to promote the vaccination of 
children has begun, aimed mostly at diseases such as whooping 
cough.ID But, as far as polio is concerned, the emergence of PPS 
has been of far greater importance. Because of PPS polio is now 
back on the personal, historical and public health agendas of the 
7 Halstead, L.S. and Grimby, G. ( 1995). Post Pollo Syndrome, Hanley and Belfus, 
Inc. Philadelphia, is a comprehensive series of essays on the subject of PPS. See 
also Leboeuf, C. ( 1991). The Late Effects of Pollo: informatf.on for healthprovtders, 
Commonwealth Department of Community Services and Health, Australian 
Polio Network, ( 1991 ). Pollo Papers 1991, Citadel Press, Hawthorn, and the 
Proceedings of the Australian Conferences on Post Polio, Adelaide 1992, Merroo 
NSW,1996. 
8 Halstead, L.S. and Griinby, G. (1995). PostPoltoSyndrome, pp.199-214, Sass, 
E.J. ( 1996). PoUo's Legacy: an oml history. University Press of America. Oral 
Histocy Interview J. p.93, and K, p.93. 
9 Interview C. 
IOWA, 8 April, 1995, p.49; WeekendAustraltan, 3-4 Februacy 1996, Schedule 
aims to arrest 'scandalous' immunisation levels, p. 7. 
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community. I I New demands in the field of after care have been 
highlighted and a new response is required from medical and 
clinical practitioners. Post-Polio Networks have formed in 
Australia and New Zealand, and in other parts of the world, to 
gather information and provide practical and non-material forms 
of support for polio survivors. 
The memory jolt brought about by Post Polio Syndrome, has 
affected many people very deeply. It is as though an earthquake 
has broken the surface of the historical landscape, throwing up 
things that had hitherto laid buried or forgotten. As the oral 
testimonies used for this thesis show, polio survivors have been 
caused to revisit memories of their personal and professional past, 
and that of the community in which they lived. The silence is 
being broken, new light is being cast on these experiences and it is 
possible to ask fresh questions that will allow us to reframe the 
received understanding of this period. Histories which deal with 
life in Australia during this era pay little or no attention to 
polio.12 But polio has begun to be discussed again as it has re­
emerged due to PPS. A parallel can be found with the experience of 
many who lived through the Second World War but did not speak 
11 Bearup, C. ( 1991). The outcomes of the Poliomyelitis Epidemics in South 
Austm.Ua: 1912-1960, unpublished Honours Thesis, Flinders University, p.18. 
Bearup surveyed 124 members of the Post-Polio Support Group of South 
Australia. Many stated "their story had not been told and that the greatly 
reduced incidence of the disease had erased knowledge of their experience from 
the public's mind". 
12 Stannage, C.T. (ed.), ( 1981 ). A New History oJWestemAustralta, Nedlands: 
University of Western Australia Press, makes no reference to polio while G Bolton 
makes a small reference to it in connection with Sister Elizabeth Kenny and 
Dame Jean Macnamara in Crowley, F. (ed.), ( 1974). A New History qf Australia, 
Melbourne: William Heinemann, p.481. A brief article appears in the more recent 
work by Gilbert, A, and Inglis, K. (eds.), ( 1987). Australians: a historical atlas, 
Broadway: Fairfax Syme and Weldon Associates, pp. 172-3. 
CHAPTER 1: History, memory and polio 15 
of their memories until legitimacy for doing so was given, fifty 
years later, through Australia's year of remembrance in 1995. 13 
The physical effects of polio have not been especially debilitating 
for me and I have been able to do most things in my life. But in 
my middle years I found that the social and psychological effects 
emerged to reveal enduring scars. In 1991 after twenty years of 
struggling to maintain close relationships, I was referred to a 
psychologist familiar with attachment theories, especially those 
represented by the work of John Bowlby.14 My difficulties were 
attributed to the initial long period of separation from my family, 
endured at a particularly vulnerable time of life. In the 1940s 
there was little hospital visiting allowed and the attitude to child 
care was hard and unfeeling. In my case access was difficult - I 
was one hundred and fifty eight miles away from home where there 
was a farm to run and five other children to care for. It was like 
being abandoned but the wounds created by this experience 
remained "out of sight". Being given the tools to understand this 
aspect of my past and de-code the experience allowed a revelation 
to occur. I was given a lens through which I began to re-read the 
whole of my life up to that point. And I have had to think about 
the future in new ways. Others have had similar experiences but 
in our culture it is not something that is readily accepted or 
discussed. It is evident that there is some reluctance to allow the 
memories of childhood deprivation to be accepted into our 
13 Dartan-Smith, K, and Hamilton, P, (eds.), (1994). Memory and History in 
Twentieth Century Austmlla, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, p.139. 14 Explanation is given in Chapter 9 below. 
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This thesis investigates memory and history in connection with the 
impact of polio on individuals and the community in Australia, 
particularly in Western Australia from 1938-1956. From 1881 
until 1956 (the 'polio era') several Western countries, including 
Australia, were affected by an increasing number of polio 
epidemics. Although the polio virus has made little impact on the 
Australian community since the late 1950s the effects of this 
disease continue to shape the identities of its survivors, and others 
who for different reasons knew it at close range. Polio has not 
been a disease to reckon with in Australia since the mid 1950s, few 
cases were reported in Australia after 1966, and none since 1986 . 1 6 
However, the virus continues to be active in Africa, India, South 
East Asia and China [Figure 11, 1 7 where steps are being taken to 
eradicate it. 1 8 
It is difficult to imagine the impact a polio epidemic made on the 
community though some draw parallels with the AIDS epidemic. 19 
Until vaccination commenced perplexed research scientists and 
1 5 The original reaction of the medical profession to Bowlby and Robertson's 
work was one of disbelief, and later feminist writers have attacked some of their 
presuppositions. In Australia the treatment given to the recent "Stolen 
Generation" report, and the slow emergence of the details surrounding the 
"Leaving of Liverpool" are signs of the difficulty we have confronting issues of 
childhood deprivation. 
1 6 WA, 8 April, 1995, Polio a risk:Lawrence, p.49. 
1 7 World Health Organisation, Global reported incidence of poliomyelitis, used 
with permission. In 1996 there were 3,755 polio cases reported, mostly from 
Africa, India, South East Asia and China. None were reported in Australia, 
North America or South America. 
1 8 WA. 20 Januruy 1997, p.24. 120 million Indian children were vaccinated in 
the second round of an attempt to eradicate polio by the year 2000. 
19 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease: poUo before FDR, Rutgers University Press: 
New Jersey, p.3. 
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health and medical professionals were obliged to recognise and 
respond to the growing threat the polio virus posed to the 
community. At first children were the main ones to suffer from the 
paralysing effects of the virus, but during the more recent 
epidemics a growing proportion of young adults suffered infection 
and residual paralysis. Those who survived, learned to live with 
the result. Family members and carers experienced quarantine, 
and sometimes ostracism, when someone close to them became 
infected. During an epidemic quarantine officers and council 
workers had extra du ties to perform, school and kindergarten 
teachers had their classes cancelled, swimming bath operators 
were unable to conduct their businesses, and journalists had to 
weigh the social cost of a sensational story against the potential 
effect it might have on the level of fear and hysteria abroad in the 
community. 
Memory and history 
This research has been influenced by work which has reflected on 
the relationship between memory and history.20 For some memory 
is 'the life of history' as the tree is to its bark, for others the 
relationship is more ambiguous, even antithetica1.21 The lack of 
formal sources in some fields, such as indigenous history, and the 
continued expansion of historical methodologies, has provided 
20 Dartan-Smith, K. and Hamilton, P. (eds.), ( 1994). Memory and History, and 
Samuel, R. and Thompson, P. (eds.), (1990). The Myths We Live By. Routledge, 
London. Both contain numerous essays by writers who have explored new ways 
of making the connection between memory- and history-. 
2 1 Dartan-Smith, K. and Hamilton, P. (eds.), (1994). Memory and History, pp.9-
1 1. 
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impetus for a re-evaluation of the place of memory, or perhaps we 
should say experience, and its relationship with history.2 2  In the 
last two decades history has been 'nourished' by memory through 
the development of new questions arising from new methodologies. 
The continued acceptance and sophistication of oral history, the 
growth of interest in indigenous oral traditions, the collective 
remembering of nations, and of groups such as holocaust survivors 
and war veterans, the gendered nature of memory, and the 
influence of post-structuralism have all contributed to this 
development. The results include a deeper appreciation of the 
links between place and identity.23 Expanded perspectives on ways 
the past is remembered have been paralleled by new 
understandings of ways in which the past is forgotten.24 An 
'official' or single, abstracted understanding of a subject is now 
hardly possible, if it ever was. 
The revisiting of memory means that it is necessary to take a more 
flexible, or fluid, approach to history. Parallel narratives are 
acknowledged by some writers, and counter stories are accepted 
alongside, or even within, a narrative.25 Judith Binney,2 6 Carolyn 
Steedman,2 7  and Mark Baker,2 8  are examples of writers who are 
2 2  Benjamin, W. ( 1992). Illuminations, Fontana: London, p.83. Benjamin 
regarded the decline in storytelling as a sign that experience had been devalued. 
2 3 The work of Peter Reid for example. 
2 4 Darian-Smith, K, and Hamilton, P. (eds.), ( 1994). Memory and History, see 
Paula Hamilton's discussion, pp.12- 13. 
2 5 The Australian "lest we forget" approach to the ANZAC tradition is a counter 
narrative when placed alongside the call for the elimination of the "black arm­
band" view of indigenous history which requires institutionalised forgetfulness. 
26 Binney, J. ( 1997). Redemption Songs: a life of the nineteenth century Maori 
Leader Te Koott Ariklmngi Te Turiki, Melbourne University Press: Carlton. 
27 Steedman, C. ( 1982). The Tidy House: little girls writing, Virago: London. 
2 8  Baker, M.R. ( 1997). A Journey Through Memory: The Fiftieth Gate, Flamingo. 
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involved in exploring the connections between history and memory 
in new ways, and from different perspectives. 
With respect to the negotiations that take place in society over 
memory and history Paula Hamilton has written -
... since all memory ls subject to structures of power in any 
society, we need a great deal more investigation into the 
processes by which some memories become erased, some 
emerge in the public arena, and some remain relatively 
privatised.2 9 
The most readily noticeable memory gaps in Australian history 
have been in connection with indigenous history, the place of 
women, and the experience of war veterans and prisoners of war. 
It is evident from this research that there has been a gap in the 
public memory of the polio era in Australia. Despite the popular 
appeal of Alan Marshall's I Can Jump Puddles, published in 1955 
and made into a television series in the 1970s, polio has not 
figured in popular discourse since the late 1950s. While the the 
success of the immunisation campaign, which was trumpeted as a 
conquest of the disease, can account for this there is also evidence 
polio survivors were inducted into a culture that encouraged them 
to deny their disability, and its effect on their life. Consequently 
the perceptions and stories of many who survived infection, or in 
some way encountered the ravages of the disease at close range, 
have been overlooked, marginalised or forgotten. Those survivors 
who did gatn attention were often high profile figures, such Alan 
29 Dartan-Smith, K. and Hamilton, P. (eds.). (1994). Memory and History, p.20. 
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Marshall and Marjorie Lawrence, who were seen to triumph 
heroically over their loss.30 They shared the limelight with 
international heroes such as President Roosevelt and Jonas Salle 
about whom much has been wrttten.3 1 
There are many voices to be heard in recounting the history of 
polio in Western Australia, but up to the present time the official 
history has been provided by the Public Health Department, in the 
Annual Reports, which are thorough and detailed. Designed to 
satisfy the accountability provisions of the Public Health 
Department they contain medical and epidemiological information 
rather than material of a personal or social kind. 
Archival materials from the Public Health Department illuminate 
these reports, and offer other voices and perspectives not included 
in the annual reports. Australian Government Archives provide 
access to national policy decisions which affected the whole of 
Australia and, as in the case of the 1 954 royal tour, details 
affecting to Western Australia in particular.32 Royal Perth 
Hospital Archives reveal something of effect polio epidemics had on 
the life of the chief public hospital in Perth. The ongoing debate 
about polio amongst health and medical professionals is found in 
the medical and public health journals. Unpublished material is 
available that refers to polio as part of hospital, public health or 
30 Marshall, A. (1955). I Can Jump Puddles, Hawthorn: F W Cheshire, Lawrence, 
M. (1949). Interrupted Melody, New York. 
31 See Chapter 3 below. 
32 The ABC TV Social History Documentary, "TIME FRAME - Pollo Days", March 
1997, dealt with polio and the royal tour. 
r 
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physiotherapy histortes.33 
2 1  
Newspaper reports during the polio era offer a number of 
perspectives, often supporting the official line, as represented by 
the Public Health Department, or through the columns such as 
"The Diary of a Doctor" .34 Newspapers were also the means 
whereby some of those articulate enough to express themselves via 
letters to the Editor had their views published. Parliamentary 
papers record the urgent questions and answers of politicians 
concerned about their constituencies. 
Julie Marshall's short history of Princess Margaret Hospital refers 
briefly to the first major epidemic in 1948. 35 And gradually more 
individuals, other than the more high profile figures, have felt 
moved to voice their polio sto:ry. A volume by Vivienne Overheu, 
(1984). It Helps To Be Stubborn, Perth, and a volume of stories self 
published by the Post-Polio Network, (1990). The Polio Experience: 
personal stories , Perth, provide this form of personal perspective. A 
rapidly growing amount of similar material is available for other 
parts of Australia, New Zealand and the United States of 
33 An unpublished manuscript compiled by Lissiman, M.C. and Mackay. J.H. 
( 1959). Poltnmyelltts: a general study of the disease. is kept in the Curtin 
University Librruy. Written for physiotherapy students, the manuscript offers a 
brief factual outline of the history of polio in Western Australia. Other 
unpublished sources are Martyr. P. ( 1994). The Profess tonal Development of 
Rehabtlttation tn Australta, 1870-198 1 ,  University of Western Australia: PhD 
Thesis, History, Martyr, P. ( 1996). A History of the Vtctorta Hospttal (Infecttnus 
Diseases) to the Royal Perth (Rehabllttattnn) Hospttal, 1893-1993, Perth, Graham 
Taylor, S. ( 1996). Public Health tn Western Australta tn the Post War Years: Draft 
Report. Unpublished Manuscript, Perth: Public Health Department. 
34  The Diary of a Doctor, "Whooping Cough 'More Serious' Than Paralysis", 
Western Mall. 9 September 1937, p.5. 
35 Marshall, J. ( 1996). Starting Wtth Threepence: the story of Princess Margaret 
Hospttal for Chtldren. Fremantle: Freman tie Arts Centre Press, Ch.4. 
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America.36 
22 
In this thesis the voice of those who have been directly affected by 
polio and lived this history has been gained through testimonies 
given in twelve interviews which have been transcribed. Two were 
conducted with families in which a member had polio, and ten 
with polio survivors themselves. All interviewees live in Western 
Australia, though one had polio in New South Wales and one in 
Tasmania. Six are male and six are female. One had polio in 
1937 /38, two in the late 1940s, and the remainder between 1951 
and 1956, the peak of the polio era in Australia. 
Post Polio Networks have held conferences in Australia and New 
Zealand since 1991. Proceedings from these events provide another 
source of medical and scientiflc data in relation to PPS . and a 
wealth of other material covering the personal concerns of polio 
survivors. 
As a participant observer in this history my own memories are 
another source for this narrative. There are advantages and 
disadvantages in being so closely involved in an investigation of 
this nature and I have sought to find and appropriate balance in 
the discussion that follows. 
The history of Poliomyelitis must, of necessity, be examined within 
36 Recent examples are, Butterworth, K.P. (ed.), (1994). Mind Over Muscle: 
suroiving polio in New Zealand, Dunmore: Palmerston North; Sass. E.J. with 
Gottfried, G. and Sorem, A. (1996). Polio's Legacy: an oral history, Lanham: 
University Press of America. 
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the framework of scientific and medical developments that 
occurred following its emergence as an epidemic disease during the 
1880s.37 The subsequent attempts to understand the disease, the 
search for a vaccine, the immunisation campaigns, and the 
broader currents of social and political influence that provide the 
context for these developments, have been integral to the 
discussion of polio and western society in this century. 
Until recently the dominance of medical and scientific interests 
has resulted in a history in which social and personal stories, 
outside those associated with figures such as Jonas Salk and FDR, 
have played a lesser part. The increased attention paid by 
historians to medical and public health topics has contributed to a 
growing body of social rather than medical histories of disease, and 
the emergence of PPS has ensured polio, and polio survivors, a 
place on this agenda. While medical and scientific histories 
cannot be ignored, this thesis is a social history with at least two 
aims in view. To examine community reaction to polio and in the 
process allow a greater variety of voices to be heard on the subject, 
and to contribute to the reframing of our understanding of the 
relationship between polio and society. 
Little has been published of the history of the polio epidemics in 
Western Australia and so far no social history of polio in Western 
Australia has been attempted. A brief outline, based mostly on the 
annual reports of the Public Health Department, has been given in 
chapter seven of the book by Dudley Snow, (1981).The Progress of 
3 7 For a lucid summary see Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, pp.165-190. 
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Public Health in Western Australia 1 829-1977, Perth. The title of 
Snow's book suggests that it covers all of Public Health in Western 
Australia, but it does so only in outline, concentrating for the 
most part on the events he himself was involved in while serving 
the Public Health Department 1950-1973. Educated in England, 
Snow joined the Perth office of the Western Australian Public 
Health Department in 1950 after two years in the North West with 
the Royal Flying Doctor Service. Formerly a Major in the British 
Army, Snow brought the skills, discipline and language of that 
profession to his work. His language in connection with polio was 
strongly militaristic, something common in other places and 
perpetuated by the newspapers of the day which often used 
headlines such as "Polio Fight Goes On". 38 Snow titled Chapter 7 
of his book, 'The Conquest of Poliomyelitis" and wrote -
Few diseases are capable of evoking as much human emotion 
as polio . .. Its conquest throughout the world since 1956 has 
therefore been one of the most gratifying accomplishments . . .  
The history of the disease in Western Australia is a fairly 
accurate reflection of its epidemiology elsewhere, but its 
eradication in this part of the world presented special 
problems.39 
He does not make personal references in his account of the 
epidemic and records the conquest of polio as a triumph. With the 
words "in due course the vaccine was pronounced extremely 
effective in preventing polio,"40 Snow passes over any reference to 
38 Daily News, 11 February 1956, p.6. Militaristic language may have arisen in 
connection with polio because the period in which the virus was most active in 
its epidemic form included World Wars I and II. 
3 9 Snow, D.J .R. ( 198 1 ). The Progress of Publtc Health in We stem Australia 1829-
1 977, p.66. 
40 Snow, D.J.R. (198 1). Progress, p.68. 
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the difficult history that preceded that point, especially in 
connection with the search for a vaccine. While avoiding the 
medical difficulties Snow does not hesitate to point out the 
logistical problems that had to be overcome in Western Australia 
where the programme "had all the components of a military 
campaign - an objective, a plan, logistics and reconnaissance, and 
even propaganda" . 4 1 An easy frame of reference for a former Major, 
but one that completely neglected the personal, human element of 
the story. 
Snow's efficiency resulted in the Public Health Department 
conquering not just the virus, but fears about the safety of the 
vaccine. Throughout Australia Salk vaccine was provided to all 
members of the public who volunteered to receive it. In Western 
Australia an immunisation acceptance rate of 97% was recorded 
and in the decade 1956-66 over two million doses of Salk were 
administered throughout the state. The triumph, which is deeply 
interconnected with his own, 42 is trumpeted by Snow -
No other vaccination programme has ever been attended by 
such remarkable results. No other public health measure in 
the history of Western Australian public health could have 
been more successful. 43 
Although the introduction of Sabin oral vaccine, in 1966, made 
the task of supplying vast areas much easier, Snow, whose own 
4 1 Snow, D.J.R. ( 1981). Progress, p. 70. 
42 Snow was promoted to the position of Director of Epidemiology in the Public 
Health Department. Informally some referred to him as "Mr Polio", conversation, 
Dr Richard Lugg, October 1994. 
43 Snow, D.J.R. (1981). Progress, p.76. 
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contribution to the campaign against polio was significant, 
modestly asserts that to "Salk vaccine alone must go the credit for 
the conquest of poliomyelitis in this state". 
In this thesis I place the voice of official histocy, as represented by 
the Annual Reports of the Public Health Department, and Snow's 
The Progress of Public Health in Western Australia 1829-1977, in a 
broader perspective gained through access to the additional 
sources outlined above, including the memories of polio survivors. 
I aim to link an aspect of the histocy of disease with social histocy 
and place the fruits of Dudley Snow's excellent epidemiology in a 
broader social and personal context made possible through this 
research. At the same time I have placed the West Australian 
experience of polio in a national and international perspective. 
This thesis is a narrative social histocy that began with the whole 
of Australia in view. The abundance of material available led me 
to narrow the main focus to Western Australia. The title, Fear, 
Frustration and The Will to Overcome , emerged from the research. 
Over several decades, polio was described as a disease that was 
universally feared. Lack of information about the disease, and 
misunderstandings over its means of transmission fed this fear. 
The implementation of protection policies that emerged from this 
lack of understanding were as frustrating to those subjected to 
them as to they were to those who had to administer them. The 
will to overcome the ravages of epidemic polio is as noticeable 
amongst medical and health experts, as the remarkable 
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determination to overcome their disabilities is amongst polio 
survivors. The implementation of the immunisation campaign, 
and the high level of public response to it, is another indication 
that the defeat of polio was something all members of the 
community were fiercely resolved to accomplish. 
Explanation of the chapters of the thesis 
Chapter one of introduces the thesis of history memory and polio 
and discusses memory and history. Chapter two details the virus 
at the heart of the story and provides an overview of the social 
meanings attached to polio in history. Chapter three provides an 
international context for the polio story in Australia through a 
review of literature associated with the history of polio in the 
United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and Britain. 
Chapter four discusses the early history of polio in Australia and 
Western Australia, examines the outbreak which occurred in 
Western Australia in 1938 and provides a context for the three 
major epidemics, 1948, 1954 and 1956. Chapter five discusses the 
first polio epidemic which occurred in Western Australia in 1948 
and which sorely tested the resources of the Public Health 
Department. Chapter six discusses the second West Australian 
polio epidemic which reached a peak of hysteria on the eve of the 
1954 royal visit to the state. Chapter seven discusses the last, and 
in some ways the most severe of the Western Australian polio 
epidemics, which occurred while preparations were being made for 
the mass immunisation programme that commenced in mid 1956. 
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Chapter eight discusses the immunisation programme. Chapter 
nine discusses the experiences of polio survivors and their families, 
and the impact of PPS. Chapter ten draws together the argument, 
discusses the understanding of the relationship between polio and 
society that emerged from this research, makes some observations 
concerning memory and history, indicates where further research 
could be undertaken, and concludes the thesis. 
*** 
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Few diseases are capable of evoking as much human emotion as polio. 
Dudley Snow, Government Epidemiologist, Public Health Department, Perth. I 
The virus at the heart of the story 
Poliomyelitis, the name that was eventually given to the virus at 
the heart of this investigation, was created from a combination of 
Greek and Latin words (n:011.wo = grey, µeu11.oo = marrow, itis = 
Latin for inflammation) that reflected its behaviour in attacking 
the grey matter of the spinal cord.2 Poliomyelitis was originally 
regarded as exclusively a children's disease, was not considered 
infectious, and did not come to prominence in its paralytic form 
until the middle of the nineteenth century. The Englishman 
Michael Underwood first coined the name Debility of the Lower 
Extremities in 1789. From the middle of the nineteenth century 
until about 1930 polio was most commonly referred to either as 
Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis or Ir!fantile Paralysis .3  Until the first 
decade of the twentieth century medical practitioners and 
scientists in Australia, and throughout the world, observed that 
children were sometimes paralysed but did not know a virus was 
the cause. 
I Snow, D.R.J. (1981 ). Progress, p.66. 
2 More detail is available in Paul, J. R. ( 1971). The History of Poliomyelitis, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, and Wyatt, H.V. ( 1993). in Kiple, K. F. 
(ed.), Cambri.dge World History of Human Disease, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.942-950. 
3 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.5; Wyatt, H.V. (1 993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed. ), 
Cambridge, p.942. 
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The first recorded epidemic of polio, which occurred in Sweden in 
1881,4 signified a change both in the behaviour and perception of 
polio. From early this century it came to be regarded as dangerous 
and contagious and, as epidemics of paralytic polio began to occur 
more frequently, was made a notifiable disease. Particularly during 
the 1920s and 1 930s, the virus was observed to affect people of all 
ages, not just children. Worse still the most severe paralysis was 
evident amongst those in their early twenties. Partly because of 
this, and partly for convenience, from the late 1 930s the term 
Infantile Paralysis was superseded by Poliomyelitis, or Polio. 
A standard definition for polio used by medical professionals and 
clinicians during the 1 940s and 50s, was: 
Poliomyelitis is a common, acute viral disease characterised 
clinically by a brief febrile (fever) illness with sore throat, 
headache, vomiting, and often with stiffness of the neck and 
back. In many cases lower neuron paralysis develops in the 
early days of illness.5 
Anyone with first-hand experience of polio would agree with John 
Paul that this clinical description "falls far short of the usual 
picture which this disease conjures up in the minds of most 
people" .6 
The base for the activity of the polio virus in human beings is the 
4 Paul, ( 1971). History, p.72; Burnet, Sir M. and White, D.O. ( 1940 and 1972). 
Natuml History of Infectious Disease, Cambridge University Press, p.91. Burnet 
and White nominate 1887, and although the year is subject of discussion in 
Scandinavia, the first epidemics occurred in the 1880s. 
5 Paul, ( 1971 ). History, p. 1. 
6 Paul, ( 1971). History, p. l .  
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intestine and once lodged there it behaves in the following manner. 
An incubation period of two to five days, during which the virus 
multiplies, is followed by an attempt to breach the body's defences. 
If the immune response succeeds in repelling the virus it departs 
after a few weeks leaving its host with a level of immunity, having 
experienced a brief febrile illness, or perhaps having manifested no 
symptoms at all. The Swedish epidemiologist Wickman named this 
su bclinical form the mino r illness, or abortive po lio myelitis , 7 and 
prior to the 1880s most children in western societies would have 
been affected by it. The majo r illness, or " true polio" , B is caused if 
the virus is able to breach the immune system, and travel via the 
blood stream to the central nervous system where it may attack 
the grey matter of the spinal cord, the motor neurons, or the brain 
stem.9 The resulting inflammation may damage or totally destroy 
motor cells which, unlike cells in to other parts of the body, 
cannot regenerate. The result is permanent paralysis, or possibly 
death. 
There are three ways in which a person may be affected by 'true 
polio' depending upon what part of the central nervous system the 
virus has attacked, and the severity of the damage it has caused. I o 
It is also possible for a person to be affected by a combination of 
these forms. In the first case a person may suffer only damage to 
7 Paul, ( 1971). History, pp.2-3. 
8 Paul, ( 1971). History, p.3. 
9 Wyatt, H.V. 1993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed.), Cambridge, p.942. 
1 O Killalea, A. ( 1995 ). The Great Scourge: the Tasmanian Infantile Paralysis 
Epidemic 1937-1938, Tasmanian Historical Research Association, pp. 4-5, 
provides a helpful summary as does Lebouf, C. ( 1991 ). The Late Effects of Polio: 
tnformation for health providers, Commonwealth Department of Community 
Services and Health, pp. 12- 15. 
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some motor cells, the result of which is a temporary paralysis and 
loss of strength. Damaged cells may recover their function or be 
compensated for by adjacent healthy cells. In this case a person, 
who may at first experience quite debilitating paralysis, may 
recover the use of affected muscles after some months of therapy. 
In the secondly scenario, where the motor cells are completely 
destroyed, severe paralysis follows with permanent crippling, or 
possibly even death. The third, and worst form of paralytic polio 
infection, known as "bulbar", affects the brain stem and may cause 
paralysis in the soft palate and the pharynx. A large proportion of 
bulbar patients do not survive principally because of difficulty in 
clearing the throat secretions. Where the respiratory system is 
also affected, death is virtually inevitable. Paralysis of the 
respiratory muscles is a separate factor, not necessarily connected 
to bulbar cases. All three forms may include respiratory paralysis 
and survival depends on the degree of damage caused. Severe 
respiratory paralysis requires the patient be placed in a tank 
respirator or "iron lung" as it was commonly known. While a 
proportion of respiratory patients were too severely paralysed to 
survive, and others required permanent support and had to live in 
the iron lung for at least part of the day, most were able to regain 
respiratory independence and resume normal life. 
Polio in history 
Poliomyelitis is thought to have existed widely in the ancient 
world, primarily in its endemic form, 1 1  as it still does in numerous 
1 1  Paul, { 1971). History, pp. 10-16. 
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countries in the world today. 12 In ancient, crowded communities 
most children would have suffered a silent infection of the polio 
virus by the time they were three or perhaps five years old 1 3 and, if 
their body resisted the paralytic effect, would have been rendered at 
least partially immune. On this basis a minority of children are 
thought to have contracted paralytic polio, which was known in 
ancient times. Biblical and Homeric literature refers to lameness 
and withered limbs in children, leaving open the the possibility 
that the cause was polio. 1 4 An Egyptian stele, dating from the 
eighteenth dynasty ( 1 580- 1 350 BCE) and now in the Carlsberg 
Glyptothek, Copenhagen, 1 5  portrays a carved figure of a priest with 
a deformed leg which is "so characteristic of the after-effects of 
poliomyelitis that the diagnosis is practically assured" . 1 6 
While the clinical recognition of polio took place during the 
nineteenth century, at that time it was not known what sort of 
microbial agent was responsible for it , or if it was contagious. The 
clarity of the 1 950s definition was made possible by fifty years of 
painstaking research commenced by Ivar Wickman and continued 
by others following the first epidemics. Karl Landsteiner of Vienna 
and his assistant Erwin Popperl 7 changed the direction of polio 
research with their announcement of the discovery of the virus in 
1908. So well did Landsteiner and Popper prove their case that by 
1912  their viral concept of polio was readily accepted and research 
12 See [Figure l ]. 
13 Burnet and White, (1972). Natural History, p.95. 
14  Paul, (1971). History, p.10. 
15 Wyatt, H.V. 1993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed.), Cambridge, p.947. 
16  Paul, (1971). History, p.12. A photo of the Egyptian stele appears on p.13. 
1 7 Paul, (1971). History, pp.98-100. 
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had begun to build on the understanding of an organism that was 
contagious and infectious, with the potential to cause epidemics. 
In 1931 the Australians Burnet and Macnamara, who both earned 
substantial reputations in the field, positively established that the 
virus had more than one strain. I s  Eventually three strains were 
proven and named, Type I, Brunhilde, after a chimpanzee, Type II, 
Leon, after a person and Type III, Lansing, after a town in the state 
of Michigan in the United States of America. 1 9 
The ironic feature of polio is that the rise of its new and more 
dangerous form of epidemic activity took place in countries that 
simultaneously enjoyed some advancement in their standard of 
health and welfare. At the same time there was a parallel decline 
in the infection and the mortality rates associated with a variety of 
other diseases such as whooping cough and diphtheria. 
The change in the behaviour of polio has been explained in the 
following way.20 While the virus was endemic in society most 
children experienced it in the subclinical fo rm and became 
immune, much as they would if they had suffered from mumps or 
measles. As some societies improved their standards of community 
health and hygiene and infant mortality declined, a greater number 
of children lived beyond the age of five years without achieving the 
18  Fenner, F. (ed.), (1990). History of Microbiology ln Australta, Curtin: Brolga 
Press, p.378, and Paul, ( 1971 ). History, p. l .  Burnett was the only medical 
virologist working in Australia at that time . 
1 9 Parry, W. ( 1969). Communicable Diseases, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 
p. 135, Wyatt, H.V. 1993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed.), Cambridge, p.942. 
2 0  Burnet and White, (1972). Natuml History, pp.90-95. 
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immunity from the silent infection of polio. As this cohort of 
children aged a greater proportion of older children existed who 
were vulnerable to the virus. As young adults this group were 
found to be particularly susceptible to paralysis. 
For a generation after the first polio epidemic other outbreaks, 
which notably affected young children, were recorded at intervals 
in countries such as Scandinavia, Canada, the United States of 
America, Australia and New Zealand.2 1 The first epidemics were 
reported in the United States in 1893 and 1894, Canada in 1910, 
New Zealand in 1914 and 1916, Britain in 1911, and Australia in 
1897.22 All the above countries recorded an escalation of the 
intensity and severity of epidemic activity from the 1920s until 
incidence decreased dramatically following the introduction of 
immunisation with Salk vaccine in 1956. 
Polio in Australia 
The first outbreak of polio in Australia large enough to arouse the 
interest of public authorities occurred at Port Lincoln, South 
Australia in 1897, when fourteen cases were reported out of a 
2 1 Burnet and White, (1972). Natural Htstnry, p.92. 
22 Paul, (1971). History, pp.79-80. Vermont in 1894 had 132 cases and was a 
substantial epidemic; Rutty, (1995). Poliomyelitis in Canada, p.44; Ross. J. C .. 
( 1993 ). New Zealand, pp.15-16; Gould, T. ( 1995 ), A Summer Plague: polio and its 
surotvors, Yale University Press:New Haven and London, p. 1 6; Fisher. P.J. ( 1967). 
The Polio Story, Heinemann, London, p.112; Buxton, A.J.G. ( 1977). Poliomyelitis 
ln South Australia 1937-1956, Honours Dissertation, University of Adelaide, p.8 . 
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population of 1 500.2 3  During the next decade several larger 
outbreaks were recorded. In 1905 twenty five cases were reported 
in Sydney, thirty-four at Stanmore, NSW, and one hundred and 
eight in Brisbane.24 In 1 908 there were one hundred and fifty-five 
cases in Victorta.25 
Polio was made a "notifiable disease" in Tasmania in 1 9 1 1 ,  
Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia in 1912,26 
Victoria in 1916, and South Australia in 1922.2 7 While the 
number of polio notifications in each state has been recorded in 
the Commonwealth Year Book from 1929, the actual number of 
cases that occurred remains beyond reach, because many 
23 Buxton, ( 1977). Poliomyelitis in South. Australia, p. 8. The date, derived here 
from the Parliamentary Papers of South Australia, is often given as 1895 in other 
sources, who probably base their dates on C umpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J.). 
( 1989). Health and Disease inAustm.lia: a history, Commonwealth Government 
Printer: Canberra, p.326. The confusion may be with the first recorded death 
from Poliomyelitis which occurred in South Australia in 1895. 
24 Gilbert, A and Inglis, K. (eds.). ( 1987). Austm.lians: a historical atlas, Broadway, 
Fairfax Syme and Weldon Associates, pp. 1 72-3, Article on Polio. The date for 
these outbreaks is given as 1904. 
2 5 Public Health 1948, ( 1949). Appendix XV, page 58, BL, 614.09 WES; Stephens, 
H. D. ( 1908 ). Summary of an Epidemic of 135 Cases of Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis 
Occurring in Victoria in 1908, Melbourne, Stillwell and Co; McKenzie, W. ( 19 10). 
The Treatment of Infantile Paralysis: a study of muscular action and muscle 
regeneration, Melbourne: Stillwell and Co. Cumpston, J .H.L. ( ed. Lewis, M.J. ). 
( 1989). Health and Disease in Australia, p.326, gives different dates for these 
figures. 
26 Order in Council, 28 May 1912,  BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 595 / 45, p.2 1 ;  Letter 
CPH to Local Health Authorities, 25 November 1916, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/4,626/ 1925, p. l .  
2 7 Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed . Lewis, M.J. ). ( 1989). Health and Disease lnAustralia, 
p.326. 
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subclinical infections will have escaped notice. 28 
38 
The official 
record reveals [Figures 2 and 3) that in the period 1929-1966 there 
were 27,986 notifications of polio nationwide.29 The worst periods 
of infection were 1937-38 (4,555), 30 1945-46 (2 ,449), and 1949-56 
(15,965) . In contrast the virus appears to have been almost 
entirely dormant between 1939 and 1944 when only 384 
notifications were received, although it is possible that figures were 
not accurately recorded due to the stringencies of the war effort. 
During the worst single year, 1951, 4, 735 notifications were 
received, mostly from New South Wales (1,526), South Australia 
(1,456), and Queensland (1,030).3 1 After an initial flurry in 1938 
epidemics of polio occurred in Western Australia in 1948 (311), 
1954 (434), and 1956 (401), full discussion of which appears below 
in Chapters 4-9. 
All Australian states recorded a dramatic decline in the incidence 
of polio following the introduction of mass immunisation with 
28 Buxton. ( 1977). Poliomyelitis, p. 84. Buxton's figures are drawn from the 
Commonwealth Year Book, but do not tally exactly. The figure of 70,000 cases, 
said to have occurred between 1936 and 196 1. in Jones. R.F. ( 1 99 1) Post Polio 
syndrome: what can we do? MJA Vol. 155, Sep. 16, is based on an "estimate" that 
relies on work by Charlotte Leboeuf, ( 1990). The late effects of Polio:informatton for 
health care p roviders, Commonwealth Department of Communi1y Services and 
Health, Canberra, p. 14. Leboeuf appears to ignore the reported figures and 
calculates on the basis of the number of deaths multiplied by five or ten, a basis 
that I believe does not allow for variations in the mortali1y rates that occurred 
during epidemics. Wyatt, H.V. 1993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed.), Cambridge, p.942 states 
"In the past, cases of abortive polio and those with paralysis who later recovered 
were often included in statistics as polio cases. Today, only case with paralysis 
or paresis after 3 months are recorded as paralytic polio". 
2 9 Australian Health Information Service, ( 1965). Health in Australia: the polio 
story, p. 10,  [Figure 21 Commonwealth Year book, 1929- 1966, [Figure 3]. 
3 O Buxton, ( 1977). Poliomyelitis, p. 63, notes that after 1937 the incidence in 
polio in Australia made it a national problem. 
3 1 Buxton, ( 1977). Poliomyelitis, p. 62. A high rate of polio incidence in South 
Australia 1949-56 resulted in 4589 cases. 28% of the national total. In the 
period 1948- 1956 Western Australia recorded 14 75 cases. 
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Salk vaccine in 1956 [Figures 2 and 3], but in 1961-62 an alarming 
upsurge occurred in several states. A similar pattern was noticed 
in New Zealand and America at this time. The states worst 
affected, (NSW, 378 cases, and Queensland, 179 cases) were 
studied in detail.32 It was concluded that three doses of Salk 
vaccine protected between 77% and 87% of the population, but 
some were still at risk. It was recommended that four, or even five 
doses of Salk be given to ensure adequate protection, and the use 
of Sabin "live" or attenuated vaccine began to be considered. 
Sabin, unlike Salk which was a "killed" vaccine, had the potential 
for helping to protect people against an epidemic that had already 
commenced. 
Disease and society 
32 Boughton, C.R. , Fine, R.D. and Burgess, P. ( 1963). "Poliomyelitis Epidemic in 
NSW. 1961 -62: clinical experiences in the management of 196 patients", MJA. 
2,20, 16 November, pp. 820-833. and Patrick, P.R. ( 1963). "Poliomyelitis in a 
Vaccinated Community: the 1961 -2 Queensland epidemic", MJA. 2,20, 16 
November, pp. 838-84 1 .  Type 1 polio virus was largely responsible for 196 cases 
studied in NSW. Twenty six had received one or more injections of Salk vaccine, 
and sixteen, one of whom died, had had three injections. There were 20 deaths, 
of which 17  had not been immunised. Ten pregnant women were all severely 
paralysed, and one of them died. Those aged 10-20 were relatively immune to 
polio, while majority of cases (52%) occurred in the 0- 10 age range. The was a 
high incidence in the 20-35 year age group, in which men outnumbered women 
three to one. There was a high proportion of severe paralysis and respiratory 
paralysis. The results for Queensland were similar in many respects. There was 
low incidence in the 10- 19 age group, the majority of cases (62%) were aged 0-9. 
and there was a high incidence in the 20-34 age bracket. Forty six cases of polio 
occurred in vaccinated people, seven of whom became severely paralysed. Twenty 
two of the vaccinated cases were identified as Type III virus. There were seven 
deaths, all in subjects who had not been immunised. 
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The concepts of disease and health have a long history with many 
nuances.3 3  The relationship between disease and society is 
expressed through theories of public health, and the policies and 
practices that emanate from them. Sylvia Tesh suggests that four 
different theories, each connected with a different socio-political 
view of society, were used to explain disease during the nineteenth 
century; supernatural causation, miasma, contagion and personal 
behaviour.34 Three of these have found a place in the twentieth 
century in the form of environmental health (miasma), germ theory 
(contagion), lifestyle (personal behaviour). 35 Supernatural theory, 
which offers religious rationale for the cause of disease, no longer 
has currency in the field of medical science, although it was 
popular prior to the Enlightenment.36 Despite this it still forms a 
point of reference for many outside the medical profession who, for 
example, evoke sin in relation to the AIDS epidemic. And the 
religious impulse appears to be alive in the growing number of 
people who seek relief or a cure for their condition through the 
many forms of alternative "New Age" spiritual or holistic therapies 
available. Many polio survivors record religious thoughts and 
feelings in relation to their infection and its after effects, and use 
religious paradigms to make sense of their life.3 7 
3 3  Wiener, P. (ed.), ( 1973). Dictionary oJThe History of Ideas: studies of selected 
pivotal ldeas, New York: Scribners Sons. Volume 2. pp.395-407, " Health and 
Disease". 
34 Tesh, S.N. ( 1988). Hidden Arguments: political ideology and disease prevention 
policy, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p.9. 
35 Tesh, ( 1988). Hidden Arguments, pp.33-57. 
36 Tesh, (1988). Hldden Arguments, p.17. 
3 7 Woods Smith, D. ( 1994). Power and Spirituality in Polio survivors: a study 
based on Rogers' science.Nursing &lence Quarterly. 8:3, pp.133-139. 
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Epidemic polio arose in a period when major changes were taking 
place in the understanding of disease and public health. The 
dominance of miasma based sanitation and quarantine policies 
was being challenged by new understandings of contagion based on 
discoveries made by microbiologists such as Joseph Lister, Robert 
Koch, and Louis Pasteur.38 Public health practices began to swing 
toward new methods of diagnosis, prevention and cure. But in 
relation to polio continuing uncertainties concerning the cause 
and transmission of the virus led health authorities to implement 
methods of control, based on both miasma and germ theories, 
without being certain of their efficacy. Public health in nineteenth 
centu:ry Western Australia reflects the transition outlined above.39 
The basis of miasma was the ancient Greek notion of a link 
between climate, the corruption of air, and disease. Epidemics 
were thought to have been C?Lused by miasmata or pollution.40 
From the time of Hippocrates "corrupted air" was "fumigated" by 
means of bonfires in the streets and, later, through firing cannons 
and the personal use of sweet or strongly smelling applications. 
38 Duffy, J. ( 1993). in Kiple, K.F. (ed.), Cambridge World Htstory of Human 
Disease, Cambridge University Press. p.204. 
39 Snow, D.J.R. ( 198 1). Progress, pp.3 1 -32. In 1842, thirteen years after the 
foundation of the colony, an Act provided for the establishment of public 
slaughter-houses and prohibited unlicensed slaughtering of animals within 
town boundaries. In 1876 the 187 1 Municipal Act was repealed and replaced 
with another which extended the powers of local authorities over matters 
affecting the environment, sanitation and housing. The Vaccination Act 
followed in 1878 and in 1886 the first Health Act was proclaimed which 
legislated for the control of infectious diseases, sanitation and other matters. 
These powers were extended in 1898 and in 191 1  when a new Act came into 
being which forms the basis for current practice. 
40 Wiener, P. (ed.) ,  ( 1973). Dictionary, Vol 2, p.397. 
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Although miasmatic theory is now regarded as invalid the 
sanitation movement that sprang from it produced significant 
gains in nineteenth century public health. 41 Greater efforts were 
made to clean streets, dig deeper graves for the dead, ventilate 
rooms, and control the odours from cesspools, sewers and 
privies. 42 One application of miasma theory can be seen in the 
approach taken to the polio in New York in 1916 .  Naomi Rogers 
has described this as a "dirt and disease" approach in which flies, 
and those parts of town inhabited by the less affluent, often 
migrant and black communities, were demonised. 43 
As the bacteriological revolution advanced, health officials became 
preoccupied with new insights concerning contagion and the 
control of disease. 44 While the practice of developing good 
drainage and sanitation continued into the twentieth century, 
interest extended to the bacterial contamination of food and 
water.45 Germ theory steadily shifted the emphasis towards the 
use of diagnostic techniques, vaccines and antitoxins. The new 
science seemed capable of providing the "real" explanation of all 
disease. 46 Tesh wrote -
The germ theory is virtually synonymous with science. It 
41 Duffy, J. ( 1993). in Kiple, K.F. (ed.}, Cambridge, p.204. 
42 Tesh, ( 1988). HiddenArguments, p.27. 
43 Rogers, N. ( 1992). DirtAnd Dt.sease, p. l .  During the same period the WA Public 
Health Department was concerned about the threat flies posed, see McCormick, 
H. ( 1 9 1 7). The Fly and The Baby, Papers Read at Meetings of the Certified Health 
Inspectors' Association ofWestemAustm.Ua, Perth, pp.64-69. 
44 Duffy, J. ( 1993). in Kiple, K.F. (ed.}, Cambridge, p.204. 
45 Graham Taylor, S. ( 1996). Public Health in WA in the Post War Years: Drqft 
Report, Unpublished Manuscript, Perth, pp.2-.3. 
46 Rogers, ( 1992). DirtAnd Dt.sease, p.3; and Graham Taylor, S. ( 1996). Public 
Health in WA, p.3. 
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evokes images of white coats, sophisticated laboratories, 
dedicated researchers, and the relentless search for truth. 
Our society awards considerable prestige to people who 
investigate disease causality from the perspective of germ 
theory. Because their attention is fixed on empirical 
phenomena, they are "real scientists". 4 7 
Germ theory spawned the potent symbol of the scientific 
laboratory, and the elitism that grew from the belief that disease 
was a technical phenomenon that could only be properly 
understood by scientific experts. 
During the polio era a variety of control methods were 
implemented: articles of clothing were removed from their infected 
owners to be fumigated, washed and sometimes burned. 48 
Survivors record having clothes and personal effects confiscated 
because they were regarded as having "wogs" on them. 49 At the 
same time practices such as handshaking or kissing were 
discouraged,50 and pamphlets were issued providing information 
regarding the scalding of milk, the preparation of fruit and 
vegetables, and the consumption ice-cream prepared outside the 
home.5I 
Quarantine restrictions in connection with polio were first 
introduced in Western Australia in 1937, on the recommendation 
of the consultative committee of doctors, specifically established by 
the Public Health Department to advise on matters related to the 
4 7 Tesh, ( 1988). Hidden Arguments, p.38. 
48 Tesh, (1988). Hidden Arguments, pp. 1 1- 12. 
49 Interview I, p.39. 
50 Wagin Argus, 21 March, 1932. p.2. and Western Mail, 12 August, 1937 p.25. 
51 Pamphlet, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944 / 1948, p. 12. 
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dtsease.52 The conditions required visitors who arrived from 
nominated points of departure to be quarantined for twenty one 
days, or face penalties of up to £50. Quarantine restrictions were 
a manifestation of an increased awareness of the dangers of polio 
which, in 1937, resulted in its status being upgraded from that of 
"notifiable" to that of "dangerous infectious disease", following the 
outbreak of large epidemics of polio in Victoria and Tasmania.53 
The change gave the CPH temporary access to the special powers of 
the Health Act.54 
Quarantine restrictions were again imposed in Western Australia 
at the end of 1947 when South Australia and New Zealand were 
affected by polio epidemics.55 All travellers from those ports, 
including those who had only passed through South Australia, had 
to be isolated. Any sickness that subsequently occurred in the 
host house had to be reported to the Public Health Department. 
Vigorous public debate was provoked when a group of 250 boys, 
who had passed through Adelaide on a tour the eastern states with 
the Young Australia League, (YAL) were quarantined on their 
return to Perth.56 
The application of quarantine restrictions to all members of a 
community proved economically and administratively impossible. 
52 Letter, 18 November 1937, and reply, 16 December 1937 BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/4, 626/ 1925, pp.188, 189, 196 and 200. 
53 Minute paper, Executive Council, 9 September 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
626/ 1925, p.35. 
54 Health Act 191 1, Part ix - Infectious diseases, By-law 249,6, p.189. 
55 WA, 1 January 1948, p 5. 
56 WA, 1 January 1948, p. 5; 22 January 1948, p. 9. 
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The restriction of the movements of children who had had polio 
contacts, but not adults, resulted in the Public Health Department 
being criticised for its perceived lack of capacity to understand the 
disease and respond with effective control measures. For many 
years the behaviour of the virus was so little understood that, for 
the sake of being seen to respond to the crisis, health officials had 
to draw on every preventative measure they knew, despite being 
unsure of its efficacy. 
Understanding the means of transmission 
Although polio was identified as a virus in 1908, and germ theory 
had returned to popularity during the era of the epidemics, 
understanding the means of transmission of polio was a slow 
process that relied on ongoing research in many parts of the world. 
As early as 1912 Swedish experiments identified the polio virus in 
intestinal excreta57 but the weight of opinion, as expressed by 
American leaders in the field such as Simon Flexner of the 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, fell on entry through 
the exposed nerves of the nasal tracts as a result of the 
transference of oral/ nasal droplets. This view dominated research 
until the 1950s58 and in the late 1930s resulted in the 
development of dangerous prophylactic nasal sprays,59 the use of 
5 7 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p. 130. Discovered by C. Kling following an epidemic 
in Stockholm in 1911. 
58 Smith, F.B. (1990). The Victorian Poliomyelitis epidemic 1937-1938, in 
Caldwell, J. (ed. ), (Vol. II, Ch. 53). What we Know about Health Transition: the 
cultural, social and behavioural determinates qf"health, The Proceedings of an 
International Workshop, May 1989, Canberra,p.873. 
59 Gould, T. (1995), A Summer Plague, p.69; Wilson, J.R. (1963). Margin of Safety: 
the story of poliomyelitis vaccine, Collins: London, p.49. 
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masks, and even a nasal clip, to prevent the entry of the virus. 60 
Other agents, such as milk, were long suspected of being 
instrumental in the spread of disease.6 1 This fear was revived in 
regard to polio, much to the sorrow of dairymen and the 
manufacturers of ice cream. 62 
Between 1 938 and 1 940 the Australian, Macfarlane Burnet 
obtained results which suggested that infection by polio occurred 
via the pharynx and the intestine, and that "polio virus would 
multiply in human foetal intestinal and buccal tissue" .63 
Difficulties in obtaining sufficient tissue, and lack of confidence in 
his techniques, caused Burnet to stop short of the discovery, made 
a decade later by the American Enders, which enabled Salk to 
create a polio vaccine.64 
There is evidence that some researchers were reluctant to draw 
conclusions regarding the transmission of polio from the 
knowledge that the virus was present in the intestine and the 
faeces. During a polio epidemic in Victoria in 1 946 a meeting of 
the Melbourne Paediatric Society discussed the pathology and 
60 Smith, F.B. ( 1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed. ), (Vol. II. Ch. 53), p.868 
6 1 Higgs, F. ( 19 17). The Importance of a Pure Milk Supply, Papers Read at 
Meetings of the Certifled Health Inspector's Association of We stem Australia, Perth: 
Health Department. 
62 Paul, ( 1971). History, pp. 178- 18 1. In Australia, Dame Jean Macnamara, 
amongst others, helped keep this suspicion alive. See below, Chapters 4 and 5. 
6 3 Fenner, F. (ed.), ( 1990). History of Microbiology in Australia, Brolga Press, 
Curtin, pp.378-9. This discovery came about because a closed season on rhesus 
monkeys led to the use of cynomolgus monkeys from Singapore, which were 
susceptible to a new procedure. 
64 Fenner. (ed. ), ( 1990). Microbiology, p.379. One result of the personal and 
political struggles that accompanied the history of polio is that Enders, Weller 
and Robbins, not Jonas Salk, received the Nobel Prize in 1954. 
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pathogenesis of poliomyelitis. Dr Reginald Webster observed that -
. . .  the epidemiological significance of the facts established 
with regard to the constant presence of the virus in the 
faeces of subjects of poliomyelitis and many of their contacts 
was far reaching and profound. . .  Faeces, sewage and flies 
seemed strong links in a chain of infection. . .  This 
. . .  suggested strongly that poliomyelitis should be regarded at 
least provisionally as one of the excremental infective 
diseases, even as dysentery and typhoid fever.65 
Some of those present opposed Webster's views and the meeting 
did not discuss the means by which infected faecal particles could 
be transmitted. The links in Webster's "chain of infection" 
remained obscure, even at this late stage. 
Although preference for the view that transmission occurred 
through the olfactory system was waning, interest continued to 
circle around the droplet theory, the importance of flies, and 
questions of the cleanliness of milk and water. At this stage no 
instructions were issued recommending intensive hand hygiene as 
a method of controlling the spread of polio, and although both the 
1 937 and 1 946 Victorian epidemics had begun in winter, when 
there were fewer flies to effect the spread of the disease, 66 the 
meaning of this clue seems to have gone unnoticed. 
Hesitance over the faecal contamination theory is evident in more 
modern writing. John Paul, who recognises that the "commonest 
mode of spread is by contact with an already infected person" stops 
65 Melbourne Paediatric Society, Poliomyelitis, Pathology and Pathogenesis, 
( 1946). Medical Journal of Australia, Vol. 1 ,  No 18, p.638 . 
66 Melbourne Paediatric Society,MJA, ( 1946). Vol. 1, No 18, p.638. 
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short of naming faecal contamination as a key component, even 
though doubt is no longer necessary.67 Jane Smith remains coy 
with her statement -
. . . nobody has ever completely settled the question of how 
polio is spread, though the best evidence suggests that the 
virus is excreted in the stool and passed through hand-to­
hand or hand-to-mouth contact.68 
An even stronger sense of uncertainty can be found in the recent 
work by Sass who writes "the means by which the polio virus 
reaches the central neivous system ls not definitely known" .69 
Health Professionals working in Western Australian hospitals and 
the Public Health Department during the 1950s were not so 
reluctant to consider the faecal contamination theory, or express 
its implications in new methods of polio control. At the point 
where the long awaited 1954 royal tour of Western Australia was in 
doubt because the state was in the grip of a polio epidemic the 
Public Health Department highlighted the faecal contamination 
theory, explained it to the public, and indicated what measures 
where necessary to circumvent transmission of the disease. 70 All 
children, in particular, were now expected to avoid sharing cups 
and towels, and to wash their hands before eating food, and after 
using the toilet. 
67  Paul, (1971). History, p.2. 
68 Smith, J.S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, p.36. 
69 Sass, E.J. ( 1996). Polio 's Legacy, p.2. Sass has consulted Taber, C.L. ( 1970). 
Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, Philadelphia: Davis Company. 
70 DN, 2 March 1954, p.2. 
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The circumstances of having to endure a severe epidemic at a time 
when large crowds would gather for the royal tour gave Western 
Australia a unique opportunity to test this theory. On the 
assumption that faecal particle transmission was the crucial link 
in the chain leading to polio infection the Public Health 
Department emphasised intensive personal and hand hygiene and 
proposed several measures governing crowd control. The plan was 
successful. During a six day period huge crowds assembled to see 
the royal couple but notifications of polio began to decrease from 
the date the tour commenced and did not rise again after the two 
week incubation period had passed. In 1948 [Figure 7), the 
opposite reaction had been observed after school holidays and the 
holding of People's Day and Children's Day at the Royal Show. 7 1 
Snow hastened to publicise his findings in the Medical Jo urnal qf 
Australia. The fact that the gathering of large crowds over a this 
period was not followed by an increased number of notifications, 
he said 
. . .  suggests that the spread of poliomyelitis is attributable to 
the transference of infected faecal particles rather than to 
the droplet mechanism, and that the control measures 
which were based largely on hand hygiene, were justifl.ed.72 
Snow's boldness in accepting and applying the faecal 
contamination theory contrasts with others, and his views may 
have had influence in Western Australia if not elsewhere. Olga 
Wignall, whose daughter attended Leederville school, not far from 
7 1 Public Health 1948, ( 1949). Appendix .XV, p.63. BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
72 Snow, D.J.R. ( 1955) . Crowds and Poliomyelitis: with special reference to a 
recent epidemic in Western Australia, MJA. Vol. I, No. l .  p.5. Snow, ( 1955). 
Crowds, p.5. 
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Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH), describes the effect of visits 
from the Director who came to lecture the parents and pupils on 
hygiene. 
His frankness on personal matters had some women 
blushing and leaving the venue. When he addressed parents 
on the Three F's: flies, fingers and food, his graphic 
descriptions made a few people flee, never to retum.73 
In view of the protracted nature of the faecal contamination 
debate, and an apparent lack of knowledge or acceptance of Dudley 
Snow's findings, it is difficult to avoid F.B Smith's conclusion that 
the subject was repugnant to the manners and sensibilities of the 
researchers. 7 4 
The quest for a vaccine 
The quest for an effective vaccine commenced in earnest following 
the realisation that polio was caused by a virus. Attempts to 
stimulate immunity were inspired by the use of successful 
prophylactic and convalescent sera already developed for such 
diseases as diphtheria, pneumonia, meningitis and typhoid. 75 
Convalescent serum therapy was first recommend by the French 
scientist Netter. Experiments with serum were conducted in New 
York and Boston during the 1916 epidemic and were continued 
along both convalescent and prophylactic lines.76 Doubts about 
73 Wignall, 0. ( 1993). Heliflre's Homechlld, Leeder, p.66. Faecal contamination 
was popularly known as the 'dirty finger' theory. 
74 Smith, F.B. ( 1 990). in Caldwell, J. (ed.), (Vol. II , Ch. 53), p.875. 
75 Rogers, N. ( 1 992). Dtrt and Disease. p.96. 
76 Paul, ( 1971 ). History, pp. 190-3. 
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the efficacy of serum caused it to be abandoned during the early 
1930s. Paul considers the experiments were based on correct 
principles but the dosage used was too small and there was 
insufficient knowledge of polio available to direct the research. 77 
The subsequent history of the polio vaccine is marked by two 
things. The debate over whether to pursue the use of live or killed 
vaccine, and the risks that were taken in the rush to be the first to 
produce an effective prophylactic. Between 1935 and 1955 three 
ill-fated trials were conducted before Salk vaccine was declared 
safe. The first was conducted by Dr Maurice Brodie, of Montreal, 
and the second by his competitor, Dr John Kolmer of Philadelphia. 
In 1935 Brodie successfully immunised a total of twenty monkeys 
with a form of the virus rendered non-infective using formalin. His 
knowledge that Kolmer was working on a similar project caused 
Brodie to rush into experimentation with humans but, although 
he had come close to the solution, he failed the safety test, was 
severely criticised, and his vaccine was never used again. 78 
A severe polio epidemic in Philadelphia during 1932 provoked 
Kolmer to engage in a search for an effective vaccine. He 
experimented with a live but slightly attenuated virus which was 
tested on forty two monkeys, followed by a number of children and 
adults, including himself. A larger trial resulted in cases of 
vaccine related polio, some of them fatal, which occurred in 
localities where the virus was dormant. Kolmer's results, 
77 Paul, (1971). History, p.199. It is possible the sera, too, were variable. 
78 Paul, (1971). History, pp.254-256. 
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published in 1935, were severely criticised on grounds of safety, 79 
and his vaccine was withdrawn. 
Fear of polio and the horror of paralysis was so strong that 
experimentation with human subjects was discontinued for over a 
decade. After World War II a new form of blood serum was 
developed known as gamma globulin which was created by 
concentrating blood serum that contained polio antibodies.so The 
public was still justifiably nervous about human trials. But in 
addition to this gamma globulin gave only six weeks protection 
and there was difficulty in obtaining sufficient supplies of blood 
that contained polio antibodies.s 1 
Jonas Salk eventually developed his vaccine in the early 1950s, but 
before it could be released to the public, he and his sponsors fell 
victim to the same pressures that had brought down Brodie and 
Kolmer. The infamous "Cutter" incident has become a landmark 
in polio history. 
During an American trial of Salk vaccine held in 1954, live virus 
was found to be present in vaccine manufactured by the Cutter 
Laboratories of Berkeley, California. The vaccine was hurriedly 
withdrawn but the error resulted in the infection of 204 children, 
of whom three quarters became paralysed and eleven died.s2 
79 Paul, (1971). History, pp.256-258. 
80 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dtrtand Disease. p.178. 
8 1  Paul, ( 1971). History, pp.198-9; 384-394. 
82  Paul. (1971). History, p. 437; Gould, (1995). A Summer Plague, pp.153-157. 
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Throughout the world the incident seriously undermined public 
confidence in the use of Salk vaccine. In Australia the Public 
Health Committee of the NH&MRC reversed an earlier decision to 
import American Salk vaccine,83 recommending local production 
according to standards set by the Commonwealth Department of 
Health.84 Safety considerations were supported by the knowledge 
that Canada had used locally manufactured Salk vaccine without 
any sign of a mishap, and a similar story had emerged with respect 
to Denmark and South Africa. From America Sir Macfarlane 
Burnet, Director of Melboume's Walter and Eliza Hall Institute, 
stated that Australian Salk would be manufactured correctly and 
properly tested.85 And in Western Australia the CPH gave the 
assurance that the vaccine would be tested "even more rigidly" 
than in Canada and the USA.86 
Weird and wonderful ideas 
The persistent lack of an effective antidote and reliable knowledge 
83 Minutes, NH& MRC, May 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411/ 55, pp.58-62. 
84 Report, May 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411/55, p.80; Letter, Health 
Department to BMA, 25 October 1955. BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/55. pp.26-
28; 
85 WA, 5 April 1956, p.10. Further detail concerning vaccine manufacture 
appears in Chapter 8 below. 
86 WA. 1 March 1956, p.2. 
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concerning the causes of the disease and its behaviour stimulated 
a wide variety of theories from medical and lay sources alike. A 
similar phenomenon, which seems to have arisen for the same 
reason - lack of accurate knowledge - is evident in Australia during 
the 1919 influenza pandemic.87 Typical of the many offerings made 
during the polio era is this, from a letter written to the 
Commissioner of Public Health (CPH) in 1938. 
I have been reading with great interest the article on 
Infantile Paralysis. Will you allow me to give my humble 
opinion on this matter. When I came to this country twelve 
months ago, I was struck by so many children running the 
streets without any shoes. I am convinced that this is 
mainly the cause of this disease in children, when you think 
of the microbes, which are about in every country, and must 
inevitably get on their feet, many, I should imagine go to bed 
with these microbes still on their feet, with the result that 
they get into their body. I have come from England where 
the children are shod, except in the very, very poor parts of 
London and very few of them without shoes, there are very 
few cases of Infantile paralysis in England.SB 
The CPH appealed to the authority of science in his firm, direct 
reply 
.. .  regarding your theory I must point out to you that 
scientists have been investigating this disease for many 
years, and there is no evidence whatever that the virus of the 
disease occurs on the ground, nor is it likely that infections 
of this kind would do so.89 
87 McQueen, H. The 'Spanish' Influenza Pandemic in Australia, 1912-1919, in 
Roe, J. (ed.), (1976). SocialPolicy lnAustralia: some perspectives 1 901 -1975,  
Cassell, Stanmore, p.139; Taska, L, The Masked disease:Oral History, Memory 
and the Influenza Pandemic 1918-19, in Darian-Smith. K. and Hamilton, P. 
(eds.). (1994), Memory and History, p.83. 
88 Letter AH to CPH, 9 March 1938, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 626 / 1925, pp.287-
89. 
89 Letter CPH to AH, 10 March 1938, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/1925, p.291. 
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Manifestations of a similar interest in popular science and 
medicine are to be found elsewhere. Naomi Rogers reports that 
during the 1916 polio epidemic in New York doctors in the 
American Department of Health received over two hundred letters 
containing suggestions from the public. Simon Flexner, director of 
the Rockefeller Institute laboratories did not reply to them, and 
filed then under "Crank Letters and Fantastic Theories" .90 Medical 
experts were in despair over the suggestions they received. Haven 
Emerson, commissioner of the New York Health Department wrote 
"one hardly knows whether to laugh at the fantasies or weep over 
the ignorance and superstition exhibited" .9 1 An elitist approach 
to scientific and medical knowledge existed and those with a 
professional interest in public health were embarrassed by these 
expressions of interest. But the lay public, which for centuries has 
had opinions about the aetiologies of diseases, was unashamed 
and readily proffered its views. Some suggestions were ridiculous 
but others were surprisingly close to the mark.92 
In Western Australia, between 1938 and 1956, many such letters 
were published in the Press, and received by the Public Health 
Department whose officers carefully wrote replies.93 Officialdom 
was polite, but sometimes irritated and embarrassed by this mail 
and no reference is made to it in the Annual Reports. Though 
neglected by the official record these suggestions are part of the 
90 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease. p. 108. 
9 1 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease. pp. 108-9. 
92 Gould, T. ( 1995). A Summer Plague. pp.20 ff. 
93 The Victorian Epidemic of 1937-38 also witness the public expression of ideas 
concerning the causes and cures for polio. See Smith, F.B. in Caldwell, J. (ed.), 
( 1990). Vol. II, Ch. 53, pp.869-870. 
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social response to the polio epidemics and form a sub text or 
counter narrative to the official histocy. It is obvious that there is 
a link between the medical establishment's outlook on "weird and 
wonderful ideas" and its opposition to the more serious forms of 
quackecy that are evident during these years. 94 There may also be 
a link between this and its fierce resistance to Sister Elizabeth 
Kenny whose alternative methods for the treatment for paralytic 
polio were judged to have little or no basis in scientific or clinical 
fact.95 Kenny, a notable self-publicist who had a film made about 
her work, was unable to achieve recognition for herself within the 
official histocy of polio in Australia. A recent work investigating 
her was inspired partly by the fact that she has shared the same 
silence that has surrounded the disease.96 
Fear, frustration and the will to overcome 
For the first half of the twentieth centucy people in many countries 
of the world, including Australia, are said to have lived in great 
fear of paralytic polio. Far greater numbers suffered and died from 
diseases such as diphtheria, whooping cough, heart disease and 
9 4 Louise, M. ( 1956). Protection From Polio and Animal Research, Adelaide; Gibbs, 
F.J. ( 1952). Poliomyelitis and Kindred Diseases of Chemical Origin, Self Published; 
de Lout, D.W. ( 1956). Jew Mass Poison American Children, Circular, and 
Correspondence, Jewish Board of Deputies to Prime Minister Menzies; C.E.Cook 
to PM, Australian Archives, A 1658 / l ,  259 / 1 / 17, Propaganda Against 
Immunisation. 
9 5 Willis, E. ( 1979). Sister Kenny and the Evolution of the Occupational Division 
of Labour in Health Care, The Austmltan and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 
Vol 15, No 3, pp.30-38, especially pp. 32-34. See also Martyr. P. ( 1994). The 
ProfesstonalDevelopment ofRehabilitatton tnAustmlia, 1870-1981, University of 
Western Australia: PhD Thesis, History, Chapter 5 and Martyr, P. ( 1997). "A 
Small Price to Pay For Peace: the Elizabeth Kenny Controversy Re-examined", 
Austmltan Historlcal Studtes, Volume 28,Number 108, Melbourne, pp.47-65. 
9 6 Wilson, J. R. ( 1995 ). Through Kenny's Eyes: an explomtton of Sister Elizabeth 
Kenny's views about nursing, Townsville, Royal College of Nursing, p.4. 
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cancer, but it is evident that polio evoked fear among medical 
professionals and members of the public alike. 9 7 
The early listing of polio as an infectious disease indicates the 
West Australian Health authorities were alert to the threat it 
posed and it is evident that fear of the virus did not suddenly 
erupt. In 1916, the year in which severe epidemics occurred in New 
York and New Zealand, Everitt Atkinson, the CPH for Western 
Australia, wrote to Local Health Authorities and said -
It is quite possible that within the next year or two the 
infection may make its appearance in the State in epidemic 
form, and in order to guard against this, it will be necessary 
for Local Authorities to carry out the well recognised 
measures of disinfection and isolation in connection with 
every case of Infantile Paralysis that is notified to them.98 
The dramatic, unpredictable and largely inexplicable increase in 
the number and intensity of polio epidemics in Australia produced 
a high level of fear in the community. Paralysis guaranteed a life 
of physical difficulty and, almost inevitably, economic hardship. 
Concern was felt for the limited prospects that awaited a child who 
became paralysed. In 1910 William (Colin) McKenzie, M.D., (later 
Sir), wrote -
Because of its early onset, [ polio] becomes at once a matter 
of great economic importance, since a lame member of the 
community is worth less in the struggle for existence than 
9 7 Greenland, W. ( 1 990). lnfantUe Paralysis (Polfomyelltis) tn New South Wales, 
1930-1940: a study of perceptions and reactt.ons, unpublished Honours Thesis, 
University of New South Wales, pp.2 and 1 1 . Greenland accepts the view that 
polio was more feared than most, arguing that the fear was fueled by ignorance, 
a sense of helplessness, and fear of disability. 
98 Circular Letter, 25 November 19 16,  CPH to Local Health Authorities, BL, ACC 
1 003, AN 120/4, 626 / 1925, p. l .  
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were he physically sound.9 9  
The image of a severely paralysed child kept the fear of polio alive 
even after it was realised that adults were also affected by the 
virus. One root of this fear was the fate of being "worth less in the 
struggle for existence". The horror of being crippled was also 
associated with not being able to earn a proper living and having 
to rely on the State for support, perhaps for the rest of one's life.  
In the late 1930s Dr Laurence Macdonald encapsulated the feelings 
of many when he wrote 
While it is true that as a fatal disease Poliomyelitis is of 
small account when compared with many of the other ills of 
childhood, the summation of its effects over a period of years 
has produced a large body of permanent cripples, the bulk of 
whom throughout life are dependent on the State for 
support. I oo 
Any form of disability raised doubts about the prospect of physical 
and economic survival. A link can be made between this and the 
theory of eugenics which, during the 1920s and 30s, prevented the 
development of a positive image of disability, and spurred those 
who were disabled to prove they suffered no moral or intellectual 
99 McKenzie, W. ( 19 10). The Treatment of Infantile Paralysis, p. 10. At some points 
Australian culture resisted the idea of "economic wastage" due to disability, and 
the idea of anyone becoming "a burden on the state". For discussion of this see 
Greenland, W. ( 1990). Irifantile Paralysis, pp. 26, 47-48, 60, and Atkinson, A., 
( 1996). The Role of the Colonial Government in the Introduction of Chinese Labour to 
Western Australia in the Nineteenth Century, Unpublished paper, Edith Cowan 
University, p. 17. Chinese labourers who were recruited for the labour force, but 
who were found likely to become "burdens on the state" through requiring 
admission to colonial institutions as patients, paupers or prisoners.were 
returned to their homeland. 
1 00 Macdonald, L. ( 1930). The Treatment of Poliomyelitis, MJA, Vol. I, No. 19, 
p.797. 
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impairment. I o 1 
59 
Medical authorities considered media practices helped foster fear of 
polio. During the 1948 epidemic in Western Australia the number 
of reported polio cases was published each day in the newspaper 
and on Saturday the weekly result was summarised, rather like a 
war-time casualty list. 1 02 The Commissioner complained -
Infantile paralysis receives far more attention from the Press 
than its relative incidence merits. Every new case is counted 
and reported with such details as may be gleaned for the 
purpose. This is true of no other notifiable disease, 
although several of these occur in much greater numbers 
over longer periods and cause . .. much greater damage .... 103 
Very powerful imagery was used to represent polio, as reflected in 
the series of cartoons produced in Western Australian newspapers 
in 1948, I 04 and the recourse to military metaphors such as "the 
war against polio". The more xenophobic members of the public 
stigmatised visitors from infected areas as polluters, whether from 
interstate or within the state, called for children entering the state 
to be tested, and for travellers to be banned. I o5 In Western 
Australia fear of polio reached an hysterical pitch prior to the royal 
visit in 1954, 1 06 but began to subside once mass immunisation 
commenced in 1956. 
I O I Morris, J. ( 1993 ). Pride Against Prejudice: transforming attitudes to disability,  
Women's Press: London, p.51. 
I 02 WA, 9 June 1948, p.5, is a typical example. 
103 DN, 23 Januaiy 1948, p.2. 
I 04 See below, Chapter 5. 
I 05 Letter, 3 September 1937, and reply, 4 September 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/4, 626/ 1925, pp.158-9. 
1 06 Report of the Commissioner of Public Health for the year 1954, (1956). 
Appendix VIII, p.60, BL, 614.09 WES. 
CHAPTER 2: Polio and its themes 60 
Fear of polio was not confined to Australia. Christopher J. Rutty 
has written of Canada that "most people knew a polio victim, but 
nobody wanted to become one".107 American Jane S. Smith has 
written, "to many people, there were far worse things than dying of 
paralytic polio. You could get the disease and live" . 1 os Susan 
Sontag has written -
The most terrifying illnesses are those perceived not just as 
lethal , but as dehumanising, literally so. . .  Polio's effects 
could be horrifying - it withered the body - but it did not 
mark or rot the flesh: it was not repulsive. Further, polio 
affected the body only, not the face. The relatively 
appropriate, unmetaphorical reaction to polio owes much to 
the privileged status of the face, so determining of our 
evaluation of physical beauty and of physical ruin. I 09 
While it is possible to accept that Sontag's view that diseases 
affecting the face are particularly repulsive, her outlook is difficult 
to reconcile with the fear and stigmatisation of polio, and other 
forms of disability, that was experienced in Australia and 
elsewhere . The visual image of a child's body, crippled from 
paralytic polio, became the source of powerful feelings of fear, 
shame and embarrassment, both for those who suffered in this way 
and for those who had to live close to them. 1 1  o Alan Marshall 
identifies the presence of stigmatisation in his experience, but 
1 07 Rutty, C. J. (1995). PolwmyeUti.s in Canada, p.12. 
108 Smith, J .S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, p.37. 
109 Sontag, S. ( 1991). Illness as Metaphor: AIDS and lts metaphors, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp.124, 125. 
1 1 0 Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Pam.lysls, p 52. In 1928 Sydney Rotarians 
cond uctlng a survey of the needs of crippled children found that. because of their 
own shame, many parents concealed by their children at home to protect them 
from ridicule. And p.61 "Fear of disability was a significant component in the 
overall fear of infantile paralysis". 
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rejects it for himself. 
6 1  
In childhood a useless leg does not bring with it a sense of 
shame; it is only when one learns to interpret the glance of 
people unable to hide their feelings that one experiences a 
desire to avoid them... Suffering because of being crippled is 
not for you in your childhood; it is reserved for those men 
and women who look at you. 1 1 1  
Although Marshall plays down his experience, the feeling of shame 
and embarrassment a child affected by paralytic polio may learn 
from adult observers added one more dimension to the struggle 
already being faced; life with a dysfunctional body in the context of 
a society that expected all its members to be capable of able-bodied 
performance. The parents of a boy, who had polio in Western 
Australia 1951, reported -
Our friends sort of dropped off a bit.. .  and it was a stigma 
on the family. Grandma was extremely distressed but she 
was very upset to think that this dreadful thing had 
happened to her son's child... but in those days if anyone 
had any kind of a slight disability or anything wrong it was a 
major no-no, you didn't tell your friends, you didn't do 
anything. 1 1 2 
The distress caused by stigmatisation is here linked to the loss of 
the ideal of a "perfect body" capable full economic and physical 
performance. A woman who had polio as a child in 1954 testifies 
her parents and siblings never discussed the subject. And when 
she told her friends at school they maintained a stony silence . 
. . .I captained the basketball team in Sixth Grade and in the 
first year I was really having trouble, I couldn't quite keep up 
1 1 1 Marshall, A. ( 1955 ). Puddles, p. 7 1 .  p. 73. 
1 1 2 Interview A. p.3. 
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with the physical demands of the sport just at that time . .. 
so I dropped out and I told them it was because I had polio 
and ... they treated me like a leper. I was really shocked by 
that and they never mentioned it agatn. 1 1 3 
The impact of such stigmatising experiences took decades to 
resolve, that is, if the polio survivor, or the family had the will to 
face the emotional issues involved and could find support for 
embarking on such a project. 
Those parents whose children survived to live with profound 
paralysis were spared the pain of bereavement, but had to consider 
what physical social supports would be available for their offspring 
once they were no longer present to give assistance. Adequate 
after-care required special support which demanded extra 
resources. Provided their case was genuine and they were unable 
to meet the costs themselves polio survivors enjoyed the benefit of 
ongoing support, which govemmen t and community sources in 
Western Australia supplied. 1 1 4 For example the Public Health 
Department supported a request to provide a new wheel chair for a 
male survivor who -
... has shown great fortitude and determination in attempting 
to overcome his severe handicap . He is studying 
accountancy and has made considerable progress. The 
provision of a wheel chair would assist him to overcome 
1 1 3  Interview C. p.29. 
1 1 4 See File 'Poliomyelitis, Supply of equipment for post polio cases'. BL, ACC 
1003, AN 120/4, 1945/59 1003, AN 120/4, 1945/59. The file contains over 240 
pages of correspondence, mostly related to the most severe cases requiring after 
care. An Almoner at PMH assessed cases for their ability to pay. In 195 1, H .C. 
Smith, a farmer from Ballaying in Western Australia, was deemed "Financially 
ineligible for further O.P. [Out Patient) treatment" because his income was too 
high. Assessment report and Continuation card in the possession of the author. 
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practical problems which now obstruct his efforts. The cost 
would be in the vicinity of £70 and funds are available. I 1 5 
This particular survivor, who was severely paralysed, was 
enterprising and inventive. He designed a trolley that converted 
into a wheel chair which the Splint Department manufactured for 
him and other survivors to use. The design was passed on to the 
Children's Hospital in Victoria. 1 1 6 The rapport the Public Health 
Department developed With him was linked With his independence 
as well as his "great fortitude and determination" - in other words 
his heroism. 
The culture of denial 
The effectiveness of the vaccination campaigns is only one reason 
for the lack of public discussion of polio. Evidence suggests that a 
strong culture of minimising or denying the effects of polio has 
existed, as it had done for other forms of disability, and that this 
is part of the strong desire to overcome the effects of the disease, 
even to the point of living as though no physical or other deficits 
have been created. In his autobiography, I Can Jump Puddles , 
Alan Marshall wrote -
The word "crippled", to me, suggested a condition that could 
be applied to some people, but not myself. But, since I so 
often heard people refer to me as crippled, I was forced to 
concede that I must fit this description, yet retained a 
conviction that though being crippled was obviously a 
1 1 5 Letter CPH to Minister for Health, 27 February 1964, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/4, 1945/59, p.240. 
1 1 6 File 'Supply of equipment for post polio cases', BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 
1945/ 59, pp.25-29. 
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distressing state for some people, with me it didn't matter. 
The crippled child is not conscious of the handicap implied 
by his useless legs. They are often inconvenient or annoying 
but he is confident that they will never prevent him doing 
what he wants to do or being whatever he wishes to be. If he 
considers them a handicap it is because he has been told 
they are. 1 1  7 
At the time of writing his biography Marshall remembered that, as 
a child, being a cripple was not something that was part of his 
self-concept. 1 1 8 He gives further examples of his refusal to take 
notice of his condition and considers that such a perception does 
not come from within the afflicted one, but from people who 
categorise in this way. 1 1 9 While there is no reason to doubt his 
childhood experience, it is clear that his outlook includes his 
reflection on this subject as an adult. 
Evidence also suggests that the attitude of some members of the 
medical profession encouraged those with a disability to overcome 
their deficits and become part of the mainstream of life. West 
Australian orthopedic surgeon, the late Sir George Bedbrook, wrote 
in the Foreword of pol io survivor Vivienne Overheu 's  
autobiography 
Throughout the narrative, it is her ability that shines out 
rather than her disability and this, indeed, is the goal that 
1 1 7 Marshall, A. ( 1955). Puddles, p.7 1 .  
1 1 8  His disease was polio. but a similar attitude can be detected in connection 
with other forms of disability where it was believed the effects had to be 
overcome, minimised or denied to ensure social and personal success to the 
survivor. See for example Humphries, S. and Gordon, P. ( 1992). Out Of Sight: the 
expertence ofdtsabllity 1 900-1950, Northcote House.Plymouth, p.42 "For David 
Swift the ultimate aim was to his disability altogether and to make himself 
appear exactly the same as other children." 
1 1 9 Marshall, A. ( 1955). Puddles, pp. 99- 100, p. 195 .  
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all disabled people are striving for. 1 20 
After being paralysed by polio in 1954 the author battled with the 
consequences to live a full life which included marriage, children, 
and duties as a farmer's wife. The title of her book, It Helps To Be 
Stubborn, was chosen because of the particular brand of 
determination - the "cussedness" - the which gave her the will to 
fight . Susan Sontag refers to the German philosopher 
Schopenhauer when she wrote -
"The will exhibits itself as organised body" ... Recovery from a 
disease depends on the will assuming "dictatorial power in 
order to subsume the rebellious forces" of that body. 1 2 1  
A heroic style in the face of difficulties, strong willed behaviour, 
stubbornness, denial and, often, an outstanding level of 
achievement, is found amongst polio survivors. "Throw off your 
pessimism, and determine to help yourself', 1 22 was the advice of 
Dr John Colebatch who had polio at 24 years of age and a year 
later was shown with a frame he invented which made him mobile 
at home. The evidence suggests that once a person became 
paralysed the prevailing social and medical culture trained them to 
overcome their difficulties, an attitude that often led to what could 
be described as overcompensation. Many drove themselves to 
reach the same level of achievement as those living without a 
disability. The following report on the 1981 West Australian 
People's Marathon provides a case in point. Although the official 
1 20 Overheu, V. (1984). It Helps to Be Sf11bbom! St George Books: Perth, p.5. 
1 2 1  Sontag, S. (1991). Metaphor, pp.44-45. 
1 22 DN, 13 April 1954, p. l .  
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maximum time allowed for the race was five hours the time keeper 
left the timing gates open a few minutes longer to allow the last 
competitor, polio survivor Tony Parnell, to cross the line. Parnell -
... whose rtght leg is completely withered with virtually no 
muscle structure, ... uses it purely as support while he drives 
With his good leg. A magnificent effort ... he took up running 
because his doctor told him he couldn't do it, and he decided 
otherwise. 1 23 
The biographies of polio survivors frequently chart the course of 
one who exercised rigid discipline in order to restore lost 
capacities. If regained these capacities can be retained, at first, 
because polio is not a degenerative disease. Many survivors 
describe themselves as having "had" polio, and have difficulty 
acknowledging the legacy of special needs the disease created. 
Indeed, some have gone out of their way to ignore them. 
After surveying several biographies, Mary Westbrook summarised 
the experience of polio survivors as governed by "ignore your 
distress:hard work and cheerful acceptance will overcome polio" . 1 24 
Denial and hard work was the salve applied to wasted muscles and 
twisted lives. "Use it or lose it" was the programme instilled into 
many polio survivors, and by this means they built up their 
strength, overcame the effects of their affliction and moved into 
the mainstream of life. 1 25 Unfortunately in the long term this has 
proved to be the reverse of the strategy needed to care for and 
1 23 Western Australian Marathon Club, Newsletter, Spring 198 l ,  p. 12. 
1 24 Westbrook, M. ( 1996). Early Memories of Polio-Survivors: Memories Versus 
the Official Myths, Proceedings. International Post-Polio Conference, NSW, p.5-6. 
1 25 Scheer, J. and Luborsky, M.L. (1991). Post-Polio Sequelae: the cultural 
context of polio biographies, Orthopaedics, Vol. 14, No 1 1. pp.1178-9. 
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preserve weakened muscles and twisted bodies. For some suIVivors 
the dividend is now being paid in significant psychological 
distress, 1 26 and the curtailment of activity at an earlier age than 
might otherwise have been the case. As understanding of Post 
Polio Syndrome develops polio survivors are learning they must 
"conserve or lose it", a program that involves them in a complete 
reorientation in life. Conservation means having to recognise and 
face their own special needs, refusing to deny or minimise their 
difficulties, and letting go of the pretense that they can perform as 
people without a disability. This is the challenge facing polio 
suIVivors in the 1990s. 
FDR: icon of polio's social meaning 
The American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FOR) has been 
a primary icon of two social meanings which have become 
attached to polio; the will to overcome the effects of polio and the 
culture of denial. FOR masked the effects of his affliction and 
neutralised the negative public image of his paralysis in order to 
gain the Presidency of the United States of America, which he 
succeeded in doing in 1932, 1936, 1940 and 1944. 1 27 Recently 
North American based historians, using a variety of methodologies, 
have begun to expand and reinterpret the understanding of the 
126 Conrady, L.J. ,  Wish, J.R., Agre, J.C., Rodriguez, A.A. , Sperling, K.B., (1989). 
Psychologic Characteristics of Polio Survivors: a preliminary report. Archive of 
Physical Medical RehabUttatton, Vol. 70, p.462. 
1 27 Gallagher, H.G.(1994). FDR's Splendtd Deceptton, Vandamere Press, Arlington, 
gives the full account of FDR's survival of polio, the development of Warm 
Springs. the March of the Dimes, and his Presidency of the USA. 
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experience of polio in the United States. 1 28 At the same time 
published and unpublished research from Canada, New Zealand 
and Australia is providing the ingredients for the development of 
an international perspective on the polio era. 1 29 The process of 
reappraising the effect polio had on the lives of individuals and 
communities in twentieth centu:iy is under way. 
*** 
1 28 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dfrtand Dlsease, Smith, J.S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, and 
Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid.Deception, are authors in this category. 
1 29 Gould, T. ( 1995) .  A Summer Plague, writes with England and the USA in 
view, Rutty, C. J. ( 1 995). Do something/ Do Anything/ Poliomyelitis in Canada 1927-
1962, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Canada, argues 
that the American perspective was not the only one, and an unpublished thesis 
by Ross, J.C. ( 1993). A History of Polio in New Zealand, MA, University of 
Canterbury, provides a thorough account of polio epidemics in that country. 
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Figure 2 :  Cases of  polio notified in Australia 1 93 1 - 1 963 ,  Health in 
Australia, ( 1 963 )  The Polio Story: Australian Health Information 
and Research Service . p. 1 0  
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CASES OF POLIO IN AUSTRALIA FROM 1931  to 1963. 
(Graph line ls plotted according to the number of cases 
notified ln each period or two months . )  
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Figure 3: Cases of polio notified in Australia: 
Commonwealth Year Book, 1929-1966. 
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CHAPTER 3: Literature Review 
The polio virus knew no political or social boundaries. Our 
understanding of the epidemics in Western Australia can therefore 
be enriched by insights from work on polio in other contexts. This 
chapter provides an international perspective for this thesis 
through reviewing key items of literature related to the 
historiography of poliomyelitis. As such it stands as a framing 
chapter for the West Australian experience which makes up the 
bulk of this work. Medical and scientific writings have had a 
prominent place in this historiography, along with histories of 
significant figures such as Jonas Salk and FDR. Increased 
attention paid by historians to medical and public health topics 
has lead to a growing body of social histories of disease, while the 
emergence of PPS, and the willingness of polio survivors to record 
their stories, is ensuring that polio has a place on this agenda. 
The medical history cannot be ignored but the particular aim here 
is to discuss works that investigate polio from a social and 
historical point of view. 
A standard work in this field is A History qf Poliomyelitis, a natural 
history of the disease by the late John R. Paul. The author gamed 
medical qualifications early in this century and was intimately 
involved as a participant in the medical history of the polio era. 
He became a founding member of the Yale Poliomyelitis Study Unit 
(originally known as the Yale Poliomyelitis Commission), a 
research unit set up in 1931, 1 served on the Immunisation 
1 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.200. 
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Committee of the NFIP, conducted significant epidemiological 
research himself, 2 and knew personally many of the scientists and 
medical professionals who searched to understand the disease and 
find an effective vaccine. As a participant observer Paul is credited 
with telling the history of the political and scientific infighting 
with some degree of objectivity.3 In A History of Poliomyelitis he 
states his aim is to document, rather than interpret, this history 
and reveal for the reader the successes, frustrations and blind 
alleys of the polio research. 
Paul stays within his professional field and and does not make 
formal use of perspectives such as those that would be provided, 
for example, by environmental or social sciences. 4 He frames his 
history within comparative medical knowledge dating from earliest 
times, but concentrates on the the history of the modern period. 
Paul acknowledges that, due to variations in the "goals, 
philosophies" and the "cultural settings" in which research has 
taken place, the medical approach to polio has changed 
immeasurably since the nineteenth century. Polio has been 
reinterpreted as the result of new medical and scientific forms of 
analysis that have been developed, particularly during twentieth 
century, and Paul expects this process of reinterpretation to 
continue. 
Paul's natural, medical history nevertheless offers some social and 
psychological insights. He contrasts the stoical outlook of the 
2 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.360. 
3 Gould, T. (1995). A Summer Plague. p.326. 
4 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.xv. 
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nineteenth centucy - which regarded paralysis during infancy as 
inevitable for some children - with a more contemporary 
understanding that viewed with "dismay" the "fearful handicap" it 
was for a child to endure the "crippling deformity" brought about 
by polio.5 While he recognises these changes in perspective, Paul 
does not dwell on the social bases for them, and locates himself 
within the sphere of twentieth centucy medicine. 
Paul characterises the quest for a vaccine as a cause which 
intensified and assumed pseudo-religious overtones, largely due to 
the influence of the NFIP. It was a "crusade" which "conquered" 
polio - a vecy "militaristic" style of language which others have also 
used, and is explored elsewhere in this thesis.6 The crusade 
against polio, Paul asserts, "has been described as one of the 
greatest technical and humanistic triumphs of our age". Paul 
describes the attitude to polio in twentieth-centucy America as 
changing from the passivity of the past to a new activism which 
aimed to "stamp out this pestilence and alleviate the suffering and 
tragedy it inflicted". 7 I consider that the new activism can be 
interpreted as the medical profession's version of "the will to 
overcome" polio and its effects. 
The emotive descriptions Paul used at times in relation to polios 
5 Paul. J.R. (1971). History, p.xv. 
6 See below Chapters 4-8. 
7 Paul. J.R. (1971). History, p.xv. 
8 Paul. J.R. (1971 ). History, p. l .  This is also evident from the reflection he offers 
in connection with the standard clinical definition for polio in use during the 
1940s and 1950s, when he asserted that this description "falls far short of the 
usual picture which this disease conjures up in the minds of most people". 
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reveal that he himself was caught up in the culture surrounding 
the disease, but he also recognised the need for detachment. Paul 
is able to acknowledge that while the vaccination programme 
turned out to be a success, it was not the "victorious conquest" 
that many hoped for. He wrote -
... the temptation to write this account as a complete success 
story has been almost irresistible. The events during the 
first half of the twentieth century which led up to the 
eventual conquest of poliomyelitis and the almost 
unbelievable decline in epidemics as a result of vaccination 
have the makings of a dramatic story with a triumphant 
ending . . .  9 
After he has dealt with the history of the western world's 
relationship with polio, particularly as it affected the United States 
of America, a significant proportion of the last five chapters of his 
book is devoted to the problems of the vaccine, especially 
unfavourable reactions and the controversies that attended 
them.10 Paul argues that the story of polio is not over, it will 
continue to grow and change as new challenges, revelations and 
insights emerge, if not in the western world, in countries where the 
improvements in public health are provoking the appearance of 
epidemics, as first happened in Sweden in the 1880s. He 
concludes 
The existence of such a precarious and unresolved situation 
is the reason why this history cannot claim to be a 
completely triumphant success story. The road will lead up 
hill for many years to come. I 1 
9 Paul. J.R. (1971). History, p.xiv. 
10 Paul. J.R. (197 1). History, p.468. 
1 1  Paul. J.R. (197 1 ). History, p.469. 
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Subsequent history has shown Paul was correct, and somewhat 
prophetic, when he identified the potential for an ongoing and 
changing medical interpretation of the relationship between the 
polio virus and society. In 1971, when his book was published, 
falling rates of immunisation in western countries had not yet 
become a pressing concern, and Post Polio Syndrome had yet to be 
identified. And while there are ongoing possibilities for medical 
reinterpretation of this disease, there are similar possibilities for 
an evolving historical interpretation of the relationship between 
polio and human communities on a world wide basis. 
Naomi Rogers offers a sophisticated social and cultural medical 
history of poliomyelitis that investigates the epidemic which 
occurred in New York in 1916, five years before FDR became a polio 
survivor. 1 2  Rogers, who relies on Saul Benison, I 3 is conversant 
with the scientific, medical and public health history of polio, 
investigates the social responses to the disease, and the social 
meanings given to it, but does not include detailed discussion of 
individual cases. The key point of her argument is that, prior to 
FDR, the image of polio in the United States of America -
. . .  was associated with the poorest, dirtiest children, not 
affluent adults in the prime of life, and with immigrants in 
I 2 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease:polto before FDR, Rutgers University Press: 
New Brunswick, NJ. 
1 3 Saul Saul Benison, also a participant observer in the medical process, who 
has written a number of works which include "The History of Polio Research in 
the United States: Appraisals and Lessons", in Gerald Holton, (ed), (1972). The 
Twentieth Century &fences: Studies in the Biography of Ideas, New York: WW 
Norton, and "Poliomyelitis and the Rockefeller Institute: Social Effects and 
Institutional Response", Journal of History of Medicine and Allied &iences, (197 4). 
Vol. 29, pp.74-5. 
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slums, not Yankees from long established families.1 4  
The social meaning of polio's association with the first set of 
images, and the shift to the second set of associations is central 
to her argument. She also draws attention to the complexities and 
ironies of polio history which she shows are fundamental to 
understanding the disease. 
Rogers argues that the ideology of germ theory, which regained 
popularity from the 1890s, did not limit infectious diseases to 
divisions of race or class: germs affected the poor, the wealthy, 
ethnic minorities and the middle-class majority alike. Nineteenth 
century understandings which linked moral behaviour and 
infection were challenged by this ideology, but laboratory 
researchers who relied on germ theory failed to solve the riddle of 
polio, while health officials and the general public shared the 
assumption that "infection depended on the class, ethnicity and 
personal habits of individuals" . 1 5 There were "tensions between 
old and new medical theories and practices," 1 6 the transition to 
the "new public health" based on germ theory was incomplete, 1 7  
and the efficacy of modem science was debated by experts and the 
public alike. Rogers shows how, faced with an epidemic, health 
officials and the general public continued to be interested in germ 
theory but found it less compelling than earlier theories of public 
health. She writes -
1 4 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dtrt and. Dlsease, p. l .  
1 5 Rogers, N .  ( 1992). Dtrt and. Dlsease, p.29. 
1 6 Rogers, N. ( 1 992). Dirt and Disease, p.3. 
1 7 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p.32. 
l 
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Officials sought to make germs as fearful as filth but, unlike 
garbage and overflowing sewers, germs were not readily 
visible. I S 
Unable to interpret or control polio the authorities, who 
maintained a lingering reliance on the filth theory, resorted to 
traditional practices which included the more visible methods of 
control - quarantine, fumigation and disinfection, 1 9 which 
coincidentally furthered the social agenda of the New York health 
department.20 A scapegoat was found, not in science, but in the 
slum dwelling immigrant families of New York. It was claimed that 
the socially irresponsible immigrants whose careless sanitary 
practices contrasted with official public health endeavours, and 
the practices of the more hygienic American middle-classes, 
resulted in the spread of polio. Health officials were sufficiently 
wedded to this view for emerging clinical evidence to be ignored or 
overlooked while the perceived perpetrators were stigmatised .  
When polio infections occurred in the well-to-do areas flies, the 
favourite target of public health officials, were identified as the 
agent of transmission of the disease, though this meant that they 
would have had to travel in only one direction. Rogers writes -
An anti-fly campaign that portrayed flies as carrying the 
disease from working-class to middle-class was especially 
powerful and successful.2 1 
During the 1916 polio epidemic in New York the dirt and disease 
1 8  Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p. 16. 
1 9 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p.46. 
20 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p.19. 
2 1 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p.5. 
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was given a social meaning in relation to polio which was readily 
supported and which did not change until after Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, the adult scion of a white, wealthy, ruling family, 
became a polio survivor in 1921. Between 1930 and the 1950s his 
affliction and influence helped give polio a new social meaning as a 
different set of associations was born. Polio was removed from the 
slums to the middle-class, or to all classes; and from being the 
disease solely of children to one that also affected adults. A legacy 
of these associations is retained by those Americans who lived 
through this era 
. . .  a smiling freckled girl on crutches on a March of Dimes 
can; swimming pools closed in the summer; a nurse leaning 
over a child in an iron lung; rows of children with arms 
outstretched waiting for their polio vaccine shot; and 
President Roosevelt seated by a radio microphone, crippled 
yet strong, America's first handicapped president who refused 
to allow the press to report his wheelchair, leg braces, or 
inability to walk.22 
One of the ironies of polio history is that the disease came to be 
associated with cleanliness rather than dirt ; 23 with rural 
communities and suburbs rather than slum districts, though in 
1916 American health officials and researchers did not interpret 
the evidence in this way. "Classless" germ theory did not dislodge 
belief in the link between dirt, disorder and disease, and the group 
that had the highest level of immunity through endemic exposure 
to the virus continued to be targeted, while those who were most 
22 Rogers, N. ( 1 992). Dirt and Disease, p. 1 .  
23 Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J.). ( 1989). Health and Disease in  Australia, 
p.328. The editor notes - "Poliomyelitis is the only eptdemtc disease (sexually 
transmitted diseases excepted) the incidence of which increased in Western 
countries in the twentieth century". 
CHAPTER 3: Literature review 79 
vulnerable were not thought to be at risk. The social significance 
of diagnosis is made clear when, in the manner of Sylvia Tesh,2 4  
Rogers asserts that -
... explanations of the workings of disease have underlying 
social and political ideologies, sometimes only made explicit 
in times of urgency, such as an epidemic. It continues to 
hold a powerful intellectual and practical appeal : it 
combines morality and science; it helps to distinguish rich 
from poor, native-born from immigrant, the ignorant and 
careless from the informed and responsible.25 
Rogers argues her case through five chapters that cover polio in 
the USA, 1900-1920, the new public health, the new science of 
disease, the public response to polio and the rise of epidemiology. 
She concludes with an Epilogue which lucidly summarises the 
developments in polio histozy from FDR to the present. 
FDR's connection with polio has been fundamental to the history 
of the disease since 1921. His severe paralysis at age 39, with 
what had so far been considered a children's disease, was the 
ingredient which ultimately resulted in a change of perception 
about polio. FDR's own process of rehabilitation led him to 
dedicate his efforts to raise funds for research into the provision of 
a vaccine. He was a key figure in the formation of the National 
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) and the "March of the 
24 Tesh, S.N. ( 1988). Hidden Arguments: politlcal ideology and disease prevention 
policy, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick. 
2 5 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Dtsease, p.7. 
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Dimes" which generated funding for research which eventually bore 
fruit in the Salk vaccine. Because of him polio in the twentieth 
century was characterised as an 'American' disease. 
FDR emerged as the triumphant political and social figure of this 
era - and he did so by denying or covering over his paralysis from 
polio. At the same time the success of the American way of life in 
general, and the free enterprise system in particular, was 
underlined by the achievements of American science under the 
patronage generated by his interest.26 
In connection with the historiography of polio, and the projected 
image of people with disabilities, FDR's role is ambiguous. Some 
believe his true greatness lay in the fact that he had polio, but the 
erection of the most recent memorial to him in Washington drew a 
crowd of protesters because it continued the deception and 
maintained the secrecy of his disability.27 A bas-relief by Leonard 
Baskin depicts FDR standing alone without any external support, 
something he was unable to do, 28 while another figure has him 
sitting on a chair that is not obviously a wheel chair.20 
26  Brandt, A.M. ( 1978). "Polio, Politics and Duplicity: ethical aspects in the 
development of Salk vaccine", Intemational Joumal oJHealth Seroices, 8, p.265. 
27 Wilson, P. "Memorial Blind to FDR's Greatness", WA, 1-2 March 1997, p.12. 
28 Gallagher, H.G.( 1994). Splendid Deception, pp.210- 212. 
29 The Economist, 26 April 1997, p.41. 
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Hugh Gallagher asserts that it has become customary for many 
biographers to continue the "splendid deception" FOR himself 
created in connection with his disability by giving it perfunctory 
treatment. Gallagher's own view, born of personal experience as a 
polio survivor is 
A visible paralytic handicap affects every relationship, alters 
the attitudes of others, and challenges one's self-esteem. It 
requires minute-by-minute monitoring and control to an 
extent quite unperceived and unimaginable by the able­
bodied. This condition of being handicapped generates a 
range of emotions, whether expressed or not, that must be 
dealt with, not just at the outset, but continuing 
throughout the rest of the patient's life.30 
Gallagher argues that FDR's experience, and the discipline learned 
in seven years of rehabilitation, was fundamental to his success as 
the President of the United States of America because his suffering 
humanised him and made him more appealing to members of the 
public who were enduring the stringencies of Depression and War. 
And Gallagher presents FDR's successes as having an essential 
connection with his status as a polio survivor whose iron will and 
rigorous self education, evident during seven years of 
30 Gallagher, H.G.( 1994). Splendid. Deception, pp.xi-xii. 
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rehabilitation, contributed many things to his Presidency of the 
USA. Others, including members of the Roosevelt family, dispute 
this interpretation of FDR's life.31 But, as the memorial to him 
testifies, there is no doubt that the able-bodied image he projected 
won out over his disabled image, and this is significant for the 
social histocy of polio. It is not that FDR hid the fact that he was 
a polio survivor - he maintained a high profile as president of the 
NFIP, aimed to make people as aware of polio as they were of TB, 
and his nickname "Dr Roosevelt", earned for his rehabilitative 
work at Warm Springs, was progressively changed to "Dr 
Depression" and "Dr Win The War" . At the same time elaborate 
strategies were used to eliminate the image of his disability, 
something that would have been impossible in the TV age of live 
reporting. The media colluded with FOR to preserve and 
perpetuate the representation he cultivated of himself . Amongst 
the collection of over thirty thousand surviving photographs of 
FOR, only two picture him in a wheelchair. It is this that 
Gallagher sought to rectify when he selected one of them for the 
cover of his book, FDR's Splendid Deception. 
31 Gould, T. ( 1995 ). A Summer Plague, Ch. 2. Gould follows Merritt B Low, MD, 
who argues that personality affects the disease. 
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Gallagher's history does not advance the understanding of polio as 
a disease but it contributes to the discussion concerning the social 
and personal responses to it current in America between 1920 and 
1945. FDR defied his polio and his experience provides a 
paramount example of the will to overcome the physical results of 
paralysis, and the psychological impact of the belief that disabled 
people were morally and intellectually inferior. Gallagher's 
biography also provides ample material in connection with the 
effects of the disease on society. FDR, who is often quoted for his 
1933 statement "we have nothing to fear but fear itself', came from 
a family which feared polio deeply and used its position of privilege 
and power to flee from New York during the 1916 epidemic.32 
FDR is also an example, perhaps the example, of the culture of 
denial that accompanied polio, at the public, personal, and 
particularly the emotional level. Gallagher indicates that there is 
no evidence that FDR ever spoke of the deep feelings his affliction 
must have aroused in him, and that his handicapped condition 
32 Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid Deception, p.13. 
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was never spoken about in the family, 33 even though every 
member's life was affected by the special arrangements made for 
coping with it, and the experience forged the type of relationship 
he had with his wife Eleanor for the rest of his life. At a time 
when there was no concept of "mainstreaming" for disabled people 
FDR succeeded in convincing everyone that the effects of polio 
were unimportant and need not be taken into consideration on 
moral, intellectual or physical grounds. He demonstrated that 
paralysis did not prevent him succeeding in high office or taking 
his place on the world stage during the Second World War. 
FDR succeeded for a quarter of a century but, as the history of his 
last years reveals, his defiance came at a price. PPS had not been 
identified in 1945 and we cannot attribute his end to its effects, 
although recently some have attempted to suggest there was a 
link.34 The crushing pressure of his combined role as President 
and Commander in Chief during the Second World War was 
enough to wear down the fittest of all. In the last stages of the 
33 Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid Deception, p. 15. "There is no record of his ever 
having discussed it with anyone". Original emphasis. 
34 Sass, E.J. Polio's Legacy, p. 15. Sass follows Speier, J.L., Owen, R.R. , Knapp. 
M., and Canine, J.K., (1987). Occurrence of post-polio sequelae in an epidemic 
population. In Halstead,L.S. and Weichers, D.D. (eds) Research and the clinical 
aspects ofpolfomyelltis, White Plains. March of the Dimes. pp.39-48. 
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War Winston Churchill was so fatigued he had himself carried up 
and down stairs. 35 FDR found his physical strength undermined 
when he most needed it and while Eleanor wrote, cruelly, that he 
had succumbed to "invalidism", and Gallagher argues that in the 
end polio beat him,35 any weakness in FDR need not be seen as 
unusual, even if PPS could be shown to be present. Despite his 
determination, in the long run FDR the polio survivor was 
conquered by hard work. 
John Rowan Wilson was one of the first to investigate the history 
of the search for a suitable polio vaccine, 31 which he characterises 
as a "race" between different individuals and organisations that 
was fraught by competing social and political agendas. Wilson 
focusses on the role of key individuals and organisations in the 
USA, notably Basil O'Connor, Jonas Salk, Albert Sabin, the NFIP, 
the Press and the Government . He is critical of the the laissez-
faire attitude of the US Government in connection with public 
health policies and the role played by the press in offering 
35  Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid. Deception, p.177. In the last stages of the War 
Winston Churchill was so fatigued he had himself carried up and down stairs. 
36  Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid. Decepti.on, p.191. 
3 7  Wilson, J.R. (1963). Margin Q[Safety:the story of poliomyelitis vaccine, Collins: 
London. 
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sensationalistic reporting of "breakthroughs" in the polio war.38 
Wilson, who writes in a journalistic style, is particularly critical of 
the concentration of so much power and influence in the hands of 
the determined O'Connor, and of the way in which the NFIP 
"became a law unto itself'. O'Connor's promotional and fund 
raising agendas competed with the research needs of the scientists 
in an unhealthy and dangerous way and the NFIP became "trapped 
within its own image of dynamic optimism" .39 Wilson argues that 
from this position it could not afford to be slow, unpopular or 
unsuccessful, but the interests of public safety demanded that 
scientists engaged in time-consuming vaccine research were 
thorough and cautious. The weakness of Government controls 
over experimental vaccine trials conducted in the USA in 1954 
contributed to the "Cutter"40 incident in which, Wilson argues, the 
NFIP with government connivance assumed a role that was 
inappropriate for a private body. It directed national policies and 
priorities in polio research and, when O'Connor placed an order for 
nine million dollars worth of polio vaccine, took a step that was 
38 Wilson, J.R. ( 1963). Margin of Safety, p.54. 
39 Wilson, J.R. ( 1963). Margin of Safety, p.85. 
40 Wilson, J.R. ( 1963). Margin of Safety, p.93. Because the trials were 
experimental, the vaccine did not have to be licensed by the Government 
Laboratory of Biologies Control. Once the trials were conducted, all vaccine had 
to be licensed; too late for some. 
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more correctly a Government responsibility.4 1  
A later interpretation of these events can be found in an article by 
Allan M. Brandt which investigates the history of the development 
of Salk vaccine in the light of a number of ethical decisions that 
were made in the process, particularly in connection with 
preliminary tests using human subjects, and the mass trial 
itself.42 Brandt highlights three key areas of ethical concern: the 
need to "define the risk-benefit" and the terms of consent in the 
use of human subjects, whether mentally defective children (who 
were used in early trials), or healthy "parent volunteered 
youngsters" ; the fact that in a competitive situation the 
"obligation of pharmaceutical companies to manufacture safe 
products cannot be assumed"; and the necessity for government to 
"provide a central direction" in the quest for scientific advance.43 
Other more recent examinations of the development of polio 
41  Wilson, J.R. (1963). Margin of Safety, p.64. 
42 Brandt, A.M. ( 1978). Polio, Politics and Duplicity: ethical aspects in the 
development of Salk vaccine, Intematfonal Joumal of Health Serofces , 8. The use 
of intellectually disabled children is discussed in Wilson, Margin of Safety, 
pp.148-9, and 153-55. 
43 Brandt, A. M. ( 1978). Polio, Politics and Duplicity, p.268. 
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vaccine have been offered by Aaron Klein,44 Richard Carter,45 and 
Jane S. Smith.46 Smith's reflection of her research experience is 
that "a buried fear is hard to resurrect" . 47 The quest for a polio 
vaccine was, she says "one of those vast public events that 
everyone remembers, but no-one wants to know about" -48 Her own 
experience as a Polio Pioneer, a volunteer in the Salk trials, led her 
to research the memory gap that has developed concerning polio. 
She writes a new history of the discovery of the vaccine from the 
point of view of a participant observer and beneficiary in the 
immunisation process. Hers is a lucid account that commences 
with FDR and recounts the development of and introduction of 
Salk vaccine. Smith tends to support the "hero of our times" view 
of Jonas Salk and sees him as having helped create, post 1955, the 
"healthiest generation in history". a group of people who know 
nothing of epidemic diseases.49 
44 Klein, A. (1972). Trial by Fury: The Pollo Vaccine Controversy. New York: 
Charles Scribners and Sons. 
45 Carter. R. ( 1966). Breakthrough: the saga of Jonas Salk, Trident Press: New 
York. 
46 Smith, J.S. (1990). Patenting the Sun: polio and the Salk vaccine, New York: 
William Morrow and Co. 
47 Smith, J.S. (1990). Patenting the Sun, p.19. 
48 Smith, J.S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, p.24. 
49 Smith. J .S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, p.390. 
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A Summer Plague, by journalist, editor and author Tony Gould 
reflects in its title something of the negative representation of 
polio common durtng the era of the epidemics. 50 Gould's narrative 
is not as technical as Paul's scientific and medical history, but it 
surpasses it in its endeavour to weave together the several strands 
to polio history. He writes -
The history of epidemic poliomyelitis has several aspects -
scientific, clinical, political and experiential - and my aim, 
in the first half of this book has been to weave together 
these various strands, which have in the past been treated 
separately, if at all.5 1  
In taking an integrative approach, his particular concern is that in 
their readiness to record the scientific and political aspects of this 
history, a number of historians have completely or largely side­
stepped the experience of polio survivors. Gould also acknowledges 
the predominance of American influence in this history, the 
practice of using of military metaphor, and celebrated the success 
of science when he writes -
The 'conquest of polio' was an American - perhaps the 
50 See also Rutty, C. J. (1996). Do Something! . . .  Do Anything! Poliomyelitis in 
Canada 1927-1962, and Killalea, A. (1995).The Great Scourge. 
5 1 Gould, T. (1995). A Summer Plague. p.xiii. 
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American - success story for the Fifties (the decade of 
conformism and the Cold War) and Salk, the bespectacled 
doctor in a white coat holding a test tube up to the light, 
became and instant celebrity.52 
Gould offsets the American influence by making use of British 
source material, and in this way provides another level of 
integration. His narrative is made up of two parts ; the first is 
dedicated to the history of polio and the polio epidemics, the 
second to the history of polio survivors. Gould does not focus 
primarily on one epidemic, as does Naomi Rogers, nor on one 
figure, as does Hugh Gallagher. He gives "added resonance" by 
frequent use of the oral testimony of polio survivors, and material 
that has not been included by other authors. He has produced a 
work which is not of the technical stature of John Paul's book, nor 
as rich in its analysis as Dirt and Disease . yet is comprehensive, 
readable, and gives more space to the recording of personal 
experience. Also a participant observer Gould survived polio in 
1959 and, though not at this stage affected by it himself, was 
roused to write this book when the impact of PPS began to make 
itself felt. Gould's personal experience reflects the relationship 
52 Gould, T. ( 1995). A Summer Plague. p.xii. 
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between polio and society that many knew in the 1950s, and the 
relationship that has emerged since the advent of PPS. He writes -
When I set out to write this book l knew very little about 
paralytic polio, even though I'd had it myself. . .  what I 
discovered in the process of researching and writing this 
book was that I, too, had been so busy 'mainstreaming' and 
'denying' my disability over the years that I had 
simultaneously both overvalued and undervalued it. I had 
overvalued it in the sense of regarding my experience of polio 
as somehow unique... and undervalued it by not allowing 
that it had made any substantial difference to my way of life 
and thinking... I don't any longer.. .  however impressive a 
recovery you make, you don't 'conquer' or 'overcome' polio in 
any meaningful sense, you merely adapt to the limitations it 
imposes and - if you're fortunate - discover resources within 
yourself you might not otherwise have found.53 
Gould himself was subject to the cult of denial that surrounded 
polio - he treated it as something he 'had' - did not learn anything 
more about it, and invested effort in 'mainstreaming' himself. The 
insight that you don't 'conquer' or 'overcome' polio is an 
understanding that did not develop until the 1980s and 1990s, in 
the wake of PPS. Gould, who from the start located himself in this 
history, came to see the need to relocate himself in a similar, but 
more enlightened place. He believes there are advantages in being 
53 Gould, T. ( 1995). A Summer Plague. pp.xv-xvi. 
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a polio survivor if it is possible to see past the old habits of 'denial' 
and the will to 'overcome' and live a life in which the effects of 
polio are understood and properly integrated into the personal and 
social context. 
In his PhD thesis, a narrative history of polio in Canada 192 7 -
1962, Christopher J. Rutty has sought to integrate the Canadian 
experience of the disease within current historiography and show 
how the American "scientific and publicity war on polio" influenced 
the response, particularly of the government, north of the border.54 
Rutty asserts that Canada was harder hit by polio than the USA55 
and as the impact of the epidemics was felt there 
Pressures mounted on physicians, scientists, voluntary 
health agencies and governments to do something, anything, 
to minimize polio's high personal and financial costs.55 
"Do something, do anything" becomes Rutty's motif to encapsulate 
the Canadian struggle with polio. 
54 Rutty, C. J. ( 1995). Do something! Do Anything! Poliomyelitis in Canada 1927-
1962, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Canada, p. 16. 
55 Rutty. C.J. ( 1995). Poliomyelitis tn Canada 1927-1962, p . 10. Evidence is cited 
from a WHO report on the incidence of polio. 
56 Rutty. C.J. ( 1995). Poliomyelitis in Canada 1927-1962, p.3. 
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Rutty argues that in the prosecution of the campaign against polio 
a fundamental difference between Canada and its southern 
neighbour was the degree of government intervention in public 
health matters that occurred. This response, which grew 
aggressively and strongly between 1927 and 1953, the worst of the 
Canadian polio era 
... was built upon a distinctive tradition of close institutional 
and personal links between leaders in local, provincial, and 
federal health departments, the medical profession, and 
public health education, research and the centralised and 
non-commercial production of preventative health products 
at the University of Toronto's Connaught Medical Research 
Laboratories and the intimately associated School of 
Hygiene.57  
Despite the advantage of these "close institutional and personal 
links" Canadian progress in the war against the polio virus was as 
slow as in other parts of the world. The difference was that the 
Canadian polio campaign was not plagued by the unfortunate 
consequences of competition between pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, as in the USA. The reason for this was that the 
57  Rutty, C.J. ( 1995). Pollomyelltts ln Canada 1927-1962, p.4. 
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University of Toronto based Connaught Medical Research 
Laboratories, which had the capacity to conduct research and 
produce vaccine , was the national serum institute for the 
government. In Australia a similar role was played by the 
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (CSL). Connaught received 
funding from the NFIP to conduct polio research and a vaccine 
trial. The facilities of Connaught were a significant tool for the 
Canadian government which, in response to a rising expectation of 
greater federal involvement in public health, used them to wage 
war against polio and other diseases. Connaught was integral to 
the Canadian public health system in which it "facilitated and 
reinforced strong national public health links" ,58 through links 
with key leaders at provincial and federal levels. During the polio 
campaign the Canadian government was able to impose national 
standards for the production, distribution and evaluation of polio 
vaccine. 
Compared with the United States of America the governments of 
Canada and Australia appear to have exercised a higher level of 
centralised control in matters of public health. This was possible 
58 Rutty, C.J. ( 1995). PoliomyeUtis in Canada 1927-1962, p.4. 
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because of an openness to a greater level of government 
intervention in public life, something which strengthened during 
the Second World War. During the campaign against polio there 
was an advantage in having uniform decision making with respect 
to the manufacture and distribution of polio vaccine. 
A collection of first hand stories of polio survivors who live in New 
Zealand is available.59 And Jean C Ross, has written a narrative 
social history of polio in New Zealand from 1914 to 1961, with a 
post-script concerning PPS. 50 Ross's research provides valuable 
material for contextualising the history of polio in Australia. She 
charts the changes in the understanding of the disease, the shifts 
in public health administration that resulted, and the reaction of 
the public to these developments. Ross concludes that the 
changes, which sometimes amounted to a complete about face in 
public health policy, were accepted by a bewildered public, which 
eventually had its fears calmed concerning the disease and the 
disabled survivors it created. As a result of developments during 
59 Butterworth, K.P. (ed.), ( 1994). Mind over Muscle: s urviving polio in New 
Zealand, Palmerston North: the Dunmore Press Ltd. 
60 Ross, Jean C. ( 1993). A History of Polio in New Zealand, unpublished MA 
thesis, University of Canterbury. 
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these years health services in general were improved while New 
Zealand polio patients were offered free treatment. Ross argues 
that radical changes in the management of paralysis patients, and 
a greater use of physiotherapy techniques, were the result a high 
level of acceptance of Sister Kenny's methods.51 
An outline of the early history of poliomyelitis in Australia is 
available in J.H. L. Cumpston's volume, edited by M.J. Lewis, 
( 1989). Health and Disease in Australia: a history, Canberra: 
Australian Government Printing Service . Cumpston's book, 
written in 1928 during the first phase of his distinguished career 
as Director-General of Health for the Commonwealth of Australia, 
was not published until Lewis undertook the editing of it sixty 
years later. Under the heading "Anterior Poliomyelitis" Cumpston 
states that the first recorded incidence of polio in Australia was in 
1895,52 and that up to 1914 there was no consistent recording of 
further incidence. Cases of Land:ry's paralysis, a disease that may 
have been confused with polio, were not uncommon during the 
1880s. References to early outbreaks are indicated, and useful 
6 I Ross, J.  C. ( 1993 ). A History of Polio in New 7.ealand, p. l 02. 
62 Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J. ). ( 1989). Health and Disease in Austmlia: a 
history: Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, p.326. 
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tables are given which record the incidence of polio in all states, 
1911-1926, and the seasonal distribution of cases. 
Frank Fenner's history of microbiology in Australia briefly records 
the Australian medical response to the polio virus since 1930, 
along with accounts of more recent developmentS.63 Details are 
also given of the key people and institutions that were engaged in 
polio research and the production of vaccine in Australia , 
including Dr P.L .  Bazeley, Dr (later Sir) F.M. Burnet, the 
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, the Walter and Eliza Hall 
Institute, Melbourne, the John Curtin School of Medical Research, 
Canberra, and the Fairfield Hospital, Melbourne. 
The Commonwealth Serum Laboratories played a significant part 
in the Australian response to polio. Its history by A.H. Brogan, 64 
dedicates a chapter specifically to the details of polio vaccine 
development in Australia.65 Brogan's history is based on a variety 
of sources as well as medical and institutional archives. His work 
63 Fenner, F. (ed.), (1990). History of Microbiology inAustm.lia, Curtin: Brolga 
Press, pp.378-9, 504-5. 
64 Brogan, A.H. (1990). Committed to Saving Lives: a history of the Comrrwnwealth 
SerumLabomtorles, South Yarra: Hyland House. 
65 Brogan, A.H. ( 1990). Committed to Saving Lives , Ch 12. Poliomyelitis Vaccine: 
the last major triumph? 
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provides technical information and gives and impression of the 
internal politics of the CSL, which are a significant sub-text to the 
polio story in Australia, and the type of interstate rivalry that 
occurred over the introduction of polio vaccine.55 
Brogan's chapter on polio vaccine is followed by another devoted to 
Dr P.L. (Val) Bazeley. In the late 1940s Bazeley achieved acclaim 
for his work on the development of penicillin and, in October 1952, 
left to join Jonas Salk at the University of Pittsburgh.67 
Somewhat a celebrity, Bazeley returned to Australia in 1955 to 
supervise the manufacture of polio vaccine at the CSL. He arrived 
just before news of the Cutter incident broke. Despite the setback, 
Bazeley's expertise and demanding style of leadership enabled the 
project to go ahead and between 1956 and 1960 the CSL produced 
17,670,000 doses of Salk vaccine.68 Problems developed, during 
1960-61, over the safety and supply of Salk and, after prolonged 
debate, Sabin vaccine was introduced in 1966. A controversial 
figure who ultimately did not flt the "public service mould" of the 
CSL, Bazeley eventually left to Australia to work in America. 
66 Brogan. A.H. ( 1990). Committed to Saving Lives, p.116. 
6 7 Brogan, A.H. ( 1990). Committed to Saving Lives, p.115. 
68 Brogan, A.H. (1990). Committed to Saving Lives, p.122. 
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The historical atlas produced as part of the Bicentennial 
Australian history project contains a small entry on polio69 which 
does more to suggest that further work needs to be done than 
provide the reader with a comprehensive grasp of polio in Australia 
the twentieth century. A brief historical outline of the polio 
incidence in Australia from the early 1900s is supported by charts, 
serial spot maps, and photographs, and brief mention is made of 
the work of Sister Kenny. Epidemics in South Australia (1947-48) 
and Western Australia (1948 and 1954) are analysed briefly, but no 
mention is made of the 1956 epidemic in Western Australia, or the 
major epidemic that occurred in South Australia between 1949 and 
1951. 
Investigations of the work of Sister Elizabeth Kenny (1880-1952) 
provide another source of polio historiography in Australia. 70 
Apart from her own books and pamphlets,7 1  there is a growing 
body of published and unpublished material available which 
explores different aspects of her part in the polio story. 72 John 
69 Gilbert, A.O. and Inglis, K.S. (general eds.), ( 1987). Australians: a historical 
atlas, Broadway, NSW: Fairfax, Syme and Weldon Associates, pp.172-173. 
70 A discussion of Sister Kenny's work is found below at p.188ff 
7 1  Kenny, E. ( 1955). My Battle and My victory: history qfthe discovery qf 
poltomyelltis as a systemic disease, London: Robert Hale Limited, and Kenny, E. 
and Ostenso, M. ( 1943 / 1980). And They Shall Walk, New York: Amo Press. A full 
bibliography of sources related to Sister Kenny can be found in Wilson, J.R. 
( 1995 ) .  Through Kenny 's Eyes: an exploration of Sister EliZabeth Kenny 's views 
about Nursing, Royal College of Nursing: Townsville Regional Group, especially 
Appendices D,E,F,H. 
72 Unpublished works which include material on Sister Kenny and polio include 
Martyr, P. ( 1994). The Prqfessional Development of Rehabilitation inAustralfa, 1870-
1981 , University of Western Australia: PhD Thesis, History, see especially Chapter 
5. See also Martyr, P. ( 1997) . ..  A Small Price to Pay For Peace: the Elizabeth Kenny 
Controversy Re-examined", Australian Historical Studies, Volume 28,Number 
108, Melbourne, pp.47-65. 
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Robert Wilson 73 began his research to explore .. the discourse 
generated by and about" Sister Kenny. His purpose was to 
"uncover some of the ideas, attitudes and beliefs about nursing 
that helped influence Sister Kenny's extraordinary career".74 
Coincidentally he provides valuable historical background in 
connection with Sister Kenny whose career suffered both from 
professional ostracism in Australia, and the same historical 
silence that has attended the history of polio. Sister Kenny did 
not visit Western Australia and was working overseas by the time 
the first major epidemic struck in 1948. Some of her rehabilitation 
methods, which were introduced to the state by the Orthopaedic 
Surgeon R. D. McKellar Hall, raised the ire of Dame Jean 
Macnamara who in 1948 conducted an investigation of on polio 
rehabilitation in W .A. on behalf of the Public Health 
Department.75 
An important early study of polio in Melbourne was produced in 
response to the severe epidemic that occurred in Victorian during 
1937-38. Hilda W. Bull, a Medical Officer of the Victorian 
Department of Health, conducted clinical and epidemiological 
research to produce a report, later published by Melbourne City 
Council. 76 Apart from the medical results reported, many of its 
7 3 Wilson, J .R. (1995 ). Through Kenny's Eyes: an exploration of Sister Elizabeth 
Kenny's views about Nursing, Royal College of Nursing: Townsville Regional Group 
74 Wilson, J.R. (1995). Through Kenny's Eyes, p.vii. 
75 McKellar Hall, R.D. (1983). Reflections, p.47. See Chapter 4 below. 
76 Bull, H. M. ( 1939). Poliomyelitis in the City of Melbourne, Melbourne City 
Council. 
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conclusions shed insight into the social context of the epidemic. 
The epidemic, which occurred at a time when Victoria was 
relatively free from other diseases, began during a cold, dry winter, 
challenging the theory of the 'summer plague'. Both factors were 
surprising, though not without precedent. New Zealand, which 
recorded 656 cases of polio in 1936-37, was seen as the source of 
the infection Victoria. 1 1  An improbable conclusion 78 but one that 
was allowed to stand at the time and which continued to be used 
between the two countries and, as we shall see, between the 
Australian states. Data from earlier epidemics in Victoria shows a 
higher incidence in the slums. 79 Bull challenged the concept that 
children from the upper-classes were most vulnerable to polio and 
argued that in Melbourne, as had also been found in Canada -
The inner suburbs, containing a large proportion of people 
liVing under conditions of overcrowding and economic stress 
actually had the highest incidence.so 
7 7  Bull, H. M. ( 1939). Poliomyelitis tn the City of Melbourne, p.7. 
78 Ross, Jean C. ( 1993). Pollo in New Zealand, p.54. When in February 1938 the 
Maunganui arrived from Australia at Invercargill, it carried the body of a boy who 
died of polio. Normal quarantine procedures had been observed, but it was 
charged that polio was being brought to NZ from Australia. 
79 Poliomyelitis in Melbourne, Medical Journal of Australia, ( 1940). 1 ,  23, June 8, 
pp.809-8 12, MJA, ( 1918). Scientific, 1 .  14, April 6, pp.292-294, F.B. Smith, 
( 1990). 'The Victorian Poliomyelitis epidemic 1937- 1938', pp.87 1 -2 .  
80 Bull, H.M. ( 1939). Poltomyelttls in the City of Melbourne, p.30. 
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All but four per cent of those infected during this epidemic were 
under fourteen years of age. It was notable that a high proportion 
of cases were traceable through direct contact to either an abortive 
or paralytic case of polio. The City responded to the distress polio 
caused, especially to low income to families. Breadwinners were 
often affected by informal social sanctions, even though 
quarantine restrictions were not applied, while the expenses of 
after-care were an added drain. Various forms of relief were 
arranged to assist families affected by these and other concerns. s 1 
Due to the severity of the epidemic, for the first time the 
administration closed schools and classes where infection 
occurred, though no consensus could be reached on the efficacy of 
this policy.s2 F.B. Smith has offered a more detailed historical 
interpretation of this epidemic which places the clinical and 
epidemiological data in a political light.83 In relation to the 
science and politics connected with gaining a deeper understanding 
of the transmission of polio, and the treatment given to Sister 
8 1  Bull, H.M. ( 1939). Poliomyelitis in the City of Melbourne, p.31. 
82 Bull, H.M. (1939). Poliomyelitis in the City of Melbourne, p.39. 
83 Smith, F.B. ( 1990). The Victorian Poliomyelitis epidemic 1937-1938, in 
Caldwell, J. (ed), (Vol. II, Ch. 53). What we Know about Health Transition: the 
cultural, social and behavioural detenntnates of health, The Proceedings of an 
International Workshop, May 1989, Canberra, p.866-881. 
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Elizabeth Kenny, Smith argues that -
... neutral, objective epidemiology and therapeutic regimes 
may sometimes be, as they were in Australia during the polio 
years of the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s, the continuance 
of politics by other meanS.84 
Smith shows that during the 1930s, and in connection with this 
epidemic in particular, Australian researchers, who came close to 
understanding the correct means of polio virus transmission, were 
prevented from making the breakthrough by lack of resources, their 
subordination to orthodox American views, and a failure to pursue 
the logical consequences of the data on hand. 85 It was the 
unusual circumstances of the 1954 royal tour to Western Australia 
that gave Dudley Snow the opportunity to prove the faecal 
contamination theocy.86 
The Great Scourge: the Tasmanian Irifantile Paralysis Epidemic 1937-
38, by Anne Killalea, is based on her Master of Humanities thesis 
of the same title.87 Killalea has written a narrative social histocy 
84 Smith, F.B. ( 1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed), (Vol. II, Ch. 53), p.879. 
85 Smith. F.B. ( 1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed), (Vol. II. Ch. 53). p.873. 
86 Snow, D.J.R. (1955). Crowds and Poliomyelitis: with special reference to a 
recent epidemic in Western Australia, MJA, Vol. I. No. l. See above, Chapter 2. 
8 7 Killalea, A. ( 1992 ). The Great &ourge: the Tasmanian Infantile Pamlysis 
Epidemic 1937-1938, Master of Humanities Thesis, University of Tasmania. 
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of one of the worst epidemics ever recorded in the world. The polio 
virus was peculiarly infective in Tasmania during this epidemic, 
and produced case rate of 421 per 100,000, more than three times 
that recorded during the same period in Victoria, where an 
epidemic occurred concurrently, and more than seven times that of 
any epidemic in Western Australia.88 Killalea shows that, despite 
magnitude of the Tasmanian epidemic, and a plentiful supply of 
historical and personal material, the epidemic attracted no 
mainland attention at the time, and little more since. Her theme 
illuminates the sort of relationship that sometimes prevails 
between the remote Australian states and their more populous 
neighbours. 
The Great Scourge explores the response to the epidemic, the 
experience of those affected by it, and the aftermath. Killalea, 
utilises a wide range of source material, medical, historical, 
photographic and personal. She writes with a view to seeing how 
"personal accounts affect historical understandings" and it is 
through this perspective that she illuminates the impact this 
88 Killalea, A. ( 1995 ). The Great &ourge, p. 136. The worst recorded epidemic 
occurred in Iceland in 1924 when the rate of infection was 480 per 100,000. 
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epidemic had on the small population of Tasmania. No extensive 
published research is so far available for other Australian states 
but unpublished work is available for South Australia and New 
South Wales.sg 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide an international frame 
of reference for this thesis through a review of key items of 
literature related to the historiography of poliomyelitis. John 
Paul's history has disclosed the long quest to understand the virus 
and create a suitable vaccine. John Rowan Wilson has shown 
what difficulties arose in that search, due to lack of centralised 
control of the manufacture of vaccine in America. Rutty's work on 
Canada and the Connaught Laboratories shows an alternative 
response to this difficulty which more closely matches the 
Australian situation, as demonstrated by Brogan in his work on 
the CSL and Bazeley's contribution. The medical history by 
Cumpston and Fenner provides basic information related to the 
89 Buxton, A.J.C. (1977). Poliomyelitis in South Australia 1 937-1956, 
unpublished honours thesis, University of Adelaide, is an administrative history 
which examines the preparedness of South Australia for the onslaught of the 
polio virus, and the ways in which the government and the community 
responded to the epidemics. Cecille Bearup, ( 1991 ). a retired occupational 
therapist who studied at Roosevelt's Warm Springs, USA, wrote her honours 
thesis, The Outcomes of the Poliomyelitis Epidemics in South. Australia 1 912-1960, 
with the Late Effects of Polio, or Post-Polio Syndrome, in view. It is a social 
history which examines the long-term effects of polio on those who were affected 
by the virus. Wendy Greenland, ( 1990). lrifantile Paralysis (Poliomyelitis) in New 
South Wales, 1930-1940: a study of perceptions and reactions, honours thesis, 
University of New South Wales, analyses why polio was perceived by the medical 
profession, the public and social commentators of all kinds to be the most feared 
of all diseases. Greenland argues that the fear was based on Ignorance, the lack 
of a cure, and the horror of paralysis. Outside the work on Sister Kenny, there is 
no historical research I am aware of that has been attempted in connection with 
the epidemics of polio in Queensland. 
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Australian situation, but it is not extensive in scope. The social 
meaning of polio in the American and British contexts is brought 
out in different ways by Rogers, Gallagher, Gould and Jane S 
Smith. The classless nature of the disease, the fear and denial 
that attended its presence in the community, the centrality of FOR 
to the process of finding a cure, his role in the denial that 
characterises the history of polio, and the making of polio heroes, 
are illustrated by these authors. And as indicated above, 
Australian and New Zealand perspectives are offered by Jean Ross 
(New Zealand) ,  F.B. Smith and Hilda Bull (Victoria) ,  Anne Killalea 
(Tasmania) and John Robert Wilson (Sister Kenny) . 
The themes explored in the literature reviewed here are pertinent to 
the West Australian experience. The long quest for a vaccine, 
marked by confusion over the nature of the disease and the 
consequences for implementing control measures, and the conflict 
over health control in industrial democracies all feature in the 
story of polio in Western Australia. And the fear and denial that 
polio aroused were felt just as strongly here. The published history 
of polio in Western Australia, and the sources used for this thesis, 
have been outlined in Chapter 1 above. The following chapters 
discuss the history of polio in Western Australia in detail. 
*** 
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CHAPTER 4: A fortunate experience: polio in Western 
Australia 19 13- 194 7. 
Western Australia has been extremely fortunate in its experience of this disease 
by comparison with other States. 1 
Polio in WA prior to 19 13 
Western Australia was seriously affected by polio for eighteen 
years, from 1938 to 1956, a much shorter period than was suffered 
in other states. Serious incidence of polio was recorded in South 
Australia between 1897 and 1 963,2 in New South Wales , 
Queensland and Victoria between 1903 and 1963, and in Tasmania 
between 1930 and 1960. 3 The low incidence of polio in Western 
Australia between 1913, when the Public Health Department 
commenced keeping records, and 1938, when the first major 
outbreak occurred, was the consistent pattern for the state. 
There is no consolidated source of information on the incidence of 
polio in Western Australia prior to 1913, 4 but hospital Admission 
and Discharge registers which are available for Perth Public 
Hospital (later Royal Perth Hospital, RPH) indicate the diagnosis 
for each patient. Determining the number of polio cases admitted 
l Public Health 1 939-44, ( 1944). Report, p.6. BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
2 Buxton, A.J.G. (1977). Poliomyelitis, p.82. 
3 Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J . ). ( 1989). Health and Disease in Australia, p. 
326, and Figure 3. 
4 A table of the reported polio incidence in all states of Australia 1911-1926 
[Figure 41 can be found in Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J.). ( 1989). Health and 
Disease in Australia, p. 326. The only entry for WA prior to 19 16 records eight 
cases in 1913. Cumpston's figures vary a little from those found in Figure 4 and 
referred to in the letter CPH to S. Dove, 26 April 1935, BL, ACC 1003, 
120/ 4,626, 1925, p. 128. 
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to hospital prior to 1900, or even 1 9 1 0 ,  is complicated by two 
factors. Diagnoses were recorded in a column that could contain 
only a few words, and a variety of descriptions were used for what 
could possibly have been Infantile Paralysis. It is possible that the 
diagnosis of polio was not yet sufficiently defined for doctors to use 
it, and there is evidence that, in Western Australia, polio was not 
considered a threat to the community. For example between 1899 
and 1 909 Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis, or Infantile Paralysis, was 
not included on the list of diseases that were considered to be 
dangerous, malignant, infectious or contagious.5 
Hospital registers reveal that between 1 876 and 1894 there were no 
cases of children admitted to Perth Public Hospital (PPH) with 
poliomyelitis. During this period approximately thirty patients 
were admitted with "paralysis" which was regarded as a "nervous 
disease" a category that included apoplexy, tetanus, hemiplegia 
and chorea.6 Of this number the youngest was a fifteen year old 
male admitted on 1 8  October 1 876, who was hospitalised for only 
five days. If he had polio it seems unlikely that his was a serious 
case. The remainder of those listed were aged between twenty four 
and seventy eight years of age and it seems unlikely that many, or 
any, of these were cases of poliomyelitis. 
5 Definitions of Diseases, Central Board of Health, 27 June 1899, p.10; Letter, 
Undersecretary to Mayor of Coolgardie, 31 July 1909, p.2, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120 / 4 595 / 45. Malignant, lrifectf.ous or Contagious Diseases were - Smallpox, 
Asiatic Cholera, Plague, Yellow Fever, Typhus Fever, Leprosy. The list Dangerous 
Infectious Diseases added to the above Scarlet Fever, Typhoid Fever, Diphtheria, 
Diptheritic Group. 
6 Admission and Discharge Registers, Perth Public Hospital, Book 1, 1876-1886; 
Book 2 1887-1897, Royal Perth Hospital Museum. 
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The first case of Anterior Poliomyelitis to be diagnosed and 
recorded as such was a thirty four year old male who was admitted 
to PPH in June 1895. 7 It is not clear whether he had recently 
contracted polio, or whether he was admitted for after-care, but 
seventy four days later he was discharged in a "relieved" condition. 
Between 1895 and 1912 sixteen cases of polio, including the one 
above, are listed in the hospital registers and of these twelve were 
children,s and four were adults. 9 The worst incidence occurred in 
1904 when three children were admitted with polio . On their 
discharge the condition of twelve of these patients was described as 
"relieved", two as "unrelieved", and two as "status quo". During 
this period numerous cases of "paralysis" are listed along with 
"diphtheritic paralysis" or "post-diphtheric paralysis", "infantile 
atrophy", "bulbar paralysis" and "myelitis"- a description which is 
reserved for older patients. In 1904 a forty two year old male died 
of bulbar paralysis and respiratory failure, 1 o which is not described 
as polio related, but the link would seems plausible. And in 1905 
a diagnosis of "febrile attack" is noted in a twelve year old female, 
which seems suspiciously like a non-paralytic polio infection. I I If 
these hospital registers are any guide to the state-wide incidence of 
polio in Western Australia up to 1912, the disease affected 
individual lives but posed no threat to the community. An 
7 Register, Book 2. 1887- 1897, RPH; 1895, entry 226. 
8 Nine were aged between eleven months and three years, the remaining three 
were five, six and nine years of age respectively. 
9 Registers, Books 2-14, 1887- 19 12, RPH. Two adults were aged 34, one 42 and 
the other 60. 
10 Register, Book 6, 1903-1905, RPH; 1904, entry 862. 
1 1  Register, Book 6, 1903- 1905, RPH; 1904, entry 1321. 
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outbreak of polio was reported in Kalgoorlie in 1 909, but there 
appears to be no corroborating evidence to support this cla1m. 1 2 
While polio may not have presented any danger to the Western 
Australian community at this time, other infectious diseases 
certainly did. The Central Board of Health (CBH, later the Public 
Health Department), established under the Health Act 1 886-191 1 ,  
had to manage outbreaks of influenza, leprosy, typhoid, diphtheria 
and small pox. 1 3 The CBH circulated information to Local Boards 
of Health regarding the characteristics of infectious diseases and 
methods of controlling them. 14 Local Boards, which were required 
to report any incidence of these diseases, in turn issued directions 
to the public concerning their responsibilities when infection 
occurred, and the treatment of infected persons. 1 5 As a result of a 
smallpox epidemic in 1 893 the Victoria Hospital, a small, primitive 
infectious diseases hospital was established in bushland west of 
the suburb of Subiaco. 1 6 
It was typhoid that most sorely tested the Central Board of 
Health's resources, as a result of the gold rushes of the 1 890s. The 
rapid increase of population accompanied by poor living conditions 
1 2 Note, 5 February 1932, BL, ACC 1003, AN 1 20/4, 626/ 1925, p.48. "There was 
an epidemic in Kalgoorlie in 1909 but I cannot help you about those patients." 
The Kalgoorlie newspapers for 1908-9 gave no evidence of an outbreak. 
1 3 Snow, D.J.R. ( 198 1 ). Progress, pp.57-65. 
14 Circular Letter, JHL Cumpston, Secretary, Central Board of Health to 
Secretary, Local board of Health, BL, ACC 1003, AN 1 20/4, 988 /  1910, p. l .  
1 5 Notice regarding Infectious Diseases, Guildford Municipality, Local Board of 
Health; Davyhurst-Mulwarrie Local Board of Health, Notice re Typhoid Fever, BL, 
ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 16 19/ 1 908, unnumbered pages. 
1 6 Bolton, G.C. and Joske, P. (1 982). History ofRoyal Perth Hospital,Perth, Royal 
Perth Hospital, p.57-58; Snow, D.J.R. (198 1 ). Progress, p.62; Martyr, P. (1996).A 
History of the Victoria Hospital {Infectious Diseases) to the Royal Perth 
(Rehabilitatton) Hospital, 1893-1993, unpublished manuscript: Perth. 
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led to an outbreak of typhoid fever which commenced in 1894 . 
Hundreds of typhoid cases boosted admissions to the PPH, 1 7 
without accounting for the thousands from the gold fields who 
died before reaching hospital or were nursed locally. The mortality 
rate from typhoid rose from 73 in 1894 to 325 in 1895, and 400 in 
1897 and 1898. A decade later in 1904 , after the goldflelds 
achieved a secure water supply, the number of annual cases 
declined to below three figures. 18 For a decade the state grappled 
with typhoid and in the process had witnessed what Snow named 
"one of the most protracted and notorious epidemics in the history 
of public health" . 19 
Polio in WA 19 13- 1947 
Despite low incidence of polio in Western Australia up to 1912, the 
newly formed Public Health Department took the step of extending 
the list of notifiable diseased to include Acute Infantile Paralysis.20 
In doing so it noted that there had been epidemic outbreaks of 
polio in Australia, America, England and Europe. Yet it was to be 
36 years before the state would face its first real test from polio. A 
maximum of nineteen cases were recorded in 1916 and 192 5, 
followed by sixteen in 1940 and 1943 , matched by zero in 1917 and 
17 Register, Book 2, 1887-1897, RPH; total admissions rose from 8 12 in 1896 to 
1534 in 1897, Bolton, G.C. and Joske, P. (1982). RPH, p.58 . Between June 1896 
and June 1898 there were 1387 typhoid admissions, of which 10% died. 
18  Snow, D.J.R. (198 1). Progress, p. 160. 
19  Snow, D.J.R. (1981). Progress, p.4. A full account ofthe "two fevers" is to be 
found in a fine social history, Whittington, V. ( 1988). Gold and Typhoid: two 
fevers, University of Western Australia Press, Nedlands. 
20 Memo CPH to Undersecretary, 7 May 1912, p. 18; Order in Council, 28 May 
1912, Proclamation 31 September 19 12, p.2 1, BL, ACC 1003, AN, 120/4, 595/45. 
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1922.21 The worst incidence, forty eight cases, occurred in 1 938 
and was regarded by some as the first "epidemic" but it was really 
only an initial flurry of activity. Western Australia remained 
relatively free of the polio from 1913  to 1947, when an average of 
seven cases per year were recorded [Figure 5].22 In the 
corresponding period the low incidence of polio in Western 
Australia to 1947 is exceeded only by the Northern Territory and 
the Australian Capital Territory.23 
During the 1930s Tasmania, Victoria and New South Wales 
suffered severely from polio and from then on the disease claimed a 
significant place on the public health agendas of all Australia 
states. New South Wales had 240 cases in 1929, and 1 06 and 
382 in 1931 and 1932 respectively. Victoria recorded 2 76 cases in 
1931 and Queensland 284 in 1932. But by far the worst years were 
1937 and 1938 when Victoria recorded 2 176 cases, Tasmania 1006, 
New South Wales 757 cases, South Australia 389, and Queensland 
281 [Figure 3).24 Against this Western Australia's fifteen cases in 
1937, followed by forty eight in 1938, hardly rated a mention even 
though it was the worst total so far. The most severe outbreaks of 
polio in Australia were still to come in the 1950s, when Western 
Australia also suffered signiflcan t epidemics. 
Increased activity of the polio virus in Australia is paralleled in 
2 1 CPH to S. Dove, 26 April 1935, BL, ACC 1003, 1 20/ 4,626, 1925,p. 1 28. 22 Public Health 1948, (1 949). Appendix XV, p.6, BL, 61 4.09 WES. 
23 See Figure 3. 
24 Commonwealth Year Book, 1929- 1966, see also Buxton, A.J.G. ( 1977). 
Poliomyelitis, p.84 
CHAPTER 4: A fortunate experience: 1 9 1 3- 1 947 1 1 3 
New Zealand which had several polio epidemics in the period 1916 
to 1956. In 1916 there were 1018 cases, 1925, 1,159 cases, and 
1937, 816 cases. In 1946 and 1947 rates of polio infection were 
higher than normal and in 1948 another epidemic occurred, which 
extended into 1949, with 963 and 355 cases respectively. What 
must have seemed like an interminable epidemic occurred between 
1952 and 1956 when, apart from a respite in 1954 when 43 cases 
occurred, the remaining years recorded totals of 890, 403, 703 and 
897 respectively.25 And in 1961, five years after immunisation 
commenced, there was a wonying increase to 214 cases, a feature 
shared with several states in Australia. 
The remoteness of Western Australia may have some bearing on a 
pattern, discernible later, in which polio epidemics occurred after 
those in New Zealand and the eastern states.26 There was no lack 
of vigilance on the part of the authorities, despite the delayed 
appearance of polio in Western Australia. Preparations were made 
at an early stage, even though health experts did not know how to 
predict the occurrence of an epidemic and were unsure what 
measures to adopt to prevent or control an outbreak. In 1916, 
when New York and New Zealand were experiencing severe 
epidemics, the Public Health Department noted the occurrence, 
advised its Local Government authorities accordingly and 
"requested their observance of the ordinary conditions of 
2 5  Ross. Jean C. ( 1993). New Zealand, Appendix 2, Table 1 ,  pp. 108- 109. 
2 6 For example, in 1937-38, 194 7-48 and 1 952-54, see Public Health 1948, 
( 1949), Appendix :XV, p.58, BL, 6 14.09 WES; Ross, ( 1993). New Zealand, Appendix 
4, p. 1 14 ;  Killalea, A. ( 1992). The Great Scourge, p. 70. The first case of polio in the 
Tasmanian epidemic of 1 937-38 occurred on 5 November 1937. 
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notiflcation".27 A year later the Town Clerk of Boulder, in 
response to a reported case of polio, wrote to the Commissioner 
seeking information.28 In 1926, one year after the second epidemic 
in New Zealand, the Commissioner wrote to the doctor in the 
wheat-belt town of Bruce Rock expressing his concern that, of the 
dozen cases notified in the state that year, three had come from 
his district.29 From this period onwards the Public Health 
Department was in contact with its corresponding bodies in other 
states to share and seek information concerning the threat posed 
by polio.30 
During the 1930s polio began to be discussed more widely in 
Western Australia. It is possible that this resulted from reports of 
epidemics in the eastern states, New Zealand, and other countries 
overseas. In 1932 the Commissioner received a letter written by a 
man who lived at the Old Men's Home in Claremont, who said -
I suffered from this disease when a child of three, and am 
now forty six years of age. If you think I could be of any use 
to you, I am willing to come forward at any time.3 1 
2 7 Circular Letter, CPH to LHA. 25 November 19 16, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 
626/ 1925, p. l .  
28  Town Clerk, Boulder to CPH. 1 1  October 191 7, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
626/ 1925, p.3. 
29 CPH to Dr Bean, 27 May 1926. BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4.  626/ 1925, p.21. 
30 For example, Department of Public Health, Hobart. to P ublic Health 
Department, WA, 3 1  April 193 1 .  BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4,  626/ 1925 p. 32. "I 
have to request you to be good enough to furnish me with the following data 
regarding Anterior Poliomyelitis in your State: 1 )  The number of cases reported 
since 1925. 2) What steps have been taken for treatment of early cases, and in 
the after-care of paralysed cases. 3) Who is responsible for the expenditure 
involved in so far as item (2 ) is concerned? 4) What steps, if any, are taken to 
provide for the teaching of children. and vocational training of adults? See also 
pages 36, 6 1  and 62 for further examples. 
3 1 Letter to CPH. 18  Februazy 1932. BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, p.84. 
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On the basis of his evidence he had polio in 1898. There is no 
evidence that he was in the state at that time of his infection but 
one reason he lived at the Old Men's Home, at age forty six, could 
have been that he suffered from serious paralysis. It is possible 
that he was a pensioner. At this time there were in the state 
eleven males and six females who had applied for pensions due to 
incapacitation from polio.32 
Early attempts to create a prophylactic using blood from polio 
infected people aroused public interest and there were others who 
joined the man above in offering themselves, or their blood for 
serum.3 3  In 1937 one such donor wrote -
Some years ago I read that a serum to combat Infantile 
paralysis could be prepared from the blood of a person who 
had recovered from the disease. As it now seems to be 
prevalent in other parts of Australia I thought there might be 
a demand for such blood. I suffered from this disease in 
1904 and although my left leg is practically useless am 
otherwise recovered. I would be prepared to give as much 
blood as I could spare if it is of any use to the Department.34 
Stocks of this type of serum were kept by the Public Health 
Department,35 but it was of limited usefulness, it being "powerless 
to check the development of the disease" . 36 Serum was usually 
32 Undated List, BL ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, p.58. 
33 Note, 10 February 1932, BL ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, p.57. 
34 Letter HCP to CPH, 22 July 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, p. 144. 
35 Telegram, Director General of Health, to CPH, 27 January 1932, p.36; 
Secretary, Central Board of Health Adelaide to CPH, 5 February 1932, p.44, BL, 
ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1106/ 1933. 
36 Australian Archives, CRS 1928 / 1, 8012, Section 2. Zwar, D. ( 1984) The Dame: 
the life and times of Dame Jean Macnamam, medial pfoneer, South Melbourne: 
Macmillan, pp. 18-20. F.M Burnet considered that after 1931 no one should 
have used serum, but Macnamara continued its use until 1937. 
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only applied when polio was diagnosed in an unparalysed patient, 
in the hope that paralysis would not develop. By then the 
patient's own body was producing antibodies and the serum added 
little further protection. 
In the early 1930s the favoured understanding was that the polio 
virus gained entry through the nose and mouth,37 by means of oral 
and nasal droplets.3 8  Concentration on this point of entry led to 
the development, in the late 1930s, of nasal sprays - some of which 
were quite dangerous - and even a nasal peg. 39 Negative reaction 
to the use of these sprays, and difficulties in encouraging the use 
of the nasal peg eventually led to them being abandoned. 
Personal contact was also suspect, and in particular its effect on 
children was feared. In 1932 the editor of the Wagin Argus , a 
country newspaper, published this warning -
DON'T KISS ME 
Now that infantile paralysis has raised its ugly head in 
Australia, the "don't kiss me" campaign has started. 
Everybody seems to want to kiss every baby. No doubt the 
rosebud mouth is a tempting target, but it is a filthy and 
disgusting practice for the Twentieth Century, and rough on 
the baby! Every babe should wear a bib labelled "Don't Kiss 
Me! "40 
37 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.246, Smith, F.B. (1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed.), (Vol. 
II, Ch. 53), p.867. 
38 Burnet, F.M. (1935) MJA. 21 September, Vol 2, No.12, p.390. 
3 9 Paul, J.R. (1971). History , p.316; Smith, F.B. (1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed), (Vol. 
II, Ch. 53), p.868; Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Paralysis, p.20; Helms, K. 
(1937). "Poliomyelitis" MJA, 2,8,  21 August, pp.328-9; Buxton, A.J.G. (1977). 
Poliomyelitis, p.26. Despite lack of official endorsement of nasal sprays in South 
Australia, during 1937-38 the Hindmarsh Council promoted their use. In 
February 1938 the sprays were officially declared to be useless. 
40 Wagin Argus, 21 March, 1932, p.2. 
CHAPTER 4: A fortunate experience: 1913-194 7 1 1 7 
This attitude was not confined to country people but was strongly 
promoted by the medical profession. In 1937, when the Victorian 
epidemic was gaining momentum, Dr Featonby, the head of the 
Department of Public Health, said that the key question in regard 
to polio infection was whether or not a person had developed 
immunity. He then warned -
. . .  that kissing was medically a most dangerous custom. It 
was the commonest method of spreading the disease which 
found entrance through the nose and throat.41 
A great deal of ignorance prevailed concerning polio, but such 
knowledge as was available was passed on to the public. In 1932, 
when the first case of polio known in the coastal town of Bun bury 
was notified, the following description of the disease accompanied 
the report in the WaginArgus . 
The only symptoms are fever, irritability, headache, stiffness 
of the neck, vomitting, twitching of muscles, constipation 
and sometimes convulsions. These are generally followed in 
a few days (if death does not occur in the early stages) by 
paralysis of one or more limbs or groups of muscles. Some 
cases have been known without any paralysis whatever 
occurring. 42 
Whether or not this information was provided by the Public Health 
Department, it would have done little to still the fear of polio that 
was developing in the community. 
41 WestemMatl, 12 August 1937, p.25. 
42 Argus, 10 November 1932, p.2. 
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It is also evident that during the 1930s medical professionals in 
Western Australia, especially those who worked among children, 
were becoming alarmed at the prospect of a polio outbreak. In 
January 1932 the Honorary Staff at the Children's Hospital, (later 
known as Princess Margaret Hospital for Children), met to discuss 
the subject. It was unanimously agreed to convey their concern to 
the Commissioner in the following resolutions: 
1. That in the opinion of the Honorary Staff and epidemic of 
Poliomyelitis is an alarming possibility, and that steps be 
taken immediately to prepare for such. 
2. That the Honorary Staff is anxious to discover for its 
guidance what machinery exists for combatting such an 
epidemic. 
3. That a copy of the above resolutions be sent to the 
Commissioner for Public Health, and that he be informed 
that the Honorary Staff would greatly appreciate the 
courtesy of his attendance at a further special meeting, to be 
held in the Board Room of the Children's Hospital on 
Wednesday 2 7th January at 8.30pm. 43 
From the late 1920s serious consideration was also given to 
upgrading the poor facilities of the Infectious Diseases Branch of 
RPH.44 A new facility was agreed upon and a conference of all 
Municipal Councils and Road Boards in the metropolitan area was 
called in 1933 to discuss the joint funding of the project. The 
43 R.D. McKellar Hall to CPH, 20 January 1932, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 
626/ 1925, p.35. 
44 Bolton, G.C. and Joske, P. ( 1982). RPH, pp. 12 1 - 124; RPH Board Minute 28 
June 1928, p.4 and 26 July 1928, p.2. At one stage a new facility was planned, to 
be located in the outer suburb of Kwinana, and it was intended to offer polio 
after-care based on the principles of Sister Elizabeth Kenny. The proposal came 
to nothing, and IDB was upgraded. The full account of these developments is to 
be found in Martyr, P. ( 1996). A History of the Victoria Hospital ffnfectious Diseases) 
to the Royal Perth (Rehabilttn.tion) Hospital, 1893-1993, unpublished manuscript: 
Perth. 
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conference unanimously agreed -
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That the Government be requested to submit to the local 
authorities, at the earliest date possible, a basis upon which 
the local government bodies interested may in conjunction 
with the Government, make the earliest possible provision 
for an up-to-date and central hospital for the treatment of 
infectious diseases. 45 
There were continuing difficulties between the Public Health 
Department and Local Authorities with respect to achieving 
funding for the venture, 46 but a redeveloped Infectious Diseases 
Hospital was ready for occupation early in 1939, at a total cost of 
£52, 175.47 When planning this development the Public Health 
Department sought information from Victoria with the intention of 
emulating the Fairfield Infectious Diseases Hospital, Melbourne. 48 
Another feature of the 1 930s was that the work of Sister Elizabeth 
Kenny captured the interest of both the medical profession and the 
public.49 The Kenny method included giving psychological support 
to the polio patient and treating the group of muscles affected by 
paralysis with a combination of hot packs, massage, active 
45 Letter, Town Clerk, Fremantle to CPH, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4 626/ 1933, 
pp. I ,  4, 6 and 7. 
46 WA. 10 Februruy 1938, p. 18; 12 April 1938, p. 12; 10 May 1938,p. 12; 13 May 
1938, p.2 1  
4 7 Martyr, P. ( 1996). A History of the Victoria Hospital, unpublished manuscript. 
48 Under Secretruy to Scholes, 9 December 1933, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
626/ 1925, p. 4. 
49 Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Paralysis, p.5 1. During the 1930s Sister Kenny 
and Lord Nuffleld were both responsible for stimulating greater awareness of the 
needs of disabled children. 
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exercises and hydrotherapy, during the acute stage of infection.so 
In contrast orthodox medical treatment immobilised the patient in 
splints or plaster casts for up to six months. and treated pain with 
massage and analgesics. While some were receptive to her 
methods, and she was able to commence clinics in Townsville, 
Brisbane and Sydney, the medical establishment ultimately 
resisted her innovations. Controversy frustrated her work in 
Australia during the 1930s. It was overseas, particularly in the 
United States of America, that her methods achieved most 
recognition in the 1940s.51 
Three investigations of Sister Kenny's methods were conducted in 
Australia during the late 1930s and the reports were published in 
the Medical Journal of Australia (MJA).5 2  Public awareness aroused 
by this was sustained through media reports which broadcast her 
international successes and discussed her techniques. Many were 
searching in hope for methods which would alleviate the effects of 
polio paralysis, and there was an openness, particularly amongst 
members of the public, to anything that seemed as though it would 
help. But the medical establishment did not approve, though 
50 Wilson, J.R. ( 1995). Through Kenny's Eyes: an explomtlon ofSister Elizabeth 
Kenny 's views about Nursing, Royal College of Nursing: Townsville Regional 
Group, especially Appendix B, p l36.  See also Martyr, P. ( 1994). The Professional 
Development of Rehabilitation in AustmUa, 1870-1981 , University of Western 
Australia: PhD Thesis, Histocy, Chapter 5 .  
51 Zwar, D .  ( 1984). The Dame, pp .  84-87. Dame Jean Macnamara was vecy 
critical of Sister Kenny, and competed with her for project funds. The two 
women advocated opposite methods of treatment for polio. Macnamara 
published her views on the treatment of polio, The Care of the Paralyses of 
Poliomyelitis, ( 1946). MJA, 2, 17, 26 October, pp.577-580. 
52 Medical Journal of Austmlia, (MJA), ( 1937). The treatment of Paralysis at the 
Elizabeth Kenny Clinic, Royal North Shore Hospital, Sydney, 2, 20, November 13, 
pp. 888-894; MJA, ( 1939). Report on an investigation of twenty three cases of 
poliomyelitis in which the "Kenny system" was used, W R  Forster and E E  Price, 
1 .  8, Februruy 25, pp.32 1 -325 . 
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some doctors were ambivalent. 
1 2 1  
The Queensland Government held a two-year-long Royal 
Commission into Sister Kenny's methods, the findings of which 
were published in full in the first edition of the MJA for 1938.53 
The Commission, did not recommend the Kenny method at all -
especially during the acute or early stages of paralysis. The 
findings, which were reported in the press, included the statement 
that -
The belief held by many people in the possibility of a cure 
and in the reality of improvement by the Kenny method, in 
spite of facts to the contracy, is attributable to Miss Kenny's 
strong personality. Her own conviction of technical 
competence, and of the improvement in patients treated by 
her all combined to inspire the patients and relatives with 
greater hope, and especially with unshakeable loyalty to Miss 
Kenny.54 
Some ambivalence towards Sister Kenny is evident in other 
quarters. The Federal Health Minister, Sir Earle Page, himself a 
medical practitioner, declared that he could only find one point of 
controversy between Sister Kenny and the doctors. The the real 
value of her work lay in her personal enthusiasm, and the 
confidence she inspired in her patients.55 Sister Kenny's methods, 
and her professional credibility, were soundly called into question 
by a medical establishment that was unable to accept the core of 
her work, which involved respecting and nurturing the whole 
53 MJA, (1938). Report of the Queensland Royal Commission on modem 
methods for the treatment of poliomyelitis, I ,  5, 29 January, pp.187-224; WA, 6 
January, 1938, p.15. 
54 WA, 6 January, 1938, p. 15, and MJA, (1938). I ,  5, January 29, p. 219. 
55 WA, 19 January 1938, p.21. 
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person. 
1 2 2  
The report drew an indignant response from Sister Kenny who, in 
threatening an early conclusion to a project she was then engaged 
in in Melbourne said 
So many stumbling blocks have been placed in my way . . .  I 
intended to stay longer. . .  but misrepresentations by the 
Brisbane Commission- and certain obstacles here have 
changed my plans.56 
After a conference with Government officials, Kenny reversed her 
decision and continued her work in Melbourne, and the Victorian 
Minister for Health, also a medical practitioner, declared that most 
of the profession "were eager that Sister Kenny's treatment should 
be investigated here".57 Elizabeth Kenny did not visit Western 
Australia, but the Public Health Department apprised itself of her 
views and declared that "her treatment [did] not materially differ 
from that of doctors and hospitals everywhere" .58 From this it 
seems those with polio could feel confident of the treatment they 
would receive from their doctors, regardless of Sister Kenny. 
Nevertheless, her techniques did have an effect on orthopaedic 
practices in Western Australia. 
In 1936 R.D. McKellar Hall , the orthopaedic surgeon in charge at 
the Children's Hospital, accepted an invitation of the Minister for 
56 WA, 6 January, 1938, p. 15. 
57 WA, 7 January, 1938, p.20.  
58 Memo,Undersecretary to Angus and Robertson. 27 August 1937, request for a 
copy of Kenny, E. Infantile Paralysis and Cerebral Dtplegta; Letter, 10 March 1938; 
Letter, 27 January 1938; BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, pp. 15 1,290 and 
317. 
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Health to attended a conference in Canberra to investigate the 
problems of dealing with the after-care of polio survivors, and 
those crippled by other means.59 The controversy surrounding 
Kenny's work was one of the reasons the Director General of 
Health convened the gathering. McKellar Hall records the tensions 
evident between Kenny some of his professional colleagues, 
particularly Harold Crawford, a leading orthopaedic surgeon from 
Brisbane. McKellar Hall visited a Kenny Clinic in Sydney where, 
after witnessing a demonstration by Sister Kenny he said 
I relearned an important lesson and found I was on Sister 
Kenny's side. A very old method of treatment was reinforced 
in my mind, the use of common-sense.60  
On his return McKellar Hall implemented some methods based on 
her technique. 
At the end of 1938, when there was an unusually large number of 
polio after-care cases to attend to, the Public Health Department 
sought a person with massage skills to do what it termed 
"reconstruction work with post-polio sufferers,"61 but no mention 
is made of Sister Kenny. 
A decade later when Kenny's protagonist, Dame Jean Macnamara, 
visited Western Australia she brought down a report that was 
severely critical of what she saw. The facilities in the state were a 
"slow but effective factory which turns the potential cripple from 
59 McKellar Hall, R.D. ( 1 983). Reflections, pp.39-46. 
60 McKellar Hall, R.D. ( 1983). Reflections, p.43. 
6 1  WA, 8 April 1938, p. 18; WM. 14 April 1938, p.5 1 .  
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poliomyelitis into the finished cripple". 62 
1 24 
Apart from any 
inadequacies that existed in Western Australia's polio after care 
system at that time, an added factor was that she disapproved of 
the more active methods of rehabilitation that were being applied, 
derived from Kenny's techniques.63 
Awareness of the dangers posed by polio increased in Western 
Australia as a result of the epidemics in the eastern states during 
1937-1938. It is significant that, in September 1937, the Public 
Health Department had Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis declared a 
"dangerous infectious disease within the meaning of section 204 of 
the Health Act 1911-1935.64 Compared with its earlier status as a 
"notifiable disease" this change gave the Commissioner the right to 
invoke emergency powers in time of need. The change had to be 
announced each time the Department believed an emergency 
existed which called for access to the special powers of the Health 
Act. When invoked these powers temporarily authorised the 
Executive Director of the Public Health Department to perform 
duties he did not have, but were normally vested in Local 
Authorities. Options include powers of entry, inspection, the 
isolation of infected persons, houses and places, and "the removal 
and curative treatment of the sick" .65 
Differences of opinion over polio were evident among doctors 
6 2  Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/  4, 1 190/ 1948, pp. 22-23. This report is 
discussed below, p. 182ff. 
63  McKellar Hall, R.D. ( 1983). Reflections, p.47. 
64 Minute, Executive Council, 9 September 1937, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4.  
595/45, p.90. 
65 Health Act 191 1, Part ix - Infectious diseases, By-law 249,6, p. 189. 
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during the 1930s. Some treated polio infection in the same way 
as soldiers at war had treated death - you'll get it if it's coming to 
you - while others endeavoured to play down the horror and risks 
or paralysis. The author of the weekly column "The Diary of a 
Doctor" wrote 
It is right and proper that we take whatever precautions are 
necessary . . .  but there is much accentuation of infantile 
paralysis as a horror disease . . .  its results are not nearly so 
disastrous or crippling as many other quite common diseases 
of children. Rheumatic fever, for instance leaves more 
permanent damage and crippling in its train than infantile 
paralysis ever did. Even whooping cough is more serious.66 
The press in Western Australia were accused of fueling the growing 
fear of polio , but it is difficult to see how it could have censored 
news of epidemics from other states. Travellers, telephones and 
letters would have conveyed the news and rendered the secrecy 
counterproductive . The progress of epidemics elsewhere , 
particularly the severe occurrences in Victoria and Tasmania in 
1937, received regular, and sometimes sensational coverage in the 
papers.67 
Public concern over polio is evident at this time, however it may 
have arisen. The Australian Natives' Association (ANA) requested 
the Minister for Health, the Honourable S .W. Munsie, to order 
that people entering the state, by any means, should be subjected 
to a medical examination. Such a step had been recommended 
and taken by other states when their neighbours were infected by 
66 WM, 9 September 1937, p.5. 
67 WM, 7 October 1 937, p.2; 2 1  October 1937, p.59; 28 October 1937, p.59; 4 
November 1937, p.60; 1 1  November 1937,p.59; 18 November 1937, p.72. 
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polio. 68 The ANA was particularly concerned that children should 
be examined, and asked what steps the government would take in 
the event of an escalation in the Victorian epidemic. The 
Minister's reply confirmed the difficulties being experienced by his 
department and, by expressing the view that the authorities did 
not know what factors led to an epidemic of polio, left room for 
any existing fear of an approaching epidemic to continue 
unabated. He wrote -
I can assure you that such steps as can feasibly be taken to 
limit or prevent the possibility of spread to this State, will be 
taken. It must be recognised, however, that sporadic cases 
of Infantile Paralysis do occur and such have actually 
occurred in this State, and exactly what the factors are 
which influence the appearance of the same disease in 
epidemic form are not known.69 
The ANA were joined in their concern by the Fremantle branch of 
the Australian Labor Party, which framed an even stronger 
resolution recommending that, while an epidemic was in progress 
elsewhere, children under sixteen should be prohibited from 
entering Western Australia. 10 In reply the Commissioner pointed 
out that his Department had appointed a consultative committee 
of doctors which recommended visitors from Victoria be 
68 WM, 26 August 1937, p.23. In view of the Victorian polio epidemic, a Bill was 
introduced to prohibit the entxy into NSW, by sea, land or air, of any child of 
sixteen or younger who was known to have had contact with polio. These 
restrictions did not apply to adults, see Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Paralysis, 
pp. 3, 38 and 44. And Buxton, A.J.G. (1977). Poliomyelitis, pp.20-21 and 30 
states that in 1937-38 the South Australian Education Department cancelled 
interstate trips for schoolchildren between SA and Victoria and applied 
quarantine restrictions, and the Northern Territory imposed quarantine 
restrictions against SA. 
69 Letter, 3 September 1937, and reply, 4 September 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/ 4, 626/ 1925, pp. 158-9. 
70 Letter, ALP to Munsie, 18 November 1937, p. 189, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 
626/ 1925. 
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quarantined. He aimed to show that the Public Health 
Department was exercising more rtgour in this matter than other 
states when he said that "Infantile Paralysis is not one of those 
diseases for which Interstate and International quarantine has 
previously applied". 7 1 
In addition to concern expressed by organisations, it is evident 
that members of the community were fearful of the consequences 
of contact with polio. A man from Kalgoorlie who intended to 
holiday in Melbourne wrote to the Commissioner seeking advice, 
afraid that his trip would result in twenty one days of quarantine 
on his return. 72 The Commissioner was to receive many similar 
letters in the the years to come. 
In Western Australia a significant expression of the fear of polio 
and the frustration that attended it can be seen in the controversy 
that developed over quarantine restrictions. The controversy also 
may have fostered this fear because it exposed the uncertain state 
of knowledge about polio. And it also brought into focus the 
question of how extensive the powers of the Public Health 
Department were, and how fully it was prepared to exercise them. 
From this time onwards many Western Australians, in fear of their 
children and looking for someone to blame, came to believe that 
the Department ought to have been far more assertive than it was 
in the face of the threat from polio. 
7 1  Memo CPH to Munsie, 16 December 1937, p.196, and Letter, Munsie to ALP, 23 
December 1937, p. 200, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 626 / 1925, p.s 188,189, 196 and 
200. 
72 Letter to CPH, 28 August 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/1925, p. 152. 
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The first and, in some ways, one of the most colourful examples of 
this fear and the associated controversy is found in correspondence 
between the citizens of Noggerup, a hamlet in the apple growing 
district of the south west of the state, and the Commissioner. In 
December 1937, when Tasmania and Victoria were in the grip of a 
serious epidemic of polio, the citizens of Noggerup received news 
that a family from Victoria was to visit their town. A public 
meeting was held which delegated three members to write to the 
West Australian and the Commissioner to express their views on 
the matter. They wrote -
In view of the fact that the residents of this town became 
aware a few days ago, that a family from Victoria, including 
three children, was soon to be resident here, a public 
meeting was held on December 2 to discuss the position, and 
a motion was carried that this meeting viewed with alarm 
the likelihood of people, particularly with children, coming 
to Noggerup from Victoria, and requests the Health 
Authorities to take action to safeguard the health of 
residents. 
Strong indignation was expressed, especially when the 
following facts were made known : -
1) Communication with Dr Atkinson showed that there was 
no Government quarantine of such children - the only 
quarantine being for three weeks in their own home - in this 
case a house not 40 yards from the State School Building. 
2)  The District Medical Officer, Dr Collins, of Donnybrook, 
says that he has no control except in the actual township of 
Donnybrook, about 25 miles away. 
3) The Education Department states that there are no 
regulations framed to cover the admission or exclusion of 
such children from the School. 
It would seem, then, by the above facts, that the 
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Government is offering practically no protection whatever to 
West Australians from this dreaded disease. Dr Atkinson 
states that there is no cause for alarm. Why then were tours 
of schoolchildren to the Eastern States cancelled? These 
children would spend only a few days in Victoria, yet this 
was considered sufficiently dangerous to warrant the 
cancellation of those tours. New South Wales, apparently, 
is aware of the danger as children from Victoria are refused 
admittance there. 
Again, who is to enforce this 2 1  days quarantine in country 
districts. isolated, as we are at Noggerup from any any 
medical or Government authority, also, may we ask, is every 
person in the house affected by the quarantine restrictions, 
and what penalties do those who fail to observe the 
quarantine orders incur? 
At various times we have read of different Governments 
enacting laws to prohibit the entry into their State of plants, 
animals, etc . from other States where disease was prevalent, 
yet apparently the life and health of our children are of so 
little importance to the Government that practically nothing 
is being done. 
Does the Government intend to wait until the disease gets a 
hold here, or is it prepared to take preventive measures now 
before it is too late? 
Several months ago, Victorians were being told, as we are 
now, that "there is no cause for alarm" and what is the 
position in that State now? 
We have been deputed by the public meeting, held at this 
place, to put our views before you and also to communicate 
with the Commissioner for Public Health and the Education 
Department and we trust that you will give this matter every 
publicity.73 
The Commissioner responded firmly and in detail. He said other 
states had taken as strong action as Western Australia and 
Tasmania which imposed quarantine restrictions on children 
73 Copy, with covering letter to CPH. 3 December 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 
626/ 1925, pp. 179- 183:WM, 16  December 1937, p.59. 
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arriving from Victoria. 7 4 Furthermore, those from Victoria who 
were known polio contacts would have been in quarantine before 
arrival in the State. All care was taken with new arrivals, and the 
best possible supervision was given by Health Inspectors. The 
Commissioner reminded his correspondents that, thanks to the 
action of his Department, Western Australia had a polio advisory 
committee of doctors whose advice resulted in the gazetting of 
appropriate regulations, breach of which incurred a penalty of up 
to £50. In reply to the suggestion that children be dealt with at 
the border in a similar way to plants and animals, the 
Commissioner pointed out that this would involve the division of 
families, and in no part of the world had such a strategy been 
employed. In any case, he said, South Australia had kept its 
borders open and was not yet suffering from the disease. The 
Commissioner assured his correspondents that Public Health 
Department was exercising all vigilance and school teachers, and 
citizens like themselves, were encouraged to add their support in a 
difficult situation. 7 5 
The citizens of Noggerup were not really satisfied and compared the 
response with measures taken by the Department of Agriculture 
when a neighbour's apple orchard was infested with Codlin Moth. 
In addition to receiving strict instructions regarding the disposal of 
fruit the a Departmental Officer practically lived on site to 
supervise the work. They wrote -
7 4 The CPH's assertion was incorrect, as footnote 64 above indicates. See also 
Killalea, A. ( 1995 ). The Great Scourge, pp.26 ff. Tasmania added quarantine 
restrictions to existing policy of issuing certificates to children to permit them to 
travel from one region of the state to another. 
75 Letter, 9 December 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, pp. 184-5. 
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If, as you assert, the quarantining of arrivals from Victoria is 
beyond the resources of your Department, surely the 
alternative is to prohibit the entry of such persons into the 
State ... we notice that the Fremantle Branch of the 
Australian Labour Party also has this subject under 
consideration and we are glad to think we are not alone in 
this matter. 76 
At the political level in Australia there is little difference between 
the quarantine issues that apply to diseases affecting humans, 
fruit, and other foodstuffs. 77 Ironically early in 1938, as the 
number of polio cases began to increase, Noggerup district 
experienced another outbreak of Codlin Moth. 78 
In addition to offers of blood for serum, members of the public 
volunteered good advice and bizarre forms of help during the polio 
years. The suggestion of a possible connection between bare feet 
and polio infection, referred to in Chapter 2 above, was raised 
during the 1938 polio scare. The first of many to come, such offers 
of popular insight signify a continuing level of community 
involvement in the quest for a solution to the problem of polio. 
But some gestures were not based on altruistic motives. A resident 
of South Africa wrote to the Commissioner: 
I would suggest that your investigations follow the isolation 
in Raw Cows Milk of the bacillus of this disease. It has 
been definitely established in several health-progressive 
countries that children who have not been vaccinated 
76 Letter, 13 December 1937, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 626/1925, pp.193-5. 
77 Controversy over quarantine restrtctions occurred in Australia during the 
Spanish Influenza epidemic of 1918-19. McQueen, H. The 'Spanish' Influenza 
Pandemic in Australia, 1912-1919, in Roe, J. (ed) (1976) Social Policy In Australia, 
pp.131-147. 
78 WA. 8 February 1938, p.5. 
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(bovine extract) and who refrain from imbibing raw cow's 
milk (bovine extract) are immune, or do not contract this 
disease. "Boil your milk" would be the housewife's slogan 
against this disease and also TB. 
He then concluded with 
Should you test this statement and verify it my fee can be 
met by reserving me an assisted passage for my young family 
of six as immigrants under your scheme. 79 
The Health Department did not respond as requested to the offer of 
this information, but the possible link between milk and the polio 
virus continued to attract attention. 
In the late 1930s the Australian Government received assistance 
from the British philanthropist, Lord Nuffleld, 80 whose company 
manufactured iron lungs. In 1938 Nuffleld offered to donate a 
respirator to every hospital in the British Empire "which might 
reasonably make use of it".8 1  One hundred and fifty two 
respirators were installed in Australian hospitals, 82 of which 
79 Letter, 12 December 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 626/ 1925, p.244. 
80 In 1935, Nuffield donated £50,000 to the Commonwealth Government to 
help crippled children, see. Buxton, A.J.G. (1977). Poliomyelitis, p.66. and 
Greenland, W. (1990). Infantile Paralysis, p.10. 
8 1  Cablegram, Acting High Commissioner, London, to Prime Minister, 13 
December, 1938, AA (ACT), 1928/ l ,  802/21. Poliomyelitis, Lord Nuffield, gift of 
Iron Lungs, Applications. 
82 Letter, Cumpston to High Commissioner, London, 3 January 1938, 
AA, 1928 / 1, 802 /21, Poliomyelitis, Lorcl Nuffield , gift of Iron Lungs, Applications. 
Qld received 35, NSW 71, Victoria 14, SA 24, and ACT 1. 
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Western Australia received eleven.83 
The 'epidemic' of 1938 
1 33 
Forty seven cases of polio were notified in Western Australia in 
1938, double the maximum annual figure reported since records 
have been kept. This itself was noteworthy but the rise in the 
number of notifications began slowly and may not have attracted 
much attention if it were not for the fact that forty four of them 
were reported in the first five months of the year. After May the 
number of notifications declined, as was expected during colder 
weather, and the few remaining cases occurred sporadically 
throughout the rest of the year.84 
Late in November 1937 the Tasmanian Health Department 
contacted Commissioner Cook to ask if there was any outbreak of 
polio in Western Australia. The Commissioner replied that there 
was no unusual prevalence noticeable, only the usual sporadic 
cases which, at that stage, numbered about ten for the year.85 A 
month later, on Christmas eve, a boy from the semi-rural district 
of Caversham was reported to have a severe case of respiratory 
paralysis. In retrospect this was regarded as the first of the 
83 See file ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1940, especially pp. 52, 99, 123, 128, 147. 166 and 
ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 5 178/57 pp.7-35, 85-87. During the next two decades the 
number was increased. In 1956, when the IDB received a large number of bulbar 
cases. the Public Works Department manufactured a version of the iron lung to 
meet the need. 
84 The occurrence of the disease in summer led, in the future, to extensive 
investigation of the links between climate and the virulence of the disease. 
85 Telegrams. 25 November 1 937, BL. ACC 1003. AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, pp. 174-
175. 
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unusually large number or cases that marked the first half of 
1938.86 In January the Public Health Department obtained two 
respirators from Victoria, a provision which was to serve them well 
in the future when treatment of those who experienced respiratory 
paralysis was required.8 7  
The Commissioner resisted the notion that an  epidemic was under 
way, an attitude later reflected in the annual report for 1938 which 
stated that the cases "were so widely scattered and so unassociated 
with one another as to suggest only a sporadic incidence rather 
than a spreading epidemic" .88 The outbreak could hardly be termed 
an epidemic but such a balanced view, taken after the event, does 
not reflect the feelings of the population at the time. In 1937 the 
epidemics in Victoria and Tasmania had raised the awareness of 
the potential dangers, a feeling that strengthened as the summer 
months approached. 
From the moment quarantine restrictions were imposed in 
December 1937, they became the subject of controversy. This was 
the first time they had been imposed in Western Australia in 
relation to polio and, although they were applied to children under 
sixteen years of age who came from polio infected areas, they 
affected all travellers. Interstate visitors were warned of the new 
conditions89 and letters were written to boarding schools advising 
86 WM. 6 January 1938, p.55. 
8 7  WM, 13 January 1938, p.55. 
88 Public Health 1948, (1949), Appendix XV, p.59, BL. 614.09 WES. 
89 WA, 13 May 1938, p.19. 
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of the need to quarantine any students from interstate.90 In 
January 1938, perhaps to show that he did mean business, the 
Commissioner vowed to prosecute a visiting parent, with two 
children under seventeen, who had been caught disregarding 
quarantine restrictions.9 1  
By January 1938 the community must have felt prospect of a polio 
epidemic had increased. The boy from Caversham had been 
admitted to hospital, a fourteen year old girl was being treated for 
respiratory problems, and rumours were circulating wildly. Under 
the heading "Alarmist rumours refuted" the West Australian 
reported that, after a meeting of the consultative committee of 
doctors, the Commissioner had stated -
All sorts of rumours were going about, according to reports 
made by doctors at the committee, that there were numbers 
of cases of infantile paralysis in this State. These rumours 
were without foundation.92  
The Commissioner stated that the few cases which had occurred 
were the same sporadic type of infections that were reported in 
most years. He affirmed the use of quarantine restrictions 
governing arrivals from interstate, and reported that the committee 
of doctors recommended restrictions on the movement and 
congregation of children "even within the state" .93 He said -
The visits of groups of country children to the city were 
9 o Letter, CPH to Lord Abbot of New Norcia, 8 February, 1938, NNA O 14 1 .  
9 1  WA, 15 January 1938, p.2 1 .  
92 WA, 7 January 1938, p.20. 
93 The attitude of the WA Ed ucation Department to school closure was 
equivocal, but eventually some were closed after cases of polio occurred. 
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particularly discouraged, as country children were usually 
more susceptible to infantile paralysis than city children.94 
When a man from the wheat belt town of Morowa telegrammed the 
advice that he was leaving for Perth with one hundred children 
who were due to have a holiday at South Beach, Fremantle, the 
Commissioner replied firmly -
Strongly urge you not to bring country children who [are] 
more susceptible [to] infantile paralysis to Metropolitan area 
STOP. This definitely not in [the] best interest of [ the] 
State.95 
Whether or not it was true that country children had a lower 
immunity to polio, the evidence suggests that, from the outset, the 
Public Health Department took a clear line on the congregation 
and movement of children during a polio scare. While quarantine 
restrictions had the effect of placing inter-state relations under the 
microscope the ban on the congregation of children directed the 
focus to intra-state relations. The fact that adults were not 
subject to the same restrictions became a source of tension and 
frustration within the community, and between the community 
and the Public Health Department. 
School teachers were also affected by quarantine regulations. The 
committee of doctors recommended that, on their return, teachers 
on holiday in the eastern states should submit to twenty one days 
of voluntary quarantine, less the number of days spent in 
94 WA, 7 January 1938, p.20. 
95 Telegram, CPH to Morawa, 4 January 1938, p.2 15, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
626/ 1925. 
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travelling home from their last port of call. The Education 
Department reported that forty two West Australian teachers were 
known to have intended taking holidays in the east. The 
Department, which characteristically administered, with some 
muscle, policies proposed by Public Health, concurred with the 
recommendation and warned that teachers who did not return 
home in time to fulfil their quarantine obligations before school 
commenced would be banned from the classroom, and and incur 
loss of pay.96 
It seemed anomalous that, while under quarantine, teachers were 
banned from the classroom but were otherwise unrestricted in 
their movements. Whereas in the case of smallpox all travellers 
were quarantined and released after vaccination, adults were 
thought to be less susceptible to "infantile paralysis' ,  and so could 
move about, and there was no prophylactic vaccine that was 
regarded as sufficiently strong or trustworthy. The Commissioner 
expressed views which would return to haunt him in the future 
when he said 
Total quarantine for infantile paralysis would mean the 
complete disorganisation of business interests, as adults as 
well as children would have to be kept in quarantine for 
three weeks. As adults in the main are not susceptible to 
the disease, their quarantine would not be veiy justiflable.9 7  
Public criticism of  quarantine restrictions continued with local 
government bodies joining the fray. The District Road Board of 
96 WA, 15 January 1938, p.21; WA, 18 January 1938, p.13. 
97 WA, 18 January 1938, p.13. 
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Cue, which was responsible for station country surrounding a 
remote and now almost defunct mining town, forwarded to the 
suburban Nedlands Road Board a recommendation that 
A strong protest be forwarded to the Commissioner for Public 
Health against the allowing of children from those Eastern 
States where infantile paralysis is prevalent to land in this 
State and to travel to various parts before being isolated, 
and this board considers that such isolation should be made 
at the port of entry, and strongly urges that this procedure 
be adopted, a copy of this protest be sent to all road boards 
in the State with a request for their support. 98 
Nedlands Road Board joined their country colleagues and, with 
only minor amendments, supported the recommendation. 
In the press the Commissioner defended the approach being taken 
by his Department, again citing the fact that its policies were 
developed after consultation with the consultative committee. He 
pointed out that Western Australia had adopted stronger 
provisions than those which, in Victoria, had proven beneficial in 
slowing the spread of polio. For the benefit of those who thought 
that everyone entering the state should be quarantined at the 
point of entry, he indicated that such measures usually only 
applied where the disease in question was unknown to the 
country, and all of Australia was familiar with polio . And in 
connection with the cry to quarantine only children at the point of 
entry, he said it was a measure which would ultimately only help 
the spread of the disease, and would have been impractical. It 
would 
98 WA, 2 Februaiy 1938, p.9 . 
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. . .  necessitate for this State huge establishments at 
Kalgoorlie, Albany and Fremantle, where three trains and at 
least three boats a week would be constantly landing 
families from whom children under a certain age would have 
to be separated and quarantined . . .  In each centre there 
would be very shortly a colony of children . . .  living under the 
most suitable conditions for spread of the disease . . .  99 
All visitors were informed of their responsibilities before they left 
their point of entry into Western Australia. Where polio did occur 
in a visiting family the preferred method was to isolate the child in 
the host home in the hope of containing the disease. The 
Commissioner indicated the policy was a success and reported 
that, by the end of January, the monitoring of the many adults 
and children who had re-entered Western Australia during a peak 
holiday period revealed that no cases of polio had been imported 
into the state. 1 00 
Shipping companies working the interstate routes were requested 
to keep children under 16 on board while their vessels were berthed 
in West Australian ports. When in January 1938 some passengers 
from the Kantmbla, which arrived at Albany from the eastern 
states, defied orders and took their children ashore the Minister for 
Health threatened tougher action against these and any similar 
perpetrators. I o 1 The purser claimed that the shipping company 
had not been advised of the new regulations prior to arrival at 
port. A doctor on board challenged the assumptions behind the 
99 WA, 28 January 1938, p.11. 
100 WA, 28 January 1938, p.11. 
1 01 WA, 10 January 1938, p.23; 11 January 1938, p.14; 12 January, 1938, p.7; 
WM, 20 January 1938, p. 54. 
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precautions declaring them to be "futile" in view of the fact that 
"you will probably get it eventually ... they can't stop it from 
spreading unless the winter beats it". 1 02 The doctor illustrated his 
point by referring to the fact that Victoria had now eased its strict 
quarantine regulations, but these had been revoked because the 
Victorian epidemic was now in decline. He added that in his view, 
as far as Western Australia was concerned, the distance from 
elsewhere was sufficient safeguard. As far as the Public Health 
Department was concerned, the distance from elsewhere was an 
important reason why it sought to restrict the traffic of those most 
vulnerable to the disease. Differences over polio amongst doctors 
and health officials was not uncommon and, when aired publicly 
in this way, did little to inspire confidence. 
Meanwhile in Western Australia interest in polio was kept alive by 
regular announcements in the press of more cases at home and 
abroad. One such, headed "Man's Death in Adelaide," 1 03 would 
have helped keep any existing fear alive and provoked readers to 
ask the question of whether polio did only affect children, and who 
was at risk from its paralysing power. 
Despite the fact that draconian powers were given to the Public 
Health Department under the Health Act 1911, 1 04 its preferred 
method of operating was to exercise the power of persuasion. The 
Commissioner postured in the press and threatened to prosecute 
parents who broke the restrictions, and occasionally did so. 
1 02 WA, 12 Januruy 1938, p.7. 
l 03 WA. 5 Februruy 1938, p.20. 
104 Health Act 19 11, Part ix - Infectious diseases, By-law 249.6, p. 189. 
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Reports were released to show that Health Inspectors did in fact 
monitor the behaviour of families living under quarantine 
restrictions.1 05 The attitude of the Department was clear and 
consistent on this point but, in some cases, its administration of 
policy was handled ineffectively. 
The Commissioner complained when the Young Australia League 
(YAL) ignored his advice that its plan to take a party of thirty eight 
boys on tour of the eastern states did not meet with the approval 
of the consultative committee. The Director of the YAL responded 
to the criticism by declaring "there has been no defiance of any 
health regulations by the League" and indicated that medical 
experts in New South Wales had given an assurance that there was 
no risk to the boys in Sydney. "When doctors differ, who will 
decide?" l 06 he asked and alleged that the "more emphatic opinion" 
of the health authorities was not conveyed until after the boys had 
left for Sydney. There may have been some laxity on the part of 
the Public Health Department, or it may be that Simons, the 
Director of the YAL was particularly pigheaded. But it was not the 
last time the Commissioner and the YAL would clash over a 
proposed tour during a polio scare. 
From the public point of view policies related to the isolation of 
children were not implemented consistently, either between the 
different Australian states or within states, despite the fact that 
the topic was frequently discussed by health experts. Research by 
1 05 WA. 15 January 1938, p.2 1. 
1 06 WA, 3 January 1938, p. 13. 
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the National Health and Medical Research Council suggested that 
isolation could at least slow the progress of an epidemic, and so it 
advocated that any child who experienced a minor febrile illness 
should be segregated until a diagnosis had been achieved. Similar 
treatment of paralysis victims, however, was considered 
unnecessruy because the risk of infection was thought to have 
passed. 1 07 
Belief in the efficacy of isolation was one reason for the policy of 
quarantine practiced during the 1938 epidemic. Discussions were 
to continue during future epidemics in Western Australia and, as 
in other parts of the country, strong views were held on both sides 
of the argument. While interstate visitors were subjected to the 
precautions of quarantine and residents of rural Western Australia 
were discouraged from bringing children to Perth, some country 
centres acted as if they would like to blockade themselves against 
intrusion from outside. 
During the summer months of 1938 the Commissioner responded 
to alarmist rumours in order to put the record straight. He 
reported that there been eleven cases during February, six in the 
metropolitan area and five from widely scattered areas in the 
country. 1 08 The next day stated that since 1 January a total of 
twenty one cases had been reported. 1 09 While not a large figure 
this represented a considerable increase on the yearly average to 
date, and was three higher than nineteen, the maximum annual 
1 07 WA, 3 Januaxy 1 938, p.13. 
1 08 WA, 3 March, 1938, p.19. 
1 09 WA, 4 March, 1 938, p.23. 
CHAPTER 4: A fortunate experience: 19 13- 194 7 143 
figure recorded since 19 13 .  The Commissioner was at pains to 
point out that the mild nature of the disease being experienced 
could have meant that some cases would have been overlooked, 
were it not for the constant vigilance and attention to detail of the 
medical profession. There may not have been the hundreds of 
cases that some people imagined, and the medical profession may 
have been doing its job well. But it is also possible that the alarm 
present in the community was based on knowledge of cases that 
people were unwilling to report. 
When infections did occur the Public Health Department took 
action, particularly in relation to schools, a tactic which, while it 
showed decisiveness and strength, may have served to underline 
perceptions of the gravity of the situation. In March the Mt 
Hawthorn, Rosalie and Claremont Practicing Schools were closed, 
as was St Brigtd's Convent, West Perth, and the country schools of 
Kellerberrin and Mingenew. 1 10 In the weeks following more 
schools and kindergartens were dealt with in the same way. 1 1 1  
The Commissioner pointed out that this action was futile if 
parents allowed their children to attend public gatherings before 
the period of quarantine was completed. The Churches of Western 
Australia respected the policy of discouraging the movement and 
congregation of children and teenagers and cancelled their annual 
Easter Camps that year. 1 1 2 
1 1  O WM, 3 March, 1938, p.57; 10 March 1938, p. 18; 1 7  March 1938, p.54. 
Buxton, A.J.G. ( 1977). Poli.omyelitis, pp. 28-29. South Australia had implemented 
school closures and the cancellation of functions where children would mingle 
in 1937. 
1 1 1  WA, 18 March, p.25; 3 1  March, 1938, p. 15; 5 April, 12. 
1 1 2 WA. 18 March, 1938, p.25. 
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By 24 March twenty eight cases had been reported of which just 
over half, fifteen, were from the country. In April a 24 year old 
patient from the far flung rural district of Newdegate was brought 
to the Infectious Diseases Hospital, where he developed respiratory 
paralysis and died. 1 1 3 By mid April the outbreak had peaked and 
near the end of the month the Commissioner announced that no 
case had been reported for seventeen days. He was also able to 
report that the epidemics in other states had abated. 1 14 On 12 
May the consultative committee recommended the lifting of the 
quarantine restrictions affecting children who arrived from New 
Zealand and the eastern states of Australia. 1 1 5 The matter, which 
had been under consideration since April, was brought forward as 
the result of a letter to the Commissioner from the Committee 
from Associated Shipping Companies who were seeking to be 
relieved of the burden of dealing with quarantine restrictions. 1 1 6 
In Western Australia during the 1938 there was a genuine fear of 
contamination from polio introduced from overseas, other 
Australian states, and between city and country. Some clearly 
wanted the Health Department to insist on stronger quarantine 
laws, especially in connection with children entering the state. 
Local authorities did not support the policy of the Public Health 
Department and lobbied to bring about a change. A minority of 
doctors also did not support the line taken by the Public Health 
1 1 3 WM, 24 March, 1938, p. 57; 14 April 1938, p.5 1 ;  Argus, 31  March 1938, p.3. 
1 14 WA. 22 April 1938, p.22. 
1 1 5 WM, 19 May 1938, p .56. 
1 1 6 WA, 13 May 1938, p. 19. 
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Department, 1 1  7 revealing divisions amongst the members of the 
medical profession over how to deal with polio. Their insistence 
that a more open policy would suffice revealed that, at this stage, 
health experts were actually at a loss over what to do about polio. 
During the polio outbreak of 1938 the Public Health Department 
experienced some difficulty in achieving its goals of providing a 
sense of safety and confidence with respect to polio. A decade 
later, when the first real epidemic occurred the resources of the 
Department were tested far more sorely, by the polio virus, the 
press, and members of the community. 
*** 
1 17 WA, 12 January 1938, p.7. A doctor, a passenger on the K.antmbla, said 
quarantine was "futile" because "you would probably get it eventually" .  
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Figure 4: Annual reported incidence of poliomyelitis 1911-1926 . 
Source, Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J. ). (1989). Health and 
Disease tnAustralta, p. 326. 
Year NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas 
1 91 1  
1 9 1 2  5 * 3 
1 91 3  47 3 8 * 8 4 * 
1 91 4  79 6 * - -
1 91 5  63 3 3 2* - -
1 91 6  31 1 76 2 7 * 1 9  3 * 
1 9 1 7  1 6  32 3 7 * 2 3 * 
1 91 8  50 303 1 3 * 4 1 4* 
1 9 1 9  8 2 1 1  9* 2 5 * 
1 920 45 5 1 7* 8 1 * 
1 921  1 84 27 3 5 * 1 1 * 
1 922 33 23 2 5 * 47 - 1 * 
1 923 1 04 7 1 * 1 7  8 3 
1 924 1 08 1 2  1 1 2 - 3 3 
1 925 50 1 39 39 1 3  1 9  1 
1 926 78 3 1  42 2 1 3  3 
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Figure 5: Annual reported incidence of polio in Western Australia 
1913-1948, Public Health 1 948, (1949) .  Appendix XV, p.58, BL, 
614.09 WES. 
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CHAPTER 5: Fear and Frustration: the 1948 epidemic. 
Western Australia experienced its first major epidemic of polio 
during 1948. Throughout the year several factors combined to 
make it a very unpleasant and frustrating experience for the whole 
of the community. The fear of polio was exacerbated by 
uncertainty concerning the disease and its transmission . 
Frustrated by a lack of experience and resources the Public Health 
Department bumbled through, seeking help wherever it would be 
found. The protection measures it implemented, especially 
quarantine restrictions, were distrusted and resisted, while 
criticism and alternative suggestions flowed freely, especially in the 
press. 
Two cartoonists, Saw and Davies, made visual comment on the 
polio epidemic, in the Dally News and the Sunday Times 
respectively, and went so far as to represent polio itself in their 
work. Saw, who pilloried the introduction of quarantine 
restrictions, suggested that, thanks to the Public Health 
Department, Western Australia was suffering from a bad case of 
Governmental paralysis. 
The fear and frustration that accompanied the 1948 polio epidemic 
were eloquently represented by the story, published in the Dally 
News late in January, of Roger Groom, a fourteen-year-old Vee 
Jay yachting champion, photographed at home working on his 
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boat. I Roger, who was favoured to win the upcoming W.A. junior 
sailing championship, was unable to compete because he was in 
quarantine. Earlier in the month Roger had broken his Young 
Australia League (YAL) tour to the eastern states and travelled to 
Sydney where he won a sailing competition. His return flight 
home called at Adelaide, which was in the grip of a polio epidemic, 
and Roger was put into quarantine. The Public Health 
Department had imposed quarantine restrictions to prevent the 
spread of polio from South Australia. The irony is that, on his 
outward journey, Roger visited Adelaide before he travelled to 
Sydney, where he raced during what would have been the 
incubation period, had he contracted polio. 
Late in January 1948 the first case of polio was reported for the 
year, followed by five more reports in March. Many epidemics were 
known to decline once summer was over but during autumn this 
outbreak increased in intensity, while the weather remained 
unusually warm. Further cases were reported in April and May. 
The winter months of June, July and August together produced 
155 cases - half of the total for the entire year.2 A total of sixty 
seven cases in July was the worst month-to-date total so far 
recorded in Western Australia. The epidemic appeared to die away 
in September but revived during November and December [Figure 
6] .  
1 DN, 30 January 1948, p.8. 
2 Public Health 1948, ( 1949), Appendix .XV, p.62, BL, 6 14 .09 WES. 
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The final total of 3 1 1 cases (a rate of 62 cases per 100,000 
population) consisted of 1 8 1  from the metropolitan area and 1 30 
from the country. 3 The youngest person to contract polio in this 
epidemic was four months old, and the eldest fifty-one years of age. 
Approximately 40% of those affected suffered some residual 
paralysis. The twenty-five deaths that occurred represented a 
mortality rate of approximately 8% , which was considered "normal" 
except for one thing - among young adults and particular groups of 
adults the death rate was significantly higher.4 Within the 20-29 
age group the rate was 30.6% while it was 4 7% for country males 
in the same age bracket. Mortality was also high amongst 
pregnant women. Five of the nine pregnant women who contracted 
polio died, compared with only three deaths amongst fifty-four 
non-pregnant women of child-bearing age.5 
The 1 948 epidemic presented the Public Health Department with 
its first major opportunity to analyse and evaluate the incidence 
and the effects of the disease in Western Australia. 
Comprehensive epidemiological work was undertaken by Dudley 
Snow whose findings became part of the Annual Report for that 
year.6 It is not clear how Snow managed to investigate the 
epidemiology of polio on this occasion, as he did not officially join 
3 Public Health 1948, (1949). Appendix XV, p.65, BL, 614.09 WES. In 1945 
Western Australia had a population of 492,018. of which 233,000 lived in urban 
areas and approximately 25,000 were of Aboriginal descent. See, Hetherington, P. 
"Introduction: Western Australia in the Commonwealth, 1939-1945", in Gregory, 
J. (ed) (1997). On the Homefront: Westem Austmlla and World War II, University of 
Western Australia Press: Nedlands, p.3. 
4 Public Health 1948, ( 1949), p. 12, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
5 Public Health 1948, ( 1949), p.67, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
6 Public Health 1948, (1949), p. 12, and Appendix XV, BL. 6 14.09 WES. 
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the Perth Office of the Department until almost three years later. 7 
The Public Health Department used a method devised by John 
Snow (1813-1859), a name sake of its own Dr Snow, created serial 
spot-maps of the metropolitan area, a device which provided a 
visual history of the progress of the epidemic. The serial spot map 
of the first 150 cases reported in 1948 revealed a greater incidence 
in suburbs north of the Swan river [Figure 6). The Annual Report 
also included a full list of the localities affected by polio. The large 
number of towns and suburbs recorded clearly suggest that polio 
was a classless disease, affecting people from all walks of life. 
Several features of the 1948 epidemic were considered to be 
stgniflcant.8 There was little traceable link between cases, so that 
except for a few instances, no history of contact could be 
identified. The epidemic continued into the winter months and 
was at its worst when it would normally have been expected to 
decline. Western Australia had an unseasonably dry winter in 
1948, a feature which reinforced the interest already being taken in 
the link between weather patterns and the activity of the virus. 
The spread of infection increased during the Royal Show and 
school holidays [Figure 8 ), suggesting that contact between 
different groups of children had been a factor in the dissemination 
7 Snow, D.J.R. ( 198 1 ). Progress, p.xi. During his career in the Public Health 
Department, Snow rose to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Public Health, 
a role he filled from 1963 until his retirement in 1973. WA, 1 1  February 1948, p.8. 
Snow, with Dr E.G. Saint, arrived from England in February to work as a Public 
Health Department Doctor with the Royal Flying Doctor Service in the north 
west of Western Australia. 
8 Public Health 1948, ( 1949). p. 12, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
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of the disease. 
There were epidemics of polio in several countries of the world in 
194 7 and 1 948. A severe epidemic which involved almost ten 
thousand cases occurred in England.9 New Zealand, which 
experienced a severe epidemic in 1948, reported significant 
increases in new cases of polio during 1946 and 1947. I O  New 
Zealand schools remained closed from the beginning of 1948 until 
Easter, and the authorities sought assistance with after-care from 
the Kenny Institute of the USA which dispatched two technicians 
and a supply of "electrically operated centrifugal apparatus" not 
previously used in that country. I I In 1948 a large outbreak of 
polio occurred in North Carolina, USA. I 2 
Large epidemics of polio occurred in eastern Australian in 1945-4 7, 
particularly New South Wales, Victoria , Queensland, and 
Tasmania.13 The incidence declined markedly in 1948 but in that 
year South Australia , Western Australia's  nearest neighbour, 
reported ninety-eight cases, which represented the peak of a three 
year upward trend. Between 1938 and 1948 there were relatively 
few cases of polio in Western Australia, and in 1946 and 194 7 
there were only two cases each year. It must have seemed that an 
epidemic might not strike but, as had happened in 1938, it was 
9 Public Health 1948, ( 1949). Appendix XV, p.59, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
I O Ross, J .  ( 1993), New Zealand, Table I .  pp. 108- 109. 
11 WA. 28 January 1948, p.3. 
1 2 S unday Times, 18 July 1948, p.4. 
13 Public Health 1948, ( 1949). Appendix XV, p.58, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
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after the decline of epidemics in the eastern states that cases 
began to be reported in Western Australia. The link was 
circumstantial, not proven. 1 4 
On 30 December 1947 the Health Department gazetted quarantine 
regulations, measures that were consistent with those adopted in 
1938. 1 5  Children who arrived by land, sea or  air from South 
Australia and New Zealand had to remain in isolation for twenty­
one days. All such arrivals, and any sickness that subsequently 
occurred in the host house were to be reported to the Public Health 
Department. All who passed through South Australia on their 
journey to Western Australia would be subject to quarantine. 
Quarantine restrictions did not affect arrivals from Singapore, a 
busy international port which had regular shipping links with 
Western Australia. In April the WestAustralian carried news of 
the death from polio of an Australian, the wife of a newspaper 
executive working for the Straits Times, Singapore. 1 6 When 
challenged on the matter the Public Health Department gave the 
assurance that any cases of polio on board would become evident 
on the journey to Fremantle, where the normal quarantine 
procedures would suffice. I 7 In any case, it did not consider there 
was an epidemic of polio in Singapore. 1 8 On this occasion the fear 
1 4 Public Health 1948, ( 1949). Appendix XV, p.60, BL, 614.09 WES. 
1 5 WA, 1 January 1948, p.5. 
1 6 ST, 25 April 1948, p. 12. 
l 7 DN, 6 January 1948, p. l 
1 8  DN, 19 April 1948, p.8; 3 June 1948, p.2; 2 1  June 1948 p.2. 
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of Asia ran second to the fear of polio in neighbouring Australian 
states. 
The father of a family in quarantine was reported to have broken 
the ban. 19 Parents who breached the restrictions were threatened 
with prosecution and in mid-January, in the second of such cases 
to occur in that district, a Kalgoorlie woman was fined £5 for 
failing to keep her child isolated for the entire statutory period. 20 
As the number of cases rose the Commissioner, Dr C.E. Cook, 
requested Local Health Authorities to advise him of any breaches 
of quarantine so that orders could be issued to parents whose 
children were infected.21 
Quarantine restrictions were a major source of frustration in the 
community during 1948. From the outset of the epidemic there 
was controversy over the question of contact and isolation. The 
Daily News responded to the imposition of quarantine regulations 
with a leading article accompanied by the first of a series of 
cartoons by artist Lew Saw,2 2  who offered graphic commentary on 
the Public Health Department's handling of the epidemic. 
19 DN, 9 January 1948, p.4. 
20 WA. 16 January 1948, p. 10. 
21 Memo, CPH to LHA, 31 May 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, p.5. 
22 Lew Saw, whose family lived at Armadale, an outer suburb of Perth.was 
employed as an artist by the Daily News where he also functioned as a 
cartoonist. Saw was successful with this form and eventually left Australia to 
cartoon in Canada. He was followed at the Daily News by Paul Rigby. In 1948 
the WestAustrallan did not employ an artist. This information provided to the 
author by Bruce Wroth and Peter Ewing. I am grateful to Pamela Hodge and 
Brian Shoesmith for their discussions of the iconography of these cartoons. 
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Australian newspapers have employed the comic art of cartoons to 
make political and editorial comment since at least 1850.23 
Always a popular feature of the papers, cartoons used images that 
drew upon a wide diversity of themes not restricted to Australian 
culture.24 The work of each artist was idiosyncratic, but 
nevertheless reflected the cartoonist's perception of an issue that 
currently affected the community. 
The first of the eight cartoons to be examined in this chapter, and 
the accompanying article, were in support of quarantine 
restrictions. The cartoon, captioned "There's No Room For 
Argument" [Figure 9] , 2 5  visually expressed the question posed in 
the article which was -
A mother has to travel to South Australia and must take her 
child. She is frightened of Infantile Paralysis - yet irked by 
the prospect of quarantine regulations. What should she 
know, what should she do?26 
The picture shows a well-to-do mother, labelled "quarantine 
dodger", with her son, dressed in clothes resembling a private 
school uniform, labelled "juvenile traveller" , confronted by a 
doctor, who represents the authority of the Public Health 
Department. Behind the doctor is a bed and theatre floodlight, 
2 3 Coleman, P . •  Tanner, L. ( 1967). Cartoons of Australian History, Thomas Nelson 
and Sons Ltd: Melbourne, p. 7. 
24 Gordon, I. ( 1986). Stop Laughing Th.is ls Serious: the comic artfonn and 
Australianldentlty 1880-1960, unpublished BA Honours Thesis, University of 
Sydney, p.85. 
25 DN, 17 January 1948, p.2. Cartoons in Figures 8- 12. 14- 16 provided courtesy 
the WestAustralian, reproduction permit PF 428D. Cartoons in Figures 13 and 
20 courtesy the Sunday Times, verbal permission 28 August 1996. 
26 DN, 17 January 1948, p.2. 
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and a nurse who is discreetly at work beside a box respirator, 
popularly known as the "iron lung". The mother protests, "You 
can't expect me to keep him cramped up at home for 3 weeks!", to 
which the doctor replies, "We do: home was never like this" .2 7 
The iron lung, feared icon of polio's crippling power, represents 
scientific and technological advancement, hopefully the saviour of 
many. But it was also symbolic of the horrific fate that lay in wait 
for some who became infected and then paralysed. The message 
was that the new regulations would prevent having to face the 
living death of paralysis, or perhaps even death itself. 
In similar fashion to 1938, questions were raised concerning the 
policy of quarantine restrictions that applied to children but not to 
adults. A letter expressing this opinion was published on the same 
page as the cartoon and the accompanying article. This was the 
last time cartoon commentary favoured the Public Health 
Department. From this time onwards it was pilloried, particularly 
by the Daily News and the Sunday Times, for its imposition of 
quarantine, and for using the policy of persuasion. 
Community resistance to the quarantine restrictions was aroused 
by two events that occurred in quick succession during January. 
The published opinions of Commissioner Cook on the subject, and 
the way in which a party ofYAL boys were dealt with who returned 
home from a visit to the eastern states. 
2 7 DN. 17 January 1948, p.2 . 
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Fear of polio in other parts of Australia had, once again, not been 
sufficient to cause the YAL to abandon its plan to take a party of 
250 West Australian boys on tour. They travelled through South 
Australia to arrive, on January 6, in Melbourne where they were 
housed at the showgrounds.2 8  The new quarantine restrictions 
were applied to them on their return but the Commissioner decided 
that, since the party had visited South Australia on its outward 
journey and would not pass through it on their return, the boys 
could count their quarantine from the date of departure from 
Adelaide. This plan would require them to be isolated for only a 
few days when they reached home.29 It was a compromise policy 
intended to minimise the inconvenience to the boys and their 
families. 
In mid-January- there were reported to be 146 children in isolation. 
The return of the YAL boys in the third week of January 
exacerbated an accommodation crisis and the Commissioner 
appealed to the public for offers of help with the provision of 
rooms.30 A number of the YAL boys were housed in the former 
Cathedral Hall, located opposite Royal Perth Hospital, which was 
in the process of being converted to a TB clinic. Poor washing 
facilities and a complete lack of electricity gave the press another 
opportunity to highlight the practical problems created by the 
28 WA, 6 January 1948, p.4. 
29 WA, 1 January 1948, p.5; 22 January 1948, p.9. 
30 WA, 24 January 1948, p.4. 
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Near to the time the YAL boys were due home, and perhaps to stifle 
developing criticism, the Daily News published an article in which 
the Commissioner provided a full account of the reasons for the 
introduction of quarantine. The explanation revealed the limits of 
the policy and exposed the Commissioner and his Department to 
doubt and criticism. In the event that cases of polio were 
discovered in a neighbouring state, the Commissioner listed the 
reasons why quarantine restrictions would have limited success 
a) The probability that infection had already crossed the 
border in a carrier before cases cases began to appear in the 
adjoining state. 
b) The possibility that the epidemic in the adjoining state 
[was] simply the outcome of some environmental change 
operating upon a virus [ in that state] . . .  
c) In actual fact, blanket quarantine [was] impossible. The 
demands of commerce and other dictates of self-interest 
would require special exceptions or the prohibition would be 
defeated by clandestine migration.32 
The statement was designed "to allay public fear" but the CPH did 
did not improve his standing with the public, and the case for 
imposing restrictions was weakened significantly. If experts 
believed polio was probably already present in Western Australia, 
people must have wondered why the restrictions had been imposed 
in the first place. 
3 1  DN, 26 January 1948, p.4. 
32 DN, 23 January 1948, p.2. 
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The Commissioner blamed the press for arousing fear, and 
attempted to play down the dangers of polio, indicating that people 
should demonstrate more confidence in his department. He said -
Infantile paralysis receives far more attention from the Press 
than its relative incidence merits. Eveiy new case is counted 
and reported with such details as may be gleaned for the 
purpose. This is true of no other notifiable disease, 
although several of these occur in much greater numbers 
over longer periods and cause.. . much greater damage . . . 
Panic, or lack of confidence, are bad psychological 
ingredients in a community during epidemic times and the 
health authority must decide whether the public's interest 
does not demand some attempted control even where 
epidemiological expectation of success is small.3 3  
The Commissioner may have believed that he was providing 
inspirational leadership but by highlighting the dangers of giving 
in to panic, and lack of confidence, he reflected unfavourably on 
his readers, and his words returned to haunt him. 
The next day Saw pilloried the situation in a cartoon, captioned 
"Paperchase" [Figure 10], 34 which depicted a man, labelled "health 
regulations", perched in the branches of a tree with a bag of 
quarantine regulations on his arm. The man dropped pages 
labelled "bans, rules, restrictions and orders" onto the ground 
below while two men, "the public" and "the press", chase each 
other around in circles over them. While a policeman tries to 
intervene the man in the tree says "We're not sure that all this is 
really necessaiy, but it saves a panic". 
33 DN, 23 January 1948, p.2. 
34 DN, 24 January 1948, p.2. 
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The implementation of the quarantine restrictions was followed by 
the issue of a series of announcements and pamphlets which 
detailed the nature of polio and recommended the precautions 
necessary to avoid infection.35 But Saw believed the public 
questioned their worth. 
A few days later "Quarantine Victim" , an articulate schoolboy, 
challenged the views expressed by the Commissioner in a letter to 
the press. He asked why the needs of commerce were allowed to 
endanger public health, how quarantining 400 children seived to 
allay public fear, and why no-one seemed to mind "taking it out on 
the kids?"36 The Commissioner did not comment publicly on the 
letter which, though written by a sixteen year-old, had a rather 
adult tone. 
The Daily News regaled the public with stories that showed the 
effect of the restrictions on children and young people who were 
quarantined. It was at this point that the story of Roger Groom 
appeared.37 
Another Saw cartoon [Figure 1 0] appeared. 38 Obviously drawn 
with Roger Groom's story in mind it was captioned "Are We getting 
35 Pamphlet, B/L ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, p.3; Pamphlet, B/L ACC 1003, 
AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, p. 12. 
36 DN, 28 January 1948, p.2. 
3 7 DN, 30 January 1948, p.8. 
38 DN, 31 January 1948, p.2. 
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Anywhere?" The picture is of a doctor's surgery in which a boy, 
gagged and with hands and feet tied, sits on a couch. A doctor, 
"Health Department", prepares a huge injection from bottles 
labelled " restrictions" and "regulations" . Nearby stands a box of 
"adhesive (red) tape." The doctor says "Of course this treatment 
won't prevent infantile paralysis" . Standing nearby the boy's 
father, with a worried look on his face, replies "Hmm, it  seems to 
be causing paralysis of a sort" . 3 9 
The community were feeling the effect of the restrictions and saw 
the policy as illogical. A week later Mary Ferber, a journalist who 
was known for her controversial style, wrote a forceful leading 
article headed "Let's call the whole thing off' in which she used 
words of the Commissioner himself to damn the use of quarantine 
restrictions. 40 
The next cartoon to appear [Figure 12 ] unfavourably compared the 
quarantine policies of Western Australia with the polio policies of 
the eastern states.4 1 The scene is the entrance to a picture theatre 
where a large poster advertises "Now Showing, WA Public Health 
Department Treatment for Paralysis - Epidemic Isolation." A boy, 
gagged and with hands and feet tied, lies on the ground next to a 
coil of rope with the caption "thousands of feet of red tape used in 
the making" . Standing over the boy is a doctor, made to look like 
39 DN, 31 January 1948, p.2. 
40 DN, 7 February 1948, p.2. 
4 1 DN, 13 February 1948, p.2. 
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a quack, who appears to be hypnotising him. On the footpath 
near the poster stand three figures representing the states of New 
South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, who say to each other "We 
seemed to have achieved the same result with far less drastic 
methods" . 
Commissioner Cook could hardly fail to realise that, despite the 
fear of polio, the quarantine restrictions affecting interstate travel 
were highly unpopular, and medical experts, as represented by his 
department, were being cast in a bad light. In mid-January he had 
declared that the restrictions would not be continued "a minute 
longer than necessary", and on 20 February they were lifted.42 
As the epidemic progressed there was a growing realisation 
amongst health professionals and members of the public that 
children were not the only group to be affected by the disease. 
Adults were in contact with polio, though it was believed they were 
less likely to suffer from its effects, and both children and adults 
were potential carriers. With this in mind, many people came to 
believe that the quarantine restrictions were an ineffectual safety 
measure. 
The belief that the movement should be restricted of known adult 
polio contacts, or potential carriers, was highlighted in a letter to 
Commissioner Cook from the wife of a farmer. She was dismayed 
to discover that a shearer, who had been on her property for eight 
42 WA. 13 January 1948, p.6; 13 February 1948, p.8 .  
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days, had immediately beforehand lived for two days in a 
Fremantle house from which a child with polio had been removed. 
The shearer was known to the Fremantle Health Inspector as a 
polio contact. She believed his freedom of movement compromised 
her own careful policy of keeping her six month old baby away from 
crowds. The question she and many like her asked was - "why all 
contacts cannot be isolated for three weeks prior to associating 
with the general public?"43 The answer was that the authorities 
thought society would not have been able to function under those 
circumstances. In any case uncertainty remained about how the 
disease was transmitted. And at this stage adults were thought to 
be less susceptible than children. 
While itinerant workers did not find their activities restricted, 
others were forced to be more conscientious. An embarrassed 
clergyman, whose six-year-old son was suspected of having polio, 
cancelled church services and ceased visits to the local school 
while his family were in quarantine at home. 44 
A pamphlet issued by the Public Health Department conveyed the 
assurance that "more than half of the diagnosed cases obtain 
complete recovery," and, "most get back partial and reasonable use 
of paralysed muscles" - outcomes that would be aided by early 
recognition and appropriate attention. 45 No mention was made of 
43 Letter, 27 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944 /48, unnumbered page. 
44 WA, 3 July 1948, p.2. 
45 Pamphlet, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 944/ 1948, p.3. 
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the possibility of death. 
Further publications provided additional information regarding the 
scalding of milk, the peeling of uncooked fruit and vegetables, and 
the consumption of food, including ice-cream, that was prepared 
outside the home.46 The consumption of foodstuffs prepared 
outside the home was discouraged because of the risks of 
contamination through handling, rather than the lack of 
pasteurisation. But this assumed that the dairy products used at 
home had been pasteurised and were less likely to be contaminated 
through human contact. 
Ice cream manufacturers reacted to their product being 
stigmatised in this way. Later in the year, when the second wave 
of the epidemic was under way, and no doubt sales of ice-cream for 
end of year parties were suffering, the management of Peters' Ice 
Cream (WA) Ltd defended its product in the press. 
In the manufacture of Peters' ice cream, the mix is 
pasteurised in accordance with the most modem methods of 
pasteurisation known as nflash pasteurisation,n to ensure 
the purity of the product. It is manufactured under the 
supervision of a bachelor of science on the staff of this 
company, under the most hygienic conditions and subject to 
Government inspection. We claim with confidence that 
Peters' ice cream could not be a possible source of infection. 
We further understand that in recent references in British 
medical journals it has been stated that ice cream, when 
pasteurised by modem methods, could not be responsible for 
the spread of infantile paralysis. The granting of space for 
publishing this letter in your newspaper would be 
appreciated as ice cream has, in our opinion, completely 
without justification, been singled out from all other foods 
46 Pamphlet, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 944/ 1948, p.12 . 
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Health experts were still searching for clues to the conditions that 
allowed the polio virus to thrive and spread. All possible links 
were considered in an effort to gather information and to build up 
a complete epidemiological profile of polio. A pamphlet issued by 
the CPH requested that Health Inspectors note whether or not 
children had previously had measles, mumps, chicken pox or other 
viral diseases, and if there had been close contact with animals, 
particularly those that had been sick. 48 
Attempts were made to allay the fears associated with polio, 
particularly in respect to the effects of paralysis and the threat to 
life. Another pamphlet contained the defensive reassurance that 
"your child has more chance of being crippled by a motor car than 
by infantile paralysis".49 Similar comparisons were made on other 
occasions. In September it was reported that there had been 
seventeen deaths from polio so far that year, whereas the annual 
numbers of deaths from heart disease and cancer in Western 
Australia were 646 and 324 respectively.50 But people continued 
to find the risk of death or life-long paralysis from polio , 
particularly amongst children, especially fearful. 
During 1948 the warm Autumn weather extended well into May 
47 WA, lO November 1948, p.2. 
48 Letter, 14 June 1948, p.10, and Memorandum for Health Inspectors, BL. ACC 
1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page. 
49 Pamphlet, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/1948, p.12. 
50 DN, 7 September 1948, p.4. 
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and from this time the number of polio cases began to rise. Seven 
cases, from diverse parts of the Metropolitan area, were reported in 
the third week of the month compared to one in the preceding 
three weeks. The Assistant CPH tried to suggest there was no need 
for alarm, believing the activity of the virus would subside when 
the cooler weather came. 5 1 But the weather remained warm and 
the trend continued. A boy from Nedlands died within twenty-four 
hours of showing first symptoms, and when three cases were 
reported amongst children from two schools in nearby Claremont 
the question of school closure was discussed.52 The Deputy 
Premier, the Ministers of Education and Health, the Director of 
Education and the CPH met and concluded that no good purpose 
would be served by the closure of schools because while they 
remained open it was easier to supervise the children. The warm 
weather continued and the epidemic intensified. In June several 
schools and a kindergarten were closed, and four suburban 
theatres discontinued Saturday matinees for children until the 
position improved.53 
The persistent, but erroneous, belief that the nose and mouth were 
the major entry portals for the virus meant that steps were to 
taken to combat air-borne and food-borne infection.54 
Information concerning the spread of the disease was prepared, as 
follows, for publication in the press. 
5 1 WA, 2 1  May 1948, p.2. 
52 WA, 25 May 1948, p.5. 
53 WA, 2 June 1948, p. l .  
54 WA, 26 May 1948, p.4; 27 May 1948, p.4; DN, 26 May 1948, p. l .  
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Carriers of poliomyelitis virus are likely to broadcast 
infection by sneezing, coughing, or even talking. Food may 
easily be contaminated if it is within the range of the spray. 
At the present time it is very important that all persons who 
handle food should take every care that they do not 
contaminate it with salivary spray. 
Food may also be infected by the buying public whenever it is 
exposed for sale. The attention of all storekeepers is invited 
to the necessity for protecting foodstuffs. Articles of food 
should not be exposed on shop counters.55 
Newspapers began to provide details of reported cases on a daily 
basis, with a summary each Saturday morning, rather like a list of 
war casualties. Items regarding polio were featured regularly, and 
it is clear that, whether by design of the health authority or by 
desire of the press, some attempts were made to play down the 
seriousness of the situation. In mid-June it was reported that -
Health Department considers that 43% . . .  of the . . .  cases of 
Infantile Paralysis that have occurred in this State since 
January 1 will make a complete recovery.56 
This report was followed by another of the visit of Dr T.W. Stubbs 
Brown, a polio expert from Brisbane. During a stopover in Perth 
Stubbs Brown was invited to inspect patients at the Infectious 
Diseases Branch, and speak at a meeting of the local branch of the 
British Medical Association. Stubbs Brown gave the assurance 
that, in his view, the disease was occurring in a "relatively mild 
form".  He said -
55 Press release, 27 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
56 WA, 15 June 1948, p.4. The rate of residual paralysis in 1948 was 40%. 
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The cases that have been occurring in WA since the middle 
of January have been scattered as regards time and 
location . . .  Therefore it would be unreasonable to consider 
the disease to be of epidemic proportions, especially when 
compared with past epidemics in the Eastern States of 
Australia.57 
Stubbs Brown was of the opinion that the practice of closing 
schools had little effect on the spread of the disease. His view was 
that epidemics usually occurred in the summer months when 
children were on vacation, a signal that it was in the 
fraternisation of children from different groups that infection most 
frequently occurred. 
Such divisions in expert opinion were not confined to polio but, 
during the first serious epidemic experienced in Western Australia, 
they exacerbated the degree of confusion felt in the community as 
people endeavoured to negotiate their way through the threats, 
restrictions and mixed messages they were receiving. Letters from 
the public , which sought advice or expressed concern at actions 
being taken , became a common item in the newspapers. For 
example the Daily News published an "Opinion" column headed 
"Infantile Paralysis: the people are asking about it" in which were 
reproduced five of the many it had received. 58 There was suspicion 
that information concerning polio was being suppressed, a lack of 
confidence in the policies designed to control spread of the virus, 
and a request for specific direction . A month later a follow-up 
selection of similar opinions was presented in the same column. 
5 7  WA, 19 June 1948, p.2. 
58 DN, 5 June 1948, p.2. 
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Questions were raised about when "concrete action" would be 
taken to combat the epidemic and why, since adults were also 
susceptible, theatres and dance halls were not closed, and what to 
do about flies and food. O .W. of North Perth, almost certainly 
Olga Wignall who is quoted in Chapter 2 above, wrote -
Flies, food and fingers are all- important factors in our 
health, and in the present paralysis outbreak medical 
authorities emphasise this again and again. But we are told 
that the cost is too great for a campaign against paralysis in 
the form of extensive disinfecting. Is not a pennyworth of 
prevention worth a pound of cure? Is any cost too great in 
order to protect our children? 
We should also have placards in every school illustrating the 
close relationship between of flies, food, and fingers, and 
why hygiene rules must be obseived.59  
Later research was to show that O .W. had solved the polio 
infection puzzle. But the authorities remained impervious. The 
Daily News reported Commissioner Cook declined to comment on 
the letters, and the Minister of Health declined to read them. 
On the eve of a two day conference of Health Inspectors that was 
held in July, the state president of the British Medical Association 
stated that he expected the outbreak of polio to decline shortly.60 
The notification papers for the Conference did not list polio as a 
subj ect to be discussed, but the Commissioner gave a 
comprehensive account of the steps being taken to control the 
59 DN, 6 July 1948, p.2. 
60 DN, 7 July 1948, p.4. 
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disease.6 1  
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The West Australian reported on the conference under the by-line 
"Dr Cook Says Most Persons Resistant To Disease". The 
Commissioner illustrated that many people were resistant to polio, 
pointing out that cases were rare amongst nurses and doctors, and 
non-existent amongst health inspectors whose duties in 
quarantining and spraying exposed them to serious risks. 
The problem of "carriers", people in whom the virus was present, 
and who could spread it but showed no signs of polio, was a source 
of anxiety. The Commissioner pointed out that there was no 
medical means to identify them, so nothing could be done about 
their presence in the community. He openly admitted that the 
policy of quarantining children was of doubtful value - a 
concession to convention, he said, and "not worth a tinkers 
cuss" .62 Having undermined the policies of his Department in this 
way, the Commissioner included in his speech the reassurance 
that "from figures published of other outbreaks ... it would seem 
that fairly soon we will pass again into the daylight".63 
The Daily News put the Commissioner's talk in an entirely 
different perspective, a disparity which would not have assisted in 
clearing up confusion. Under the by-line "WA has low resistance 
6 1  Notice, undated, but for Conference to be held 8-9 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, 
AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page. 
62  WA. 9 July 1948, p.5. 
63 WA, 9 July 1948, p.5. 
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to paralysis" it was reported that he had stated that people in 
Western Australia had not had the opportunity to build up 
resistance to the polio virus, which meant that an outbreak in the 
state would probably result in more infections per capita than had 
occurred in the USA. 64 On the basis of American experience there 
would be at least 100 cases in Western Australia, and to date 110 
had already been reported. 65 At this stage, the figures were the 
worst on record, but as yet the ratios of paralysis and death per 
rate of attack were not particularly alarming. 
While the two newspapers took entirely different lines, it appears 
that the CPH was following the wisdom of his advisors and, like 
Stubbs Brown, may have been making another attempt to pour oil 
on troubled waters. Some weeks later another advisor, Dame Jean 
Macnamara, may have been pointing to a trend to play down or 
minimise the significance of the epidemic when she made the 
observation that "mild" did not mean "unimportant" .66 
Unfortunately for everyone July became the worst month of the 
epidemic.with sixty cases recorded, including several tragedies. A 
young man from Bruce Rock, and young Perth mother with her 
new born child, died. 67 A week later another pregnant mother, 
already in an iron lung, was expected to suffer the same fate.68 
64 Twenty cases per 100,000 was the rate in the USA he quoted. 
65 DN, 8 July 1948, p.5. 
66 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1190/ 1948, p.23. 
67 ST, 11 July 1948, p. l .  
68 ST, 1 1  July 1948, p. l .  
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A month later the number of cases began to decrease, providing 
welcome relief and raising hopes that the epidemic had run its 
course. By now the Public Health Department was more cautious 
and, though suggesting the worst of the outbreak might be over, 
advised against the relaxation of precautions. When questioned 
on the subject the Commissioner wisely refused to predict the level 
of attack that might occur in the approaching summer.6 9  
Flies were suspected of being one of the major agents in the spread 
of polio and those who allowed flies to congregate and breed were 
prosecuted. In one such case, reported under the by-line "Court 
told of polio Menace" , the Subiaco Health Inspector was reported 
as stating that "the fight against infantile paralysis was directed 
mainly against flies, which were thought to be germ carriers". 10 
Suspicion of flies was applied particularly to places where children 
gathered and were required to use unsewered toilet facilities. Five 
reported cases of polio in South Perth, home of the Zoological 
Gardens, gave the local Road Board an opportunity to advise the 
State Gardens Board that it believed the presence of twelve 
unsewered earth closets at the Zoo represented a risk to children. 
The Road Board siezed the moment and recommended the Zoo be 
closed until sewerage connections could be made. 1 1  In 1954 the 
69 WA, 4 August 1948, p 2; 19 August 1948, p.2. 
70 DN, 5 October 1948, p.5. 
7 1 WA. 24 June 1948, p.5. 
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Como state school, located in the same local government area, was 
used for a comprehensive study of the relationship between the 
spread of polio and the use of sewered toilet facilities. 12 
Spraying with DDT was regarded as an effective fly control 
measure. A method widely used in Western Australia was to 
regularly spray all school buses, school premises and public 
transport vehicles with a solution of 5% DDT powder mixed with a 
solution of kerosene and water. Spraying the schools involved a 
significant logistical exercise, since the municipal area covered by 
Perth City Council alone included twenty State schools and twelve 
kindergartens. The twenty-three denominational schools within 
the bounds of the Council engaged contractors to fumigate their 
premises once per month, 73 while public transport was treated 
daily. 
A later generation would have demonstrated in the street at such a 
use of the chemical, but at the time DDT was highly regarded. The 
Public Health Department knew of the dangers of handling DDT 
and issued instructions accordingly. The method employed, which 
was of questionable value, must have been very inconvenient for 
the Tramways and Ferries Department and their patrons. The 
Department was fastidious in its requirements. The Assistant 
Commissioner, Dr A.N. Kingsbury, wrote: 
72 The results of the survey are discussed below at p.237f. 
73 WA, 12 August 1948, p.2. 
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With reference to the frequency of spraying of trams during 
the present outbreak of Poliomyelitis, I have to invite your 
attention to the fact that the film of DDT left after spraying 
will quickly be removed by the clothes and boots of 
passengers. For this reason it is desirable that the daily 
spraying of trams be carried out.74 
The member of the public who, tongue in cheek, suggested that 
men and women should smoke on public transport because 
tobacco smoke, particularly from pipes, provided resistance to the 
polio virus, may have had an equally useful solution to the 
problem. The correspondent may also have known that during the 
outbreak of "Spanish" Influenza in Australia 1912-1919, similar 
suggestions were made and some travellers who were quarantined 
were subjected to fumigation by smoke. 75 
Members of the public self confidently offered their views on the 
possible cause of polio to Commissioner Cook. Some ideas were 
food based, others were hygiene related, and some included a 
degree of class consciousness. A woman wrote -
May I suggest that a possible factor in the spread of Infantile 
Paralysis is the banana. Not particularly the fruit itself, but 
the skin. 
During the war years when bananas were scarce or 
unprocurable Infantile Paralysis was at a low incidence. As 
soon as the banana trade increased so did the disease. 
Can it also be a co-incidence that very often the disease 
appears in the homes of professional people who may be 
considered able to afford a regular supply of bananas in the 
daily budget? 
Would it be too costly an experiment to prohibit the 
7 4 Memo, 7 July 1948, Assistant CPH to Manager, Tramways and Ferries 
Department. BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page. 
75 McQueen, H. "The Spanish Influenza Pandemic", in Roe, J. (ed), ( 1976). p.135. 
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importation of bananas for a given period, say three months, 
and tell the public why it is being done? Since no one knows 
very much about the disease my suggestion may not be so far 
from the truth, and is worth trying. Who knows from whence 
the simple remedy may appear? Perhaps this is it. 76 
The Commissioner's office was curt in reply, 77 but a mother from 
the country offered another view which the Department took more 
seriously. 
I should like to give you my opinion on this terrible disease, 
that we have with us in WA and its causes. (Infantile 
Paralysis). My idea is the cause comes from the (Pig) which 
are subjected to (Paralysis) as the pig has a germ which 
attacks the nervous system muscles and sinews, which is 
detrimental to human life, and should be carefully watched, 
for Paralysis in the flesh, at butchers shops. And again 
(Margartne) is made from Hog fats, (lard) and it finds its way 
into pastry and cake's shops, perhaps a few hints in our WA 
paper of this note might do some good for the public to read. 
If you should think flt, I could give a lot more things on this 
subject, if you would care to have them.78 
The connection with margarine was ignored, but the link between 
animals and paralysis struck a cord with the Public Health 
Department, which forwarded the letter to the Minister for Health 
with a note. 
[this] letter raises an interesting point. In addition to the 
pig, other animals are liable to illnesses of which paralysis 
may be a feature, horses, sheep, dogs, etc. As far as our 
present knowledge goes, there is no connection between any 
of these diseases and poliomyelitis in the human. There 
could be no justification for the banning of pork or 
76 Letter, BM to CPH, 29 June 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, no 
page number. 
77 Letter, CPH to BM, 9 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 944/ 1948, no page 
number. "Receipt is acknowledged of your communication of 29th ultimo, 
regarding Infantile Paralysis". 
78 Letter, ES to Premier, 25 June 1948,BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, no 
page number. 
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Cows featured again in letter from a woman who had lived in the 
south west of the state where cattle sometimes fed on the native 
zamia palms. She wrote -
Some years ago I lived in Greenbushes WA and saw cows 
crippled on hind quarters from eating native palms. I 
thought perhaps their milk might have something to do with 
the Infantile trouble. These cows ate Palms on new country 
where a fire went through. It was pitiful to see them 
tryini! to get up when they lay down. Thought this might 
help.so 
In reply the Commissioner politely pointed out the flaw in the 
argument. Once more scientific reasoning triumphed over popular 
logic. 
I have to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your 
letter . . .  containing your interesting su�estion. I was 
unaware of zamia poisoning among cattle b-ut it seems very 
unlikely that the poison, excreted in milk, could cause 
poliomyelitis. The disease occurs in so many countries 
where the zamia palm does not grow and at present there is 
so much good pasture available for our cattle here.B I  
The possible link between ice cream and polio, a hardy annual, was 
raised in a novel way by another contributor. 
I am writing with reference to Ice cream being a possible 
cause of infection (Paralysis). 
I think the method of serving is at fault, as every time an Ice 
79 Letter, CPH to Minister, 14 July 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, no 
page number. 
80 Letter, JS to CPH. 7 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, no 
page number. 
8 1  Letter, CPH to JS, l O September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, 
no page number. 
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cream is served the servers are placed in a basin of water. 
This water at times is veiy dirty, almost as thick as Ice cream 
and being similar to milk this exposed (milk-water) is open 
to flies and dust. 
I thought this might be inquired into and if this water was 
sent to an analyst it might give some results.82 
Lay members of the public were not the only ones who took an 
interest in finding a solution to polio. A veterinarian from a 
countiy town offered his views regarding the effect of mould, based 
on his observation of sickness in animals. 
This terrible disease of the Humans, Infantile Paralysis, is 
veiy similar to a disease that flourished in this state l 0-15 
years ago in the horse. Fine, strong animals would be 
stricken down without warning, never to rise again, except 
with the aid of slings. Veiy few recovered, and if left down 
would die in 24-36 hours. This complaint is caused by a 
mould in the hay. It had a bluish tinge, sometimes in great 
quantities and at other times just veiy light traces .. . .  
There is a possibility that this disease is being introduced 
from a mould or fungus in some breakfast cereals - some of 
the prepared varieties that have been treated in the factories. 
A check on the household on this subject should be veiy 
important. Large families which use a packet in a day of so 
would be alright. But the family which only used them 
occasionally may have them opened for weeks or months. 
These preparations are never cooked by the householder, but 
are eaten with cold milk, or at the best warmed a little. 
Infantile Paralysis first started in the USA. So did breakfast 
foods. Americans are great users of cereals. There is a 
possibility that this little message might bring to light 
something worthwhile ... . 
Furthermore, I had a packet of cereal opened in the house 
for about 3 months. There was a trace of mould on them so 
I fed them to a pair of Turkeys last week and both died with 
paralysis in four days.83 
82 Letter. unsigned, 10 September 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4. 944/ 1948, no 
page number. 
83 Letter, HJB, 9 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 944/ 1948, no page 
number. 
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As the polio epidemics continued, so did the flow of suggestions 
such as these. Everyone thought that they had a special insight to 
bring, and made their views known to the Public Health 
Department in the hope that theirs might be the idea that would 
finally led to the defeat of the polio menace. 
Picture theatre managers were particularly troubled by the 
Department's discouragement qf gatherings involving children. 
The Motion Picture Industry Public Relations Council of WA 
sought, and was granted, a meeting with the Minister and the 
Commissioner of Public Health. 84 At the meeting, the Industry 
representatives stressed that their establishments were very well 
looked after and were sprayed regularly with DDT. They were at a 
loss to understand why the official line seemed to target their 
venues when people were allowed to congregate freely for live 
theatre shows and church services. In discussion the Minister 
wisely declined to single out motion picture theatres from other 
venues but stressed that it was generally good practice for members 
of the public to avoid large gatherings of people. The Minister 
indicated to the deputation that he had endeavoured to minimise 
"scare" publicity and hoped that, with the decline of the epidemic, 
community fears would also subside. The delegation, which 
84 Letter, 9 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page. 
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revealed that it considered TB a greater threat than polio,85 in 
tum offered to assist the Minister by showing slides regarding the 
destruction of flies, and by publicising similar material affecting 
the health and well-being of the community. Picture theatres 
would would thus be a partner with the Minister in the provision 
of health education for the public, goodwill would be restored, and 
above all the present boycott would be reversed. The meeting 
concluded happily, although the Minister may have said more than 
intended when he "thanked the Council for its kind offer re 
propaganda".86 
The prevailing perception was that the Public Health Department 
was inconsistent in its attitude to quarantine, travelling, and the 
congregation of crowds. These matters remained contentious, and 
a temporary decline in the number of reported infections during 
August, September and October did not mean the community 
relaxed. As the time for the school holidays approached, a group 
of teachers from Albany wrote to say that, since they had contact 
with children through their work, perhaps they should not move 
around during the holidays, and also suggested the date of the 
August school holidays might be changed.87 The CPH wrote to the 
85 Porter, R.M. and Boag, T.C. (Undated). The Australian Tuberculosis Campaign 
1948-1976, The Sir Robert Menzies Memorial Foundation. It is notable that 
during these months considerable media coverage was also given to the presence 
of TB in the community. In 1948, 325 cases of Pulmonary Tuberculosis were 
reported in Western Australia, from which 157 deaths resulted. Although the 
death rate from TB was declining in WA, the number of reported cases in 1948 
was the highest for twelve years. That same year the Tuberculosis Act ( 1948) was 
passed, an initiative of the Federal Government which linked the Commonwealth 
and the States in a campaign that succeeded in controlling the disease. 
86 Report, 20 July 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page. 
87 Letter, 27 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944 / 1948, unnumbered page. 
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Education Department with the request that it consider a change 
of dates but, after discussion, the normal programme was 
upheld.88 
Spring normally brought a round of picnics, carnivals, inter-school 
sports and Agricultural Shows and people wanted to plan their 
traditional pastimes. The Commissioner was frequently consulted 
regarding the wisdom of travelling between towns, taking holidays 
away from home, holding sports days, annual picnics and end of 
year celebrations. The advice of the Public Health Department was 
to curtail such activities, but it did not ban them outright. 
A typical example is the case of the Midland Railway Company 
Employees' Picnic Committee. The Committee, having sought 
advice from Commissioner Cook, initially decided to shelve their 
plan for an annual picnic at Gingin, a small town north of 
Perth.89 Four weeks later fresh advice was sought from the 
Commissioner. The number of reported polio cases was in decline 
and the committee believed the decision to abandon their function 
had been influenced by a conservative minority from Gingin itself 
who did not want an influx of strangers in their district. The 
committee had since found that -
.. . quite a number of Gingin residents travel daily to Perth per 
bus and also it is estimated that approximately 60% of the 
persons residing in that district will attend the Royal Show 
88 Letter, 2 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
89 Letter, 3 1  August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
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which is held about two weeks prior to the date for which 
the Picnic had been arranged . . .  also a large motor racing 
exhibition is to be conducted . . .  only eight miles north of 
Gingin.9o 
The people equivocated, and so did the Public Health Department. 
Despite its promotion of the policy of avoiding crowds and large 
gatherings of people, there is no evidence of any direct attempt to 
have the Royal Agricultural Society (RAS) abandon the holding of 
the 1948 Royal Show, and Children's Day was not banned. The 
Department predicted the Show would result in a rise in the 
number of cases of polio, and later recorded the result -
Poliomyelitis infections during the last few days have shown 
a tendency towards increase compared to those of recent 
weeks. This increase was not unexpected as it was 
anticipated that the new and extensive contacts between 
unprotected persons and carriers associated with mass 
attendances at the Royal Show would have this result. It is 
not necessary for the victims themselves to have attended 
the Show, but the increase in the number and the wide 
dispersal of healthy carriers occasioned by this mass 
migration, will have exposed these persons to the risk of 
infection even though they themselves have remained in 
areas hitherto unaffected.9 1  
The RAS appears to have been beyond reproach. There is no 
evidence of correspondence on the matter, and no mention of the 
subject is to be found in the minutes of the Society.92 
90 Letter, 27 September 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
9 1  Memo, 22 October 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page; Public Health 1948, ( 1949). Appendix XV, p.62, BL, 614.09 WES. 
92 Information provided by Mr W. Gable. See also Public Health 1948, ( 1949). 
Appendix XV, p.63, BL. 6 14.09 WES. 
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The Public Health Department was more assertive with other 
groups and used the adverse outcome following the Royal Show to 
support its case. In November the Commissioner wrote to all 
Church leaders to urge that -
In view of the continued incidence of Poliomyelitis 
throughout the State, it is considered inadvisable for 
Christmas parties or festivities to be conducted of a nature 
which might bring into association children of different 
Sunday Scbools or groups. 
It is regretted that the cancelling of these functions will 
deprive many children of an enjoyable Christmas festivity 
but you will, I am sure, appreciate the importance of co­
operation with this Department in its endeavour to reduce 
the incidence of the epidemic.9 3  
This was also the season for inter-school sports and the Assistant 
Commissioner wrote to the Education Department to say that -
Following the Royal Show in Perth there has been a 
considerable increase in Poliomyelitis incidence. It is 
considered that, until further notice, all School Sports 
meetings should be cancelled.94 
This was a sensible and necessary measure to suggest, but it 
extended only to the holding of inter-school sports carnivals, not 
to sports days involving children from within a school.95 
Comment included a light-hearted cartoon by Saw [ Figure 12 1 
captioned "They want to get IN. "96 A crowd of children were 
9 3  Memo, 10 November 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
94 Memo, 28 October 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
95 WA, 3 November 1948, p.2. 
96 DN, 3 November 1948, p.2. Original emphasis. 
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depicted waiting to get into a state school, barred by gates boarded 
up with signs which read "ban on inter-school sports". 
Under the by-line "Let's get right into this polio battle", Mary 
Ferber, who advocated stronger actions by the Health Department, 
began her "Common sense" column with "I took my children to the 
Royal Show this year - because nobody told me not to". Due to the 
course the epidemic had taken she believed the public would now 
be receptive to strong action in relation to swimming carnivals and 
inter-school sports days, and called upon the Health Department 
to state clearly what should be done. In her opinion "all that 
parents want to know is what to do, and I think Dr Kingsbury has 
only to say what should be done for general obedience" .9 7  
A Doctor from the leafy, comfortable suburb of West Perth 
responded. The Health Department had always indicated, publicly 
and to all who asked, that the congregation of large numbers of 
people from different areas would expose them to the risk of polio 
infection.98 He obviously felt that everything necessary had been 
said on the subject. 
Once again the activities of the YAL which, unlike the Scouts, 
resisted quarantine regulations, aroused controversy and exposed 
the Health Department to further criticism. A proposed Spring 
tour of the Eastern Wheatbelt and Goldflelds by a YAL concert 
9 7  DN, 6 November 1948, p.2. 
98 DN, 11 November 1948, p.2. 
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party evoked a fierce response from residents of the towns on the 
itinerary.99 The Commissioner, in reply, restated the Department's 
position 
. . .  I have to inform you that this Department is unable to 
prohibit the proposed tour of the YAL Concert Party but the 
League has been advised strongly to postpone the tour . 1 00 
Vigorous cor respondence was exchanged between the 
Commissioner and the Secretary of the YAL. The Commissioner 
wrote "I venture to repeat my telephoned advice that the deferment 
of the tour is highly desirable at the present time" . 1 o 1 In a lengthy 
reply the Y AL assured the Commissioner that it was aware of the 
seriousness of the situation, because production of the show to be 
taken on tour had begun in May, when the epidemic became more 
intense. 
The belief that the winter weather would stop the progress of the 
disease had led the YAL to continue rehearsals, in the expectation 
that the epidemic would have subsided by August, when the tour 
was to commence. 1 02 The YAL found showed it had found support 
for this plan in the announcements of the Commissioner himself, 
coupled with the rate of reported cases which declined in August. 
The YAL pleaded willingness to co-operate but pointed out not only 
99 Letters from Cunderdin, Kellerberrin, Trayning and Kalgoorlie, in BL. ACC 
1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948. 
1 00 Letter, 10 August 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
101  Letter, 30 July 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page. 
1 02 Letter, 5 August 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
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the hours of rehearsal spent in preparation for the tour, but the 
"fair amount of money that has also been extended towards 
production and advance arrangements, together with publicity." 1 03 
The writer weighed the risks to human life, then drew the attention 
of the CPH to two more anomalies. Another youth group would 
travel over the same route as the YAL to bring entertainment to 
the countzy, and a group of forty boys had been permitted to travel 
as a football team from Western Australia to Queensland. 
Barring a clear veto from the Commissioner, the YAL obviously 
considered its tour would go ahead. The League underlined its 
willingness to co-operate with an offer to have all the boys in its 
party medically examined by a doctor approved by · the Public 
Health Department, and promised that all theatres used on the 
tour would be sprayed with DDT prior to each performance. In his 
penultimate paragraph the YAL Secretary- wrote -
... it appears to me that my organisation is being unduly 
picked out when one considers the number of people who 
will be visiting the goldflelds from the metropolitan area for 
the racing carnival at the same time, or a little before our 
proposed visit. I 04 
In his response the CPH pointed to the difficulties of predicting the 
course an epidemic would take, and stated that, since polio 
carriers could not be detected, a medical examination of the tour 
1 03 Letter, 5 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
1 04 Letter, 5 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration 186 
group would serve no purpose. I o5 
Correspondence to the Commissioner over the YAL tour is evidence 
that some rural people were deeply afraid of their children having 
contact with children from the metropolitan area. Although the 
number of cases of polio from the country was less than from the 
city (130 as compared with 181), on a per capita basis the rate of 
infection was far higher. Any natural suspicion country people 
had regarding contact with city children was strengthened by the 
view, occasionally expressed by Public Health Department officials, 
that country children were more susceptible to polio than their city 
counterparts. 
A report regarding the residents of the south west town of 
Bridgetown, not far from Noggerup, showed that, while they were 
nervous of children returning home from city boarding schools and 
brtngtng polio with them, they were acting to protect themselves. 
As a precaution against the intrusion of infantile paralysis, 
the Bridgetown Road Board proposes to disinfect all schools 
and school buses regularly. It is seeking information as to 
the most suitable type of disinfectant. While there has been 
no case reported in the district, the Board is worried because 
a number of children have been brought home from schools 
in Perth . 106 
A result of the 1948 epidemic in Western Australia was that there 
was an urgent need for systematic, on-going after-care for a large 
105 Letter, 6 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered 
page. 
106 WA, 14 June 1948, p.5. 
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number of polio survivors. Two women doctors from Victorian, Dr 
Elizabeth Mccomas and Dame Jean Macnamara visited the state 
to investigate and report on Poliomyelitis and Cerebral Palsy in 
Western Australia. The report, which reflected Dame Jean's 
capacity to compare the facilities developed in Victoria with what 
she found in the West was highly critical and made wide ranging 
recommendations. Dame Jean favoured the immobilisation 
method of treating polio and was strongly opposed to active the 
methods, including hydrotherapy, introduced by Sister Kenny. 1 07 
Examination of a cross-section of patients enabled Dame Jean to 
see that some of Sister Kenny's methods were being used in 
Western Australia, and she did not approve. 1 08 In a covering letter 
she wrote 
I have been saddened beyond expression by the situation in 
Perth, and hope that you will see that these people are cared 
for. If I can help in any way from Victoria I will be glad to do 
so. 1 09 
The report began with the observation that, up to this point, 
Western Australia had been the most fortunate of the Australian 
states. In the period 1925 to January 1948 there had been 207 
cases of polio in Western Australia whereas in the same period in 
Victoria, for example, there had been 3,800 cases, half of which 
had occurred during the 1937-38 epidemic. 1 1 0 The rapid increase 
1 07 Willis, E. ( 1979). "Sister Kenny", The Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Sociology, Vol 15, No 3. p. 31. 
1 08 McKellar Hall, R.D. ( 1983). Reflections, p.47. See Chapter 4 above. 
109 Letter, 20 August 1948,p.41. BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1190 / 1948. 
1 10 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1190/ 1948, p. 12. 
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in demand for hospital beds, qualified staff and adequate after-care 
facilities, now urgently confronting Western Australia, had been 
faced earlier by other states, and this was an opportunity to learn 
from their experience. 
Although health experts in Western Australian had kept 
themselves informed regarding developments in other states, the 
sadness Dame Jean felt arose from her belief that the situation, as 
she found it, was ill-prepared and significantly under-resourced. 
In her view these factors doomed many of the surviving children to 
life-long suffering. The number of cases was comparatively small 
but the lack of suitable staff and facilities caused her to say -
. . .  this epidemic already almost warrants declaring a state of 
emergency, if efficient accommodation and personnel cannot 
be obtained AT ONCE by other means. 1 1 1  
Facilities in Western Australia were inadequate and, in her view, 
cripples were being created, not rehabilitated. 
The recommendations proposed covered a wide range of subjects; 
boiling of milk and water for human consumption, increasing the 
temperature for pasteurizing milk used in ice-cream, regulating the 
length of time for storing ice-cream, increasing publicity regarding 
personal hygiene, ensuring the cleanliness of toilets and the proper 
disposal of sewage, spraying for flies, using of the ocean for 
swimming instead of swimming pools, and recognising the impact 
1 1 1  Report. BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1190/ 1948, p.24. Original emphasis. 
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of fatigue in the early stages of infection. She also recommended 
an increase in the quantity of respirators and suction apparatus 
modules available, the installation of Hubbard saline baths, 
increasing the number of nursing and physiotherapy staff at the 
Infectious Diseases Branch, appointing of a Medical Registrar at 
the IDB for the duration of the epidemic, and establishing a splint­
making service. 
Dame Jean's real concern was that there was no margin of safety 
in Western Australia. She called for increased accommodation 
which would cater for present after-care patients and also could 
provide for the demands future epidemics would impose. 1 12 In her 
view, the Commonwealth Government should be requested to make 
beds available at the Hollywood Repatriation Hospital. 
More time and energy needed to be spent on the after-care of polio 
survivors. She wrote -
At the stage the [body) temperature falls the majority are 
potential cripples only. Many I have seen in Perth have 
spent several months already in the slow but effective factory 
which turns the potential cripple from poliomyelitis into the 
finished cripple. Others mildly affected, in whom complete 
recovery- of a life of full efficiency was a certainty if care had 
been provided, are not receiving that care and their disability 
is becoming permanent and increasing. 1 13 
The lessons that had been learned through repeated epidemics in 
Victoria, Dame Jean said, were that even mild cases should be 
1 1 2 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 190/ 1948, p. 19. 
113 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 1 190 / 1948, pp.22-23. 
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regarded as important as they could soon be restored to full 
health, given the application of the correct treatment at the right 
time. 1 14 And there needed to be more forward thinking; "plans for 
the care of patients should be made in the intervals between 
epidemics". 
The plans offered by Dame Jean were, on her own admission, not 
aimed at providing a maximum level of care but at covering the 
present critical situation. She concluded -
The suggestions I have made may seem expensive - more 
than West Australia can afford. I would ask you, Mr Abbott 
- can West Australia afford not to do this? Can you afford 
to deny the mothers of young families and the young people 
their chance to a life of usefulness, to allow the little 
children to deform without attempting to cry halt to the 
crippling process?l 1 5 
The report was forwarded to the Public Health Department with 
the note that it also had the imprimatur of the Consultant 
Physician of the Alfred Hospital in Melbourne. 1 1 6 Dame Jean also 
used the occasion to suggest that Western Australia could add its 
weight to that of other state authorities who were seeking to lobby 
the Commonwealth for more assistance in combatting polio 
through the Federal body for funding medical and scientific 
research, the National Health and Medical Research Councn. 1 1 1 
1 14 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1190/ 1948, p.23. 
1 1 5 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1190/1948, p.30. 
1 1 6 Letter, 23 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1190/ 1948, p.40. 
l l 7 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1190/ 1948, p.12. 
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The consultative committee of doctors considered it at a special 
meeting, and recommendations for action were made to the 
Minister. I I S After due consideration the Premier wrote -
CABINET desi res to give every assistance to the 
Commissioner of Public Health in his work for the after-care 
of sufferers from poliomyelitis and is prepared to consider 
any practicable proposals to improve the conditions ... 1 1 9 
The Commissioner replied in detail, requesting a full-time splint­
maker, the early completion of additions to the After-care Wards at 
the IDB, the fo rmation of an After-care Committee of 
philanthropic laymen to raise funds for the work, and the addition 
of two members to the consultative committee. 1 20 
Steps were taken immediately to employ a splint-maker and, on 20 
Februaiy 1949, George Clarke arrived from Melbourne to commence 
work, first at Royal Perth Hospital, and then in a workshop 
provided at Princess Margaret Hospital . 1 2 1  In connection with the 
plan to expand the IDB, the opportunity arose to provide an 
additional facility. The "Golden Age", a de-licensed hotel owned by 
the Swan Brewery Company in Leederville, an easy distance from 
Princess Margaret Hospital, was purchased for the sum of £5,500 
and renovated for the specific purpose of housing polio after-care 
patients. 1 22 
1 1 8 Report, 27 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 190/ 1948, pp.99- 100. 
l 1 9 Memo, 1 November 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 190/ 1948, p. 1 1 7. 
120  Memo, 9 December 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 190/ 1948, p. 128. 
1 2 1  WA, 18 February 1949, p. 2; 23 February 1949, p.5. 
1 22 Letters, 5 March 1949; 3 1  March 1949, 1 September 1949, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/4, 322/ 1949,pp. l ,8, and 37. 
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Another scheme that was put forward to assist with after-care was 
to convert a natural hot pool, located on the shore of the Swan 
river in Dalkeith, for therapeutic purposes. 1 23 Plans were 
discussed for several years but, despite considerable interest being 
shown, it proved impossible to negotiate the necessary approvals 
and nothing eventuated. The "Hot Pool" was a nocturnal meeting 
place for controversial skylarking and it was eventually shut down 
completely. 
Polio research continued around the world. For more than three 
decades polio had been identified as a virus, and now it had been 
photographed through an electronic microscope. 124 But mystery 
still surrounded its means of transmission. The occurrence of five 
cases of polio in the suburb of Osborne Park, in September, was 
seen by politician and medical practitioner Dr J. Gordon Hislop, 
MLC, as providing an opportunity to do research on the subject. 
He recommended to the Minister that a three member committee 
be set up to manage the project, that the public be invited to 
contribute funds to "The Poliomyelitis Research Fund of WA" and 
that a young physician be engaged to do the research. 1 25  
The West Australian supported Dr Hislop's plan with a leading 
article which touched on Dame Jean Macnamara's suspicion of 
1 23 Letter, 6 December 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 106/1949, p.3. 
1 24 ST, 26 September 1948, p.3. 
1 25 Letter, 8 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1249/ 1948, p. l ;  DN, 10 
September 1948, p.2. 
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unscalded dairy products, expressed in an article in The MJA of 
December 1947. Osborne Park was home to several dairies and the 
editorial offered the view that it could be a suburb where a greater 
than normal amount of raw milk would be consumed, thus 
providing fertile grounds for the investigation. 1 26 Dr Hislop's 
suggestion elicited a flurry of responses. Correspondents wrote to 
the papers in support and several Rotary clubs agreed to receive 
donations. 1 27 Later the editor wrote another leading article in 
which the virtues of conducting such research in Western 
Australia were extolled. The article recognised the potential for 
research to yield nothing, or only negative results, and 
acknowledged that compared to the USA, or even the state of 
Victoria, Western Australia had a lot of ground to make up. 
However, it was hoped that -
. . .  some factor scarcely apparent in the United States or 
Victoria may show up more boldly here with our different 
soil, climate and other conditions, including the sparseness 
of our population and the wide distribution of the 
complaint. We may have a contribution to make, and if we 
have it is well worth making. 1 28 
Not wishing to create the impression that the Public Health 
Department was in any way lacking in its attention to this subject, 
the editor hastened to add -
It should be emphasised that the sponsoring of this appeal 
and the giving of donations to it constitute no reflection on 
the technical officers of the State Department of Public 
1 26 WA. 6 September 1948, p.2. 
1 27 WA, 8 September 1948, p.5; 1 1  September 1948, p.4. 
1 28 WA, 1 3 September 1948, p.2. 
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Health. That Department is, no doubt, deeply concerned 
and doing what it can, but it is not overstaffed and it has 
much to do.129 
The editor's disclaimer was a sensible ploy because the publicity 
brought into focus the question of how thoroughly reports of polio 
were investigated by the Public Health Department, which felt the 
pressure of this attention. When speaking to to a meeting of the 
Perth branch of the Liberal Party, the Minister made the point that 
"every case of infantile paralysis was closely investigated," and 
continued to say that, while experts differed in their opinion on 
the cause of the disease, from Dame Jean Macnamara he had 
learned -
. .. nothing about precautions that the Health Department 
was not aware of and on which it had not taken action ... 
The Government has done its best to give effect to her 
advice.130 
A few days later, Mr Grayden, MLA for Middle-Swan, asked the 
Minister whether the government intended to investigate the 
matter as suggested. 131 Mr Abbott assured the Parliament that 
every case, including those that had occurred at Osborne Park, had 
been carefully investigated under the direction of Dr Kingsbury, 
who had been especially trained for the role.132 
129 WA, 13 September 1948, p.2. 
130 WA, 14 September 1948, p.2. 
131 Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, ( 1948). Vol. l ,  
p. l 080, 15 September 1948, BL, 328 -9412, WES. 
132 WA, 16 September 1948, p.2; Hansard, (1948). Vol. I ,  p.1081, 15 September 
1948, BL, 328 -9412, WES. 
CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration 1 95 
The Minister visited Osborne Park personally to obtain an 
impression of the procedures followed when a report of polio was 
made. Shortly afterwards he had to endure more questions in the 
House from Mr Grayden who wanted to know how thoroughly the 
directions of the Department were followed when a case of polio 
was reported. 1 33 The Minister replied that all local authorities 
had received instructions to investigate contacts and movements of 
infected persons, and that reports were double checked if 
necessaiy. 1 34 
The public subscribed generously to the research fund and the 
Public Health Department approached the Medical School of the 
University of Adelaide to see if it would undertake the research. 1 35 
Because of the perceived benefit to all, and perhaps in an attempt 
to win some points for Western Australia, Premier Ross McLarty 
wrote to Prime Minister Chifley to seek Commonwealth 
assistance. 1 36 Having sought the advice of the NH&MRC, Ben 
Chifley replied that 
. . .  owing to the extreme difficulty in purchasing monkeys, 
which are essential for the carrying on of research into the 
poliomyelitis virus, and that, as this work is being carried 
out extensively in other countries where monkeys are 
available, it did not propose to undertake any large scale 
investigations into the mode of entry and prevention of 
1 33 Hansard, ( 1948). Vol. l .  28 September 1948, p . 1345, BL, 328 -94 12, WES. 
1 34 Memo, 23 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, 
unnumbered page; WA. 1 October 1948, p.2. 
1 35 Letter. 27 October 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4.  1249 / 1948, p. 1 7; Letter, 4 
November 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1249/ 1948, unnumbered page. There 
was no Medical School at The University of WA at this time. Teaching in the full 
M.B, B.S, commenced in 1959. See Alexander, F. (ed). ( 1963). Campus at Crawley. 
University of WA Press, pp.400-4 10. 
1 36 Letter. 5 November 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4. 1249/ 1948, p.23. 
CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration 1 96 
spread of the poliomyelitis vtrus itself. 
However, Professor Burnet of the Walter and Eliza Hall 
Institute of Medical Research is carrying out extensive 
investigations into the mode of entry of other types of 
viruses which can be easily cultivated in chick embryos. 
The general feeling of the the National Health and Medical 
Research Council was that if these researches are successful, 
the knowledge gained will be applicable to practically all 
virus diseases, which will include Poliomyelitis. 1 3  7 
The reply, which reflected the difficulties experienced by Australian 
polio researchers and the priorities chosen by the influential 
NH&MRC, must have been disheartening for the doctors and the 
state government. And it was uncomplimentary to the Western 
Australian initiative, revealing it as out of step with the realities 
and trends in other places. 
Dr Hislop's plan came to nothing. The apparent significance of the 
multiple cases of polio in Osborne Park faded from view and efforts 
to recruit the services of researchers from South Australia were 
unsuccessful. Although nominations were received for the fund 
raising committee no meeting ever took place. 1 38 Dr Hislop wrote 
to the press to close the appeal and suggested that the money 
already donated be held in trust to assist long-term paralysis 
patients. 1 39 
As the year came to a close cases of polio once more began to 
1 37 Letter, 8 December 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1249/ 1948, p.31. 
1 38 Letters, 23 December 1948, and 27 June 1950, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
1 07 / 1949, p. 1, and unnumbered page. 
1 39 WA, 15 December 1948, p.2. 
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occur. The response to polio varied widely when it came to 
congregations of children. The country town of York banned 
children from swimming in the Avon River. Unlike the YAL, the 
Boy Scouts' Association abandoned its plan to send 200 boys to 
the Pan-Paciflc Jamboree in Victoria, and The Red Cross cancelled 
its "gypsy fair" scheduled for Riverside Drive in early December. 1 40 
Some groups cancelled plans for large gatherings of children, even 
from the same school. It was reported that at Pingelly, a town on 
the Great Southern Railway -
A public meeting recently decided that owing to health 
warnings issued by the Health Dept it was inadvisable to 
hold a Christmas party for the children this year and this 
was recommended to the Progress Association. The Pingelly 
Parents and Citizens Association has also agreed to abandon 
plans for a large school break-up function, but a party will 
be held at the school for children under supervision of the 
teaching staff. 1 4 1  
But other country centres went ahead with their gatherings, 
perhaps believing or hoping that their children would be safe 
because no-one from outside the district would be present. After 
the second wave of the epidemic had run its course the Wagin 
Argus reported on events at Ballaying, also on the Great 
Southern, where a one teacher school, currently enjoying its peak 
enrolment, had operated for over forty years. 
On Saturday evening last, December 18th, the school 
children of Ballaying presented their first two act play in the 
local Hall. The scene was laid in Cinderella's Palace, after 
her marriage to Prince Charming. All the 22 children of the 
1 40 WA. 18 November 1948, p.4; 20 November 1948, p.2. 
1 4 1  WA, 18 November 1948, p.4; 8 December 1948, p.2. 
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Ballaytng School took part in the play, and great credit is 
due to the producer (Mr Jack Ward) and to the director (Miss 
Brown) as well as to the kiddies for a really excellent 
evening's entertainment. The Hall was filled to capacity and 
eve:ryone was happy - especially the children who seemed to 
enjoy every minute speaking, singing and dancing around the 
Maypole. We hope to see more of these clever little artists 
when they put on their next show. Several of those present 
suggested that they would like to see the Concert put on in 
Wagin. 1 42 
Perhaps it was thought that being so remote from larger 
populations the dreaded disease was unlikely to strike. And in any 
case, the children were all from the same school. 
For the safety of children the Public Health Department 
recommended that Father Christmas not appear in Perth 
department stores. The Retail Traders' Association banned Father 
Chrtstmasl 43 and cancelled any functions which would have 
resulted in the gathering of large numbers of children. 
Sunday Times artist Davies replied with a cartoon [Figure 14] 
which included the first representation of polio. 144 Father 
Christmas is pictured on a cricket pitch, with bat in hand. He has 
just been clean bowled by polio, pictured as a dark, ugly "trickster" . 
Polio is the spoil sport who has clean bowled a long series of 
actMties, listed on the score board, normally enjoyed during the 
summer. The trickster cheated many West Australian children and 
adults out of familiar pastimes during the summer of 1948. 
142 Wagin Argus, 23 December, 1948 p. l .  
143 DN, 18 November 1948, p .  l .  
144 WA, 18 November 1948, p.4; ST, 21 November 1948, p.4. 
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Although it was the Retail Traders' Association that banned Father 
Christmas, the action provoked Mr Marshall, Labor member for the 
Murchison, to question the Minister for Health. He asked whether 
it was -
. .. necessary and just to deny city children the right to be 
presented to Father Christmas at city emporiums, while 
large numbers of children were allowed to congregate at 
picture shows etc. 1 45 
Any uncertainty that existed in the community would not have 
been dispelled by the the Minister's reply, which highlighted the 
difficulty felt by some. He said -
Although the Health Department tendered advice on the 
precautions to be taken to avoid the spread of poliomyelitis, 
it was left to the individual whether he accepted that advice 
or not.1 46 
An even greater degree of ambiguity is evident in the advice the 
Deputy Commissioner gave regarding the holding of swimming 
carnivals. The WA Amateur Swimming Association (WAASA) was 
advised by Dr Kingsbury that -
. . .  swimming under racing conditions would not be 
dangerous .. .  [but he] warned of the danger of attracting large 
crowds.1 47 
1 45 WA. 24 November 1948, p.2: Hansard, (1948) .  Vol. 2, p.2625, BL. 328 -9412, 
WES. 
1 46 WA, 24 November 1948, p.2. 
1 47 WA, 25 November 1948, p.2. 
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In the light of this advice the WAASA intended to hold its 
swimming carnivals and reduce the size of the crowd that gathered 
by inviting only club supporters to attend. Such advice was the 
result of continued uncertainty regarding polio transmission and 
the Health Department's wish to persuade the public rather than 
enforce its will through legislation. 
The frustration felt over polio was summarised in an article titled 
"Official Confusion on Polio" . The Editor of the Sunday Times 
wrote at length, noting that there was no official force behind the 
requests the Department made of the public. He then detailed the 
inconsistencies he saw in its policies. 
* Children's Day at the Royal Show was not banned, but 
later it was stated that crowds gathered there had caused an 
increase in cases [of polio) .  
* A ban was put on inter school sports, but not until some 
had already been held. 
* Although swimming in pools is discouraged, the official 
mind seems to regard it as safer for competitive sWimmers to 
swim in lanes at a carnival. 
* Crowds at carnivals are frowned upon, but it seems all 
rtght for only club supporters to attend them. 
* In winter, people were packed together at football much 
closer than at the Royal Show, yet there was no suggestion 
that this caused any special flare-up of the disease. 
* Cases are occurring at small country towns where there are 
not enough people to make a crowd. 
* On a per capita basis the estimated incidence in the 
metropolitan area is lower than in the country. How does 
this square up with the crowd theories of the Health 
Department, particularly when children have been crammed 
in over-crowded school rooms, and have travelled every day 
CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration 20 1 
on crowded conveyances?l 48 
The Editor maintained that West Australians were law-abiding 
people and would co-operate with even irksome laws if they could 
appreciate their underlying logic, but these policies did not appear 
to make sense. But it was the public conduct of the Minister for 
Health, who attended a Baby Show, that drew the most severe 
criticism . 
. . . is it any wonder that parents are bewildered when, after 
betng told to keep their children away from crowds they find 
the Minister for Health opening a Baby Show?l 49 
The Minister said he had drawn the attention of the organisers to 
the advice of his department in this matter but the only excuse 
offered for his attendance was that he had promised to do so a 
long time beforehand.1 5 0  
More criticism of departmental policy was aired in the press. As 
the Assistant Commissioner, Dr Kingsbury, retired "Just a Mother" 
wrote -
As a mother of two young girls I am amazed at Dr 
Kingsbury's advice to the public about poliomyelitis. He 
advises us to keep children away from entertainment and 
Father Christmas, but he says nothing of closing hotels, 
where anyone can drink out of glasses, public conveniences, 
race and trotting meetings, speedways and lodge meetings, 
where men and women of all ages and health habits rub 
shoulders. Cannot these parents infect their children when 
they come home? ... I cannot see that swimming in lanes is 
1 48 ST, 28 November 1948, p.4. 
1 49 ST, 28 November 1948, p.4. 
1 50 DN, 26 November 1948, p.2. 
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any reason for having swimming contests if gatherings in 
public are dan�erous. Should I take my children to swim in 
public-infectea water or keep them at home getting fretful 
and begging me to go for a swim as we did last year?l�l 
The prerogative trained male experts assumed in the science of 
polio prevention was strongly challenged by a woman who, in 
describing herself as "Just a Mother", left no doubt where she 
thought the real wisdom on the subject could be found. 
A frustrated Commissioner rebutted strongly, indicating the 
difficulties faced by the department. Responsibility for the final 
decision over the congregation of children fell to parents, but the 
Commissioner felt they needed the courage to choose. 
If parents had not the courage to make a decision about 
poliomyelitis precautions unwelcome to their children, that 
was no reason for an acrimonious attack on a department 
which had given advice that they were not prepared to 
accept. . .  The Department has consistently advised against 
children attending parties and similar places of public 
assembly where they will come in contact with adults and 
children who are strangers to them. . .  it should be possible 
for all organisers of parties to make a decision for themselves 
whether or  not the function will be held . . .  It ls an 
indication of a wide-spread incapacity to make a bold 
decision or to accept responsibility for an unwelcome 
decision that the fate of almost all such parties ls referred to 
the department for decision, presumably so that the 
responsibility for an unwelcome decision shall rest on other 
shoulders and so that the resentment of those who are 
disappointed shall be diverted to the department, represented 
as a kill-Joy, rather than countered by the plea of public 
interest. Failure to conform to the department's advice 
during the Royal Show led to a rise in the incidence of the 
disease and . . .  a section of the public complained that the 
department should have given specific advice against 
attendance at the show. Specific advice against attendance 
at Christmas parties ls now stigmatised as unwarranted 
1 5 1 WA. 1 December 1948, p.2. 
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interference. 1 52 
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The department expected parents to be bold in a way that it was 
not prepared to be; they were expected to choose to keep their 
. children away from large gatherings which it refused to ban. Some 
parents saw themselves as bold in choosing to allow their children 
to attend some gatherings, such as their end of year Junior and 
Leaving Certificate examinations. 1 53 
Saw, captured the mood in his cartoon "Punch it Home" [Figure 
14], 1 54 in which, for the first time, he now ventured to represent 
polio as an image. The scene is a boxing ring in which polio, a 
masked male pugilist, whose image is reminiscent of the Phantom, 
"the ghost who walks", hits out at the 'Health Department' who is 
on the ropes, and because his head is trapped is looking away from 
his opponent. 1 55 The ropes are reminiscent of the red tape that 
features in some of Saw's earlier cartoons. The averted gaze and 
the constraint of the head suggests a level of paralysis in the 
"Health Department" as it applies the measures currently in use 
against polio. Behind his back "Health Department" is holding 
one gloved fist, marked "power of enforcement", while with his 
naked left hand he holds up in front of polio a large sheet of paper 
on which are the headings "Advice, Warnings, etc ... ". The public, a 
typical 1940s male working man dressed for an outing, who stands 
1 52 WA. 1 December 1948, p.2 ;  ST, 5 December 1948, p.4. 
1 53 WA, 7 December 1948, p. 16. 
1 54 DN. 1 December 1948, p.2. 
1 55 WA, 29 August 1996, 'People' supplement p.3 "The Phantom" first appeared 
in 1936. 
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as the side of the ring and acts as coach to the "Health 
Department", says - ''You might do better if you stopped waving 
your left and hit out with your right" . 
The chorus against the use of a persuasive style of management 
had reached a pitch. Although the public did not know what 
specific actions would ensure its safety against polio, Saw believed 
it was weary from the lack of assertive behaviour demonstrated by 
the authorities. 
Criticism continued. "A Concerned Observer", who claimed to be a 
trained scientist wrote in support of "Just a Mother". After giving 
a brief resume' of the current understanding of the characteristics 
and dangers of the polio virus, the author showed that this 
knowledge presented some serious challenges to the policies of the 
Public Health Department, especially with respect to crowds and 
gatherings. He then fixed the leadership firmly in his sights as the 
ones responsible for the spread of polio -
People of integrity in all stations are beginning to feel the 
doubts and misgivings so clearly expressed by "Just a 
Mother" in her plain admission and plea of bewilderment."  
. . .  When I repeatedly observe the the filthy conditions of city 
streets and railway carriages, when I see the city council 
dust cart regularly spreading dust and leaving the streets 
unclean, when I find filthy dust blowing at me and into 
exposed food on all hands, when I realise that public money 
- our money, diverted compulsorily from our provision for 
children's needs - is being paid to those who, through inept 
direction or personal inefficiency, or both, are "messing 
things up, " perhaps I may be pardoned for feeling that the 
spread of poliomyelitis - or disease of any kind - is not so 
much the problem of individual apathy as of wise 
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205 
The Health Department did not allow these criticisms to pass. 
After the Sunday Times published an article titled "Official 
Confusion on Polio" , the Commissioner went on the attack, 
asserting that any clear-minded person could see that there was no 
official confusion in relation to polio, and restated the position. 
The Department has ... consistently issued the advice that 
unnecessary migration and attendance at public assemblies 
should be avoided. It is discretionary with the individual or 
with his guardian whether this advice, which is never varied, 
is accepted or not. 1 57 
He reiterated his point that, while the Department had never 
banned any functions, organisers who cancelled events were 
inclined to lay the blame at its feet in an effort to evade personal 
responsibility for their decision. The Commissioner made a similar 
response through the columns of the Daily News and, in an 
attempted put down, suggested that the letters to the Editor 
revealed "a lamentable incapacity to think coherently" . 1 58 
The protest did not move the Editor of the Sunday Times , who 
replied at length and supported his original position with more 
criticism. Children's parties were banned, but the Minister allowed 
a Baby Show to go ahead and even graced it with his presence. 
Schools, which in the USA and New Zealand had been closed 
1 56 WA, 7 December 1948, p.16. 
1 57 ST, 5 December 1948, p.4. 
1 58  DN, 6 December 1948, p.2. 
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during polio epidemics, remained open in Western Australia. The 
unfortunate practice of servicing toilet pans during school hours 
was allowed to continue. Quarantine regulations were imposed on 
the children of interstate visitors, but movements within the state 
were not restricted. The Editor doubted the Department had the 
power to enforce its policies, but argued that Parliament should 
have been asked to provide them. He concluded -
We say there is a public lack of confidence in the Health 
Department, not only in the field of infantile paralysis, but 
in other fields . . .  we tell Dr Cook and the Government that 
the public is not satisfied . . . with statements that are so 
vague and confused that they only serve to bewilder the 
people at a time when parents might reasonably expect to be 
reassured. 1 59 
Earlier in the year the Commissioner had complained of a lack of 
co-operation between his Department and local government 
authorities over regulations governing infectious diseases. 1 60 The 
relationship between state and local authorities, like that between 
state and federal bodies, was always prone to some difficulties. 
However by the end of the year there was a much broader level of 
discontent, mainly noticeable in the Departmental relationships 
with the press and members of the public. 
The most dramatic commentary came just before Christmas in the 
form of a cartoon by Saw titled "Not a Charming Situation" [Figure 
16]. 1 61 The central image in the scene is a huge black snake which 
159 ST, 5 December 1948, p.4. 
160 ST, 18 July 1948, p.4. 
1 61 DN, 17 December 1948, p.2. 
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is coiled to spell "polio". The snake stands on its tail and looms 
large over the "Health Department", represented by a man who is a 
snake charmer wearing colonial style dress, a pith helmet and 
white suit. Nearby stands a small cane basket with lid ajar. The 
snake was once small enough to be contained by the basket but 
now it has grown to be a horrific and threatening presence. The 
"Health Department" is playing a snake charmer's flute, which 
emits "soothing sounds" in the direction of the reptile. Meanwhile 
the public, the same 1940s man of the previous cartoon, stands on 
the sidelines giving advice. This time, as he offers the "Health 
Department" a double-barrelled shotgun titled "direct action" he 
says, "Try this one - it makes noises too". 
The cartoonist used an image of primal fear to make his point. 
The threat of snakes was well known in country and suburban 
Western Australia in the 1940s. However the snake is Saw's 
cartoon is a cobra, an exotic breed, which looms as a threatening 
and uncontrolled presence. In the face of it the "persuasive" 
actions of the Public Health Department, cast as an upper-class 
colonial figure, are interpreted as ineffectual, and ridiculous. The 
public, which in reality has no solution to offer because of the 
mystery that still surrounded polio, nevertheless proposes a 
different approach to the problem: "direct action". When 
confronted by the enlarging menace menace of a rampant polio 
virus the response of the Western Australian Public Health 
Department was seen as lacking in the force some considered the 
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crisis required and deserved. 
During the latter weeks of November and the first three weeks of 
December the number of reported cases of polio began to increase 
again. The rise was most noticed after the school year ended on 2 
December, when many families began their summer holidays, and 
the number of cases did not decline until the fourth week of that 
month. 1 62 
As Christmas drew near two more deaths brought the total for the 
year to twenty-five. Questions were raised about the wisdom of 
children having dental operations and tonsillectomies performed. 
Heroic stories had already appeared, including one concerning the 
progress of an iron lung baby living in the care of his widower 
father. 1 63 
The year closed with the realisation that the effects of polio were 
here to stay. There appeared pictures and stories of people who 
had contracted polio and yet battled with their affliction to 
triumph in some way. A girl of fifteen, who had been hospitalised 
for six months, was driven from the IDB to her school, St Mary's, 
West Perth, to receive the "Hamilton History Prize for 1948" . In 
addition, she was awarded the Form prize for "her example of 
courage and cheerfulness". 1 64 A mother of two from Shenton Park, 
1 62 Public Health 1948, (1949). p.63, BL, 614.09 WES. 
163 DN, 18 November 1948, p.7. 
164 ST, 12 December 1948, p.5. 
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who three years previously had been told she would never walk 
again was pictured on crutches, her success being credited to the 
unorthodox methods of Sister Kenny.165 
A trickle of cases continued from the fourth week of December 
until the end of February 1949. By the end of that year a further 
fifty-five cases had been added to the 311 that had been reported 
during 1948. 
The confusion that is evident on the part of the Public Health 
Department during the 1948 epidemic is partly due to the 
uncertainty that existed over the origins of polio, and the lack of a 
proven antidote. This was also the first occasion when such 
demands had been made on the Public Health System in Western 
Australia, both during an epidemic and for after-care resources. 
Over against these constraints must be placed the advantage that 
was gained by the elapse of time between epidemics in the eastern 
states and the outbreak of polio in Western Australia. It may have 
been possible to learn more from the experience of others, 
although at this stage all knowledge gained was inconclusive. 
The problem that impacted most on the public was due to the 
administrative style adopted by the Public Health Department. If 
the application of quarantine regulations was regarded as 
165 ST, 19 December 1948, p.5. 
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paralysing for the community, 166 the style in which they were 
introduced left the public confused and frustrated. 
The uncertainty that surrounded polio in the public imagination is 
reflected in the ambiguous nature of the three representations of 
the disease discussed here: the dark trickster, the phantom 
pugilist, and the evil, looming presence of the exotic snake. All 
have an element of incomprehensibility about them and they are 
beyond control. Faced with this threat, it is clear that the 
cartoonists, and many members of the community were not 
satisfied with the performance of the Public Health Department. 
Rather than exercise the full measure of the powers available to it 
I 
through the Western Australian Health Act, 1911, the Department 
chose a persuasive approach while members of the community 
called for tougher preventative measures. Susan Sontag identified 
this as typical of the reaction to a feared disease: 
Epidemics of particularly dreaded illnesses always 
provoke an outcry against leniency or tolerance - now 
identified as laxity, weakness, disorder, corruption: 
unhealthiness. Demands are made to subject people to 
'tests', to isolate the ill and those that are suspected of 
being ill or transmitting illness, and to erect barriers 
against the real and imaginary contamination of 
foreigners . 16 7 
The approach of the Public Health Department was later 
166 The idea of "governmental paralysis" was used by Saw in another cartoon 
[Figure 17] titled "Waiting for something to come down" (DN, 19 November 1948, 
p.2). The cartoon was a comment on stalled plans the WA Government had for 
developing the coal industry. This was the only occasion on which polio was 
used to refer to anything other than the disease itself. See Rogers, N. (1992). Dirt 
and Disease, p.13. "Polio was used to symbolise politics, baseball and war". 
16 7 Sontag, S. (1993). Illness as Metaphor, Ringwood, p.166. 
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interpreted as 'humane' , 1 68 but at the time many saw it as weak. 
Press commentary and letters to the editor signalled the 
frustration felt in the community. Cartoonist Saw, in particular, 
showed that he believed there was another illness to cure - a severe 
case of bureaucratic paralysis. 
Six years later, when the advent of another epidemic threatened to 
curtail a long awaited royal visit to Western Australia, the 
Commissioner showed he had regained the strength of his muscles 
and initiated a meeting with members of the media. 1 69 His view 
was -
The panic potential of epidemic poliomyelitis is ou trtvalled 
by few other diseases. This particular epidemic coinciding as 
it did with an historic social occasion, was especially 
embarrassing to the authorities concerned. The public is 
entitled to to the fullest information during times of an 
emergency . . . nevertheless it is extremely difficult to avoid 
aggravating panic in presenting the facts. 1 70 
The Commissioner aimed to gain the support of the daily 
newspapers and the ABC to publicise precautions against polio 
and promote confidence in the community. There can be little 
doubt that an unstated aim was to minimise the level of criticism 
1 68 "Move to curtail draconian disease power '',WA , 24 March 1995, p.2. A plan 
was announced to introduce a new Public Health (Infectious Diseases) Bill in 
Western Australia which would overhaul the legislative framework for the control 
of infectious diseases. Sources were quoted as saying that the Public Health 
Department regarded as draconian the powers given it by the 1911 Health Act 
(WA Health Act, 1911, sections 14, 15, 248 and 249, pp. 13,189). It was stated 
that it is only the "humane attitude of health bureaucrats" which has prevented 
the draconian laws being used. 
1 69 Greenland, W. (1990). lrifantile Pamlysls, pp. 5-7, shows that in NSW during 
the 1930s and 40s attempts were made to suppress the extent of press reporting 
about polio as a way of trying to control fear in the community. 
1 70 Publlc Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VII, p.53, BL. 614.09 WES. 
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his department might have to endure as a result of this epidemic, 
which was about to occur in this worst possible circumstances: the 
full glare of publicity associated with a royal visit in which the 
Queen herself could become the target of the polio virus. 
In relation to attempts to suppress the press and control public 
criticism of the Public Health Department, and all matters 
connected with the epidemics that followed, there is little doubt 
that the arm of the Commissioner was significantly strengthened 
by the support he received from the Government Epidemiologist, 
Dudley Snow, who moved to Perth in 1 950. And, while the public 
continued to make some criticisms, particularly in regard to the 
continuation of the royal visit, no further cartoons appeared, then 
or in 1956, to pillory the Public Health Department as it sought to 
control and defeat polio. 
*** 
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Figure 6: Weekly incidence of polio in Western Australia in 1948, 
Public Health 1 948, (1949). Appendix XV, p.62, BL 614.09 WES. 
lO 
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Figure 7: Serial spot map, first 1 50 cases of polio in the 
metropolitan area, 1948, Public Health 1 948, (1949). Appendix XV, 
p.60, BL 614.09 WES. 
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Figure 8: Incidence of polio in Western Australia followin_g the 
school holidays and the Royal Show 1948, Public Health [948, 
(1949). Appendix XV, p.63, BL 614.09 WES. 
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Figure 9: Daily News, 1 7  January 1 948, p.2 . 
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Figure 10: Dally News, 24 January 1948, p.2 . 
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Figure 11: Dally News, 31 January 1948, p.2 . 
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Figure 12: Daily News , 13  February 1948, p.2. 
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Figure 13: Daily News, 3 November 1948, p.2 . 
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Figure 14: Sunday Times , 2 1  November 1 948, p.4. 
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Figure 15:  Daily News ,  1 December 1948, p.2. 
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Figure 16: Daily News , 1 7  December 1 948, p.2 .  
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Figure 17: Daily News , 21 November 1948, p.2 .  
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CHAPTER 6: A Royal panic: the 1954 polio epidemic. 
Memories of the '50's 
Turf cigarettes on the dashboard 
of the Holden ute my father drove, 
Taking us to wave 
our personal flags, 
at the Queen as she stepped 
from her plane 
waving her white-gloved hand. 
Polio was the word 
on the lips of all the people, 
and maybe even the germs. 
So we saw the Queen from afar 
and the white-gloved hand 
touched no-one 
I saw her come and go 
and wondered when the Queen 
would appear. 
I'd seen no fur-lined robe 
or crown with sparkling jewels. 
This was only a lady 
with a white-gloved hand, 
and we waved our flags in the rain. 
Beverley Campbelll 
Beverley Campbell was five years old at the time of the 1954 Royal 
Tour to Western Australia. Her poetic reflection on her mem01y of 
the event was provoked by a report, in 1985, on recently released 
British Cabinet archival materials. 2 The documents made it clear 
that, in 1954, the Cabinet was "obsessed" with the health and 
safety of the royal couple, and that Churchill contemplated 
cancelling the Western Australian section of the tour because the 
1 Beverley Campbell, (1985). Memories ofthe '50's, unpublished poem, used with 
permission. 
2 "To crown it all", National Times, 18-24 January, 1985, unnumbered page. 
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state was gripped by a polio epidemic. 3 
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The royal tour and the 
polio epidemic are strongly linked in the memory of West 
Australians who lived through these events, particularly those who 
were children at the time. 4 
A "white-gloved hand" that waved in the distance and "touched no­
one" was all that tens of thousands of eager children saw of the 
royal visit. Because of the fear of polio, children in particular had 
to keep their distance from the queen, and most only glimpsed her 
from the roadside as she passed by in her limousine. A photograph 
of a Raewyn Coppin, an eleven year old legacy ward from 
Kalgoorlie, who presented a posy to the queen by placing it on 
stool several feet from her, where it remained, has become an key 
image of the visit.5 
Fears for the safety of the queen, whose champion was Prime 
Minister Menzies and the Federal Government, rtvaled those held 
for the children of Western Australia, whose champion was the 
Premier and the State Government. The precautionary measures 
were debated at the highest political level 
3 Cablegramme, Stephen Holmes to Menzies, 1 7  March 1954, AA, A462 / 4. 
825 / 14 / 48, no page number. "We would fully understand and so far as proper 
support any decision by your Government to either cancel the visit to Western 
Australia or to impose restrictions which are thought wise both in the interest of 
the Queen's health and in that of the people of Perth and the rest of the state. 
for example in changing the details of the programme which the Queen is to 
undertake". 
4 The ABC 1V Social Histocy documentacy "TIME FRAME - Pollo Days", March 
1997, dealt with the impact of polio on the royal tour. especially as it affected 
Western Australia. 
5 Women's Weekly. 7 April 1954, Article by Anne Matheson. Royal Tour 
Correspondent. 
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The belief that the incidence of polio would increase if children 
were allowed to congregate was based on evidence gathered 
following the 1948 Perth Royal Show.6 To limit the prospect of 
cross infection a childrens' review was cancelled and instead 
children were allowed to gather, in groups from their own school , 
at special points alongside the route the Queen travelled.7 
At the last moment major changes were introduced into the tour 
arrangements, promoted by the Prime Minister in response to 
pressure from the British Cabinet and the Royal Household. The 
changes, which included housing the royal couple on the Gothic, 
moored in Fremantle harbour, were aimed to provide a greater level 
of safety for the queen during the tour. One result of the increased 
travelling this involved for the queen was that there were more 
opportunities for children to see her "white gloved hand" waving in 
the distance.a 
From the beginning the key events of the polio epidemic and the 
royal tour were inextricably intertwined. On 2 February, the day 
the queen arrived in Australia, it was announced that polio was on 
the increase in Perth. 9 February 12, the day chosen for the 
Minister for Health's announcement that the epidemic was under 
way, was the same day as the invitations were sent out for the 
6 Letter, CPH to Undersecretary, Premier's Department, 25 February 1954, BL, 
ACC 1003, 120/4, 228/54, p.40. 
7 Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Pamlysts, pp. 6-7. In 1938 authorities had tried 
to restrain the press in the belief that too much publicity concerning the risk of 
polio infection amongst children would result in parent's boycotting the 
Sesqutcentenary celebrations. 
8 Oral History Transcript, R.H. Doig, Premier's Department 1926- 1965, BL, OH 
2144, p.357, used with permission. 
9 DN, 2 February 1954, p.6. 
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Royal Garden Party at Government House. 1 0  As the tour 
progressed in the eastern states, and the epidemic worsened in the 
west, sensational publicity in both places exacerbated the level of 
fear and hysteria developing in Western Australia. The royal couple 
arrived in Western Australia on 2 6  March, a month when 215 
cases of polio were recorded, almost half the annual total of 436. 
During 1954 hundreds of polio cases were recorded elsewhere in 
Australia, 1 1  but this was the largest epidemic to occur in Western 
Australia, and 215 remains the highest monthly total ever to be 
recorded in the state. 1 2 Occurring as it did on the eve of the royal 
visit, it was a catastrophe. 
The 1954 epidemic began slowly in Western Australia. During the 
latter months of 1953 there was a steady rise in the number of 
polio infections; two in October, nine in November and eleven in 
December. 1 3 The trend continued and, when sixteen cases were 
recorded in January, fears that an epidemic was approaching 
strengthened and the Public Health Department began to prepare 
for a crisis. 14 
The question when to declare that an epidemic was under way was 
resolved on the basis of the number of cases reported. In the 
period 1949 to 1953, when there was a higher incidence of polio in 
1 0 WA, 13 February 1954, p. l .  
1 1  Figure 3. Chapter 2 above. NSW had 562 , Victoria 572, Queensland 140, SA 
174 and the ACT 26, the second highest total on record. 
1 2 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VlII, p.62, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
1 3 Public Health 1954,  (1956). Appendix VIII. p. 49. BL. 614.09 WES. 
1 4 WA, 10 February 1954. p.2. 
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Western Australia than previously, 1 5 the highest monthly total of 
seventeen cases, was recorded in October 1951, [Figure 1 8). 1 6 It 
was decided that if twenty cases were reported in February 1954, 
the Public Health Department would regard the state as being in 
the grtp of a polio epidemic. I 7 
No debate on the matter was required because an avalanche of 
cases occurred, twenty being reported in the first ten days of the 
month. The final figure for February rose to eighty, thirteen more 
than in the worst month on record so far, July 1948. 1 8 Snow 
realised the gravity of the situation and, in a letter to the Director­
General of Health, Canberra, predicted an epidemic worse than 
1948. 19 At this stage there had been only one death, but two 
thirds of the cases involved paralysis and at least three required 
treatment with an artificial respirator.20  Worse was to come. 
This epidemic was different from the previous one in 1 948 in 
several important respects. It did not continue through the winter 
but rapidly reached a peak in March, and died away between April 
and August. No paralytic cases were reported in September, or 
December, but no month in the year was free of polio infections 
15 Memo, CPH to Undersecretary, 25 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 
228/54 p.49. Figures for the period 1949-1953 were - 1949, 61; 1950, 59; 1951, 
96; 1952, 39; 1953, 43. By West Australian standards 96 cases was practically an 
epidemic. The general rise in incidence was sufficient to maintain pressure on 
the resources available for treatment and after-care. 
1 6 WA. 22 February 1954, p.2. 
17 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.49, BL, 614.09 WES. 
1 8 WA, 5 March 1954, p. l .  The total of 81 was later corrected to 80. 
19 Letter, DJR Snow to Director-General of Health, Canberra, 24 February 1954, 
BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 270/54, unnumbered page. 
20 Letter, CPH to Undersecretary. 25 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
228/54 p.39. 
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[Figure 20). 2 1 Of the 436 notifications in 1954, 45% were 
paralytic, 48% were non-paralytic, and the balance, 7%, were 
affected by an unknown disease. Ten percent of cases retained a 
level of residual disability, significantly less than the 40% in 1948. 
The four deaths, a mortality rate of less than 1%, was far below 
the 8% of the previous epidemic.2 2  The largest number of cases, 
one hundred and four, occurred amongst children under the age of 
four, while all those under the age of fourteen accounted for two 
hundred and ten cases, almost half the final total of four hundred 
and thirty six. 23 The overall result was that slightly more children 
were affected during the epidemic than older adults. 
Snow's analysis of the areas infected in 1948 compared with 1954, 
as represented by the spot maps, [Figure 18] revealed that the 
areas where the disease developed and made progress in 1954 were 
those that had suffered least in 1948. The pattern demonstrated 
something Snow regarded as a fundamental principle of 
epidemiology, namely that -
... the pattern of any outbreak of infectious disease is 
determined by the balance between susceptibility and 
immunity.24 
The suggested interpretation was that the immunity gained by 
those living in the areas affected in 1 948 persisted, providing them 
with protection during the epidemic of 1 954, whereas those not 
2 1 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.62, BL, 614.09 WES. 
22 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.65, BL. 614.09 WES. 
23 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.63, BL, 614.09 WES. 
24 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.64, BL, 614.09 WES. 
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affected in 1948 were susceptible in 1954. Snow's convictions 
regarding faecal contamination as the crucial element in the cycle 
of infection, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 above, were reinforced 
by these findings. But this interpretation may not have made 
sufficient allowance for possibility of a population still being 
vulnerable due to a different strain of the polio virus becoming 
active. 
A close watch was kept on the weather patterns in 1954, as was 
the case in 1948, in an attempt to determine whether there were 
any discernible links between meteorological conditions and the 
spread of the disease during the outbreak. The results of this 
study were inconclusive, as were those of similar research 
conducted in the United Kingdom.25 Once the link between the 
transference of faecal particles and the spread of polio gained 
currency, it was believed that, in a community where the disease 
was present, weather patterns were relevant only in so far as they 
influenced patterns of social behaviour which led to there being 
closer contact between people. For example, warmer weather 
resulted in the persistence of activities such as swtmmtng, through 
which transmission was more likely to occur. 
Once the epidemic was confirmed the Public Health Department, 
which had the experience of a major epidemic behind it and was 
better able to deal with such an outbreak, went into emergency 
mode. Additional hospital staff, accommodation and equipment 
25 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.65, BL, 614.09 WES. See also 
MJA, July 5, 1952, "Poliomyelitis and Atmospheric Conditions in Certain 
Australian Cities". 
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were requisitioned and the consultative committee of doctors, 
convened in 1938 and 1948, was re-convened. The fifteen-member 
body, now named the State Poliomyelitis Advisory Council (SPAC), 
met on three occasions during the epidemic to formulate 
recommendations to assist the Department with policy initiatives, 
some of which related specifically to the conduct of the royal 
tour.26 
At the direction of the Minister, Mr Nulsen, the Commissioner, Dr 
Henzell, implemented a wide variety of measures aimed at 
protecting the public and providing maximum medical support. 
Press releases advised members of the public of the symptoms of 
the disease, and of what actions to take if they were presented with 
a case of polio.2 7 
The primary assumption behind all steps proposed by the Public 
Health Department was that the disease was spread through 
personal contact, chiefly involving the transference of faecal 
particles. It was known the polio virus could persist in the bowel 
for a fortnight and be an ongoing source of infection. The 
protective measures recommended were similar to those applied in 
cases of typhoid. Suspected agencies of transmission were unclean 
hands, polluted water, contaminated food and, to a lesser extent, 
flies.28 The theory that oral and nasal droplets were responsible for 
the spread of polio was now less favoured, though not entirely 
26  Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.55, BL, 6 14.09 WES. The SPAC 
met on 1 1  February, 4 March, and 8 April. 
2 7 WA, 13 February 1954, p. l .  
28  WA, 22 February 1954, p.2. 
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discounted, due to the belief that at the commencement of 
infection the virus was briefly present in the throat. Accordingly 
unguarded sneezing and spitting in the streets was still being 
discouraged.29 
Greater acceptance of the faecal contamination theory resulted in 
strong emphasis on the need for personal cleanliness, especially 
hand hygiene.30 At first there was some confusion in the public 
mind as to what was meant by "faecal contamination" and the 
Commissioner had to issue a statement of explanation to dispel 
the uncertainty.3 1  All children, in particular, were now expected 
to avoid sharing cups and towels, and to wash their hands before 
eating food and after using the toilet. These expectations focussed 
attention on the facilities at schools, which were sadly lacking. 
Public works undertaken in Western Australia during the 1930s 
and 1940s had been limited, due to the stringencies of the 
depression, followed by the war effort. Canning Dam, a major 
extension to the Metropolitan Water Supply was completed in 
1941, making it possible to service water closets. But as late as 
1962, or even 1965, some suburban dwellings still relied on pan 
toilets.32 
School maintenance and upgrading also suffered. In the 1950s 
many schools had pan-service toilet facilities, a small supply of 
29 WA, 22 February 1954, p.2; WA, 6 March 1954, p. l .  
3 0  Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII. p.50, BL, 614.09 WES. 
3 1 DN, 2 March 1954, p.2. 
32 Information provided by Dr Lindsay Hunter, Edith Cowan University. 
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hand basins and taps and, in some cases, little water to spare for 
hand washing. A resident from the newly established industrial 
area of Kwinana wrote -
Is it any wonder that the polio total is mounting? If Mr  
Tonkin would have a look at  the disgraceful toilet and 
washing facilities provided for the 190 children at the East 
Rockingham school he would act immediately instead of 
waiting till the epidemic got worse. There are only two 
toilets provided and no wash-basins. Children have to wash 
their hands under the tap and then other children go there 
immediately and drtnk.3 3  
An anti-fly campaign was introduced, similar to previous years. 
Schools, play sheds and wash- rooms were sprayed, and special 
arrangements were made for disinfecting rubbish bins and sanitary 
pans.34 The Perth City Council (PCC) had instituted a "Swat that 
Fly" campaign and it was hoped this would play a part in 
controlling polio. The PCC vigorously promoted the campaign and, 
once the epidemic commenced, suggested it would spray all 
government schools and kindergartens in the city with DDT 
solution.35 The spraying was undertaken, but at first was limited 
to those classrooms in which children with polio had been,3 6  an 
illogical practice which may have aroused feelings of stigmatisation 
amongst those who had become infected. The secretary of the 
Tramways Employees Union called for daily disinfection of public 
vehicles, as had occurred in 1948, and used the occasion to call for 
a ban on the overloading of buses and trams, especially during 
3 3  WA. 1 1  March 1954, p.8. 
34 Public Health 1954,  ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.5 1 .  BL, 614.09 WES; WA. 26 
February 1954, p.6; WA. 4 March 1954, p.4. 
35 DN, 26 February 1954, p.2. 
3 6  DN, 2 March 1954, p.2. 
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Children were still believed to be the most vulnerable to attack, 
and the public were warned that fatigue would render those 
infected more susceptible to paralysis, as would ear nose and 
throat procedures such as tonsillectomies. 38 The Public Health 
Department also recommended the postponement of 
immunisations, such as those for diphtheria and whooping cough. 
Fear and paranoia are evtden t in the public reaction to this latter 
measure. Some people assumed the reason for the ban was that 
these prophylactic injections could cause polio in the recipient, an 
idea the Medical Officer of the Perth City Council moved rapidly to 
debunk.3 9  
The Director of Education announced that schools were to remain 
open but all metropolitan swimming classes would be cancelled.40 
A week later the Public Schools' Sports Association announced 
that the inter-school swimming carnival planned for 6 March was 
cancelled. 4 1 Swimming was seen as a high risk activity. Despite 
high summer temperatures, the river beaches and public swimming 
baths were bereft of swimmers; the population did not risk the 
river water, though seaside beaches were still patronised. 42 
The presence of polio was seen as pollution and, by association, 
37 DN. 26 February 1954, p.2. 
38 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, pp.50-51, BL. 614.09 WES. 
39 WA. 19 February 1954, p.2. 
40 WA. 13 February 1954. p. l .  
4 1 WA. 19 February 1954, p. l .  
42 DN, 23 February 1954, p.2. 
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the epidemic was used to draw attention to the decline in the 
ecological health of the river. "Hi-Jean" , who for thirty years had 
caught crabs in the the river, drew attention to the contradiction 
of stressing hand hygiene to combat faecal contamination, while 
continuing to discharge effluent into the Swan. 43 Dredging, 
banking and the amount of refuse it now contained was regarded 
as having rendered this once pleasant water-way unsafe for leisure 
activities. A Subiaco correspondent wrote to the Dally News 
We're now paying for our past disregard of cleanliness, 
judging by the beautiful waterway that was the Swan River. 
This priceless heritage is now a suspected source of polio 
infection, and we only have ourselves to blame. 44 
Ground sports also suffered. In view of the epidemic the 
Australian schoolboys' cricket carnival, scheduled for Perth from 
11 to 26 March, was cancelled. Fear of infection led the South 
Australian and Queensland teams to withdraw from the 
competition, leaving only New South Wales to compete against 
Western Australia.45 
The successful management of such an epidemic depended on the 
availability of up to date information and backup resources such 
as laboratories and other forms of technical assistance. Western 
Australia was unable to provide the necessary resources itself and 
Snow was forced to communicate with laboratories and research 
institutes in other states, and to seek information from overseas. 
43 WA, 13 March 1954, p.9. 
44 DN, 23 February 1954, p.4. 
45 WA. 24 February 1954, p. 17. 
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The Public Health Department, through the efforts of Snow, who 
diligently kept abreast of new developments in the various fields 
related to polio research, was kept as well informed as possible.46 
And as a direct result of the epidemic the Public Health 
Department undertook a six-part research programme which 
involved co-operation with laboratories in three other states. 
Expert advice for the research programme was provided by Dr 
J.A.R. Miles, a leading polio specialist and senior research fellow 
from the Adelaide based Institute of Medical and Veterinary 
Research Science. 47 The Institute provided diagnostic facilities, 
not available in Western Australia, making it possible to isolate 
and identify the virus responsible for the outbreak. 48 Miles, who 
had been conducting scientific investigations in the Northern 
Territory, was invited to WA for consultations.49 He visited Perth 
late in February and, in addition to speaking with the 
Commissioner and Snow, met with the Premier, A.R.G. Hawke, 
who was concerned with the effect the outbreak might have on 
46 File, Poliomyelitis Research, ACC 1003, 120/4, 700 /54. 
4 7 WA, 20 February 1954, p l; DN, 19 February 1954, p. l; Press Statement. 19 
February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 228 /54, p.26; Letter, CPH to Director­
General of Health, Canberra, 9 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 270/54, 
p. l .  
48 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p 59, BL, 614.09 WES. 
49 DN, 23 February 1954, p.2. Miles' research, conducted under the auspices of 
the NH&MRC, had been sparked by the realisation that there was an apparently 
low incidence of polio amongst Aborigines, even when the virus was active 
amongst the white population. Figures for 1951-52 revealed that in Darwin there 
were 10 cases, all whites, and 2 deaths, both adults. During the same period the 
figures for Alice Springs showed exactly the same result. While this was thought 
to be most likely due to natural immunisation through contact with the disease, 
it was hoped there might be another explanation. That it may have been due to 
"non-specific or para-specific immunisation against some other organism 
containing a common antigen with poliomyelitis". See Letter, Miles to SMO, 
Darwin, 13 August 1952, AA. Al658/ 1. 756/1/34; For the figures see Memo, 
Secretary, Director General of Health to Dept of Territories, Canberra, 7 May, 
1952, AA, A452, 1952/ 179. 
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plans for the royal tour. All aspects of the epidemic were 
considered, especially the implications of large crowds gathering to 
see the queen.50 
Miles brought a ray of hope to a gloomy situation. During an 
interview he highlighted new advances in the quest for a polio 
vaccine that were being made by American researchers. The long­
term future looked positive, he said, due to the success of Dr 
Enders, of Boston, in growing the virus in tissue, eliminating the 
need to use monkeys.5 1 
Miles' announcement was boosted by even more encouraging news. 
It was hoped successful American research would lead to the 
production of an effective polio vaccine. Thirty years of searching 
for a polio vaccine that would be as effective as the one developed 
for smallpox had not born fruit. As recently as 1953 the World 
Health Organisation had despaired of attempts to control polio, 
but now came news of Jonas Salk's success in growing a vaccine 
that was believed to be effective against all three strains of the 
virus. Tests commenced in April and were due to be completed in 
June 1954.52 
The good news may have been encouraging, but it was of no 
immediate help in Western Australia. Miles predicted that the 
West Australia epidemic would last several months, a point that 
was later turned against the government by the Prime Minister. 
50 WA. 24 February 1954, p. l .  
5 1 WA. 25 February 1954, p.4. 
52 WA, 20 February 1954, p.7; WA, 28 April 1954, p. 10. 
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The Commissioner was aware of this prediction, and a similar 
opinion expressed by Snow, when he wrote 
It is apparent that an epidemic of major dimensions is in 
progress in Western Australia . ... 
The initial impression .. . is that the type of poliomyelitis 
which is prevalent at the present time is probably milder 
than the type encountered in 1948. However, it must be 
emphasised that this is only an initial impression. 
The course, duration and ultimate dimensions of this 
epidemic are impossible to predict with any degree of 
certainty. Previous experience, however, would indicate that 
the disease is likely to remain at epidemic level for several 
months and it would not be surprising if a peak were reached 
at the time of, or soon after the Royal Visit.53 
The Commissioner correctly predicted the peak of the epidemic but 
was wrong about the strain of the virus. Miles returned to 
Adelaide with the faecal samples packed in dry ice from which he 
was able to determine it was the paralytic variety of the virus, 
Brunhilde, that was active in the epidemic.54 
General epidemiological research was undertaken, under Snow's 
direction. An aspect of the research was a notification paper, 
devised by the Public Health Department, which aimed to secure 
from all general practitioners as much information as possible 
regarding those who reported to them with the polio.5 5  
The general level of immunity to polio in the adult population was 
53 Letter, CPH to Undersecretruy, Premier's Department, 25 February 1954, BL, 
ACC 1003, 120/4, 228/54, p.40. 
54 WA. 25 Februruy 1954, p. l .  
5 5  Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.50, BL, 614.09 WES. 
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examined, with the assistance of the WA Red Cross Blood 
Transfusion Service, which provided blood for testing, and Dr N.F. 
Stanley of the Institute of Epidemiological and Preventative 
Medicine associated with the Prince Henry Hospital, Sydney.56 
The aspect of research conducted by the Public Health Department 
that attracted most public attention was a systematic study aimed 
at investigating the immunity that is derived from symptomless 
cases of polio, known in medical terms as the serological evidence 
of silent immunising infections. 57 The research, which had to be 
conducted at a school in which several typical cases of polio had 
occurred, required the collection of a series of three blood samples, 
over a period of nine months, and the fortnightly examination of 
faecal samples, taken from the septic tank.58 The health of the 
students had to be closely monitored throughout the research, and 
it was necessary for the school to have a septic tank system. 
One hundred and fifty pupils from the Como Primary School, a 
suburb located on the banks of the Swan River near South Perth, 
were chosen for the expertment.59 The research, which was later 
published in the MJA,60 suggested that forty-seven per cent of the 
56 Public Health 1954,  (1956). Appendix VIII. p. 60, BL, 614.09 WES; Letter, CPH 
to Director, Blood Transfusion Service, 15 March 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 270/54 
120/4, pp.19-20; Letter, Snow to Stanley, 27 May 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 270/54 
120/ 4, pp.30-31. 
57 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.59, BL, 614.09 WES. 
5 8 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII ,  p.59, BL. 614.09 WES. 
5 9  WA, 16 March 1954, p. l ;  WA, 18 March 1954, p.8; ST, 21 March 1954, p. 29; 
Letter, DJR Snow to JAR Miles, 17 Februru:y 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 120/4, 270/54, 
pp.22-23. 
60  Snow, D.J.R., Raad, G.R.A, Woolcott, J.F. , Miles, J.A.R. , Ames, P.G .. Stokes, 
L.J. ( 1955). "Immunity to Poliomyelitis: an investigation amongst schoolchildren 
at Como in Western Australia" MJA, 24 September, 2, 13, pp.485-488. 
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children were immune to polio, but no change was discovered to 
have occurred in this proportion during the duration of the 
experiment. The epidemic did not result in the development of a 
greater or lesser degree of immunity to polio amongst the sample 
population. 
The services of Dr A.A. Ferris and the Epidemiological Research 
Unit of Fairfield Hospital, Melbourne were utilised in an attempt 
to isolate the virus from milk, water and sludge.61 The assistance 
of Ferris was sought for an additional problem which was kept 
secret due to fear of public reaction. Samples of water taken from 
metropolitan beaches revealed an unacceptably high level of faecal 
contamination. Snow, who called for the utmost discretion to be 
maintained in the matter, proposed that samples be sent for 
examination to determine whether or not the polio virus was 
present in them.62 City Beach was one of the areas from which 
suspect samples were collected in 1954. Those who were afraid of 
swimming in the river, but felt secure in the sea, would have been 
dismayed had they known of the suspected risk.63 
A clinical investigation was made, by Dr E.G. Saint at the Clinical 
Research Unit, Royal Perth Hospital, of a polio-like syndrome that 
61 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Government Printer, Perth, Appendix VIII, p.60, BL, 
6 14.09 WES. 
62 Letter, Snow to Ferris, 17 March 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 120/4, 270/54 pp.20-
21. 
63 Snow, D.J.R. ( 1981). Progress, pp.88- 113. Four years later the vigilance of 
Snow in this matter paid dividends when a twelve year old boy was diagnosed 
with Typhoid. The case heralded a minor outbreak that resulted in ten 
infections, nine of which occurred amongst youths who swam regularly at City 
Beach, a popular recreation spot near a then damaged outlet of the metropolitan 
sewerage treatment plant. In 1958, on Snow's advice, the acting Minister for 
Health, the Hon John Tonkin, MLA, closed the beach to the public. 
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occurred during the epidemic.6 4  Several doctors reported cases in 
which bizarre symptoms occurred, such as vomiting, with 
associated sensory manifestations resembling paralytic polio, such 
as headache, malaise, and sore throat. The polio virus, or some 
other virus, was suspected but nothing of this type was detected. 
Patient recovery was complete and at least two doctors, who had 
the opportunity to monitor such cases for up to four weeks, 
detected no signs of muscle weakness. 65 This phenomenon had 
not been noticed before in WA. It is possible that the level of fear 
and anxiety already associated with the outbreak was exacerbated 
by the excitement of the approaching royal tour and a form of 
psychosomatic or hysterical illness was the result. The matter was 
discussed with Miles who reported that similar phenomena had 
been discovered in South Australia two years earlier. The 
conclusion of the investigation was that -
The important impression we have gained is that of the 
overwhelming fear and anxiety on the part of the patient 
with any mild non-specific fever, and one wonders if early 
cases with parethesias are not manifesting mild hysterical 
signs.66 
The splint-shop, established in 1949, though now without its 
founding technician, George Clarke, who had departed under a 
cloud,67 undertook the extra duties of making equipment for the 
Infectious Diseases Hospital. This initiative, prompted by the 
inability of manufacturers elsewhere to supply materials and 
6 4  Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.60,  BL, 614.09 WES. 
65 Letter, CPH to Director, Clinical Research Unit, RPH, 26 Februruy 1954, ACC 
1003, 120/4, 270 /54, p.9. 
66 Publtc Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.60, BL, 614.09 WES. 
6 7 The information in these files is restricted. 
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equipment on time, was said to have led to the improvement of 
facilities at the IDH.68 
A swimming pool for the after-care of polio patients was regarded 
as an urgent requirement. Discussion of the possibility of using 
the Dalkeith Hot Pool was revived, and then abandoned. 
Numerous attempts to provide the state with hydro-therapy 
facilities finally bore fruit, with the help of a grant of £12,000 from 
the Commonwealth, and an appropriate pool was constructed on 
site at the IDH.69 
Quarantine measures were also applied, but they were not as 
stringent as those imposed in 1948, and the subject hardly rated a 
mention. On this occasion patients were isolated for fourteen 
days, rather than twenty-one, either at home or in hospital. Close 
associates, siblings, or adults in special categories such as 
teachers, food handlers etc, suffered from "house and garden" 
arrest for a similar period. 
The home became a new focus for polio treatment, though it was 
felt at first that the public might not accept this innovation. 10 
Epidemiological understanding, current at the time, allowed for 
home treatment in the case of non-paralytic polio, provided the 
family doctor was agreeable and sufficient precautions were taken 
68  Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.54, BL, 614.09 WES. 
69 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p. 55, BL, 614.09 WES; WA. 19 
March 1954, p. l ;  Memo, 16 Februruy 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 120/4, 106/49, p.71; 
Memo, CPH to Principal Architect, 25 Februruy 1954, BL, ACC 1003 120/ 4, 
5138/54, p. l .  
7 0  DN, 18 Februruy 1954, p.3. 
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to prevent further infection. 71 Similar arrangements had been 
introduced in the past for the treatment of typhoid patients. 
The large number of polio infections in 1954, and the high 
proportion of non-paralytic cases amongst them, made the 
introduction of home care easier and preserved hospital resources 
for those which required intensive care. 72 The Department formed 
the view that home-care was effective: it was readily accepted by 
the public, and no evidence was produced to indicate that further 
infection resulted from its introduction. 
In addition to the research programme, extra medical resources 
were organised. A consulting physician, Dr 1.0. Thorburn, was 
appointed to work at Public Health Department expense, in 
support of general practitioners in need of advice. 73 A specialist 
panel of orthopaedic surgeons was established, and additional 
physiotherapy seIVices were provided.74 
Where possible the medical fraternity were kept up to date by other 
means. Early in March two polio specialists, Dr H. McLorinan, 
Medical Superintendent f rom Fairfield Hospital, and Dr B. 
McCloskey, Director of the Poliomyelitis Division, Victorian Public 
Health Department, visited Perth and gave lectures for medical and 
7 1 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.52, BL, 614.09 WES; Memo to all 
medical practitioners, 8 March 1954, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4 228/ 54, p.68. The 
patient's linen and excrement had to be treated separately. 
72 Public Health 1 954, (1956), Appendix VIII ,  pp.52-53, BL, 614.09 WES. 
73 Memo, CPH to all Medical Practitioners, 8 March 1954, ACC 1003, 120/4. 
270/54, p.13. 
74 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII. p.54, BL, 614.09 WES. 
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health professionals. 75 Both lecturers were hailed by the Public 
Health Department as having made a positive contribution to 
medical knowledge and public confidence during the epidemic. 76 
McLortnan, in an address to Perth Rotary Club, attempted to give a 
positive interpretation of the present difficulties by emphasising 
that the epidemic would result in an increase in the number of 
those who were immune to polio, "crude and cruel" though 
nature's methods for achieving this goal seemed to be. 7 7  The 
results of the Como experiment did not support his conclusion, 
but his view was one that was current at the time. The community 
was kept as fully informed as possible regarding the progress of the 
epidemic and the symptoms of the disease. The Public Health 
Department distributed Information Bulletins to Local Health 
Authorities, an information leaflet was prepared · for public 
circulation and announcements were made in the press. 78 
The Public Health Department also embarked on a deliberate 
public relations strategy because it did not want a repeat of the the 
criticisms it suffered in 1948, least of all at a time when the state 
was under the national spotlight because of the royal visit. It 
realised that a fine balance had to be kept. The public was entitled 
to the truth, but information needed to be given in such a way 
that fears would be allayed and co-operation gained. With such 
75 Memo, CPH to all Medical Practitioners. 8 March 1954, BL. ACC 1003, 120/4, 
270/54, p. 14. 
76 Public Health 1954,  ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.58, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
77 DN. 12 March 1954, p.2. 
78 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII. p.50, BL, 6 14.09 WES; Monthly 
Health Bulletin, 24 Februruy 1954, CPH to Local Health Authorities, BL, ACC 
1003, 120/4, 228/54, pp.37a-c; For examples of press announcements see, DN. 
25 Februruy 1954, p. 10; WA. 5 March 1954, p. 10. 
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thoughts in mind, from the outset the Department enlisted the 
media in its cause. A conference was called with representatives of 
the press and ABC radio at which it was agreed that, in addition to 
providing information on speciflc topics, bulletins would be issued 
twice weekly, detailing the number of cases reported and the trend 
of the epidemic. 79 
Ten days after the first announcement of the epidemic, the Public 
Health Department provided the newspapers with a comprehensive 
article on polio written by Snow. Published under the heading 
"Hand Hygiene is Best Single Safeguard Against Polio",  the article 
discussed all aspects of disease and made available to the public 
the most recent results of medical research. It is clear that Public 
Health Department policy in this respect had been strongly 
influenced by Snow, who wrote 
Perhaps if some of the salient facts about this disease were 
more widely known, more people would learn to regard it, 
... as one of the several hazards for civilised living.so 
He believed that the provision of adequate information would help 
bring reason and calm to a situation that was potentially fraught 
with fear. 
Snow, who had arrived in Western Australia in 1948, compared the 
fear he saw with that aroused by "pandemic influenza" in 1919 .  
The reason for the current fear, he said, was obvious; parents 
79 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIIl, p.53, BL, 614.09 WES. 
BO WA, 22 February 1954, p.2. 
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found the prospect of their children suffering from the effects of 
paralysis horrifying. Snow admitted that, during an epidemic, the 
risk of infection was high, but reminded his readers that the 
chance of serious paralysis was more limited. He wrote -
The odds, therefore, are approximately 1000 to 1 against 
dying, 500 to 1 of serious physical handicap, and 100 to 1 
against the possibility of any symptoms at all.8 l 
Snow included a detailed histogram for each month of the period 
1948-1954 [Figure 19 J and provided a brief overview of the history 
of polio. He explained the manner in which it was believed polio 
was spread, and the factors which influenced whether or not an 
infected person became paralysed. The article also repeated 
information regarding the precautions and preventative measures 
recommended by the Public Health Department. 
The Public Health Department intended that through such 
publicity community confidence would be aroused, children would 
be encouraged to exercise "extreme hand cleanliness", and those 
who encountered infection, in themselves or others, would be 
prompted to seek urgent, appropriate help.82 Despite being 
criticised for releasing so much information, at the end of the 
epidemic the Public Health Department regarded the plan as 
successful. The Commissioner wrote - "there is much evidence to 
show that these intentions met with success, which was of great 
benefit to the community as a whole" .83 And the the truth of its 
8 1  WA. 22 February 1954, p.2. 
82 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.54, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
83 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.54, BL. 614.09 WES. 
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view was demonstrated, it said, by the fact that although the virus 
abroad was proven to be the paralytic variety, the incidence of 
paralysis and death in the 1954 epidemic was markedly low.84 
Official history, represented by the views of the health experts and 
the reports of the Public Health Department, contrasted with 
public perceptions of the situation. As will be seen below, 
members of the public were severely critical and felt the amount of 
information provided contributed to the level of fear aroused. The 
intense criticism was partly the result of the overlap of the 
epidemic with the royal visit. 
The Public Health Department and the Commissioner were 
criticised in Parliament for the way the epidemic was handled. The 
criticism drew a strong rebuff from the SPAC, which wrote at 
length in protest to the Minister for Health. Details were provided 
of the numerous steps the CPH and the Department had taken in 
their attempt to control the epidemic and protect the public.85 
SPAC suggested that the decline in the incidence of the disease, 
and the low incidence of paralysis, was due to community 
acceptance of the measures recommended by the Public Health 
Department. 
Public debate continued. The WA branch of the ALP wrote to the 
Minister for Health 
84 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.54, BL. 614.09 WES. 
85 Letter, SPAC to Minister for Health, 9 April 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 120/4. 
228/54, pp. 146- 148. 
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. . .  to request information as to what plans the Department 
may have to cope with any future epidemic.86 
The Commissioner replied in detail, and indicated that the 
controversy behind the request been a painful experience for his 
Department. 
At the end of Februacy, the Daily News, printed the first monthly 
bulletin from the Public Health Department under the heading 
"Authorities Fear Epidemic Will Worsen".87 Alongside the article 
appeared another headed "Cancel Royal Review Say Worried 
Parents". It reported the results of a snap survey, conducted 
amongst "scores of parents" in the city streets. The subject was 
the school children's review which, on 1 April, would bring together 
between 30, 000 and 60,000 children at the Claremont 
Showgrounds. 
While opinion was equally divided on the subject of what 
alternative to provide there was no doubt that most of those 
surveyed were in favour of cancelling the review. Samples of 
opinion given were 
With all due respect to the Queen, I don't think its worth 
the risk of possibly permanent paralysis. It wouldn't be so 
bad if it was not such a serious illness. 
I wouldn't send my children to the showground again at any 
time until they provided much better sanitary 
conveniences. 88 
86 Letter, ALP, WA Branch to Minister for Health, 23 June 1954, BL. ACC 1003, 
120/4, 228/54, p.154, and reply pp.155-156. 
8 7 DN, 25 Februaiy 1954, p. l 0. 
88 DN, 25 Februaiy 1954, p.10. 
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Eventually it was decided to cancel the review, but the decision did 
not receive unanimous public support because, once the queen 
arrived it was realised that people would congregate to see her, and 
the risks to health would remain. Even children felt moved to 
express their opinion on the subject. A disgruntled schoolboy 
wrote 
This is my complaint on the Royal visit. What chance has 
any schoolboy or girl of seeing the Queen other than for a 
fleeting second as Her Majesty drives past on her way to 
some official function? It seems that the only people who 
are allowed the privilege of seeing the Queen properly are 
councillors, their wives and politicians.89 
Other writers saw rearrangements as futile and forcefully stated 
their view that the entire tour should be cancelled. 
Let there be no half measures. If the polio epidemic is a 
alarming as I believe, the Royal tour of WA should be called 
off immediately. Rearrangement of the itinerary and 
reshuffling of children's gatherings is surely a futile 
expedient. If its dangerous to have a large assembly of 
children at the Showgrounds, how does it become less 
dangerous to have them cramming into the city to watch the 
royal progress? And why should the Queen and the Duke be 
exposed to even the slightest personal risk? I am just as 
anxious as the next person to see the Royal couple, but 
public health and their safety must come flrst.90 
And another wrote -
Why aren't the health authorities insisting on a complete 
cancellation of the Royal visit to this State? Mass 
movement, whether of children or adults, means sub-
89 DN, 6 March 1954, p.4, edition 2. 
90 DN, 8 March 1954, p.4. 
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standard hygiene , and if our present concepts of the 
promulgation of poliomyelitis are correct, such conditions 
must lead inevitably to further suffering.9 1  
In view of the reactions it seems Snow's diligence in providing clear 
information for the public may have worked against him. Some 
people, who were free of the political pressures the Public Health 
Department was under, could see that cancellation of the tour was 
a logical outcome of the knowledge at its disposal. 
Those who wanted the tour to go ahead with the potential risks 
minimised proposed their solutions. "Prevention Please" from 
Subiaco wrote -
Because of the the polio epidemic , the Education 
Department should close all schools for two or three weeks 
after the Royal visit to allow a quarantine period . . . .  Two or 
three weeks of lost schooling now for every child in the State 
would be far better than the risk of widely spreading the 
disease.92 
The problem was, if polio was transmitted during the tour, this 
measure would be of no benefit at all. 
The effectiveness of the publicity campaign was revealed in other 
more positive ways. The emphasis that had been given to hand 
hygiene made people pay attention to health standards in general, 
and several correspondents brought to notice the need for food 
handlers, in particular, to take more care. For example, "Observer" 
of Perth wrote -
9 1  DN, 10 March 1954, p.4. 
92 DN, 12 March 1954, p.4 . 
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I see that schoolchildren are compelled to observe the 
"official order" to wash their hands. Why not order the 
bakers to wash their hands before handling our bread? They 
are continually handling money (which is germ laden) and 
the reins. Cooked meats, too, are disgustingly handled, and 
a fork should be the "official order" . If these things were 
looked into there may be less polio.93 
Some doctors believed the best course of action was to cancel the 
tour and avoid any further spread of infection,94 but it is evident 
that Western Australians were strongly in favour of it going ahead. 
Throughout the controversy the Premier and Cabinet, acting on 
advice from the Public Health Department , consistently 
main tamed the view that the risks were minimal provided certain 
conditions were observed.95 This is reflected in a letter in which 
the Commissioner raised the possibility of discovering whether or 
not the queen had acquired immunity to polio from a previously 
undetected infection. He wrote -
It would be possible to determine the presence or absence of 
the existence of a degree of immunity by a serological 
examination of her blood conducted in one of the 
established virus laboratories at present in Australia. It 
would take from three to four weeks before a report was 
obtained. If the examination revealed a high level of 
immunity, then the personal risk to Her Majesty would be 
negligible and the anxiety on the part of the authorities 
would be minimal. If the result, however, is negative, the 
measurement of the risk is extremely difficult. On the 
whole, however, providing adequate precautions are 
taken, we believe this risk to be small. 96 
93 DN, 12 March 1954, p.4.  
94 WA. 10 March 1954, p.9. 
95 Oral History Transcript, R.H. Doig, Premier's Department 1926- 1965, BL, OH 
2 144, p.355, used with permission. 
96 Letter, CPH to Undersecretary, 25 February 1954, BL, ACC 1 003, AN 1 20/4, 
228/54 p.4 1. Emphasis added. 
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There is no evidence that the suggestion was followed through and, 
given the attitude of other health and medical experts, it would 
not have been regarded as necessary. 
The government and the Public Health Department carefully 
reviewed the arrangements being made for the royal visit with the 
intention of minimising the possibility of more polio cases, and 
limiting the exposure of the royal couple to the risk of infection. 
From the start the assumption was that the tour would proceed, 
but that plans would be modified to minimise the gathering of 
crowds of children, while allowing for as many as possible to see 
the queen. The itinerary would also be modified to limit physical 
contact between the royal couple and the public, and to reduce the 
possibility that the queen would become fatigued. 
Support for continuing with the tour was drawn from the fact that 
there had been outbreaks of polio in Canberra, New South Wales 
and Victoria, while little or no alteration had been made to the 
plans for the royal visit in those places. In Canberra, where one 
might have expected the protective influence of Prime Minister 
Menzies to have been felt, hundreds of children fainted at a rally, 
many drank from common cups, and parents were outraged to find 
that news of the outbreak was not released until after the Queen 
had departed. 9 7 
The performance of the entire Western Australian administration, 
9 7  WA, 4 March 1954, p.4. 
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including the Public Health Department, was under close scrutiny 
at this time and the State government was caught on the horns of 
a dilemma. As a Labor government, serving while the Menzies 
Liberal government was in power in Canberra, the administration 
may have wished to demonstrate that it was loyal to the 
monarchy. The Hawke Labor government, in keeping with 
decisions made by John Curtin at an earlier date, had declared 
that it would maintain a principle and would not block any 
honours the queen sought to bestow as a result of the tour, 
although none of its ministers would accept them.98 Any move 
that could have been construed as an attempt weaken ties with the 
monarchy would have been very unpopular, and politically unwise. 
As the date for the commencement of the tour approached the 
newspapers, on a daily basis, featured news of the preparations 
being made, which included pictures of Perth women regaled in the 
gowns they had had prepared for the ball and garden party. Large 
sums of public money were also being invested in the tour. The 
Perth City Council alone spent at least £8965, made up of £4775 
for the royal ball, £2000 for the civic reception and £1 990 for 
decorations for St George's Terrace and Barrack Street. 99 
Cancellation of the tour would have incurred substantial material 
losses amongst many sections of the community, while all would 
have suffered from disappointment and the loss of face. On the 
other hand, it was impossible to measure the cost of exposing the 
98 DN, 17 March 1954, p. l .  
99 WA. 20 March 1954, p. l .  
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royal couple, and the members of the public, to the risk of 
infection. There was potential for a loss of morale and community 
support, as well as for uncontrollable fear. 
The fact that members of the public were deeply troubled was 
reflected in the unusually large number of requests for help, and 
suggestions for controlling polio, that were received by the Public 
Health Department during the epidemic. The volume of personal 
enquiries was so great that the public was requested to limit its 
contact to special hours of the day. 1 00 
Letters to the Commissioner containing suggestions regarding the 
cause of polio came from lay and educated alike, and included 
every possible angle. One correspondent offered a list of six 
suggested lines of enquiry, each of which raised questions 
concerning the effect of immigration, or ·methods of processing food 
The increase in the number of New Australians. 
Market gardeners' produce - migrants do not hesitate to use 
human excreta on the vegetable plots. 
Milk from the country - because dirty containers were used 
and the cows had rickets. 
The "free milk" system - is there a link between this and 
polio in children? 
Washing hands was all very well, but what about washing 
the vegetables and boiling the milk? 
1 00 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.53, BL, 614.09 WES; File ACC 
1003, AN 120/4, 689/52 contains many letters on the subject; DN, 23 February 
1954. p.2. 
CHAPTER 6: A royal panic: 1954 256 
The over preservation (mummification) of food, tinned foods, 
butter, cheese, etc, and the increase of disease. 1 0 1  
Other suggestions were more direct, for example, warn parents that 
money is very dirty and may be a means of spreading polio. 102 The 
safety of food was often mentioned. A baker's delivery man was 
reported to have stopped his horse, used the privy, and not washed 
his hands before he continued on his rounds. 1 03 The crowding of 
buses, subjecting children to long train journeys, and the hygiene 
of roller towels were all included in the suggestions which should 
be investigated, 1 o4 along with the recommendation that pan toilets 
be emptied at night, rather than during the day, to limit the 
danger of exposing children to flies. 1 o5 The Minister for Health 
received a handwritten note which suggested "it is my personal 
opinion that it is a disease caused by frogs, as it has increased 
with them". 1 06 
Once again, suggestions were not restricted to lay people. A retired 
1 0 1  Letter to CPH, 26 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/ 54, p.51. 
1 02 Letter, MEK to CPH, 26 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/54, p.52. 
1 03 Letter, RIW to CPH, 26 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/54, p.53a. 
1 04 Letters to CPH, BL. ACC 1003, AN 228/54, p.53; pp.74-5; p.78; p.90; pp.82-3; . 
1 05 Letter, RT to CPH, 4 April 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228 / 54, p.87. 
1 06 Letter, DR to Minister, 7 March 54, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/54, p.117. 
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health officer, not content to suggest the cause but also offering a 
solution, wrote 
Every effort should be made in seeking for a rare mosquito, 
at present perhaps unknown to the scientists, which exists 
in Australia in small numbers and in isolated areas. Thirty 
years ago Australia rarely had a case of polio, presumably 
because of its rarity here. In the period of years however, 
these have slowly multiplied and so polio cases began to 
appear in Australia. Polio cases would then become the 
actual disseminators and the mosquito would be the indirect 
carriers, in the same way as Malaria. 
If circular letters were sent to all Local Health Authorities to 
search carefully for any mosquitoes hibernating in bedrooms 
where polio cases occurred and destroyed them by spray or 
otherwise and forwarded them to your Department for tests, 
some light might develop on the matter. 
To assist the Health Inspectors, they would need a pair of 
magnifying glasses in the form of spectacles . . .  1 01 
There is a connection in time, if not in fact, between the intensity 
of the epidemic, manifestations of hysterical illness (see above p. 
238 -239) and the number of unusual solutions put forward by the 
members of the public. 108 The number of reported infections 
1 07 Letter, JJS to CPH, 8 March 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/54, pp.90-9 1 .  
1 08 The largest number of polio cases were reported in the weeks immediately 
preceding the arrival of the royal party in Western Australia [Figure 20), a period 
when community expectations and interest were at a peak, and alternative 
solutions to the problem abounded. There was a higher level of infection, and 
greater vigilance. but it is also true that the community expectations were at a 
peak of excitement. One can only speculate at a possible link between the level 
of anxiety in the community and vulnerability to the disease. The number of 
reported cases declined markedly once the royal tour commenced, but the pattern 
of the epidemic is consistent with that of 1956. 
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declined rapidly, from the commencement of the tour, and did not 
increase two weeks later as they had following the 1948 Royal 
Show. Restrictions were lifted at the end of April. 1 09 The epidemic 
had run its course, and the protective measures had been 
effective. 
The government sought the best possible medical advice to assist it 
in planning for the continuation of the tour. The poliomyelitis 
committee of the NH&MRC was invited to meet in Perth, which it 
did from 10-12 March. As it happened, this was during the worst 
phase of the epidemic. 1 1 0 Hosting this meeting in Western 
Australia was a political coup. It provided the government with 
impeccable medical advice with which to argue its case for the 
continuation of the royal visit. 
Snow and Miles gave reports to the committee, which was chaired 
by the Director General of Health, former CPH for WA, Dr C.E. 
Cook, who praised the approach to polio control that was taken by 
his old department, suggesting that it serve as a model for other 
states. I I I In connection with the royal visit to WA the NH&MRC 
Committee recommended that 
(a) The shaking of hands with Her Majesty and His Royal 
Highness and the presentation of loyal addresses and 
bouquets should be discouraged. 
(b) The special precautions proposed by the West Australian 
Department of Public Health should be applied in respect of 
1 09 WA, 27 March 1954, p.2; ST, 25 March 1954, p.6. 
1 1 0 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.56, BL, 6 14.09 WES .  
1 1 1  DN, 10 March 1 954, p. l ;  Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.7, BL, 
6 14.09 WES. 
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persons preparing and handling food for the the Royal Party; 
(c) The arrival of the Gothic should be delayed as long as 
possible and contact of the ship's company with the shore 
should be reduced to a minimum. In addition it is desirable 
that the Gothic be fully provisioned prior to departure for 
Western Australia. 
d) The Committee is of the opinion that Her Majesty should 
not be subjected to undue fatigue. 1 12 
The recommendations were conveyed to the Commissioner who 
passed them on to the WA government. The recommendations of 
the Public Health Department itself followed those of the 
NH&MRC almost to the letter. Handshaking was to be eliminated, 
the number of persons who prepared meals for the royal couple was 
to be restricted and those chosen were to be subject to medical 
examination and laboratory tests to ensure they were free of the 
virus. In addition the Department recommended that the royal 
couple receive injections of gamma globulin, that the Gothic be 
provisioned with food before reaching Western Australia, and that 
no shore leave be permitted to the crew for the duration of the 
visit . 1 1 3 
While the NH&MRC met more cases of polio were being reported 
than ever before. An attempt was made to convince the public that 
the outbreak was not as severe as that of 1948, because a smaller 
proportion of cases were paralytic . 1 1 4 The Premier declared that 
the epidemic would not be allowed to stop the tour and the 
Government did not intend to modify the programme for the visit 
1 12 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII. pp.57-58, BL, 614.09 WES. 
1 1 3 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.58, BL, 6 14.09 WES. 
1 1 4 DN, 12 March 1954, p. l .  
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any further. 1 1 5 
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At the time these decisions were being made, Betty Beazley, wife of 
Fremantle MHR Kim Beazley and a former athlete of note, was 
taken to hospital with polio. Her son Kim., who suffered from the 
same illness, had Just been discharged and returned home. 1 16 The 
Beazleys were among the many people who offered a theory about 
those who caught polio, their belief being that it infected those 
who became run down. 1 1 1 Mrs Beazley's condition was not 
serious, but it was recalled with alarm that, on 15 February, she 
had been in Canberra where she had shaken hands with the 
queen. 1 1 8 
The editor of the WestAustrallan wrote a leading article titled "The 
Polio Danger" which advocated changes to the tour programme, 
especially the Childrens' Review, which would -
. . .  pack together children from different schools and different 
suburbs - far more risky than if each school could be kept 
together and properly separated from others - and it would 
make them undergo an arduous day. In addition, the 
potential danger would be increased by the inadequacy of 
sanitary conveniences. 1 1 9 
An alternative to the review, the editor believed, was to allow 
children to see the queen as she passed by their school during the 
many drives she would make around country districts and the 
1 1 5 WA. 13 March 1954, p.l ;  DN, 12 March 1954, p. l .  
1 1 6 DN, 26 Februazy 1954, p. l .  
1 1 7 DN, 5 March 1954, p. l .  
1 1 8 DN, 27 Februazy 1954, second edition, p. l ;  ABC 1V Social History 
documentazy "TIME FRAME - Polio Days ", March 1997. 
1 1 9 WA. 4 March 1954, p.2. 
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metropolitan area. This arrangement would keep children apart 
and would leave them within range of their usual conveniences. 
There were six other major gatherings of children planned into the 
royal itinerary, at Kalgoorlie, Boulder, Northam, York, Busselton 
and Albany, and, with "dispersion rather than concentration of 
crowds" as the aim, the editor suggested several means by which 
small groups could be organised along routes that the royal party 
would travel, even within the present schedule. So long as the 
royal household was confident the tour should go ahead the editor 
saw no reason for the West Australian administration to do 
otherwise, but it was felt that it would be a -
. . . graceful gesture to offer to reduce to a minimum those 
official presentations which will involve the Queen in the 
personal contact of handshaking. 1 20 
There were many who supported this approach to the tour. On the 
same day as the editorial appeared the Premier announced that the 
children's review would be replaced by setting up a series of 
"strongposts" - positions near schools on a now expanded number 
of routes to be taken by the royal entourage. The convoy would 
slow as it passed these positions, thus providing a maximum 
number of children with an opportunity to see queen. 1 2 1 
Daily News columnist Mary Ferber provided a counter story. In 
1948 Ferber took a lively interest in debating issues related to 
polio. On this occasion she was more ready than others to ask the 
1 20 WA. 4 March 1954, p.2. 
1 2 1 WA. 4 March 1954, p. 1; DN, 5 March 1954, p. l .  
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Should Western Australia sing: "We don't want to lose you, 
but we don't think you ought to come?" As the polio 
epidemic grows worse, anxiety must inevitably centre on the 
Royal visit to Perth. Is it not so much fear that infection 
could in any way be allowed to menace the Queen herself, 
but that the presence of the Queen must mean crowds, long 
waiting crowds. And polio loves crowds, weariness and 
impromptu hygtenic arrangements.122 
Ferber reminded her readers that once before a royal visit had been 
cancelled. The earlier occasion she referred to was the 1948 visit of 
George VI, which was abandoned because of the king's ill 
health.123 On that occasion the grief of the community was 
expressed in a cartoon by Davies in the Sunday Times . Under the 
title "Any Offers?" there was depicted the window of a men's wear 
shop in which, on an empty rack, hung a dress suit; next to it is 
placed striped trousers, a top hat and gloves. At floor level stood a 
sign which read "For Sale, Cheap" ( Figure 2 l ].124 West 
Australians seemed to be greatly concerned with what they would 
wear to greet the queen, and Ferber knew this. 
We went through all the pangs and blisses of invitations, 
curtsies, buying model frocks for her and dress suits for him. 
We've done it again. We could weather another 
disappointment if it were necessruy and desirable. I 25 
In 1948 Ferber did not resile from prompting the authorities to 
122 DN, 1 March 1954, p.10. "Monday Commentary". 
123 Doig, R.H. , BL. OH 2144, p.356. The visit had been postponed twice, in 1948 
due to King George VI's illness, and again in 1952. when he died. Planning for 
the tour began late in 1952. 
124 ST, 28 November 1948, p.4. 
125 DN. 1 March 1954, p.10. 
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take decisive action. On this occasion she did not change her 
style. 
As I have said before in the matter of the polio epidemic all 
we have to do is to do what we are told. We don't want to 
put any words into the mouths of the Royal tour officials, 
who are far from likely to under-estimate any kind of 
precautions. This royal visit is most importantly for the 
children, whom we can't stop from going to see her. But if it 
were decided that her tour should be postponed, we wouldn't 
quarrel with that decision. 1 2 6  
While the government proceeded to make changes to the children's 
review, it remained resistant to the thought that the tour should 
be cancelled entirely. 1 21 
Neither the state nor the federal government, which faced an 
election one month after the tour was to end, would have wanted 
to take the politically unpopular decision to abandon the tour. 
Under the circumstances it would have been difficult for the the 
royal household to convince the organisers that the visit be 
abandoned. But the British prime minister, Sir Winston 
Churchill, and the queen's surgeon, Commander D.D. Steele­
Perkins Joined forces to in an attempt to do so. 
Early in March the first of two high level consultations regarding 
the WA tour were held in Melbourne. In attendance were the 
federal director of the royal tour, Lieutenant General Benyman, 
the private secretary to the queen, Sir Michael Adeane, and the 
1 26 DN, 1 March 1954, p. 10. 
1 27 WA, 4 March 1954, p. l .  
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state director of the royal tour, Mr R.H. Doig. 1 28 The consultation 
revised the plans for the childrens' review. "Polio Brings Royal 
Assent to Tour Change" announced the the West Australian 
headline, 1 29 and alongside the article published a picture of small 
school children washing their hands. The .proposed changes were 
"designed to save children from infection", should the epidemic 
remain unabated by the time the queen arrtved. 1 30 
The next day an editorial appeared the West Australian in which 
the changes were applauded, but the warning was given that Perth 
. . . cannot feel it has heard the last of cancellations, or at 
least revisions, made necessaiy by the present epidemic. 1 3 1 
The editorial emphasised the reduction of risks to children, and 
made less of the question of risks to the queen. The idea was 
promoted that the real danger of infection lay in the gathering of 
crowds of children from different locations, in potentially 
unsanitary contexts, rather than in formal greetings extended by 
adults to the queen. 
As the date for the royal tour drew closer the epidemic increased in 
1 28 DN, 3 March 1954, p. l .  
1 29 WA, 5 March 1954, p. l .  
130 WA, 5 March 1954, p.l. 
1 3 1 WA, 6 March 1954, p.2. Two sub-editorials followed on the same page. One 
concerned the risks to the public through unhygienic practices in connection 
with food, and the other was a dissertation on the strengths and weaknesses of 
" McCarthyism". Perhaps the policies of Senator McCarthy, and those of the 
Communism he sought to combat, were considered to be equally dangerous -
each could infect the public, which had to maintain its vigilance in the face of 
them and keep its hands clean. 
CHAPTER 6: A royal panic: 1954 265 
intensity. The month of March began inauspiciously, and ended 
with the worst tally of cases on record. Eighty-six cases of polio 
were reported in the first twelve days, and the second of four 
deaths to occur took place.1 32 As the number of infections grew, 
and debate over the tour raged, the level of public fear rose. The 
day before the queen arrived "a polio conscious scrawler" ,  painted a 
cross on the doors of the Government House Ballroom with the 
words "May the Lord have mercy on us all" and "Bring out your 
dead". 1 3 3  
The WestAustraltan editorialised on the subject for the third time. 
The paper recognised the conflict involved and did not envy the 
decision-makers their job. Although some reservations were 
expressed, particularly concerning the risks to children, it 
supported the continuation of the tour. 
If there were any strong possibility of there being what even 
the most conservative would call a sizable increase in the 
number of polio cases during the visit, the Government 
would have been justified in asking that the tour in this 
State be called off . . . .  the aim must be to carry it through 
with a minimum of risk to the Royal party and to the people 
of the State. 1 34 
Within a week the Commissioner and R.H. Doig were summoned 
to Adelaide for a second meeting called to review the tour 
arrangements. 1 35 They were requested to provide the federal 
Minister in charge of the royal tour (Harrison) and the royal 
1 32 WA, 10 March 1954, p.1 .  
1 33 DN, 25 March 1954, p .1. 
1 34 WA, 13 March 1954, p.2. 
1 35 Doig. R.H., BL, OH 2 144, p.356. 
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household, with all available information concerning the polio 
epidemic, and the plans for the visit to Western Australia. 1 36 
The men from Western Australia walked into an ambush. An 
ultimatum was issued that the tour would go ahead only on 
certain conditions which WA would have to agree to. Doig, who 
had no prior knowledge of the conditions, had not been authorised 
to make changes to the arrangements agreed to by cabinet. He 
telephoned Premier Hawke who flatly refused to budge. 1 37 Doig 
reported his premier's intransigence to the meeting and Harrison, 
who strongly favoured cancelling the tour, said -
In other words, Mr Doig, you are saying that your Premier 
considers the Queen's health to be a secondary 
consideratlon?l 38 
Doig protested that this was not Hawke's view, but he had not 
authorised any changes to the program. The argument became 
deadlocked. Late-night sessions culminated in Harrison, 
Berryman and Doig being summoned to Government House for 
further consultations, but with no result. 
Hawke advised his men that they were to return to Perth. Cabinet 
had authorised the premier to finalise the matter on the basis of 
their agreed changes. The regular meeting was scheduled for 
Tuesday 23 March but the premier was requested to call a special 
meeting for Monday, 22 March in order to ratify any proposed 
136 WA, 18 March 1954, p. l ;  WA. 19 March 1954, p. l .  
1 3  7 Doig. R.H . •  BL, OH 2144, p.356. 
1 38 Doig, R.H . •  BL, OH 2144, pp.356-7. 
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changes. 1 39 The leader of the opposition, Sir Ross McLarty, 
publicly supported the premier's wish to see the tour continue as 
planned. 140 In the final event cabinet did not meet and the 
premier was not consulted. Changes were made to the programme 
and the WA government had to accept them. 
"Tour Alterations Seen as Political Football" read the Daily News 
headline. Differences of opinion were reported between the queen's 
surgeon and the Commissioner over the degree of risk involved for 
the queen. But political game playing was seen to be the main 
reason for a lack of decision -
The visit of the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh is still in 
doubt because no one is willing to take the responsibility for 
any drastic curtailment or cancellation of the tour through 
the poliomyelitis epidemic. This is seen as the reason for the 
delay in issuing an official statement from the conference 
that took place here last night. The Commonwealth 
Government is not anxious to make a decision to cancel or 
alter the tour - scheduled to begin next Friday, for fear that 
it may anger the people of Western Australia. This could be 
a disadvantageous move with the Government facing an 
election the month after the Queen is due to leave 
Australia. 14 1 
Eileen Travis, the special correspondent for the British paper the 
Daily Mall, was in Adelaide for the royal visit. Her reports were 
probably influential in the British press becoming so alarmed over 
the polio epidemic in Western Australia. Travis cabled her opinion 
that the tour to Western Australia should be cancelled. She also 
reported that the queen was not worried about the risks to her own 
1 39 WA. 20 March 1 954, p. l ;  DN, 22 March 1954, p. l .  
1 40 DN, 22 March 1954, p. l .  
14 1 DN, 20 March 1954, p. l .  
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health and would go along with whatever was arranged for her, but 
was vecy concerned of the effect the tour might have on others.1 42 
Perhaps if the queen was thought to be concerned about the risks 
to children it would strengthen the case for cancelling the tour. 
The Adelaide papers made fair sport of the situation, giving the 
impression to the world, said Premier Hawke, that "Western 
Australia was riddled with disease". He replied that the percentage 
of population affected by polio in Western Australia was currently 
less than it was when the queen visited Canberra. 1 43 On the same 
page as this, obviously in an attempt to offset negative publicity, it 
was announced that the the governor, Sir Charles Gairdner, had 
sent an assurance of loyalty to the queen, who had replied that 
she was eagerly anticipating her visit to WA. If the queen was not 
worried, no one else need panic. 
Despite the deadlocked meeting, the plans rejected by the West 
Australian delegates were already going ahead. Unofficial news 
was received that the Gothic had been provisioned in Adelaide and 
was about to make an early departure for WA, a sure signal that, 
unless the epidemic suddenly worsened, the royal tour was going 
ahead. 1 44 
Prior to their departure for Perth, the royal couple, their household 
and members of staff under the age of thirty-five, received a second 
injection of gamma globulin, the first having been administered 
142 DN, 20 March 1954, p. l .  
143 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l .  
1 44 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l .  
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while they were in Canberra. 1 45 Doctors from Melbourne and 
Sydney questioned the validity of giving the injections. 1 46 The 
Commissioner agreed with them; he did not want to support 
changes to the tour plans, or have to deal with a run on the 
serum. He stated that gamma globulin, which was difficult to 
produce in large quantities, was an unproven preventative, the 
protective powers of which were limited. Supplies were being 
issued to those who were regarded as being exposed to special 
risks, but it was quite useless for those who had already become 
infected. 1 4  7 
At the instigation of Harrison, the Commonwealth director of the 
tour, Prime Minister Menzies flew to Adelaide to intervene. 
Menzies held consultations concerning the tour arrangements, 
unencumbered by the presence of Hawke's men. He discussed the 
arrangements in detail with Harrison, who by now must have been 
exhausted but pleased to be getting his own way, and then dined 
with the queen and presented his views. Late on Monday night, 
without having conferred with the WA cabinet, Menzies announced 
the changes to the tour. 
The Gothic will be used as headquarters in Western Australia 
for the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh, the Royal 
household and staff, and Press representatives going on from 
Australia. 
For the crew and other naval staff, the Gothic will be a 
restricted ship and permission to go ashore will be confined 
to those on duty. 
1 45 WA, 24 March 1954, p. l ;  DN, 23 March 1954, p. l .  
1 46 DN, 25 March 1954, p.2. 
1 47 DN, 25 March 1954, p.9. 
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All meals taken ashore by the Queen and the Duke and the 
Royal household and staff will be from food prepared in the 
Gothic and brought ashore. 
Indoor functions will be limited to formal functions such as 
the Executive Council meetings. Attendance at other indoor 
functions such as the church service and Parliamentary 
dinner, will be cancelled and, where possible, suitable 
alternative arrangements will be made. 
Shaking of hands will be eliminated. 
Where a child is to present a bouquet the child should walk 
towards the Queen but should retain the bouquet or place it 
in some suitable position.148 
These decisions, which highlighted the safety of the queen rather 
than the children, differed from the wishes of the WA Government 
in several respects, and from the proposals of the Public Health 
Department and the polio committee of the NH&MRC. 
The use of the Gothic as the royal headquarters was an innovation. 
The deletion of the Parliamentary Dinner at Government House 
and the church service at St George's cathedral were also new 
arrangements, but the plan to utilise trips to and from the ship to 
provide opportunities for the population to see the queen was an 
idea already under discussion.149 
The Menzies scheme allowed the tour to proceed, thus satisfying 
the felt need for children to see the queen, but forced a greater 
separation between the royals and the public. Menzies built upon 
148 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l. Press statement by the Prime Minister, M, A462 / 4. 
825/ 14/48. p. 9; Record of events affecting WA programme resulting from 
poliomyelitis epidemic 1954, 22 March 1954, M, A462/4, 825/ 14/48. pp.22-24 .. 
149 WA, 24 March 1954, p. l .  
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decisions already in place, such as the elimination of hand 
shaking, restriction of the movement of the ship's crew and the 
provisioning of the Gothic from outside Western Australia. 
The changes won the approval of the British government. A 
personal message from Sir Winston Churchill was cabled to 
Menzies which expressed "deep appreciation" for the advice given to 
the queen and the the stringent precautions put in place. It 
concluded with 
Your friends and colleagues here realise fully all the 
difficulties you had to contend with and so appreciate your 
action the more. We are thankful you were at the helm. 1 50 
Neither government wanted to risk the unpopular move of making 
changes to the tour, but Menzies "grasped the nettle". He justified 
his actions by showing that Premier Hawke had not taken 
seriously enough the expert information provided to him, that his 
plans for the tour were still too conservative, and that the queen 
was exposed to too grave a risk. He said -
To do him [Hawke] justice, I must say that I am informed 
that the Premier does not believe himself that the risk of 
infection is great. 
However, as Her Majesty's Prime Minister, I cannot allow 
that opinion to weigh against the recommendations of the 
poliomyelitis committee of the National Health and Medical 
Research Council, of the the Premier's own Commissioner of 
Health, who, in a report on February 25 described the 
outbreak as a major epidemic which was expected to worsen 
in the following month or two. 1 5 1  
150 Cablegram, Stephen Holmes to Menzies, 24 March 1954, M. A462/4, 
825/ 14/48, no page number, 
1 5 1  WA, 23 March 1954, p. l .  
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The premier responded angrtly, claiming unnecessary interference, 
but he was accused of wanting someone else to make the 
decision. 1 52 While he disapproved, in the end Hawke had no 
option but to go along with the changes imposed. Western 
Australia fell in with the new plans, which Doig re-drafted on his 
way home from Adelaide, 1 53 and the premier announced -
. . .  the State Government would co-operate fully with the 
people of the State in giving to the Queen and the Duke of 
Edin burgh a very warm, loyal and friendly welcome in 
accordance with the best traditions of Western Australia. 1 54 
His strong resistance to any changes had been based on the advice 
of the Public Health Department, which in turn had gathered 
support from several sources. 1 5 5  And his expressed concern had 
always been for the safety of the children and people of Western 
Australia. 
The next day the Cabinet released a statement aimed to leave no 
doubt in the public mind that it was enraged by Menzies' 
intervention. Insult had apparently been added to injury in the 
way the decisions were conveyed to Western Australia. 
The Cabinet expressed strong resentment at the fact that at 
no stage before he made his decision had Mr Menzies made 
any attempt to discuss the matter with the Premier (Mr 
1 52 WA, 23 March 1954, p . l .  Notes for press release, M. A462/4, 825/ 14/48, 
p.2, " . . .  it was indicated by the Premier of WA that he wanted someone else to 
make the decision". 
1 53 Doig, R.H., BL, OH 2144, p.357. 
1 54 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l .  
1 55 Doig, R.H., BL, OH 2144, p.355. "Hawke took the view, right from the start 
that the risk was minimal". 
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Hawke), which it is claimed he could easily have done by an 
Adelaide-Perth telephone conversation. 
The Cabinet also expressed resentment at the fact that the 
Premier had received his first advice last night [Tuesday 23 
March) of the decisions made by Mr Menzies from a Perth 
Newspaper office, about half and hour before he had received 
any official advice from Mr Menzies.1 56 
But telephoning Hawke who, as Doig had made clear, was 
adamant in his view, would have served little purpose. And the 
return of his men to Perth had signalled that, as far as he was 
concerned, the discussion was over. 
The editor of the Daily News, who loyally supported the WA 
government as the final, responsible authority regarding tour 
arrangements, was scathing of the forces that had overridden the 
premier. 1 57 A not so successful attempt was made to turn the 
tables on the prime minister. Since the information on which the 
final action was based was known a month before the tour began, 
Menzies, the Commonwealth authorities, and presumably the royal 
household, should have made their decision sooner. The editor 
wrote -
. .. on February 25 the Commissioner of Health in Western 
Australia had described the outbreak as a major epidemic 
which was expected to worsen in the course of a month or 
so . . . 
. . . that being so, action should have been taken at the end of 
February instead of leaving the public and all concerned in 
this State in doubt until the proverbial eleventh hour. 1 58 
1 56 WA, 24 March 1954, p. l .  
1 57 DN. 28 March 1954, p.8. 
1 58 DN, 28 March 1954, p.8. 
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The editor accepted that, in the light of information provided by 
the Commissioner, the local administration had thought out all 
the implications and decided it was safe to go ahead with the tour. 
He took the opportunity to point out that polio was equally as rife 
in Canberra, New South Wales, and Victoria, 1 59 so that if other 
states had planned as thoroughly as Western Australia, changes 
would have been made to tour arrangements in those places. 
Western Australia, it appeared, had been "scapegoated", and this 
had happened, it now emerged, on the advice of the queen's 
medical advisor. The state's reputation for being a healthy place 
had been damaged, but, after all this, 
. . .  it has not in any way dampened our enthusiasm or our 
demonstration of affection for the Royal Visitors to whom we 
are proud to be hosts. 1 60 
The Public Health Department acknowledged that much of its 
thinking and planning had been rendered redundant by the 
Adelaide conference and the inteiventions of the prime minister. 1 6 1 
However its thorough research and preparation had assisted the 
government in its planning, and during the arduous negotiations 
over the tour. It provided them with a sound basis for discussion 
and decision making even though others interpreted the data 
differently and used it against them. 
1 59 Figure 3, Chapter 2 above. NSW had 562, Victoria 572, Queensland 140, SA 
174 and the ACT 26, the second highest total on record. 
1 60 DN, 28 March 1954, p.8. 
1 6 1  Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.58, BL, 614.09 WES. 
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While decision makers struggled over the future of the tour, public 
discussion of safety issues continued. A party of passengers who 
arrived at Freman tle in transit from Cape Town followed the advice 
of the port health officer and kept their children on board ship, 
rather than risk infection on land. 162 The south west town of 
Bridgetown, not far from Noggerup, banned all children under 
fourteen from attending the local picture theatre. They also 
applied to the Commissioner for the power to quarantine for 
fourteen days any people who visited an infected area, that is, who 
travelled outside the road board boundaries.163 The move was 
aimed to restrict residents from travelling to Perth, or to nearby 
districts to see the queen. 
Warnings were issued against the use of roller towels, which came 
in for special criticism from Snow. He said they were "the most 
criminal type of towel " l 64 provided for public use and 
recommended that every public convenience be fitted with 
disposable towels. 
Swimming in Lake Monger and the Swan River were strongly 
discouraged by the Health Department, while correspondents aired 
their views and fears concerning the handling of food in the public 
domain, the use of dirty taps, and drinking from public 
162 WA, 5 March 1954, p.8. 
163 WA. 24 March 1954, p. l .  
164 WA, 5 March 1954, p.3. 
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fountains. 165 A correspondent to the papers suggested that street 
drinking fountains should have foot operated taps, to minimised 
the possibility of contamination. In reply the Health Department 
said that, though the idea had merit, it was impossible to 
implement it quickly enough to make any difference to this 
epidemic. 
The churches also joined the fray. Having previously offered 
special prayers for the queen's safety, and also prayers for polio 
sufferers, because of the epidemic the two subjects now came 
together. The Revd Ralph Sutton, superintendent minister at 
Wesley Church indicated that if the epidemic worsened -
The World Council of Churches would be approached to 
organise prayers on a State-wide basis. 166 
Letters to the editor in the daily papers represented both opinions -
that the tour be cancelled, and that it continue. Many based their 
reasoning on patriotic grounds. Others, in a manner reminiscent 
of the 1 948 epidemic, reflected that there were cases of polio in 
other states when the queen had visited and hygienic practices 
were being breached in the community every day, leading, they 
thought, to the obvious conclusion that the tour should go 
ahead. 1 67 One such,"Worrted", wrote -
I hope nothing will be be done to cancel the Royal visit 
unless it is of the gravest necessity, endangering not only 
1 65 WA, 9 March 1954, p.13; WA, 5 March 1954, p.3; WA, 6 March 1954, p.11; 
WA. 10 March 1954, p.9. 
1 66 DN, 15 March 1954, p.2. 
1 67 WA. 4 March 1954, p.7; 6 March 1954, p. 16; 13 March 1954, p.9. 
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ourselves but our royal visitors. 
If the epidemic is a matter of faecal contamination, how does 
it account for the scattered nature of the cases? Unless we 
have complete isolation, what other precautions can avail? 
Hospital visiting, school attendance, etc., have not ceased. 
People with children, or having contact with them, are on 
public conveyances. People still attend church, cinema, and 
crowd into the shopping areas. 
This is not the only State with polio at the present time, and 
the spreading out of crowds, (with children at points 
involving the least travelling, and mixing mainly with those 
already of their group) should be as good a safeguard as any 
agatnst increase. 1 68 
On Friday 26 March 1954 the royal tour to Western Australia 
commenced according to the Menzies recommendations. The local 
newspapers eulogised the royal couple, and trumpeted the welcome 
they were afforded by their loyal Western Australian subjects. 
The cancellation of the service in St George's cathedral was 
regarded, particularly by the dean, as the most disappointing 
aspect of the changes. The question was asked as to why a 
"suitable alternative", such as a service in the open air, could not 
have been substituted. Dean Bell announced that the service, a 
harvest thanksgiving, would be held as planned. The governor 
would read the first lesson, as intended, but without the royal 
couple present. He urged those invited to still plan to attend, with 
the words "I would like people to remember that God will still be 
there". 1 69 
While Dean Bell believed that God would still be at the cathedral, 
1 68 WA. 12 March 1954, p.6. 
1 69 DN, 23 March 1954, p. l. 
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during her stay in Western Australia the queen would not reside at 
Government House. She was to be housed on the Gothic. A 
photograph of the government house bedroom which had been 
prepared for the queen but was no longer required was published 
over the plaintive caption "Where she would have slept" . 1 10 
As the royal tour had progressed through the eastern states the 
Women's Weekly had provided its readership with a rich diet of 
stories accompanied by photos of the queen in the company of 
Governors, Archbishops, and crowds of people. Western Australia 
received very different treatment from correspondent Anne 
Matheson, who took an entirely different line. The only picture to 
appear was the one of Raewyn Coppin, and there followed an 
article headed "Family Picnic Atmosphere in Perth" which now 
reads like a send up the event. 
A refrigerated ice-cream van in the Royal progress through 
Perth set the family picnic atmosphere that persisted 
throughout the Queen's Western Australian tour. 
The van carried a picnic lunch and dinner for the Queen and 
the Royal Household, specially prepared on board the Gothic. 
The Queen's "quarantine diet" was a cold collation for both 
lunch and dinner. Even table linen and cutlery were brought 
from the Gothic. 
The meals were prepared by her page, sergeant footman and 
footman who kept the required six feet away from all 
members of the Government House staff while they set the 
table and served the meal. 
The Queen and the Duke and the Royal Household lunched 
and dined in a private dining room while the Governor of 
Western Australia, Sir Charles Gairdner, and the 
1 70 DN, 23 March 1954, p. l .  
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Honourable Lady Gairdner, and their staff, dined alone. 
The Queen and her household had fairy toast, since no fresh 
bread was eaten on their polio precaution diet. Although the 
salads were brought in the Gothic to Western Australia, they 
were carefully washed and prepared in a very slight antiseptic 
solution that was quite tasteless. 
Grapes were all peeled before being eaten and no fresh water 
was placed on the table. I 7 1 
Matheson went on to report on the "keep your distance" and "no 
handling" rules in action, assuring her readers that because of 
them the reception lines lost none of their dignity, even though the 
queen and the Duke shook hands with no-one. 
When it came to planting a tree in King's Park, and laying a 
wreath at the War Memorial, all those who prepared items for her 
wore gloves. It was agreed the queen would wear gloves, for added 
protection during the ceremonies, and discard them afterwards. At 
the investiture ceremony, which took place out of doors as a 
precaution against polio, the queen broke the rules, discarded her 
gloves and "touched all whom when invested with honours" . 1 12 
The arrangements for the tour were controversial, but after it was 
all over, the state Director, R.H. Doig conceded that, because of 
the extra travelling to and from Fremantle, "a lot more people saw 
the Queen". 1 73 
In June the Commissioner wrote to Commander Steel-Perkins, the 
1 7 1 Women's Weekly, 7 April 1954, no page number 
1 72 Women's Weekly, 7 April 1954, no page number 
1 73 Doig, R.H., BL, OH 2 144, p.357. 
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physician who had accompanied the queen on the tour. 1 74 
Referring to an enclosed histogram of the incidence polio the 
Commissioner had to admit that although the epidemic had 
declined fairly rapidly after the tour, it had not subsided 
completely. He remarked on the low rates of paralysis and 
mortality and especially drew attention to the department's 
championing of the faecal contamination theocy, and the fact that 
the incidence of polio had not risen following the tour. He wrote -
... it is clear that the unusual collection of crowds in the 
metropolitan area during the week of the Tour did not in any 
way affect the course of the epidemic and did not produce a 
rise in the number of cases notified .. .  
You will perhaps recall that this Department insisted in its 
publicity and propaganda that epidemic poliomyelitis should 
be regarded and treated as a faecal disease and that the 
methods for its control should be designed accordingly. I 75 
The Commissioner reiterated "there can be no doubt that the Royal 
Tour did not in any way produce an increased incidence of the 
disease" and used this to justify his Department's policies. "We 
are reassured by the feeling that our labours have not been 
altogether in vain" he said. 1 76 If there had been a clash with 
Steel-Perkins before the WA tour began, the Commissioner found 
some opportunity from these results to rub his nose in it now. 
During the 1954 epidemic vecy few photos of polio victims appeared 
in the press. No doubt the editors were aware that the community 
1 7 4 Letter, CPH to Steel-Perkins, 24 June 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/54, 
pp. 162-165, Memo attached to Minister of Health. 
1 75 Letter, CPH to Steel-Perkins, 24 June 1954,BL. ACC 1003, AN 228/54. p.163. 
1 76 Letter, CPH to Steel-Perkins, 24 June 1954,BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/54. p.163. 
CHAPTER 6: A royal panic: 1954 28 1  
did not want to be reminded of the scourge of paralysis, and, as 
was the case in 1948, when attention was given to the subject it 
tended to be stories with an element of heroism. 
Near the end of February, when the Red Cross March Appeal was 
about to commence, there appeared a picture of students at the 
Lady Lawley Cottage school. The cottage, which was run by the 
Red Cross, was home to children who were receiving after-care for 
polio or cerebral palsey. 1 11 The school, run by the head teacher 
Mrs Miller, had formed a percussion band to enable the students 
to develop better muscle co-ordination. Rather like present day 
Telethon appeals, the picture of the band was presented as a 
motivator for fund-raising. The photo, which included many 
children wearing orthotic devices, was pictured over the caption, 
"Spastics Play In Own Band". 1 78 A week later, once more in the 
interests of the Red Cross March Appeal, a nine-year-old boy 
named Herbert, who was infected with polio in 1 948 and had spent 
long periods of time at Lady Lawley Cottage receiving physiotherapy 
treatment, was pictured with two young girls, Patty and Anne over 
the caption "Despite Infirmity, Herbert is Bright and Cheerful" . 1 79 
Finally, near the end of the epidemic, Dr John Colebatch, who had 
polio in 1953, while working as medical registrar at the IDH. was 
pictured with a frame that he had designed to enable him to move 
1 77 Marshall, J. ( 1996). Starting With Threepence, p.47; Stewart, N. ( 1966). The 
Lady Lawley Cottage By The Sea 1902-1966, unpublished manuscript held at 
Lady Lawley Cottage. Arrangements for the after-care of crippled children in 
Western Australia were strengthened in 1927 when the Children's Hospital 
formed a link with Lady Lawley Cottage, a convalescent home for children that 
had been established in the seaside suburb of Cottesloe in 1902. 
1 78 DN, 23 February 1954, p.7. 
1 79 DN, 1 March 1954, p. l .  
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about his house. The heading for his photo read "Doctor Polio 
victim Sets High Example". From such an heroic context came 
Cole batch's advice to all. He said "throw off your pessimism, and 
determine to help yourself'. l 80 
The will to overcome the effects of polio was strongly present in 
individual lives during 1954, as it was present in the minds of 
political leaders who planned to go ahead with royal tour, despite 
the real and potential risks to the queen and members of the 
community. Although the community was divided over the matter, 
a strong consensus in favour of the tour proceeding remained. The 
interconnection between the timing of the tour and the rise of the 
epidemic created an unprecedented level of frustration for 
administrators, politicians and members of the community alike. 
The Public Health Department, which aimed to avoid the criticisms 
it suffered in 1948, endeavoured to keep the public informed about 
polio, the precautions to take, and the course of the epidemic. But 
it did not have things its own way. The coming tour stimulated 
more public debate than might otherwise have occurred and the 
department felt more pressure than it was expecting. 
The fear of polio, which reached hysterical proportions in the lead 
up to the royal tour, was ever present during the 1954 epidemic. 
The tour exacerbated the fear, and made it difficult for the Premier 
and the Public Health Department to maintain their "minimal 
risks" approach. In the end they lost out to British based fears for 
the safety of the Queen. And since children were considered the 
l 80 DN, 13 April 1954, p. l .  
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most likely to transmit the polio virus, her "white-gloved hand" 
waved from afar and "touched no-one" except some politicians and 
other dignitaries. 
*** 
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Figure 18: Public Health 1 954, (1956). Government Printer, Perth, 
Appendix VIII, p.63, BL, 614.09 WES .  
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Figure 19: WA, 22 Februazy 1954, p.2. 
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Figure 20: Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.62 ,  BL, 
614.09 WES .  
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Figure 21: Sunday Times, 28 November 1948, p.4. 
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CHAPTER 7: A savage storm before the calm: 1956 
The 1956 polio epidemic was the last to occur in Western Australia 
before mass immunisation quelled the activities of the virus. The 
short, sharp and painful epidemic was handled very effectively by 
the Public Health Department, which had gained expertise and 
resources from the experience of the previous two outbreaks. 
Because it did not last a year, as in 1948, and was not associated 
with a major event, as in 1954, the 1956 epidemic was reported 
and commented upon less than the previous two. An added factor 
was that news about polio concentrated on the preparations for 
the immunisation campaign rather than the progress of the 
epidemic. 
The news about Salk vaccine stirred the hope that immunisation 
would soon rid the world, of polio's curse. A report was published 
which revealed the results of an American survey in which, in a six 
month period of 1955, the incidence of polio amongst eight-year­
olds was shown to be 52% less than for the same period in 1954, 
the difference being attributed to Salk vaccine. I In 1955 it had 
been announced that Salk vaccine would be introduced into 
Western Australia within a year, following successful mass trials 
conducted America. 2 While the polio virus was notoriously 
unpredictable, it is possible that, with the promise of relief in 
sight, the community had begun to lapse into a sense of false 
security. 
l WA. 24 December 1955, p 8. 
2 Public Health 1955, ( 1956 ). Appendix VII. p.55. 
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West Australians were used to long gaps between polio epidemics. 
There were ten years between the initial flurry of activity in 1938 
and the first major outbreak in 1948, and it was a further six years 
before the next epidemic in 1954. Although the incidence had been 
higher than usual between 1948 and 1954, only thirty three cases 
of polio were confirmed in 1955, the lowest for more than a decade 
[Figure 22].3 
The shadow of the impending disaster began to fall before the close 
of 1955 as reports of the activity of the polio virus were received by 
the Public Health Department. After New Year the number cases 
began to increase and on 5 January 1956 the Commissioner, Dr 
Henzell, had the unpleasant responsibility of announcing that two 
very young boys, one each from the country and the city, had died 
at the IDH, and that two adults at the hospital were receiving 
respiratory su pport.4 He informed the public of these 
developments, recommended that high standards of hygiene be 
maintained and called for prompt attention to cases of sickness. 
The incidence of polio infections continued to rise and very soon 
3 Public Health 1955, (1956). Appendix VII, p.55. The annual number of cases 
reported 1949 - 1953 were 61.59,96,37, and 44 respectively, an annual average of 
59.4. 
4 WA, 5 January 1956, p. l .  
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more stringent precautions were in place.5 As before, the papers 
resorted militaristic imagery: "Public Told How To Fight Polio" 
announced the WestAustralian . 6 The Commissioner recommended 
that tonsillectomies be deferred, that gatherings involving the 
mingling of children from different districts be postponed, and that 
the public maintain strict standards of hand hygiene.1 
The epidemic was notably severe and intense. A total of 401 cases 
of polio occurred, of which 359 were reported during the first three 
months of the year; 151 in January, 143 in February, and 65 in 
March.8 
There was a disturbing increase in the number of paralytic 
infections, added to which it was found that the age of those 
affected by polio had also risen. Of the 1 72 paralytic cases 
recorded in 1956, 150 were reported during the first three months 
of the epidemic. Worse still , the majority of those paralysed were 
young adults, an indication that the behaviour pattern of the 
virus, or the virus itself, had changed. A total of twelve deaths 
occurred during the year, (a mortality rate of 3%), compared with 
twenty five in 1948 (8%), and four in 1954 (1 %). 
5 DN, 20 Januruy 1956, p. l ,  "Five more makes it 60" . 
6 WA, 17 Januruy 1956, p. l .  
7 WA, 17 Januruy 1956, p. l ;  DN, 14 Januruy 1956, p. l .  
B PubUc Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, Table II, p.55. 
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During January, the most severe month, the number of infections 
increased rapidlyg and by the beginning of February there had been 
151 cases of which 70 had been diagnosed as paralytic. 1 0  This 
avalanche of paralytic cases, many of whom were adults rather 
than children, 1 1  heavily taxed existing physiotherapy and 
respirator services. 1 2  Physiotherapists curtailed their leave and 
returned to the IDH to assist with the emergency. Facilities, such 
as the therapeutic pool that had been built at the IDH, were in 
constant use. Over an article headed "Pool Never More Vital" the 
Dally News placed a photo captioned "Polio fight Goes On". 1 3 The 
language of combat cast polio as a public enemy. 
The greater number of deaths recorded in 1956, compared with 
1954, was a direct result of the severe paralysis and attendant 
respiratory cases. By the end of February eight deaths had been 
recorded, 1 4  and in mid March a twenty-four year-old expectant 
mother became the ninth. 1 5 More deaths followed. 1 6 Every effort 
9 WA. 19 January 1956, p. l ;  21 January 1956, p. l ;  24 January 1956, p. l .  
1 0  Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.55; DN ,3 February 1956, p. l .  
1 1  DN. 15 February 1956, p. l .  
1 2  WA. I8 January 1956, p. l .  
1 3 DN, 1 1  February, 1956, p.6 
1 4 DN, 27 February 1956, p. l .  
1 5 WA. 13 March 1956, p. l .  
1 6 WA. 5 April 1956, p.10; WA. 25 April 1956, p.6. 
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was made to provide the thirty two people who required it with 
respiratory support, and by this means many lives were saved. The 
death rate was less than half that of 1948, but the total of twelve 
was three times that recorded in 1954. Despite this, Western 
Australia did not lose many people to polio, compared with other 
places. The Dally News published a story from Buenos Aires which 
told of 138 deaths from polio. 1 1 
From the outset of the epidemic the Public Health Department, in 
consultation with the State Poliomyelitis Advisory Committee 
(SPAC), applied the usual methods of control. Patients were 
isolated, child contacts were placed under "house and garden" 
quarantine, gamma globulin was administered to those who had 
been in contact with paralytic cases, less severe cases were treated 
at home and tonsillectomies were deferred. Increased emphasis 
was given to the importance of hand hygiene, while organised 
gatherings of children and young people were cancelled. 1 8 
Three aspects of this epidemic were notable and alarming. The 
first, and perhaps the most significant, was that the causative 
virus was difficult to identify. It was eventually named as Leon, or 
Type III, a variety unknown in any previous Australian epidemic. 1 9  
17 DN, 13 March 1956, p. l .  
1 8 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.53. 
1 9 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.52. 
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At the end of 1955 the Children's Hospital reported the occurrence 
of a few atypical cases of illness which were thought to be due to 
"polio or related viruses". 20 Any uncertainties that existed were 
aggravated by the fact that Western Australia still did not have its 
own diagnostic laboratory and had to wait some time to gather the 
results of any testing, a fact bewailed by the Public Health 
Department.2 1  Dr J .A.R. Miles had formerly assisted with virus 
diagnosis, but his departure from the Institute of Medical and 
Veterinary Science at Adelaide caused Snow to seek help from Dr 
A. Ferris of the Epidemiological Research Unit at the Fairfield 
Infectious Diseases Hospital in Melbourne. 
A month after the first samples were sent to Melbourne the virus 
had still not been identified, and the situation was regarded as 
very grave.2 2  More samples were sent for analysis and eventually 
the causative virus was identified as Type JII.23 The same virus 
was subsequently found to be present in the majority of fifty 
samples of faeces and paired sera that the Public Health 
Department sent to Melbourne for analysis. 24 The serial spot map 
for 1956, [Figure 23) suggests that paralysis from Type III infections 
occurred largely in suburbs north and east of the rtver.2 5 
The second disturbing feature of the epidemic was that a higher 
2 O Letter, DJR Snow to A Ferris, 8 December 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4. 
270/54, p.78. 
2 1 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII. p.52. 
22 Letter. DJR Snow to A Ferris, 6 January 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
270/54, p.79. 
23 WA. 17 February 1956, p. l .  
24 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.53. 
25 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.53. 
CHAPTER 7: A savage storm: 1 956 294 
proportion of young adults were affected by paralysis. The greatest 
proportion of cases, 60% , occurred in the 1 5-34 age range, 1 5% in 
the 25-29 age group. 26 Young adult males from rural districts, 
who in the past had been shown to be particularly vulnerable to 
paralysis, were amongst those most severely affected in 1956 .  Two 
factors are likely to have affected this incidence: the less 
meticulous personal hygiene habits of rural males, and the 
likelihood that they did not cease activity when suffering from the 
febrile illness. which had exacerbated the level of paralysis 
incurred. 
The high level of severe paralysis amongst country people meant 
that it was necessary to devise a means of transporting to Perth 
those people who required respiratory assistance.  Nine patients 
were delivered safely to care using a vehicle especially fitted out 
with respirator equipment.2 7 While the mobile unit continued to 
be put into service in this way other means of transport were also 
utilised.2s A fourteen-year-old girl from the southern town of Mt 
Barker, who urgently required respirator assistance, was rushed to 
Albany airport and flown to Perth aboard an especially assigned 
RAAF Dakota aircraft, with a doctor and four nurses aboard.2 9 
The high proportion of cases that resulted in severe paralysis, was 
26 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p .52. 
27 WA. 24 February 1956, p.3. 
28 WA. 25 April 1956, p.6. 
2 9 WA, 27 February 1956, p.3. 
CHAPTER 7: A savage storm: 1 956 295 
the third, and most trying aspect of the epidemic, because it often 
required the patient to be placed in an iron lung. During 1956 a 
total of thirty two people required respirator assistance,3 0  twenty 
six of whom were admitted in a short space of time. All available 
resources were severely strained in February when a record number 
of thirteen persons were simultaneously receiving respirator 
support, more than double the previous record of six established a 
month earlier. 3 1 On occasions as many as three new respiratory 
patients were admitted to the IDH in one day .32 Respiratory 
patients were the most vulnerable, and some did not recover. The 
value of mechanical respirators was clearly demonstrated in 1 956. 
Twenty two of the thirty two respiratory cases survived the acute 
stage of the first month. Although one person subsequently died, 
seventeen of the remaining twenty one patients achieved 
respiratory independence.33 
Special resources were made available to assist the Public Health 
Department in its "fight against polio". At the onset of the 
epidemic the Commissioner sought, and was immediately granted, 
a special allocation of State Government funds to finance extra 
physiotherapy and consultative services. 34 Stocks of gamma 
30 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.52. 
3 1 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix Vil, p.53, see also HJH Colebatch, "Tank 
Warfare", Royal Perth Hospltal Joumal, Vol. 9 ,  p. 249. 
3 2 Public Health 1956, (1958 ). Appendix VII, p.53. 
33 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p. 53; Letter, HJH Colebatch to DJR 
Snow, 18 July 1956, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 5178/57 pp. 86-88. 
34 WA, 18 January 1956, p. l .  
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globulin, more readily available than in 1954, were also 
obtained.35 
As the epidemic worsened there was increased demand for gamma 
globulin, and the Commissioner was required to publicly restate 
the conditions under which it would be administered.35 Earlier he 
had publicised the availability of the preparation and reminded the 
public that the royal couple had been given it in 1954. His 
enthusiasm may have been intended to convince the public that, 
while the number of cases of paralytic polio continued to rise, his 
department was doing all that it could to protect the most 
vulnerable members of the community. 
The tragic irony of the 1956 epidemic was that it occurred as Salle 
vaccine became available and a plan for mass immunisation was 
being developed. All children aged fourteen and under, a total of 
194,750 in Western Australia, were targetted for three injections. 
But Salk vaccine came too late for some. If immunisation had 
been possible a year earlier the 1956 epidemic would probably have 
35 Notes on Poliomyelitis, 19  Januruy 1956 , BL, ACC 1003, AN 1 20/4, 689/52, 
p,235; WA, 18  Januruy 1956, p. l .  
36  WA. 19 Januruy 1956, p. l .  
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been avoided. As it was the virus had one last chance to wreak its 
crippling power before it disappeared at the hands of the Public 
Health Department which planned, with military precision, to 
eradicate this threat to the community. Mass immunisation 
commenced in July 1956 and there was a dramatic drop in the 
incidence of polio infections from 195 7 onwards. 
It had been proven that the polio virus was present in the faeces 
during the acute stages of the disease and in 1956 plans to control 
the virus were clearly based on the recognition of the faecal 
contamination theory, as this statement by the Public Health 
Department reveals. 
Modern opinion is that by its presence in the faeces 
contamination occurs from person to person by such 
methods as faulty personal hygiene, with the resultant 
contamination of fingers, domestic appliances, and food . . .  
strict attention to personal hygiene is essential on visiting 
the toilet, after which the hands should be thoroughly 
washed with soap and water. . .  If possible, avoid 
contamination of the W.C. chain, door handles and taps. 
Hand washing should also be done by the housewife before 
any handling of food and by all before eating.3 7 
37 Notes on Poliomyelitis, 19 January 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 689/52, 
p.236. 
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The clarity of emphasis was no doubt, one result of Snow's 
research conducted during the royal tour.3s 
The link between faecal contamination and swimming once more 
resulted in the disruption of summer patterns of recreation. Over 
eight thousand school children were affected when the Education 
Department cancelled the vacation swimming classes planned for 
the numerous baths on the Swan River. 39 Seaside instruction was 
still offered at South Beach, Fremantle because the Public Health 
Department had expressed the view that small groups which swam 
in large bodies of moving water would be safe from polio infection. 
River water, on the other hand, which did not circulate, was 
believed to harbour the virus for up to 180 days. 40 The result was 
that small groups of people frequented the ocean although, despite 
the warnings, some individuals continued to use the Swan River. 
In the interest of public health and safety, local authorities 
banned swimming in the Preston and Blackwood rtvers.4 1  
Fear of polio led to the curtailment of seaside and river based 
3 8 See Chapter 6 above. 
39 WA, 1 6  January 1956, p.2. Baths were operated at Crawley, Nedlands, 
Claremont, Mosman Bay, Bicton, Applecross and Como. 
40 WA, 23 March 1956, p. l .  
4 1  WA, 1 8  January 1956, p. l ;  WA, 24 January 1956, p. l .  
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activities throughout the state, along with other events that 
brought people together . The tenth annual log-chopping and 
swimming carnival at Manjimup was cancelled, as was a nurses' 
swimming carnival to be held in Crawley baths. 42 A Legacy camp, 
scheduled to be held at a new campsite at Busselton, was deferred 
until May and an inter-school camp for children from the North 
West, planned for Point Peron, was postponed. 43 The Barmaid's 
and Barmen's Union announced the cancellation of their annual 
picnic at Coogee beach while the Butchers, who on 20 February 
were to have relaxed together on the river at Keane's Point, 
Peppermint Grove, decided to forgo the picnic but not the day off 
work.44 
The fear of water born infection was put to a real test during a 
heat wave at the end of January. In eleven days maximum 
temperatures ranged between 110. 7 and 90 degrees Fahrenheit, 
while the average minimum was 63.2 degrees. Still no one dared 
swim in the Swan River. The WestAustralian published a graph of 
the heat wave temperatures and over it placed a photograph titled 
42 WA, 20 January 1956, p.2; WA, 24 January 1956, p. l .  
43 WA, 17 January 1956, p. l ;  19 January 1956, p. l ;  21 January 1956, p. l .  
44 WA, 1 February 1956, p. l .  
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"Como Beach Deserted". 
300 
Near a normally popular, but now 
deserted swimming spot, a small group sat by the river, in the 
shade of trees, trying to cool off as best they could.45 
The population's fear of swimming in the river affected the 
livelihood of those who ran businesses in the vicinity. A frustrated 
and economically threatened River Beach Shop Proprietors' 
Association fought the restrictions imposed on river swimming. 
The Association, which claimed that its members would never be 
able to recover the twenty thousand pounds in trade that had been 
lost as a result of the two recent epidemics, called for "a public 
examination into the polio cases reported this year to see if there 
were any river swimmers amongst them" -46 
Duncan Christie, President of the Association and lessee of 
Crawley Baths, highlighted the apparent contradiction in banning 
swimming while allowing children to attend picture theatres. To 
support his case he drew attention to differences in the opinions of 
experts and offered the view that the supposed link between 
45 WA, 1 February 1956, p.2. 
46 DN, 28 January 1956, p.2. Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Pam.lysts, p.37, In 
1937 the city of Melbourne estimated that £500,000 had been lost as a result of 
restricting children's attendance at cinemas and other forms of amusement. 
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swimming and faecal contamination was spurious.47 
30 1 
Christie 
pointed out that, in contrast to Snow, Dr Bazeley of the CSL held 
the view that "there is no reliable evidence yet shown that water, 
sewage, flies, or food played any important part in the 
transmittance of the polio virus" -48 When two experts could differ 
on such a fundamental point Christie believed the public should 
receive the benefit of the doubt, which for him meant that picture 
theatres should be closed and swimming baths left open. 
The ban was not lifted but the deputy Commissioner made a 
speech to the Association in which he raised the members' hopes, 
stating that it was unlikely the coming Spring would see a ban on 
swimming in the Swan river, due to the commencement of 
immunisation. Following the speech a deputation from the 
Association waited on the Minister for Health in order to clarify 
"future Government policy on river swimming".49 So certain was 
the Minister of the efficacy of Salk vaccine he replied that, in their 
position, he would be willing "to speculate on the future".50 
4 7 WA, 4 February 1956, p.4. 
48 WA, 4 February 1956, p.4. 
49 WA, 23 March 1956, p. l ;  DN, 28 January 1956, p.2. 
50 WA. 23 March 1956, p. l .  
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Although it seemed anomalous to some, picture theatres continued 
to function with children in attendance, just as they had during 
previous epidemics. This time Snow justified the practice on the 
basis of evidence, gathered from the royal tour, that polio was 
transmitted through faecal contamination rather than oral/nasal 
droplets. Contacts at cinemas "were not sufficiently close or 
prolonged" to present a risk he said, and children would be safe so 
long as they washed their hands on arriving home.5 1  
The growing publicity given to the faecal contamination theory, 
along with the residual belief that adults were less vulnerable to 
the polio virus than children, may account for the determination 
of the West Australian Cricket Association to proceed with its 
annual Country Week cricket carnival. Having sought advice from 
the Public Health Department, special arrangements were made to 
keep the toilets clean, and cricketers who manifested any 
symptoms of illness were to be advised not to play.52 
Early in March, the Commissioner cautiously greeted signs that 
5 1  WA. 20 January 1956, p.2. 
52 WA. 27 January 1956, p.2. 
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the epidemic was abating,53 but a month later, after four more 
cases had been reported during the Easter period,54 the public 
were warned not to relax their guard.55 Hopes were raised as plans 
were announced to "wage war on polio" 56 with the assistance of 
the special mobile immunisation clinics. Community spirits were 
boosted by the announcements that further help would soon be 
available in the form of the newly created Sabin oral vaccine, 
currently being tested in the United States of America. The public 
had little knowledge of Sabin at this stage, but the effectiveness of 
the Salk vaccine and its potential to rid the world of polio 
"altogether" was strongly championed in the press.57 
The 1956 epidemic had its share of tragic cases. In March a photo 
of a man in a wheel chair captioned "End of an Easy Life" headed 
the story of Rod Harrod, a bank officer who lost the use of his legs 
as the result of polio he contracted while working in Suva. The 
island paradise was one in which "the disease was unusual enough 
not to be diagnosed for several days" . 58 The implied criticism of 
53 WA, 8 March 1956, p.2; DN, 9 March 1956, p. l .  
54 DN, 4 April 1956, p. l .  
55 DN, 9 April 1956, p. l .  
56 WA, 9 March 1956, p. l .  
57 WA, 13 June 1956, p. l .  
58 DN. 7 March 1956. p 1 .  
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the "primitive medical conditions" of Suva were somewhat off-set 
by the fact that it was the well-to-do white westerner who had 
succumbed to polio. The Bank of New South Wales generously 
transported Rod and his family back to Perth where, after intensive 
therapy at the IDH, he was reported to be regaining the use of his 
muscles. 
The press continued to portray polio survivors in a heroic light, for 
example. in the report on Reno Cammarri, a seven year old boy 
from Waroona who was paralysed by polio in January. Four 
months later a feature article on Reno appeared in the Dally News 
which described how muscles in one of his legs, his neck and 
abdomen were affected. Reno had "fought back" against his 
paralysis and was now able to walk. Despite missing his large 
family Reno was reported to be "one of the most cheerful children 
in the Golden Age", and was "not even falling behind in his school 
work".59  
The good will towards others that was traditional in rural areas 
was eVident when in May the neighbours of Peter Bott, a farmer 
59  DN, 7 April 1956, p 2. 
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from the wheatbelt town of Meckertng who was confined to the 
IDH with polio, rallied to plant his crops. To complete the task 
tens of thousands of pounds worth of tractors and machinery were 
assembled from far and wide. Work done, the farmers left with the 
optimistic promise that, if necessary, a similar working bee would 
be organised to bring in the harvest.Bo 
Not so cheering was the news from the Great Southern town of 
Katanning. Vernon Smith, a married man in his early twenties, 
became the fourth member of his family to be infected with 
paralytic polio. He had the added distinction of being the first 
person to be placed in the Nuffield iron lung which had been 
installed at the local hospital in 1938 and had lain idle ever since. 
Vernon's father had died from polio two weeks earlier and his 
mother and brothers were hospitalised in the IDH when he himself 
took ill . 61 Vernon's mother requested immunisation for the 
remainder of her family, who received their injections at the 
Stirling Street Clinic, some months ahead of the scheduled visit of 
the mobile clinic to Katanning.62 Medical experts declared that no 
60 WA. 23 May 1956, p.3. 
61  WA. 12 June 1956, p. 1. 
62 Letter, Mrs E. D. Smith to Dr Thorbum, and reply. BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4. 
1242/55, pp.137.138. 
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comparable case was said to be known in Western Australia, 
although a set of twins had been infected with polio in 1954. 
Multiple infections were known in Western Australia, but were not 
always recognised by the doctorS.63 The Commissioner stated that 
four examples of multiple infections within the same family had 
been found in the United States of America and there had also 
been one such case in England. The worst known example was 
said to come from Australia where, in 1952, a family from Victoria 
reported five cases of paralytic poli0.64 
As on previous occasions members of the community offered their 
ideas concerning the the cause and cure for polio.65 The range of 
theories included those that were as bizarre, and sometimes as 
near to the truth, as those received in previous years, but in 1956 
there were fewer of them. 6 6  The news that a suitable vaccine had 
been found may have deflected some public interest away from 
speculation over causes of polio, but some offered their thoughts. 
A naturopath who lived in Victoria was said to have had a large 
63 WA, 'Big Weekend', 26 November 1994, p.2. An article, "Epidemic struck down 
four in family" , referred to three Jupp children from Geraldton, and a cousin 
from their extended family. Oral History Interviewee H reported three cases of 
polio in her family in 1946 but these were not recognised by the doctors at the 
time. 
64 WA, 12 June 1956, p.3. 
65 File: Poliomyelitis - Suggestions From the Public, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
44/56. 
66 DN, 1 February 1956, p.4. 
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measure of success in treating numerous diseases. He 
telegrammed the Commissioner with his cure for polio. 
Polio caused by chill between the shoulders. Certain things 
develop in the head first, causing headaches, discharge from 
the nose. Certain things go [ to] the back, hips and groin. 
When fully developed inside they paralyse the body. Formula 
- give the child boiled cabbage and all things inside will come 
out. Letter following by air mail.67  
A farmer from Salmon Gums, a relative of the Minister for Health, 
sent the opinion that his neighbours had shot several horses and 
the flies which had bred up as a consequence were sure to be the 
cause of polio.5s An old digger reported that when he was on a 
troop ship in 1916 the Medical Officer contained an outbreak of 
meningitis by ordering the men to gargle salt water.59 Others 
suggested that polio was caused by the tick virus in hens eggs, or 
fruit fly, 70 and milk did not escape entirely. A man wrote to 
convey the results of his wife's independent research which 
concluded that the cause of polio was the tall metal containers 
used to make milk shakes in cafes and milk bars. She argued they 
were not sterilised adequately and that it would have been better 
67 Telegram PK to Commissioner, 17 February 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
44/56, pp.1-2. The letter following included many laudatory testimonials to the 
naturopath's work. 
68 Letter AEN to Minister for Health, 27 January 1956, pp.24-26. 
69 Letter Digger to Commissioner, 27 January 1956, p.23. 
70 Letter SJ to Commissioner, 14 January 1956, pp.3-7. 
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to use disposable waxed paper containers. 1 1 Food was targetted in 
other forms. 
Regarding Poliomyelitis and its cause, may I suggest that it 
could be transmitted through the tomato, which most people 
eat raw and often from plant affected by wilts which is 
caused by a virus disease. I feel sure that your Department 
has already investigated this field, however little things are 
overlooked. 
I trust that you will accept this as merely a suggestion to 
help eradicate this crippling scourge from our community 
and would be glad if you would be good enough to reply at 
your convenience. 12 
Similar themes recurred in correspondence to the press where some 
writers linked their facts together in interesting ways. A 
correspondent from Midland Junction targetted one of the chief 
weapons used in the control of flies. 
I think the spraying of fruit and vegetables with DDT and 
similar sprays may have a bearing on the polio position. 
These sprays were a product of World War II. From this time 
onward there has been an upward trend in the number of 
cases. As the summer comes on, fruit, often sprayed with 
DDT appears, and if eaten unwashed, particularly by 
children, may readily have a paralytic effect on the muscles 
and stomach. Research from cold countries which do not 
7 1 Letter CB to MO, Perth, 14 January 1956, pp.3-7. 
72 Letter WHJ to Commissioner, Perth, 1 February 1956, p.30. 
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grow fruit which require these sprays would be interesting in 
comparison. 73 
The reply of a Public Health Department spokesperson was 
unequivocal, "One of the most explosive polio epidemics of all 
time occurred among the Eskimos of Canada's frozen tundra".74 
The handling of foodstuffs was always an area of controversy where 
the quest for better hygiene was challenged. I. J. Blotnicki of 
Subiaco wrote to point out that it was impossible for those who 
handled foodstuffs to keep their hands hygienically clean, but that 
improvements could be made by introducing the use of tongs, and 
more frequent hand-washing.75 
Frustration and bewilderment over some aspects of Public Health 
Department policies also emerged. During the first weeks of the 
epidemic Shackleton resident Agnes F. Bland wrote to ask what 
research into polio had been conducted in Western Australia in the 
past two years. She drew attention to a paper by the World Health 
Organisation which pointed out that polio epidemics were known 
73 DN. 1 February 1956, p.4. 
74 DN, 1 February 1956, p.4. Killalea, A. (1995). Scourge. pp.135-6. Summary of 
the worst epidemics. 
75 WA. 6 February 1956, p.4 . 
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to occur in "countries with a high standard of living, with all the 
best in hygiene". 76 Quoting the London Times which had reported 
that in countries where "filth, flies, absence of sanitation, over-
crowding and entire lack of hygiene prevailed, people developed 
resistance to the virus" , she questioned why the public were being 
urged to "become even cleaner and more hygienic" . 7 7  Since the 
cause of polio evidently did not lie amongst the "filth of under­
developed countries," where she believed "most other scourges of 
humanity" were to be found, she considered the public should 
demand that governments undertake more research to discover the 
real causes of polio and defeat the "fearful scourge". 78 
Jessie Richardson from Gnowangerup, a physiotherapist with 
fifteen years experience at the Children's Hospital in NSW, wrote 
to criticize the "casual way" she felt polio was treated in Western 
Australia. 79 In her experience even non-paralytic cases of polio 
were hospitalised at the IDH in New South Wales where they were 
kept in isolation for three weeks. All who attended them had to 
wear "caps masks and gowns", contact with other children in the 
76 WA. 30 January 1956, p.4. 
77 WA. 30 January 1956, p.4. 
78 WA. 30 January 1956, p.4. 
79 WA, 24 February 1956, p.4. 
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family was prevented, and parents could not visit during the first 
two weeks. Richardson observed that in Western Australia 
attitudes to isolation were far more casual. "Contacts still go to 
school and serve in shops - including food" she said, and "victims" 
of non-paralytic polio mixed freely in the community as soon as 
they felt well enough to get about. so She believed that the 
"common people" in Western Australia needed the protection of a 
much stricter policy of isolating polio sufferers and contacts. 
Richardson regarded the Public Health Department as at fault and 
the sting came in the tail of her letter when she wrote -
WA made a ludicrous spectacle of itself when the Queen was 
here with its ban on handshakes and the six feet keep-your­
distance rule which was not considered necessary in NSW 
and Victoria, which were also in the throes of a poliomyelitis 
epidemic while she was there.s 1 
Her anxiety about the lack of isolation between contacts in 1956 
may have been well founded, but her argument was undermined by 
the illogical criticism of the West Australian "keep-your-distance" 
rule enforced during the royal visit. 
By the end of March the 1956 polio epidemic had run its course, 
80 WA, 24 February 1956, p.4. 
8 1 WA. 24 February 1956, p.4. 
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and the immunisation campaign, which was scheduled to begin in 
July, had moved to centre stage in the attentions of both the 
community, and the Public Health Department. The number of 
reported infections declined from 65 in March to 23 in April and 16 
in May, after which there were only 9 more before the end of the 
year.82 One case of polio was reported in September and none in 
October and November. While the effects of immunisation were 
still building up, the virus was not in epidemic mode. 
By the end of December 225,166 doses of Salk vaccine had been 
administered in Western Australia.83 Despite the commencement 
of the troublesome period of school holidays, only one more 
reported infection was added to the list. The decline in the 
incidence of polio heralded a new era in which, thanks to the 
meticulous planning of the Public Health Department, Western 
Australia was to become permanently freed from the fear, the 
ravages, and the frustrations wrought by the polio virus. 
*** 
82 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.55. 
83 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.58, see Ch. 8 below. 
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Figure 22: Public Health 1 955, (1956) . Appendix VII, p.56, BL, 
614 .09 WES. 
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CHAP'J'ER 8: Immunisation: the war against polio 
The mass immunisation campaign, 1 which began in 1956, was 
represented in the press as the "anti-polio war". Snow, who had 
served in the British army, did not shrink from comparing the 
campaign to a military operation, with "an objective, a plan, 
logistics, reconnaissance, and even propaganda" .2 The day the first 
injections were given provided Snow with the perfect occasion to 
demonstrate his point. Looking much like airmen loading a 
bomber in preparation for a raid, he and the staff of one of the 
specially prepared mobile clinics were photographed filling the 
refrigerator with Salk vaccine, in readiness for the assault on the 
country districts.3 The "anti polio war" had begun. Photo 
opportunities over, the four mobile clinics left to commence 
I The subject of this chapter warrants further investigation that extends beyond 
the purpose of this thesis. I have explored how the people and the health 
authorities in WA responded to the mass immunisation campaign, but further 
work is possible to show the connections between this and the negotiations the 
Commonwealth entered into to secure supplies of the vaccine and supply it to 
the states. Detailed evidence is available in the following files which I have 
examined. held by the Australian Archives, Canberra. Poliomyelitis 
Immunisation Campaign, AA, A 463/17, 57 / 27, Poliomyelitis Immunisation 
Policy, AA. A4940 / I ,  C889, Interstate Committee on Poliomyelitis, AA, A 1658 / I ,  
617 /1/ 17, Poliomyelitis - general polio vaccine: policy, AA, A l 658/ l ,  259/1/ 10, 
Poliomyelitis Vaccine, AA. A4940/ 1. C l450, Salk vaccine manufacture, AA. 
A463/ l 7, 1957 / 25, Dr P.L. Bazeley. AA, A463/ l 7, 1957 / 26, Salk poliomyelitis 
vaccine - manufacture in Australia, AA, A463/ 17, 1957,25. A report is available 
by Bazeley, P.L. ( 1956). "Immunisation against poliomyelitis", MJA, 1, 20, 19 May, 
pp. 821-828. A general account can be found in Brogan, A.H. (1990). Committed 
To Saving Lives: a history of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, Melbourne: 
Hyland House. 
2 Snow, D.J.R. (198 1). Progress, p.70. 
3 WA, 2 July 1956, p.8 .  
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operations, two in the country, and two in the metropolitan area.4 
The Commonwealth Government agreed to provide the states with 
free Salk vaccine,5 and they had the responsibility of organising 
its distribution to the population according to agreed priorities, 
which included that children under fifteen years of age be 
immunised first. 
There were two features of the Western Australian immunisation 
campaign that reveal the dogged ingenuity of Snow. Mobile clinics 
were the first, and the development of a new type of syringe was 
the second. Mobile clinics were created from four caravans, three 
of which were purpose built, at a cost of one thousand pounds, 
and a fourth was created by modifying a van built earlier to 
transport respirator patients to Perth.6 The immunisation 
caravans, which were towed by two ton Bedford trucks, were 
modified versions of those already used by the school dental 
service. They were provided with running water, electrical power, 
4 WA. 2 July 1956, p.8; WA. 3 July 1956, p.6; Buxton, ( 1977). Pollomyelltts, p.80. 
The South Australian Government employed exactly the same strategy, and may 
have copied the design of WA's mobile clinics. 
5 Australian Health Information Service, ( 1965). Health ln Australia, p.9. Between 
1 965-65 the Australian government expenditure on polio vaccine amounted to 
£3,867,000. 
6 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.58. See Ch. 7 above. 
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sterilization facilities and refrigeration to preserve the potency of 
the vaccine. The refrigerators had to be run on batteries charged 
by small, petrol driven, generators because kerosene powered 
refrigeration were too unstable for the task. The Sydney City 
Council wrote to the Commissioner seeking information regarding 
the mobile units used in WA1 so that it could manufacture one for 
its own use, and the South Australian Health Department also 
employed mobile units in their campaign.a 
The second feature was the special arrangements made to provide 
the clinics with an adequate supply of sterilized syringes and 
needles. A separate needle was required for each child, and each 
syringe had the capacity for ten injections. After use both items 
were manually checked and cleaned before being sterilized, for a 
minimum of one hour, in dry heat of 160 degrees centigrade.g A 
chrome-copper syringe and needle carrier with the capacity to hold 
supplies for one hundred inoculations was invented and 
7 Letter, 10 October 1956, and reply 15 October 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
1242/5, pp.157-9. 
8 Memos, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 806/57, pp.44-48. 
9 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.58: See also photos. 
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manufactured for the campaign.1 0  The Commissioner, who sent 
the details of this innovation to Health Departments in other 
states, was congratulated on his initiative by Director of Public 
Health of New South Wales. 1 1  
In a move that coincided with the Government's plans for the 
mass immunisation campaign, it was announced that Snow, the 
43 year old Englishman, would celebrate his ninth year in 
Australia by being elevated from the position of Government 
Epidemiologist to the newly created role of Director of 
Epidemiology.1 2  Small reward for his thoroughgoing efforts in the 
"war against polio". 
The first injections of Salk vaccine administered publicly were 
given on 29 June 1956. 1 3 A schoolgirl from Wundowie, ten year 
old Beatrice Oldridge, wrote to the Daily News and requested that 
she be the first to be immunised with Salk. Her wish was granted 
and, like a true soldier, she and received her vaccination without 
1 O PubUc Health 1956, ( 1958 ). Appendix VII, p.58. The initial order was for 60 
carriers, 800 syringes and 16,000 needles. 
1 1  Letter, 24 Februaiy 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p.36. 
1 2  WA, 29 May 1956, p. l .  
13 WA, 30 June 1956, p.2. 
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flinching, in front of the admiring gaze of Snow and the 
Commissioner.14 In order to derive maximum benefit from the 
occasion a photograph of Beatrice, smiling at the needle in her 
arm, appeared on the front page of the Daily News alongside that 
of a seven year old country girl named Suzanne who, having 
suffered from polio as a baby, was reported to have just taken her 
first step. The Commissioner was also photographed immunising 
his son Robert and the Minister of Health's four "curly haired 
grand-children", who were included in the first batch. They too 
were reported to have received their vaccinations bravely; and they 
enjoyed the free toffees, purchased with a special grant from the 
Lotteries Commission, which were distributed to all vaccinees.15 
The reported reaction of children to the commencement of the 
immunisation campaign replicated the triumphant or heroic style 
that had characterised the stories of those who had suffered from 
polio itself. Four year old Mary Nulsen, grand-daughter of the 
Minister for Health, was declared that "it didn't hurt at all", 16 and 
when the first two mobile clinics began their work, rather than 
14 DN. 29 June 1956, p. l .  
15  WA, 30 June 1956, p.2. 
16 WA. 30 June 1 956, p.2. 
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showing fear or pain, the children were seen to take the Salk 
vaccine needles in their stride - "buoyed by the camaraderie of 
each other's presence, most of them treated the experience as a 
Joyous adventure" . 17 
Prominence was given to children of three American families, who 
had received their first two doses in the United States before 
moving to Perth and now became the first in Western Australia to 
be given their third injection to complete the course. One of the 
children, Dale Bautel, had been amongst the "polio pioneers", 
children who had taken part in Salk trials, in Michigan. 1 s Lest 
the public wonder at the American children receiving priority 
treatment, Snow used the moment to demonstrate an example for 
others to follow. He carefully explained the importance of having 
children immunised and completing the cycle of injections, and 
expressed the view that West Australian parents who had doubts 
about Salk vaccine would be reassured when they observed the 
confident approach adopted by the American mothers. 19 Above all, 
Snow claimed that the early vaccination of the American children 
17 WA. 3 July 1956, p.2. 
1 8 Smith J .S. ( 1990 ). Patenti.ng the Sun grew from her experience as a "polio 
pioneer". 
19 WA. 30 June 1956, p.2. 
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stood as a "small gesture of appreciation to the country 
responsible for the Salle Vaccine" .20  
I t  was part of the strategy of the campaign to show that things 
were progressing successfully and smoothly but, while there were 
only three of four accidents reported, such as when a needle broke 
in the arm of a child, the injections were often painful for the 
children who received them, and some parents were still suspicious 
that live virusnlight be present in Salk after all.2 1  
Nevertheless, during the first two months of the immunisation the 
consent rate22 was so high that the Commonwealth Serum 
Laboratories was requested to send an extra ten thousand doses of 
vaccine, which it agreed to do for one month only.23 Eventually 
the Public Health Department was able to record that its careful 
planning had produced the intended results. Between 2 July and 
31 December 1956 a total of 225,166 doses of Salk vaccine were 
administered in Western Australia, after which it was announced 
20  WA, 30 June 1956, p.2. 
2 1  File: Poliomyelitis Immunisation Campaign: Accidents, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/4, 1555/56. 
22 DN, 4 July 1956, p. l ;  5 July 1956, p. l .  By 4 July the 4600 children had 
received injections, 1000 more than planned. 
23 Telegram and reply, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4. 1242/55, pp.112-113. 
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that no untoward reactions had been recorded.24 By that time 
half of all West Australian children up to the age of fourteen had 
received their first two injections along with 4,936 who were 
between fifteen and nineteen years of age.25 A further 5,827 
special cases of persons over twenty years of age were also 
immunised. The plan was to complete the immunisation of all 
children by the end of 1957, after which the vaccine would be made 
available to other age groups in the community. 
The Public Health Department carefully monitored any reactions to 
the Salk vaccine. After 100,000 doses had been administered, 
Snow reported to the Director-General of Health that there had 
been no "notable" reactions, other than "a few rashes of transitory 
and bizarre type" , and provided notes on a case of severe and 
"unusual familial sensitivity to some component in Salk 
vaccine" .26 Snow suggested that any similar experiences should 
be gathered from around the states and shared so that the health 
authorities could learn from the experience of others. Perhaps he 
was sensitive to the possibility that there may be undiscovered 
24 Publlc Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.58. 
25 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.58. 
26 Letter, 17 October 1956, BL, ACC 2488, AN 120/25, 1623/56, p.2. 
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dangers to uncover. However the vigilance of the department was 
matched by the vigilance of the public, who readily reported any 
strange reactions experienced, in them or their children, following 
Salle injections, and just as readily sought financial compensation 
for any difficulties they experienced. 
Between October 1 956 and August 1 963 forty three cases of 
suspected reaction to Salk injections were reported to the Pu bile 
Health Department. Twelve were in children under ten years of age, 
one of whom was identified as having polio. The bullc of the cases, 
twenty three in all, were in adult members of the population. 
Slightly more of the sample reported problems after their third 
injection, the most common form of reaction being either rash or 
muscle pain, and sometimes vomiting and collapse.21 
Snow later circulated a report on neurological sequelae 
attributable to Salk Vaccine, and used for his study three adults, 
aged 50, 54, and 57, who had reported in this way.28 Not counted 
in the total of forty three cases mentioned are the figures from an 
27 File, Salle Vaccine Reactions, BL, ACC 2488, AN 120/25, 1623 /56. 
calculations my own. 
28 File, Salle Vaccine Reactions, BL, ACC 2488, AN 120/25, 1623 /56, pp. 141 -2. 
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additional report made by an office of the Public Works which 
noted that, out of its staff membership of 105, a high proportion of 
those who had the polio needle reported sick with the 'flu, whereas 
the proportion amongst those who did not receive vaccination was 
much smaller.29 Leaving the Public Works Department staff aside, 
the basic foundation of forty three reactions reported to 1963, does 
not amount to a very high rate of problems in the mass 
immunisation programme. Between 1956 and 1963 it appears that 
only one person could be construed as having contracted polio in 
the process of immunisation. 
Planning for the immunisation campaign commenced long before 
the mobile clinics first drove away. The provision of a suitable 
polio vaccine for Australia had been the concern of the federal 
Minister for Health since at least as early as 1952 . In November of 
that year Dr P. L. Bazeley of the CSL had been sent to Pittsburgh 
to work with Jonas Salk,30 the agreement being that when a 
reliable vaccine had been created, Bazeley would return and make 
29 File, Salle Vaccine Reactions, BL, ACC 2488, AN 120/25, 1623/56, p. 180. Of 
the total ( 105) 56 had injections and 25 were sick with flu. Of the 49 who did 
not have injections, only 7 had the flu. 
30 File - Poliomyelitis Vaccines, Statement to the Federal Parliament by Sir Earle 
Page, 28 April, 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 4 1 1  /55, p.26. 
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his knowledge available to enable its production in Australia. The 
Salk trials were carefully monitored by the CSL and, as 
developments progressed in Pittsburgh, preparations were made to 
provide the facilities, and the monkeys necessary to produce 
vaccine in Australia.3 1  
After Dr Francis of Ann Arbor announced, on 12 April 1955, that 
Salle gave 80% protection against paralytic polio and 60% against 
other types of the virus, the drug companies Parke, Davis and 
Company and Eli Lilly International Corporation expressed an 
interest in importing American manufactured Salle into Australia. 
The federal Minister for Health met first with representatives of 
these firms, 32 and then with the epidemiological committee of the 
NH&MRC, which suggested that 100,000 courses of vaccine per 
month be imported into Australia for six months, to cover the 
period until the CSL was in full production. At first it was 
thought that imported stocks would be used to give Australian 
children their first two injections, and by the time they were ready 
for their third, the CSL would be producing enough stock to cover 
3 1 Statement by Sir Earle Page, 28 April. 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4,  4 1 1 /55, 
p.26. 
32 Meeting held 22 April 1955, Statement to the Federal Parliament by Sir Earle 
Page, 28 April, 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 4 1 1 /55, p.25. 
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The NH&MRC understood the risks of using imported vaccine. The 
time lag between its manufacture and use, including the the 
possibility that the preservatives used may begin to break down, 
were factors which had to be considered. 33 Salk vaccine could be 
kept safely in bulk storage at 0-2 degrees centigrade for several 
weeks and when placed in ampoules for distribution it retained its 
potency for another month if kept at that temperature. There was 
the risk of lost potency if it was alternatively frozen and then 
thawed for use, 34 and if kept at room temperature potency fell to 
50% within forty eight hours.35 Therefore, once removed from cold 
storage and opened a vial of Salk vaccine had to be used as quickly 
as possible. The Western Australian Public Health Department 
used the .. Aero-Jablex" Ice Box to keep vaccine cold while being 
held for use, or transported over short distances.35 The need to 
maintain maximum levels of potency in the vaccine also meant 
33 Notes - NH&MRC Committee, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411 /55, p. 19. 
34 Letter, Snow to Town Councils, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/56, pp. 85-86. 
35 Letter, 17 January 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p. 27 
36 Letter,CPH to Agent General, London, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 692/64, pp. 1-
2, 5; and Snow to Bazeley, 19 January 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, 
p. 19. The plastic ice box, which had a capacity of one cubit foot, was 
manufactured in England and was recommended to Snow by the WA Red Cross 
Blood Transfusion Unit. Snow sent the information on to Bazeley in the hope 
that he might pass it on to Dr CE Cook for the information of other States. 
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that once the immunisation campaign had commenced its progress 
had to be carefully maintained to avoid wastage and risk to those 
inoculated. 
The Public Health Department had maintained a close watch on 
the development of Salk vaccine and collected reports of field trials 
from the United States of Amertca.37 The Commissioner was keen 
to have supplies of the vaccine as soon as possible and three days 
after the announcement by Dr Francis he urgently telegrammed 
the Sydney representatives of Eli Lilly and Co seeking the cost and 
availability of Salk.3s No import licenses had yet been granted to 
this company and the meeting to discuss the matter with Sir Earle 
Page, the federal Minister for Health, had not yet been held.39 
The Public Health Department also wrote to Parke, Davis and 
Company, Sydney, who indicated that they had been granted a 
limited temporary license to import small quantities of vaccine. 
Priced at £3/5/7 per 9 cc. vial the Parke, Davis vaccine would have 
37 File - Poliomyelitis Vaccines, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411/55, for example, 
report from Eli Lilly and Co, Indianapolis, unnumbered pages; pp. 1-8, Evaluation 
of field trial conducted by Dr Robert F Korns. 
38 Telegram, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 411 /55, p.10. 
39 Telegram, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411 /55, p.11. 
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cost in excess of £100,000 per 100,000 thousand doses, provided 
sufficient quantities could have been obtained.40 The Public 
Health Department showed some enterprise in attempting to gain 
vaccine for the children of Western Australia and while altruistic 
motives may have been paramount, there can be no doubt that it 
would have been a significant feather in Western Australia's cap if 
the plan had worked. 
Pressure was also brought to bear from other quarters. Members of 
the public, and in particular some Local Authorities, showed that 
they were excited over the success of Salk vaccine and keen to avail 
themselves of its saving power. The secretary of the Kalgoorlie 
Road Board wrote to the Commissioner 
As you are aware, much public interest has been aroused 
with the announcement of Dr Jonas Salk's Polio vaccine. 
My Board is very much alive to the advantages gamed by the 
-conducting of various immunisation clinics and . . .  I was 
directed to approach your Department and request that the 
name of the Kalgoorlie Road Board be recorded as a Local 
Authority requiring this vaccine when it becomes available.4 1 
40 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411/55, p. 14, calculations by Snow. 
4 1  Letter, Kalgoorlie Road Board to CPH. 22 April 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
411/55, p. 12. 
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Public receptivity to Salk was high but further reflection on the 
question of the safety of imported vaccine,42 coupled with 
controversy over the infamous "Cutter" incident, led the 
epidemiological committee of the NH&MRC to reconsider the plan 
to utilise American vaccine. The "Cutter" incident was crucial to 
this decision. 
During an American Salk trial held in 1954 live virus was found to 
be present in vaccine manufactured by the Cutter Laboratories of 
Berkeley, California.43 The vaccine was hurriedly withdrawn but 
the mistake resulted in the infection of 204 children, three 
quarters of whom became paralysed and eleven died.44 The 
incident seriously undermined public confidence in the use of Salk 
both in America and Australia. In May 1955 a meeting of the 
public health committee of the NH&MRC resolved that 
No vaccine should be permitted to be imported into Australia 
by any agency unless it complies with standards acceptable 
42 The question of the safety of Salle was not the only concern. Immunisation 
against Diphtheria and Whooping Cough had been suspended during epidemics 
of polio, especially since, in the 1 950s, a Victorian doctor had found a link 
between them and the incidence of polio. The Public Health Department carefully 
monitored this issue from 1950. See Poliomyelitis and Injections, ACC 2849, AN 
1 20/26, 1 273/63, pp. 3, 9, 22-26, 3 1 -32. 
43 Gould, T. ( 1995). A Summer Plague, pp. 153- 157. The Kolmer/Brodie debacle of 
the mid 1930s was similar to this incident. 
44 Paul, J.R. ( 197 1). History, p. 437. A mortality rate of 5%. 
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to the Commonwealth Department of Health.45 
The subject was again discussed at length on 22 July,46 and in 
September, with the result that the committee reversed the 
decision to import import Salk vaccine manufactured by American 
drug companies and recommended that the Commonwealth 
produce its own.4 7 
Progress with the manufacture of Salk vaccine outside America was 
followed with interest, and pressure had been brought to bear on 
health authorities in Australia to follow suit. 48 A motivating 
factor was the knowledge that Canada had used locally 
manufactured Salk vaccine without any sign of a mishap, and a 
similar story had emerged with respect to Denmark and South 
Africa. The Public Health Department had received a lengthy report 
on the Canadian immunisation campaign which included a section 
titled "Free Enterprise Until It Hurts". Critical of the American 
approach to public health it concluded with the statement -
45 Report, May 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411/ 55, p.80. 
46 Minutes, NH& MRC, May 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 411 / 55, pp.58-62. 
47 Letter, Health Department to BMA, 25 October 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/ 4, 1242/55, pp.26-28. 
48 Hansard, Vol 140. New Series, 1954, Vol 2, p.984, and Vol 3, p.3695, BL, 
328.9412. WES. 
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The introduction of anything so important as a new polio 
vaccine amounts to a national emergency and calls for some 
form of national control.49 
The question of quality control became a priority concern in 
Australian public health and the fortieth session of the NH&MRC 
Council, which met in Melbourne in November 1955 resolved that -
The Council considers the prevention of Poliomyelitis to be a 
public health problem of high importance. The use of Salle 
vaccine in Canada and other countries has demonstrated 
that the vaccine, when prepared under strict supervision and 
scientiflc control, is a safe and effective prophylactic.50 
Financial and safety considerations aside, the decision to 
manufacture Salle vaccine in Australia was made easier by the fact 
that during World War II the power of the federal government to 
intervene in the social life of the community life had increased 
stgniflcantly, particularly with respect to public health and welfare. 
By the mid 1950s Australians had come expect that their 
government would provide them with just such a safety net. 
49 Report, 14 July 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411/55, p.39. 
50 Letter, CPH to BMA. 25 October 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, 
p.27. 
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Prime Minister Menzies wrote to all state premiers with the news 
that the Commonwealth would produce Salle vaccine at the CSL. 
He advised that, commencing in June 1956, the CSL would 
produce 440,000 doses of Salle vaccine each month which would be 
distributed to the states pro-rata on the basis of population.51  It 
was calculated that every four weeks, until immunisation was 
completed, Western Australia would receive an instalment 30,000 
doses of vaccine.52 
The Commonwealth made Salk vaccine available free of charge for 
voluntary immunisation programmes provided the States accepted 
responsibility for administration of the campaign, agreed to keep 
sufficient records to enable adequate surveillance and accurate 
analysis of results, and observed the vaccination priorities 
established by the NH&MRC. 53 It was agreed that, apart from the 
51  Letter, RG Menzies to ARG Hawke, 6 September 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 
120/4, 4 1 1 /55, p.69; Reply, l O October 1955, p.78; Letter, NSW Public Health 
Department to BMA, 25 October 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242 /55, p.28. 
52 Public Health 1955, (1956). Appendix VII, p.53; WA, 25 February 1956, p. 10; 
Press Statement. Federal Minister for Health, 12  June 1956, BL, ACC 1003. AN 
120/ 4, 1242/55, p.97. The remainder of the allocations were - NSW, 75,000, 
Victoria 26,000, Queensland, 30,000, South Australia, 18,000, Tasmania 18,000, 
ACT, 1 ,500, NT, 680. 
53 Statement by Sir Earle Page, 30 August 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
4 1 1 /55, p.7 1 .  
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reservation of some vaccine for pregnant women, the first priority 
was to immunise children aged fourteen and under .54 
Sir Earle Page was emphatic that thorough checks would be made 
to ensure that no live virus was released to the public, and 
promised that, if necessary, an attenuated strain would be used.55 
Surveillance was undertaken by the federal government which 
established a vaccination surveillance committee. 56 Doctors in all 
states were required to complete a report for every suspected, or 
actual case, of polio, and to forward specimens of blood and faeces 
from every case of polio that occurred in a vaccinated subject.57 
Once the terms and conditions of the Commonwealth's offer had 
been accepted the Commissioner sought approval for the 
expenditure necessary to establish the administrative structures to 
54  DN, 4 July 1956, p. l .  This policy was adhered to in Western Australia. 
55 Statement by Sir Earle Page, 30 August 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4. 
41 1/55, p.71. 
56 Vaccination Surveillance Committee, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/22, 983/56, pp. 
9, 13, 84. The Commonwealth convened a meeting of the heads of Virus 
Reference Laboratories on 14 July 1956. The meeting set the standards for 
collection and transmission of specimens. alternative diagnostic laboratories, the 
extension of diagnostic facilities. and recommended that the NH&MRC provide 
funds for training technicians in the special methods required for cultivating 
viruses. Present were FG Morgan and PL Bazeley of the CSL, Sir Macfarlane 
Burnet, Walter and Ellza Hall Institute, Melbourne, N Stanley, Prince Hen:ry 
Hospital, Sydney, P Warner, Institute of Medical and Veterinruy Research, 
Adelaide, A Ferris, Children's Hospital, Melbourne, and C E Cook. 
57 Circular 438, 19 July 1956, BL. ACC 1736, AN 120/ 122, 983/56, p.13; 
Telegram 27 June 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p. I O la. 
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support the campaign, and to construct four mobile clinicS.58 The 
anticipated cost was £25,000 in the first year, and £15,000 in the 
years to follow. All decisions, including the choice to use 
Australian Salk vaccine, were placed before SPAC for its approval. 
Careful detailed planning followed.59 The main components of the 
effort were a poliomyelitis immunisation unit, within the Public 
Health Department, that maintained a central registry. The unit 
was established in offices developed on the site of a former infant 
health centre at 11 Stirling Street, Perth.60 The campaign team 
consisted of four doctors, four driver-attendants, two clerks, one 
typist and two laboratory assistants. 6 1 Each mobile clinic was 
staffed by a doctor, a medical orderly and, in the metropolitan 
area, two Red Cross volunteer workers assisted. Supplementary 
static clinics were established in selected local government areas.62 
58 Letter, CPH to Minister for Health, 25 October 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
1242/55, p.2. 
59 For example see letters in file, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/55, 2/ 12/55, 
pp.6-7; p.8, p.16; p.20; pp. 44-45; p.53; File - Correspondence re Static Clinics, 
BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 393/56. 
60 Letter Undersecretary for Health to Secretary, Railways Commission, 24 
November 1955, BL. ACC 2488, AN 120/26, 354/56, pp.1-2,5; Secretary of 
Railways to CPH, 14 April 1960, p.90. The property was owned by the Railway 
Commission. 
6 lPublic Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.55. 
62 Letter, CPH to Minister For Health, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/55, pp.6-7; 
Letter, Snow to Red Cross Society, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/56, p.53. 
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The Public Health Department received widespread support from 
public bodies and organisations, including the departments of 
Education and Infant Health, Local Health Authorities, Public 
Works, the Red Cross, and Parents and Citizens' associationS.63 
In addition the Lotteries Commission donated funds to provide an 
incentive in the form of sweets that were given to the children at 
the time of their injections. 
In order to service all city and countiy children aged fourteen years 
and under as quickly as possible it was planned to dispense the 
injections using a combination of mobile and static clinicS .64 
Western Australia was divided into twenty four zones, twelve in the 
metropolitan area containing 6000 school children, and twelve 
containing 3000 children in the countiy districts. On the basis of 
delivering 300 injections each day in the city and 1 50 each day in 
the countiy, it was calculated that by the end of 1 956 half of the 
state's children would have received two of the necessaiy three 
doseS,65 a target that was in fact achieved. 66 Although some 
63 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.58. 
64 Public Health 1 955, ( 1956). Appendix VII. p.55. 
6 5 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.55. 
66 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.58. 
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children waited ten months for their first injection, all received two 
of the required three doses within twelve months. 67 The exception 
to the rule was the north west which, because of its remoteness, 
formed a zone of its own where the resident District Medical 
Officers, were made responsible for administering the vaccine, at 
this stage the only local doctors empowered to do s0.68 
As the plans for the mass immunisation campaign evolved they 
were regularly featured in the press.59 Pictures of the special 
mobile clinics were published under the heading "To Wage War on 
Polio", 70 and a photo of the immunisation consent card was 
accompanied by an explanation for its use. 7 1  
The question of the safety of Salk vaccine manufactured in 
Australia continued to dog the Public Health Department. The 
public was reassured of the safety of Salk with word from the 
experts and images of science at work. A white coated laboratory 
67 Publlc Health 1955, (1956). Appendix VII, p.56. 
68 Publlc Health 1 955, (1956). Appendix VII, p.56; WA, 16 June 1956, p. l ;  Letters 
CPH to Town Clerks, and District Medical Officers of Carnarvon, Broome, Derby, 
Port Hedland, Roeboume, Wyndham, Onslow, Halls Creek, Marble Bar, Shark 
Bay and Nullagtne, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, pp. l -2; Note attached to 
p.26. Snow calculated that there were 2,525 people in the North West in need of 
vaccination. 
69 WA, 7 May 1956, p. l .  
70 WA, 9 March 1956, p. l .  
7 1  WA, 5 April 1956, p.10. 
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technician was pictured engaged in manufacturing Salk vaccine.72 
Alongside there picture appeared a report which stated that the 
federal council of the British Medical Association (BMA), which 
relied heavily on Bazeley's advice, had declared Salk "safe" , and 
was strongly supportive of the immunisation campaign. Bazeley 
stated that Salk manufactured in Australia would be subjected to 
a second check conducted by a panel of independent experts. This 
news was publicised early in 1 956 because many parents 
remembered the "Cutter" incident and some were yet to be 
convinced of the safety of immunisation. The Commissioner, who 
was keen to highlight the beneficial effects of Salk rather than the 
risks, repeated the assurance that Australian Salk vaccine would 
be tested "even more rigidly" than in Canada and the United States 
of America.73 From America Sir Macfarlane Burnet, Director of 
the Melbourne based Walter and Eliza Hall Institute, and one of 
those involved in the decision to produce Salk locally, stated that 
it would be manufactured correctly and properly tested.74 
An element of doubt continued to lurk in the popular mind and, 
72 DN, 2 March 1956, p. l .  
73 WA, 1 March 1956, p.2. 
74 WA, 5 April 1956, p. 10. 
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despite such eminent reassurance, any form of questioning became 
disturbing to professionals and public alike. Truth published an 
article in which seven West German doctors were claimed to have 
said that the children of American service families immunised in 
Frankfurt had become polio carriers. Fears of "the greatest 
catastrophe in the history of preventative medicine" had the 
Commissioner scurrying to cable Bonn seeking verification from 
the health authorities. 75 The reply indicated that although the 
report was garbled, the team of doctors, whose opinion was not 
shared by "any German Public Medical Authorities", did have some 
valid criticisms of American Salk. 76 
Fears of another more insidious kind surfaced. In a letter to the 
CPH the federal Director-General of Public Health voiced the 
concern, raised by the Victorian Consultative Council, that 
immunising migrants on their arrival in Australia should be a 
priority. The Commissioner replied forthrightly that this was 
"neither necessary on epidemiological grounds nor desirable for 
other reasons" , and added -
75 Cablegram, 17 April 1956, BL, ACC I003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p. 105. 
76 Cablegram, 19 April 1956, BL, ACC I003, AN 120/  4, 1242/55, p.104. 
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The views and the evidence which lead [them] to make this 
suggestion are not know to us, but one assumes that the 
main reason for the proposal is a suspicion that migrants 
are at present responsible for the the introduction of virus 
strains to which the Australian community is 
unaccustomed, and that prompt immunisation of migrants 
would neutralise this suspected hazard. Strong evidence 
would have to be brought forward before this can be 
accepted.11 
Any existing discrimination towards migrants would be 
exacerbated by allowing them to have their injections ahead of 
"long standing residents" , especially if the latter had a lengthy wait 
before they could be immunised. 
Several other safety issues were dealt with by the Public Health 
Department during the campaign . The question of adequate 
protection through hygiene, the effect of competing immunisation, 
and in relation to the immunisation and indemnification of staff. 
The need to maintain the highest standards of hygiene were 
obvious. All items used in the immunisation campaign, whether 
77 Letter, CPH to DGH, 18  September 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/55, 
p. 127. 
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to give injections or preserve the potency of the vaccine, were 
meticulously tested and checked to ensure their reliability. 
Syringes were sterilized in a dry heat for one hour at a heat of 160 
degrees centigrade, a thorough practice, but one that, in view of 
the importance of the matter, was not regarded as "over-
cautious".78 
Public confidence in the campaign would have been undermined 
had there been the slightest hint of any risk to the children, or 
ineffectiveness in the administration of the vaccine. The 
possibility that antigenic interference from other vaccines might 
reduce the effect of Salk vaccine led to the precautionary measure 
of recommending that other injections, such as for diphtheria and 
tetanus, be suspended for four weeks each side of immunisation 
against polio.79 
Staff involved directly, and indirectly, in the campaign were 
amongst the first adults to be immunised Registered Nurses and 
trainees working in hospitals, and young doctors with families, 
78 Letter, 24 February 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p.36. 
79 Letter, 18 July 1956, DJR Snow to PL Bazeley, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 
1242/55. p. 123. 
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especially those in general practice, were immunised; a decision 
that required an estimated 4,500 extra doses of vaccine. 80 The 
local branch of the BMA wrote with a question concerning the 
liability of staff who administered the vaccine, to which the 
Commissioner replied that under Section 365 of the Health Act, 
doctors would not be held personally responsible for any liability 
that arose as a result of polio immunisation.8 1 
A first principle of the campaign was that immunisation was 
provided on a voluntary basis which required parents to request 
vaccination for their children using the consent card mentioned 
above. The Public Health Department aimed to achieve the 
highest possible rate of immunisation and made it clear that it did 
not want to cope with large numbers of stragglers. The 
Commissioner warned parents against adopting a "wait and see" 
attitude,82 and ensured the maximum degree of surveillance and 
control by denying medical practitioners access to the vaccine until 
80 Letter, CPH to Director General of Health, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, 
p. 1 14. There were estimated to be 2,300 registered nurses, 1,200 students, and 
600 practising doctors in WA at that time, plus there families, each of which 
would require two doses of vaccine within a few weeks. Staff in the Health 
Department itself, and the Treasury, were also provided with polio immunisation, 
see Memo, 1 November 1957, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 95 1/57, p.75. 
8 1  Letter, 1 1  June 1957, CPH to BMA, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 672/56, p.25. 
82 WA, 16 June 1956, p. l .  
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the immunisation campaign was completed. This, coupled with 
the dual constraints imposed by the size of the monthly quota of 
Salk vaccine supplied to Western Australia, and the plan for 
delivering it to the community, meant that those who did not 
attend the clinic when it visited their district faced the daunting 
prospect of having to wait eighteen months to receive their 
injections. The strategy also meant that a child who commenced 
having injections after others had begun would find it difficult to 
complete the cycle. 
It was a deliberate part of the Public Health Department's strategy 
to educate the community regarding the efficacy of Salk vaccine 
and to motivate parents to consent to the immunisation of their 
children. The Health Education Council was enlisted in support, 
press releases were produced, radio broadcasts were made and 
addresses were given, particularly to parents and citizens groups. 
The achievement of an acceptance rate of 97% amongst parents of 
school children was attributed to the popularity of these talkS,83 
but publicity and education was not the only motivating factor. 
The warning that stragglers would have to wait, together with the 
83 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.55. 
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restriction of the vaccine to the departmental outlets, created a 
'narrow gate' through which some will have been herded by a long 
standing fear of the polio virus. In 1956 the departmental policy of 
operating by persuasion and recommendation had been extended 
by decisions which had the effect of directing and con trolling the 
community response, while still allowing freedom of choice. 
In April, eight weeks before the before the commencement of the 
immunisation campaign, the Dally News published a series of 
articles by Lloyd Marshall which aimed to educate and inform the 
public concerning the history of Salk vaccine the benefits of its 
use. The first of these traced the history of polio and the second 
featured a magnified picture of the polio virus alongside another 
photo of crates of Salk vaccine. "The answer to polio prevention is 
now in our hands"84 it began, and continued to explain the variety 
and character of the different polio viruses, and the means by 
which infection was passed on and took hold in the body. 
Emphasis was given to the faecal contamination theory and the 
importance of hand hygiene. The third article, which detailed the 
84 DN, 25 April 1956, p.5. 
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search for a vaccine,85 first explained how gamma globulin was 
made and why its limitations made a more effective prophylactic 
vaccine necessary. It told of the first stages of research and 
discove:iy by Enders, upon whose work Salk had later successfully 
built and whose vaccine, once accepted by the NFIP, was tested on 
hundreds of thousands of children in the United States of America. 
The failure of the Cutter vaccine was a blemish on the triumph of 
Salk that was not easily erased. The fourth article, headed "One 
Terrible Mistake - and people began to have their doubts" , 
attempted to deal with the damage it had caused to public 
confldence.86 It was freely acknowledged that some resistance to 
immunisation had developed, as revealed by the results of a poll 
taken in Western Australia in which 56% of those asked favoured 
inoculation, 26% were against, and 1 9% were undecided. 87 
Possibly because of this level of skepticism this article attempted 
to clarify the matter by detailing the investigation that had 
resulted from the Cutter outbreak, and the faults in the 
. manufacturing process that were identified and corrected. Federal 
85 DN, 26 April 1956, p.5. 
86 DN, 27 April 1956, p.5. 
87 DN, 27 April 1956, p.5. 
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intervention by the United States government resulted in the 
application of stricter controls, with the result that confidence in 
Salk was restored in forty six of the forty eight American states. 
The author admitted that such setbacks had to be expected in the 
evolution of medical science, and that doubts had been cast on the 
efficacy of immunisation, but concluded that "it is undeniably 
cruel to say so, but it has also been of immeasurable value".88 
Australians did gain from not being the first to receive Salk 
vaccine. As a result of the Cutter incident, vaccine manufactured 
at the CSL was a "precision product", like that developed in 
Canada by the Connaught laboratories of Toronto, and in 
Denmark, where no children had suffered from "post-inoculation 
paralysis" -89 
The story quintessentially expressed Australia in the 1950s, 
implying that vaccine manufactured at one federally controlled 
laboratory would be regarded as safer than that created in the "free 
enterprise" system in which quality control was more difficult to 
maintain. Public confidence in Salk vaccine was the issue at stake 
88 DN, 27 April 1956, p.5. 
89 DN, 27 April 1956, p.5. 
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and everything was done to ensure that this was kept at the 
highest level. The series of articles concluded with the reported 
comments from nine prominent parents, mostly wives of 
community leaders and mothers of young families, who all gave 
their seal of approval to the immunisation of their children against 
polio.go 
The Public Health Department enlisted the support of many 
different sections of the community in the execution of its war 
against polio. It negotiated the use of the Perth City Council's 
Beaufort Street diphtheria clinic to serve as one of its static clinics 
and seconded Dr A.P. Davis, a medical officer from the Perth City 
Council, to assist with the campaign. Stationary immunisation 
clinics, at which appointments were required, were established at 
Fremantle and Princess Margaret Hospitals, the Perth 
immunisation centre, and in the suburbs of Maylands, Mt Lawley, 
Osborne Park, Scarborough, Midland Junction and South Perth. 91  
90 DN, 28 April 1956, p.5.They were, Mrs Charles Court wife of a politician, Mrs A 
Knight, member of the Kindergarten Union, Mrs Fred Chaney, wife of the MHR for 
Perth, Mrs I M Dickinson, mother of four.Mrs R H Leach, Mother's Union, Mrs 
Ross Smith, wife of a Psychologist, Em Henfry, football coach, Mr R E Halliday, 
National Fitness Council, Mrs M Ellis, Parent's and Citizens's Federation. 
91  WA. 20 June 1956, p.3; Letter, CPH to Town Clerks, BL, ,  ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 
593/56, p. l .  
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Infant Health facilities at Albany, Bunbury, Collie, Geraldton and 
Kalgoorlie were also enlisted for this purpose and, in order to gatn 
the full support of the relevant local government authorities for 
the duration of the campaign, a subsidy of nine pence per 
innoculation was offered to defray expenses. 92 As the time for the 
campatgn to begin drew near, comprehensive information was once 
more made available to the public through the press.93 The 
assistance of the Red Cross was called for, to provide back-up 
support for the mobile clinics,94 while the Education Department 
was requested distribute the 200,000 consent cards, a task it 
believed it would not be able to undertake.95 
When it came to administering vaccine to Aboriginal communities, 
the paternalism of the day is clearly evident. In order to achieve 
parental consent the Commissioner requested that the 
Commissioner for Native Affairs (CNA), who under Section 8 of the 
Native Welfare Act was regarded as the legal guardian of all 
92 WA. 16 May 1956, p. l ;  Letter, CPH to Town Clerks. BL,, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 
593/56, pp.85-86. 
93 WA, 16 June 1956, p. l .  
94  Letter, Snow to Red Cross Society, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/56, p.53. 
Snow requested that two volunteers be available to assist on each mobile clinic. 
95 Memo, 20/3/56 Director of Education to CPH; Letter to all teachers 19/3/56, 
BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/56, p.50 and pp.44-45. 
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Aboriginal children, to authorise their vaccination. 95 The CNA 
sought advice from the Solicitor General and then gave "blanket" 
approval for immunisation to take place provided strict conditions 
were observed. In a letter to all field staff, officers in charge of 
institutions and mission superintendents the CNA requested 
a) that the injections be given by or under the supervision of 
a duly qualified medical practitioner; 
b) that the practitioner satisfies himself beforehand that 
each child who is to receive injections is sufficiently fit to 
receive them in the manner in which they are to be given; 
c) that the practitioner is informed of any known sickness 
from which the child is or appears to be suffering 
immediately prior to the giving of injections; and 
d) that any directions of the practitioner as to the care of 
the child before or after receiving the injection are 
observed.97 
He particularly requested that conditions c) and d) be strictly 
adhered to, in order to minimise the risk of a claim of damages "in 
the event of death or disablement resulting from the injections" .98 
While this request may have been routine, an extra level of 
96 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.2 1. 
97 Letter, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.21 .  
98 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.2 1. 
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protectiveness is evident here. suggesting a concern over Aboriginal 
people's vulnerability to the vaccine, despite the much touted 
safety of Australian Salk. 
The north west, designated a special region, was home to the 
largest proportion of Aboriginal children in the state and some 
controversy arose concerning their immunisation. The District 
Medical Officer for Derby, Dr L. J .  Holman, wrote to the 
Commissioner to suggest that the department deliver Salk vaccine 
to remote areas by aeroplane, and asked whether or not Aboriginal 
children were to be included in the immunisation programme. 
Holman was apprehensive and wrote 
I understand that the vaccine is an attenuated virus, and 
the community here has no contact with Polio, and therefore 
no indigent immunity, and could possibly develop polio from 
the vaccine. 9 9  
The Commissioner replied that the vaccine was not attenuated, 
but a killed virus, and was therefore regarded as quite safe, that all 
Aboriginal children under 15 should be immunised, and he agreed 
99 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 660/56, p.12 . 
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to investigate the chartering an aeroplane as suggested.1 oo The 
fear of an outbreak of polio amongst Aboriginal children was 
something which both Commissioners had to consider. The CPH 
wrote -
Although paralytic poliomyelitis is rare among natives, cases 
do occur, and with their improving standard of living 
incidents may be anticipated. 1 0 1  
At the commencement of  the immunisation campaign the 
Commissioner was reported as saying that provision had been 
made for Aboriginal children to receive Salk on an equal basis with 
non-Aboriginal children, 1 02 but a few months later an allegation 
was passed on to the Public Health Department, before it was 
made public, that during immunisation conducted at Fitzroy 
Crossing Aboriginal children from the United Aborigines Mission 
and pregnant Aboriginal women had been overlooked. 1 03 
100 Letter, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.10. 
1 0 1 Letter, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.20. This reflects the argument 
that the polio virus was endemic in 'primitive' communities and epidemic in 
'civilised' communities. 
1 02 DN, 29 June 1956, p.2. In the late 1960s, when Sabin oral vaccine became 
available, nurse Robin Miller, who became known as the "Sugarbtrd lady" , 
delivered it to remote communities by means of an aircraft. See Robin Miller 
( 1971 ). Flying Nurse, Rigby, Perth, Chapter 9, pp.49-54; Letters, BL. ACC 1736, AN 
120/22, 783/61, pp.250,254,256-7. 
1 03 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, unnumbered page. 
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Snow telegrammed Holman, who explained that while he was still 
calculating the number of vaccinations required for his region, he 
had received a supply of 300 doses, 150 short of his requirements. 
In order to cover the situation, while he awaited further supplies, 
he chose to temporarily exclude from immunisation those 
Aboriginal children and pregnant mothers who did not have 
Citizenship Rights. Holman claimed that he explained his 
predicament, and his rationale for dealing with it, in a letter to 
Snow, and had received a telegram which said "arrangements for 
polio immunisation satisfactory" . 1 04 Snow made a lengthy reply to 
Holman in which he denied there was any correspondence with his 
office which explained or approved the administration of vaccine to 
Abortginal people on the basis of citizenship rtghts.1 o5 The matter 
was soon sorted, and no negative publicity against the Public 
Health Department surfaced. 
A steady rate of immunisation had to be maintained to avoid the 
risk of deterioration in the monthly supply of vaccine. During 
term breaks, when vaccination of school aged children ceased, 
I 04 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 660 / 56, unnumbered page. 
1 05 Letter, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 660/56, unnumbered page. 
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extra efforts were made to immunise pre-school aged children 
through the stationacy clinics. For example, an offer to double the 
quantity of vaccine available to the Albany Kindergarten 
Association during December and January was accepted. 1 06 The 
choice of Albany was a politically astute decision. Polio was a 
summer disease and families from the surrounding region flocked 
to the coastal town for their holidays. The availability of extra 
vaccine would have assisted those who had missed injections at 
home, and possibly added to the sense of security felt during the 
vacation. 
Not so astute was a decision to defer the immunisation of children 
in the riverside suburbs of South Perth/Como in preference for 
those in coastal suburbs of Rockingham/Safety Bay. A swift 
reaction followed. The sitting federal and state members of 
parliament, Richard Cleaver MHR and W. Grayden MLA, raised the 
matter in their respective houses. 1 07 A deputation of angry 
citizens waited on the Minister for Health to object to the decision, 
1 06 Letter, 23 November 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/56, unnumbered 
page. 
1 07 Press clippings. 16 and 23 October 1956, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, 
p.160. 
CHAPTER 8: Immunisation 353 
and the South Perth Council wrote to the Minister. 1os 
Grayden entered the fray several times and drew on every angle 
possible to make his case. 109 South Perth and Como were also 
suburbs where many went to swim, in the river not the sea, which, 
he argued, n1ade them more wortl1y of proleciion than the seaside 
suburbs. The citizens, and the river beach traders who had 
suffered during past summers, did not intend to miss out once 
more. The Minister was ren1inded that the Como school had 
earlier given its full co-operaiion in conneciion with a series of 
serological tests conducted by Snow. 1 1  o Within a short time, in 
reply to the fmal question from Mr Grayden, the Minister replied 
that 
Sufficient additional vaccine has now been promised which 
will enable U1e entire South Perth zone to be dealt with 
before Christmas, as ortginally planned. 1 1  1 
Without loss to the coastal suburbs in question, during the 
1 08 Letter, 9 October 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, pp.164 and 24 
October 1956, p. 159. 
1 09 WA Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, ( 1956). Vol 1 .  p.1 1 78, Vol 2, 1956, pp. 
1254-55, and p.1567, BL, 328.9412. WES. 
1 1 0 Record of Deputation, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p. 1 64. 
1 1 1  Hansard., ( 1956). Vol 2. p.1567, BL, 328.9412.  WES; Letter, and Press 
stalement, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p.173, a11<l p. 187. 
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summer of 1956 /57 parents of children living near the river were 
spared the drudgery of having to find ways of amusing their 
offspring due to the loss of access to their main form of recreation. 
And the River Beach Shop Proprietors' Association capitalised on 
the advent of Salk vaccine to ensure they would have an 
opportunity to make good the losses they had sustained in past 
years. 
Other forms of resistance to, or questioning of, the plans for the 
immunisation campaign also met with a strong response from the 
Public Health Department. The municipality of Midland Junction, 
where the Department expected a lower rate of acceptance, 
provides a case in point. The Mayor, W.S. Doney, JP announced a 
public meeting at the Town Hall for 15 May 1956 at which Snow 
was scheduled to speak on the topic of "Salk Vaccine 
Immunisation". 1 1 2 In the three weeks prior to the lecture, and the 
week following, articles on the history of polio and the 
development of the Salk vaccine were published in the local paper, 
the Swan Express , ending with a challenge thrown out to parents, 
1 1 2 The Swan Express,  25 April 1956, p. l. 
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" . . . its up to you . " 1 1 3 The strategy was seen to have been successful. 
An acceptance rate of 93% was reported at Midland Junction high 
school, lower than the final state average of 97%, but higher "than 
had been expected". 1 1 4 
The publicity in the Swan Express, connected with Snow's public 
lecture at the Midland Junction town hall, differs from the series 
of articles that appeared in the Daily News in that it emphasised 
the safety of Salk but neglected any reference to the "Cutter" 
incident. 1 1 5 A better strategy may have been to have followed the 
example of the Daily News, because evidence suggests that some 
residents of Midland were worried and were advocating that 
parents refuse immunisation and resort to alternative forms of 
protection. 
In a speech at the Midland town hall Snow vigorously attacked 
those who opposed the use of Salk. In an intemperate outburst he 
advocated such people "should be gaoled", 1 1 6 and heaped ridicule 
1 1 3 SE , 2 May, 1956, p. l ;  9 May 1956, p. l ;  16 May 1956, p. l ,  and 23 May, 1956, 
p. 1. Original emphasis. 
1 1 4 WA, 3 July 1956, p.2. Vaccination continues to be a controversial topic ... 
1 15 SE , "How Good is Salk Vaccine?" 16 May 1 956, p. 1. 
1 1 6 WA, 17 May 1956, p.6. 
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on a "subversive organisation" which opposed the use of the 
vaccine and advocated that polio could be prevented through 
avoiding carbohydrates, eating carrots and washing out the bowels 
twice daily. 1 17 Snow was forced to admit what had not been 
included in his pre-lecture publicity, that more than 200 American 
children had indeed become infected through receiving the unsafe 
Cutter vaccine. However he stated in defense that, since then, 
20,000,000 people had been "successfully inoculated with Salk 
vaccine". 1 18 Midland Junction was the place where Snow focussed 
his attentions on resistance to immunisation but, as the rates of 
acceptance became known, he could count his talk there amongst 
his successes. 1 19 
Criticism suffered by the Public Health Department in 1948 and 
1954 had left its mark. During the 1956 publicity campaign care 
was taken to leave no opportunity for its policies to be publicly 
undermined. The department received prior advice of criticism 
about to appear in the press and those who raised their voices to 
dissent from the immunisation policy were confronted forthrightly. 
1 17 WA, 17 May 1956, p.6; Snow, D.J.R. (1981). Progress, p.75. Weird and 
wonderful ideas continued to have currency even at this stage. 
1 18 WA, 17 May 1956, p.6. 1 19 WA, 3 July 1956, p.2. 
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A combination of improved management and tighter control of 
public relations meant that, in proportion to earlier epidemics, 
1956 appeared to be almost trouble free and the voice of critics was 
muted. 
The effectiveness of the immunisation campaign can be partly 
gauged by the fact that the two cases of paralytic polio that 
occurred in the six months following the commencement of 
immunisation were in people who had not been immunised with 
Salk vaccine. 120 Between 1957 and 1966 the annual incidence 
declined from eight to nil, and did not surge upwards in 1961-62 as 
in other several states. Once the vaccination of children was 
complete, those over fifteen years of age, and the adult population 
were immunised. 12 1 In 1966 Sabin vaccine was introduced, and 
eventually both it and Salk were made available to General 
Practitioners. 122 The availability of Sabin greatly facilitated the 
continued immunisation of the scattered population of Western 
Australia, which suffered no more from the feared outbreaks of 
120 PubUc Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.58. 
12 1 BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 951 /57, pp.4- 119. 
122 Letter, Director General of Health to CPH, 30 July 1968, and reply, Snow to 
Oirector General of Health, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1449/60, pp.71-72. 
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polio. While Sabin must be credited with keeping polio under 
control, it was Salk vaccine that broke the cycle of epidemics that 
had so troubled the people and the health and medical experts in 
Western Australia, particularly between 1948 and 1956. The virus 
ceased to be a force to contend with, and the community relaxed 
and forgot about polio, except for those who had been affected by 
it. They continued to live with the consequences, and two or three 
decades later found themselves unexpectedly required to revisit 
their original experience of polio, as Post Polio Syndrome began to 
make its presence felt. 
*** 
CHAPTER 9: Memories of polio 
CHAPTER 9: Memories of polio 
"Patients loom small in medical history". I 
359 
Polio survivors' memories of life at the hands of the virus during 
the 1940s and 1950s may have remained out of sight but for the 
impact of Post Polio Syndrome. After the immunisation campaign 
removed the threat it posed, a silence fell around anything to do 
with polio. Since that time the official version of the story has 
been the one that has had currency. Polio is a subject that, 
outside a few biographical accounts, was only mentioned in 
connection with other subjects, such as the 1954 Royal tour, the 
history of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, or the life of 
leaders in the medical field such as Dame Jean Macnamara. Polio 
survivors helped maintain the silence . In their quest to 
rehabilitate themselves and live a normal life most concentrated 
on "mainstreaming" themselves, and were interested in leaving 
their painful memories behind. Their experiences have remained 
an inside story that has never been fully explored or investigated 
because it was rarely articulated. But memories of the polio years 
have unexpectedly and painfully been brought back into focus with 
the result that old issues long buried have had to be addressed, 
and a counter story is now emerging to challenge the official 
history.2 The memory of the polio years is now supplemented by 
knowledge of life since then, presenting a wealth of new material to 
1 Smith, F.B. ( 1979). The People's Health 1830-1 91 0, Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, p.9. 
2 Bearup. C. ( 1991 ). The outcomes qfthe Poliomyelitis Epidemics in South Australia: 
1912-1960, unpublished Honours Thesis, Flinders University, p. 18 .  
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consider in relation to that period of our histocy. The 1 950s have 
been regarded as a forgotten period in Australian histoiy, 3 and 
within that time frame the histocy of polio has remained deeply 
buried. 
A sample of two families and ten survivors were interviewed for this 
section of the thesis. Interviews were based on a set of questions 
formulated according to qualitative research principles as described 
by Denzin, and Lincoln.4 An outline of the questions can be found 
in the Appendix. The questions were aimed to explore the subject's 
memories of their polio experience, what they felt it did to their 
sense of self, and what type of reaction they were able to judge it 
brought out in those around them. All interviews were recorded on 
tape, transcribed and checked with the subjects. Release forms 
were obtained in every case and confidentiality has been 
maintained according to the ethical requirements of Edith Cowan 
University. Interviewees were offered psychological support if the 
process of remembering became painful. Only one subject reported 
a follow-on reaction to being interviewed. Interviewees were also 
asked how they were affected by the coming of PPS, and how they 
have been able to make sense of their experiences. 
The age at which this sample of survivors encountered polio ranged 
from four to twenty eight years of age. One of the families had a 
son who had polio at fourteen months while the boy in the other 
3 Murphy, J. and Smart, J. (eds.) (1997). "The Forgotten Fifties" Australian 
Historical Studies, Number 109: Melbourne. 
4 Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds. ) (1994). Handbook ofQualttattve Research, 
London: Sage Publications. Chapter 22 "Interviewing". 
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family had polio at eleven years. 5 Periods of hospitalisation varied 
from nil, through a few months to several years, and in one case 
was much longer. Three record being placed in a tank respirator, 
or "iron lung" , to recover lost respiratory capabilities. While the 
participants had vastly different experiences, some very strong 
common threads emerge from this material. This chapter explores 
key themes that emerged from the interviews, and draws heavily on 
the testimonies given. The addition of emphasis in quotations 
used is indicated in the footnotes and occasionally, for the sake of 
clarity in particular quotes, original emphasis is also indicated. 
Memories gathered forty or fifty years after the event naturally 
include the individual's reflections on their experience in the light 
of what has happened in their life since. The interpretation offered 
is the one they now choose to place on the past, rather than a 
factual account of the event. The questions posed by the 
interviewer form another part of the complex weave of influences 
that determine the way testimony is given and what is gathered 
from it. The process of editing and shaping the testimony for use 
as evidence affects the source, but hopefully does not violate its 
integrity, any more than is possible using written materials. The 
length of quotations used in this chapter is Justified on the basis 
that the aim has been to preserve, as much as possible, the full 
voice of the polio survivors interviewed. Through these testimonies 
another side of the polio story has emerged to present a counter 
narrative to the type of official history that has so often claimed 
the main ground. F.B Smith has written-
5 Interviews A and G. I myself had polio at two and a half years of age. 
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. . .  medical history is the history of social relations, with the 
patient as client, mostly but not always passive, and the 
medical practitioner as only another of the forces, albeit in 
many transactions the crucial one, shaping the well-being 
and ill-being of men and women during their seven ages. 
Within this complex set of relationships the historian is another 
active force in the transaction that has led to the writing of this 
history in which the experience of ordinary patten ts has not 
loomed large, and the perspectives of the medical experts has often 
dominated. Hopefully, from this in terraction, a new polio history 
may begin to emerge which is less clinical, more democratic, and a 
richer reflection of life as it has been lived by polio survivors. 
Ignorance and misdiagnosis 
The impression gained from examining the records of the Public 
Health Department, and newspaper reports, is that information 
about polio was disseminated widely. But a surprisingly high level 
of ignorance about polio seems to have persisted amongst members 
of the public and the medical profession alike. Survivors testify 
that they were not given accurate information concerning their 
illness, and in some cases were not told anything at all. 6 Despite 
the publicity, some subjects only became informed about polio 
after they were affected by it, 7 and it is evident that even amongst 
the medical profession uncertainty about polio continued right up 
6 Interview D. p.35; J, p.84. 
7 Interview I, p. 76. 
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to the commencement of immunisation.s Several subjects testify 
to receiving strong medical support, 9 but in other cases "the 
standard of treatment was abysmal" . 1 o The uncertainties evident 
in the history of polio are reflected in the accounts given by those 
interviewed. By the mid 1 950s the most commonly understood 
precaution was that of adequate hand hygiene, 1 1  but fear, 
superstition and ignorance remained. 1 2 While some regard the 
symptoms of polio as unreliable , one would expect to find that 
during the 1950s anyone who presented with a febrile illness would 
be tested for the disease, but it was not so . Medical professionals 
often disregarded or overlooked the presence these symptoms and 
implemented treatment for some other complaint. An unexpected 
result from these interviews has been the discovery that 50% - six 
cases - were at first misdiagnosed. 1 3  One survivor, who was 
himself a doctor, recounts -
I think there were many erroneous diagnoses. There's no 
test for poliomyelitis as we know tests for various illnesses 
today . . .  Lumbar puncture was done, but there was no 
specific test. The virus took too long to grow and be 
8 For example, Interview K. Two subjects (A, p.6, and F,) report receiving strong 
medical support, and it is clearly evident in the case of others. 
9 Interviews A, p.6; F; B. p. 17. 
1 O Interview B, p. 17. 
1 1 Interview F. p.54. 
1 2 Brogan, A.H. ( 1990). Committed to Saving Lives, p. 1 13. Brogan remembers that 
during the 1930s he was sent to the countiy to escaped the epidemic. When he 
returned home to Bendigo his father had enclosed the verandah where he slept 
with fly wire, so he could have the benefit of fresh air without the contamination 
of flies. And he kept germs at bay by wearing camphor in a small bag attached to 
his singlet. 
1 3  Interviews B. C, G, H, K, and L. In addition to these, the daughter of lnterview 
H, ( p. 70) was admitted to hospital with breathing difficulties, "stiff neck and high 
fever", not diagnosed as polio, and was operated on for removal of adenoids to 
clear her breathing. Her polio was revealed in adult life when she unexpectedly 
presented with PPS. In retrospect the symptoms seem clear but her records make 
no mention of polio. This case is not included in the count from this sample, 
nor is my own, if they were the result would be eight misdiagnoses out of 
fourteen, or 57%. 
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identified. But mind you the diagnosis was not, in 
general, exceedingly difficult to make providing one 
understood the characteristic features, and did some 
simple tests. 1 4  
It is not possible to argue that misdiagnosis was due to these six 
cases having occurred at an early stage of polio research. Apart 
from one case, which occurred in Western Australia in 1946 - prior 
to the first major epidemic of polio - the remainder were infected 
when polio was relatively well understood and accurate diagnosis 
could reasonably be expected. Of the five remaining, one had polio 
in 1953, three in 1954, and one in 1956. Of these only one - from 
1954 - was not a West Australian. Two believe they actually 
caught polio in hospital. 1 5  
Misdiagnosis resulted in a variety of responses ranging from the 
performance of a laminectomy, to relieve "cord compression" , 1 6 to 
insisting the patient walk, which exacerbated his paralysis, 1 7 to 
the removal of adenoids. 1 s The survivor quoted above recounted -
.. .if I hadn't had medical knowledge there's no chance I 
would have survived. ... I had to give instruction to my 
medical attendants. Even so, I couldn't stop them doing 
some of the harmful things that they insisted on doing, 
because I didn't know about them until after the event. 1 9 
Exposure to polio presented difficulties for those on both sides of 
the hospital bed. Patients with early symptoms of polio 
1 4  Interview B, p. 18. Emphasis added. 
1 5  Interviews B, and G. 
1 6 Interview B. 
1 7 Interview G, p.58. 
1 8 Interview C. 
1 9 Interview B, pp.23-4. 
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encountered the disbelief of doctors and medical staff, as they have 
in recent times when presenting with PPS. One doctor, an old 
school friend of the patient, was said to have, " . . .  reckoned I was 
putting on a bit of an act" .20 Another survivor presented herself at 
hospital late at night with "high fever and severe back pain" was 
prescribed APC and morphia, and instructed to "come back 
tomorrow if the pain hasn't gone" .2 1  The pain did not abate and 
the next day she returned. Although muscle loss had begun to 
occur x-rays were taken but revealed nothing. The x-ray 
technician said "You look as if you've got infantile paralysis to me, 
but its none of my business" .22  The doctor in charge visited for 
the first and final time ten days later and said "she can go home". 
The patient replied "Doctor, please, I have two little babies at 
home, I can't walk. Please look at my leg". Before he walked off 
the professional replied - "Grow up! And if you won't, get yourself 
some crutches" .23 The majority of survivors in this sample did not 
record experiencing such appalling and abusive treatment. Some 
doctors were alert to the symptoms of polio, or their colleagues 
were, and responded immediately with appropriate measures.24 
Hospitalisation and its effects 
Of the many stories of the ravages wrought by polio those involving 
20 InteIView K. 
2 1 InteIView H, p.64. 
2 2 Interview H, p. 71. 
2 3 InteIView H, p.64. 
24 Interviews A, p. l ;  F, p.49, and K. p.9 1. 
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psychological injury caused in early childhood are the most 
difficult to uncover. While psychological injury is evident amongst 
this sample, only one interviewee indicated receiving any form of 
psychological support at the time, or since .25 The evidence 
suggests that the health system was in general not attuned to the 
psychological and social effects of polio and hospitalisation. There 
is a silence around this field of enquiry amongst medical and 
health professionals, and polio survivors themselves. Attending to 
the immediate physical and technical needs of the patients may 
have been easier, and seemed more useful, than confronting the 
more nebulous psychological and social impact of polio on their 
lives. Extended periods in hospital isolated from family and 
friends during the formative years has left deflcits26 which have 
affected relationships , adding to the restriction physical 
limitations sometimes placed on social life.2 7 
The effect of child care and nursing practices in place prior to the 
1 950s contributed to the psychological wounding of polio 
survivors, as it did to any very young children who were isolated 
from their families for lengthy periods. Early in the twentieth 
century child-care policies were based on a belief that "firm, cold 
detachment" was the best approach, while the expert opinions of 
those such as the New Zealander, Truby King, and J.B. Watson 
combined to produce what we would now regard as an inhuman 
25 Interview A, p.6. 
26 Interview A. p.4; My own experience of being hospitalised and isolated from 
the family for seven months at the age of two and a half years is also relevant 
here, as is the experience of the "Stolen Generation" and the "orphans of the 
Empire" children, to name two other examples .. 
2 7 Being unable to dance, run and participate in sport is frequently recorded as a 
consequence of polio. This is discussed in more detail below. 
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environment for the nurture of children. J .B Watson advised 
regarding child care: 
Never hug or kiss them. Never let them sit on your lap. If 
you must, kiss them once on the forehead when they say 
good night. Shake hands with them in the morning. Give 
them a pat on the head if they have made an extremely good 
job of a difficult task. Tiy it out. In a week's time you will 
find how easy it is to be perfectly objective with your child 
and at the same time kindly. You will be ashamed of the 
mawkish, sentimental way you have been handling it.2 8  
Fred Davis, who from 1954-55 followed the histoiy of fourteen 
American polio survivors and their families, comments that 
exposure to hospital life loosened familial ties and introduced 
changes that made it difficult for a child to reintegrate with home 
life.29 He found hospital routine was deadening for children, and 
interactions with professionals inhumane and alienating, though 
this is true for more than just polio survivors. Humphries and 
Gordon report that, in British institutions for the disabled, often 
no pity was show to the child who cried.30 Evidence of 
punishment or other penalisation of children with polio is scarce, 
but it is known that hospital staff recorded whether their charges 
were "ciying" or happy.3 1 A phobia of "spoiling" children left 
2 8  Darbyshire, P. (1994). Living with a Sick Child in Hospital; the experiences of 
parents and nurses, London: Chapman and Hall, Quoted in Hardyment, (1983). 
p.175. While some changes to this approach can be found as early as 1927. real 
reform came much later in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
29 Davis. F. ( 1963). Passage Through Crtsis:polio victims and their families, Bobbs 
Merrill Co. Inc. NewYork. pp.120-123, p. 171. 
30 Humphries, S. and Gordon, P. ( 1 992). Out OJ Sight, p.91. They also report 
that sensory deprivation was common in institutions that housed blind and deaf 
children, and that it even extended to a ban on using sign language. leaving 
them totally alienated. 
3 1  Princess Margaret Hospital. "Examination Sheet for John Smith. Ward 2". 
January 1949, General Appearance "Crying boy of 2 1 /2, walking with stamping 
gatt". "Examination Sheet. for John Smith, Ward 2", 13 July 1949, "Temperature 
102.2. Child flushed but happy". "Examination sheet for John Smith, Ward 9", 
May 1950, "Crying boy of 4". Copies in the possession of the author. 
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distress uncomforted by hospital staff and parents alike.32 
Mary Westbrook's survey of the clinical literature reveals that, 
especially when it came to dealing with children, Australia medical 
professionals are particularly guilty of misjudging the level of 
psychological distress caused by having polio.3 3  She reports that 
the dominant medical myth was "contracting polio is not very 
upsetting for children; they soon get over any distress unless they 
are spoilt" .34 Many polio survivors report that it was taboo for 
them to be "spoilt" or "mollycoddled" - even by their parents. An 
interviewee reports her mother thought being "mollycoddled ... had 
led to the illness in fact".35 Parents and nursing and medical staff 
alike showed an aversion to normal expressions of tenderness and 
concern. Coupled with this was the dominance of the heroic or 
triumphant model for surviving distressing experiences which 
encouraged survivors to live as if they had no disability to contend 
with. 
Impetus for reform of child care policies came following the work of 
John Bowlby and James Robertson who studied the effects of 
maternal and familial deprivation, in connection with the war time 
evacuation of children. They also filmed the effects of 
hospitalisation on children and revealed the startling outcome to a 
32 Interview C. p.28; E, p.46; I. p.8 1 .  
33 Westbrook, M. ( 1 996). E arly Memories, p.5, see also Bearup, C .  ( 199 1) .  
Outcomes , p.56, "By today's standards . . .  little attention was paid to the psycho­
social needs of the polio patient . . .  " 
34 Westbrook, M. ( 1996). Early Memories , p.5. 
3 5  Interview C, p.28. My own experience was that, after long periods of 
hospitalisation I would return home. The tantrums that attended my 
reintroduction to family life were explained by the comment - "the nurses must 
have spoilt him". 
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The work of Bowlby and 
Robertson had its impact too late for many children hospitalised 
during the polio epidemics but it has contributed to a radical 
reshaping of the child care offered since. 
Jane S. Smith has written "a buried fear is hard to resurrect"37 
and among this sample there is evidence that memories of early 
experiences of hospitalisation are difficult to uncover. Factors 
may have influenced the silence include the severity of the 
experience, the age at which it took place, and the relationship of 
the survivor to the person reporting the effects. A nurse, who in 
1969 married a polio survivor who had been infected at eleven 
years of age, reports that her husband, now deceased, was quite 
reticent about his past even though his early experience of 
hospitalisation had proved almost fatal 
... trying to get any information about what happened when 
he actually had polio, or even his life before he had polio, 
was very difficult... I was trying to write something down for 
the children so that they would... know how Dad managed, 
but it was extremely difficult to get anything out of him, 
particularly about the time that he was at the "Golden 
Age",3 8  which, thinking back now, and having talked to a lot 
of other polio people, probably means that he didn't have a 
very good time there at all ... 
... one of the only things that he ever did talk about, was 
when he was left in the bath [ in] only a couple of inches of 
water. At that time he was completely paralysed, so he could 
Just lift his head up. He was lying on his tummy - the nurse 
36 Bowlby, J. (1953: 1990). Child Care And The Growth of Love, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, especially pp.21-52. Robertson, ( 1962: 1970). made two films, 
John: Nine Days in a Residential Nursery, and A Two-Year-Old Goes to Hospital, 
and SBS 1V Documentary, Are Mother's Really Necessary? Episodes 1-4. 
3 7 Smith, J. S. ( 1990 ). Patenting the Sun, p.24. 
38 The "Golden Age", formerly a hotel. was bought from the Swan Brewery and 
converted into an annexe to house patients from Princess Margaret Hospital 
who required polio after-care. 
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had gone to get a flannel - he couldn't keep his head up any 
longer and ... was drowning in water, and he was aware that 
he was drowning, and she . . .  came back and grabbed his head 
out again in time. And he spluttered and coughed and 
managed to get the water out of his mouth, and his 
comments have been that he's nearly died so many times 
that he was not afraid of dying, because he'd faced it so 
many times rtght from back then.39 
Very young children may have been the worst affected by 
hospitalisation - whether due to polio in themselves, or the long 
term removal of a parent affected by polio. And absence from home 
because of hospitalisation provoked gender issues in some families. 
In this sample alienation from one parent was sometimes 
countered by growth of relationship with the other, though no 
discernible pattern can be found. 40 But some recognise there was 
an impact arising from the separation. The parents of the 
youngest polio survivor in this sample report that after their 
fourteen month old son had been totally separated from them for a 
month, "he didn't know who we were - it was terrible" , 4 1 and that 
"the psychological effect . . . [ of polio on her son) was much worse 
than the physical effect". 42 The mother reports that she felt their 
son was twelve years old before he "really . . .  accepted me as his 
39 Interview G, p.60. 
40 Interview B, pp.22-23, a male, developed stronger mother attachment; C, p.30, 
a female, developed negative mother relationship but the father remained 
positive; d, p.36, retained positive relationships with both parents; E, p.46, had a 
positive mother relationship, but her siblings were resentful; F, p.51 ,  "couldn't 
have wished for better parents; I, pp.77-78, records that on return home, things 
continued as normal. In my own case my father was the primary carer, and if I 
experienced any depletion of the mother-bond, it was compensated for by a 
development of my paternal bond. 
4 1 Interview A, p.2. 
42 Interview A. p.14. 
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true mother" . 43 Relationships with other members of the family 
were also affected, but one month's absence at such a young age 
was sufficient to severely disrupt the maternal bond, at least in the 
mother's eyes. Such disruption was exacerbated by the hospital 
visiting policies in place at the time. The parents testify -
[Mother] We were allowed in those days to see him twice a 
week, Wednesday between five and six [pm], and Sunday 
between three and four [pm). That's all the time we were 
allowed to see him and because he was taken away from us 
for a month, we would go in and he didn't know who we 
were. But by the time we were about to leave he was 
beginning to recognise us and then we'd have to go, and he'd 
scream, and all the children would scream. 
[Father] I think that was the worst part of the whole system 
because ... he was living away when he was at the age where 
he was beginning to be part of a family, and understand that 
we were his parents and things like that. He didn't and I 
think that was a lot of the psychological problem that he 
had the rest of his life. It's only really. . .  in the last ten 
years, that he's really in a sense, knows that he's part of the 
family. I mean he's always known, well, we've told him and 
he knows, but the actual acceptance of it like a normal 
family would be. 44 
[ Mother) . . .  we have some terrible memories.. .  things he 
would do spontaneously . .. right up to in his twenties. He'd 
come home for ... the holidays . . .  and I'd be so worried about 
him driving this long distance across Australia on his own . . .  
I'd hear the car come up the driveway and I'd go to the door, 
like I would greet anybody - more so a family member - and 
I'd say [hello] and I'd go to kiss him. He'd tum his face rtght 
away - as though .. .  stabbing me in the back. .. Those were 
things I found very hard to handle. I couldn't understand 
why he would do that to me. 45 
The official versions of polio history in Western Australia pay no 
attention to these dimensions of the story, concentrating instead 
43 Interview A, p.4 . Original emphasis. 
44 Interview A. p.4. Original emphasis. 
45 Interview A. p.14. 
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on the medical victory, fear and the "conquest" of the virus, and 
the heroic triumph of selected survivors. Nor is there any evidence 
of psychological support being provided in the system of care and 
after-care. But the losses suffered by polio survivors and their 
families went far beyond those imposed by physical disablement 
and separation from home. 
Not all experiences of hospitalisation were negative. For those 
children old enough to be less vulnerable to the effects of familial 
loss, and whose level of mobility allowed them a degree of 
independence, periods of hospitalisation could be relatively happy 
times. There was a great deal of camaraderie and life-long 
friendships were sometimes formed with patients and staff.46 
After three years away in hospital, commencing at eleven years of 
age, a young woman returned home to find her friends had grown 
up. She made various personal gains during her absence, but her 
story reveals six levels of loss. Separation from family due to 
hospitalisation; the loss experienced when others were sent home; 
separation from the friends she had made during three years in 
hospital; the feeling of alienation from friends and family on her 
return home; loss of the ability to dance, and the perception that 
having a normal married and family life would be unreasonable. 
She recalls 
I was an only child and we lived on a farm, way out. I only 
saw my Dad when I was able to go home for that week at 
Christmas time, and Mum used to try to come up and visit 
46 Interviews I, J, and K record this. See also "Friendship heals polio scars", 
Busselton-Margaret River Times, April 1997. 
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me once during the year, so I. . .  saw her twice a year . 
. . .  I'd never been away from home before .. .  the doctor had 
said to me "Oh, you'll probably be home for your birthday" , 
but he didn't say it was going to be birthday three years 
along the road. [ I ]  went up to Princess Margaret... and 
didn't really know what was wrong with me until a lot of the 
kids came along and said "Oh, look this is my polio arm, and 
this is my polio leg, and which one is yours?" It suddenly 
struck me what was wrong with me . . .  
Then, after Princess Margaret, [ where] we had a teacher and 
used to do our schoolwork . . .  [ I ]  went to the Golden Age, 
which was the annex of Princess Margaret . . .  the older girls . .  
could. . .  walk around. . .  and help change the babies and . . .  
feed the little ones. It was just like one big happy family. 
We had our own classroom. I was quite happy there. 
Probably its not a very good thing to say, but you know if 
you have to be somewhere, it was a good place to be . 
. . .  [once] back home .. . you had to adjust from losing your 
big . . .  happy family . . .  and finding that all the kids . . .  I'd had 
[as] friends before I went had all grown up... They'd gone out 
to work and .. . all had their own group of friends . . .  You 
basically have to start all over again. 
It was. . .  like getting used to another family again . .. Quite 
difficult at fifteen.. . all the other kids were going to 
dances . . .  I used to try, but I'd fall over too often and look an 
idiot, so I gave up.47 
[ In hospital] there was a lot of not-so-happy times, especially 
when somebody would be getting a lot better, and leaving 
your friends behind, and you could see that that person was 
not getting better at all. And you . . .  had a . . .  feeling of guilt . . .  
because you . . .  could see that you were getting to a higher 
level and that other person just was staying put. Especially 
when they went home. . .  and you knew that they weren't 
going to get much better. You'd see them going off . . .  not 
being able to walk or anything, and you'd think "well, 
probably that's it" , because they didn't send people home 
unless they were sure that they weren't going to get any 
better. 
There was a lot of nice people up there. We were allowed to 
go out on a Sunday. Because I didn't live . . .  anywhere near . . .  
other people would take us home for the Sunday . . .  when 
they took their children. But a lot of the times weren't very 
4 7 Interview J, p.84-85. 
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happy, . . .  I think you're inclined to try to sort of forget those. 
[When I came home] I don't think it was ever the same as 
before I went, because it was . . .  so long between visits and 
with being away for so long, and being with other people, 
and seeing a whole different lifestyle, to come back to how it 
was, it didn't work that well . . . . you look forward to coming 
home; you look forward to the happy day when you're going 
to be there, but when you got there it wasn't what you 
expected. It really was completely different. 
[My parents had] got older and things .. .  weren't the same, 
and . . .  they were over protective. . .  [They would say] . .. "Oh 
no, I don't think you should go and do that" and "No! I 
don't really think that would be a good idea" . . .  rtght up 
until . . .  we were going to get married. Mum didn't think that 
marriage and family . . .  was a good lifestyle. She thought that 
maybe it's not the thing that you should be doing. Not that 
anybody ever took any notice . . .  48 
No, it wasn't the homecoming that I'd expected . . .  from my 
point of view because living away and living in Perth was 
totally different to coming back here, right away from 
everything ... We were about twenty kilometers out of town, 
and it wasn't a matter of Just being able to go and see your 
friends when you wanted to. You had to rely on them to be 
able to take you and they didn't really live that lifestyle.49 
The loss of childhood, and the disruption of sibling relationships is 
evident the testimony of a male survivor who spent four years in 
hospital. 
I resented . .. being in hospital . One of my sisters - the one 
closest to me in age - had had slight touch of polio. . .  but 
she didn't have to go to hospital and I objected to the fact 
that I was the one that was sent to hospital. I objected to 
the fact that I was miSsing out on all the wonderful things 
that happen on a farm. We had a marvellous childhood, but 
as I said we weren't at all wealthy. My father was a soldier 
48 Humphries. S. and Gordon, P. (1992). Out Of Sight, pp.144-50; There was a 
strong prejudice against having a relationship with a disabled persons, and 
relationships between disabled couples were strongly disapproved of. often on the 
basis of Eugenics. 
49 Interview J, pp.87-88. 
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settler from the First World War, and had a small holding -
at a town called Dunorlin, which is close to Deloraine - and 
raised dairy cattle. . .  We had a marvellous childhood until 
this polio struck, and I always objected that I was the one 
who was singled out to go to hospital, and I missed out on 
all the marvellous things that happen to kids when they're 
ten or eleven years of age, and in the company of big 
brothers and sisters.50 
The impairment of physical functioning, leading to curtailment of 
social opportunities, was frequently remarked upon by those 
interviewed in this sample. Difficulties were acknowledged with 
mobility, dancing, sport, horse riding and work.5 I Loss of body 
image and the prospect of decreased economic and social 
opportunities obviously lie behind this concern. For the males, 
loss of work and sporting capacities was a major consideration, 
along with the social training that came through normal childhood 
interactions. The male survivor above reports that hospitalisation 
from polio 
. . . deprived me of the opportunity to play games and 
undertake activities with children of my own age. . .  There 
might have been twenty beds in the hospital ward that I was 
in. There would only be a few boys of my age; some of them 
a good deal younger, some of them a good deal older. I never 
had the chance to play team games, even ... sedentary games 
you can't play very well in hospital. I think I missed out a 
lot in learning the ethos of the team. That's my biggest loss. 
I think I never learned to share victory and defeat in team 
sports, that other boys of my age would have had. I think 
that was the biggest loss.52 
50 Interview D, p.37. 
5 1  Interviews, D, p.37; I, p.79; J, p.85; K, p.93; L, p.100. "Dad played drums for 
the local hall and Mum relieved on the piano every now and then. If there was a 
barn dance, or a slow dance I stood up with Mum and had the dance. These 
days I can't dance, it's too much, but I was young then and I could get around". 
(Interview I, p. 77.) 
52 Interview D, p.40. 
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A mother of two who, after polio, had a third child in 1 96 1  and 
now regularly uses a wheelchair reported, "I.. . find some things 
hard. I taught all the kids to ride a horse - that's hard from the 
ground - and things like that were difficult". 53 A farmer, who was 
initially hospitalised for ten months, was allowed home in a wheel 
chair to class the wool clip at shearing time. His verdict was that 
this was "terrtftc therapy as far as I was concerned" and it formed 
the basis for his decision to return to to the land despite his 
disability and the adjustments he had to make as a result.54 
Parents who were hospitalised with polio and had small children at 
home suffered from being deprived of their children. Assisted by 
other members of the family their children may have had the 
advantage of a better quality of care than those children with polio 
received in hospital, but relationships were also disrupted, though 
perhaps not as badly. Keeping the family going required additional 
help and extra effort on the part of spouses and in-laws. A mother 
with one young child was 
Six months pregnant when I got [ polio ] and there was 
nothing wrong with the baby . .. she came home, my mother­
in-law had her. . .  for twelve months, because she didn't 
come home immediately I went home. I came home once, I 
think, during that twelve months... for Christmas ... 
Until [the baby] was perhaps a year old, we had a girl, a live­
in girl that had just finished school. ... we had three girls 
that stayed three years each, and then... they went off and 
did their own thing. .. it worked out well for. . .  all of us. 
In connection with the separation from her baby, she said -
... that was a bit hard you know. My husband used to come 
53  Interview L, p. 100. 
54 Interview K, p.92. 
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to Perth every fortnight and stay with friends. And ... 
occasionally he brought ... the eldest girl, but he didn't bring 
the baby up of course. But, you know, I don't think anyone 
had any lasting effects from it. My mother-in-law used to 
have . . .  a fair bit to say about whatever affected that 
particular child. Well she had a right to I suppose ... but 
there was no drama about that.55 
A mother of two who was hospitalised for three months found that 
her two children, a boy of twenty months and a gtrl of three years, 
were disturbed by her absence. During her three months of 
hospitalisation her son was also admitted to PMH with polio and 
her daughter was cared for by her sister who lived in the country. 
She felt deeply about not being able to see her children. 
Most traumatic was . . . not being able to see my children. 
You didn't have visitors. My husband [ who] was in the 
Services . .. nearly got a court martial over trying to cope with 
[my son] when he was fretting. It was traumatic because I 
had no family in Perth. My mother was [ in Bunbury], my 
sister was at Wagin, so she took [ my daughter] to Wagin. I 
was a woman that craved to have children and here I am in 
hospital months on end, and I never saw my babies. 
When she was discharged from hospital she found that her son, 
who was still receiving treatment, did not know her. Then, after 
enduring the difficulties of making a journey to Wagin to see her 
daughter, she encountered a similar reaction. 
We got off at the station and [me with] that caliper on my 
leg, . . .  we got lost, and... by the time we got to my sister's 
place.. .  I was so tired. . .  she said. . .  "Go and lay down on 
our bed" . They brought me a cup of tea. . .  I was . . .  so 
exhausted that I fell asleep with ( it] in my hand . 
.. .  when I did see [my daughter] she didn't know me. Well I 
broke my heart, to think there's my babies, they don't know 
me. No-one can understand what that's like when you're 
55 InteIView L. pp.97-98. 
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separated from your children for so long, unless they've been 
through that. But you suIVive.5 6  
While separation from her children drove this mother to the brink 
of doubt and despair her "but you suIVive" reveals a strong sense 
of determination to win out over polio. She continues -
I cried day and night. I can remember crying for my children, 
so many days, so many months. I just sometimes wondered 
if I'd ever see them again - you long for them. My [daughter ] 
was just at the stage of beginning to talk - and I thought 
"I'm missing all this and not because I want to" , .... you do 
wonder and then you think I'm going to beat it, it's not going 
to beat me, I'm going to beat this thing.57 
In later life this mother has also reflected on the other side of this 
story - the effect of the separation on her children. She said, 
wistfully -
I have wondered. I have really wondered... I think [my 
daughter] having nothing the matter with her, ... always 
mothered [my son] but I often wonder if she felt he got all 
the attention, and maybe she missed out. She would deny 
that possibly . . .  but I have wondered.SB 
Separation from family and friends was affected by rules about 
hospital visitation. During the early stages of infection quarantine 
restrictions often applied, but even where this was not so, parents 
frequently had little time with their children, as noted above. A 
male suIVivor hospitalised in Tasmania at nine and a half years of 
age recalls that for the first two weeks he had no visitors because -
56 Interview H, p.66. 
5 7 Interview H. pp. 70-71. 
5 8 Interview H, p.70. 
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I was in the Infectious Ward in the old Launceston Infection 
Diseases Hospital, but after that I was able to. My parents 
lived some distance away - they were farmers - we certainly 
weren't wealthy people by any means. My parents were able 
to make the trip into Launceston - this was forty miles - to 
begin with they used to come and see me every weekend, but 
after a while they gave up quite such regular visits, because I 
did have a sister, and later on two sisters, and one brother, 
who were attending high school in Launceston, and they had 
to board, and though they did go home by train some of the 
weekends, some weekends they spent in Launceston and they 
would visit me. So the system worked out, roughly speaking, 
my parents came once a fortnight and the the odd fortnight, 
either my brother or one of my sisters would come to see 
me.59 
Added to this form of isolation was the regime that existed in the 
hospital in 1937 / 38 . 
. . .  my first recollection is of a system that didn't really 
believe in explaining to the patient what was going on. The 
patient wasn't expected to know, or to be able to take in. 
They treated us as children - of course we were children - but 
they talked down to us . . .  60 
Those who were transferred to the city from country districts were 
sometimes little worse off than those whose families lived in the 
metropolitan area. A Perth woman who had polio at four years of 
age recalls -
I know my family visited, but I don't know if anyone else did. 
I don't know how regular my family were. I know we didn't 
have a car in those days, so they would have had to depend 
on public transport. 6 1 
59 Interview D. p.35. 
60 Interview D, p.35. 
6 1 Interview E, p.45. 
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Polio and hospitalisation brought many deficits, but some gained 
advantages from the experience which proved to be a crossroads at 
which they made fundamental decisions about their future 
directions in life. The Tasmanian, who in adult life became a high 
ranking librarian, continues 
Scholastically it didn't worry me, because I did reasonably 
well. One of my first gifts that my parents and brothers and 
sisters gave me was a set of books called Practical Knowledge 
For All, which I can still see on the shelf right across in this 
very room, and I became an avid reader. In St Giles Home ... 
they had a small library there and I took charge of it and 
used to arrange the books properly. I used to get somewhat 
annoyed, because I used to arrange them alphabetically by 
the name of the author and someone would come along and 
arrange them by the colour, or the size of the binding. 
I got terribly interested in scholastic things, reading and so 
on, and I think I benefited from that . . .  I was interested in 
history and so on, because of the reading I did in those days, 
so I never regretted it from that point of vtew.62 
And the doctor, who in 1953 spent seventy four days in an iron 
lung, turned his attentions to respiratory research. A 
distinguished career followed over the next thirty years, marked in 
1989 by his being awarded the inaugural "Fisons" medal of the 
Thoracic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Three years later 
62 Interview D. pp.40-4 1 .  
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was made a Member of the Order of Australia.53 His career, which 
included working with Julius Comroe at the Cardiovascular 
Research Institute, San Francisco, grew directly out of his 
response to having polio 
I left Perth in 1957 to take up research at Sydney University. 
I was partly inspired by reading books such as that of Julius 
Comroe The Lung , which was a mine of useful information. 
And there were other works, other publications, that I found 
extremely helpful in managing people with respiratory 
paralysis during the '56 epidemic . . .  These works led me to 
the idea that the best thing for me to do - considering that I 
was fairly severely paralysed, and would be permanently 
paralysed and have to walk with crutches - was medical 
research. . .  I gained an appointment at Sydney University, 
working on pulmonary function [and] was there for three 
years. . .  The problem was what to do then and it seemed to 
me the best thing to do was to gain further knowledge of 
research through working at one of the major centres in the 
United States. In my case it was the Cardiovascular 
Research Institute, whose director was Julius Comroe - the 
same Julius whose book on the lung I'd read in 1956. At the 
time, in 1956, I remember idly remarking that it would be 
nice one day to work in Comroe's Institute, and in 1 96 1  I 
found myself there. 6 4 
Not everyone was able to turn their polio experience to such 
advantage but some did, as is evident from these testimonies. One 
result of their decisions, and their determination not to let polio 
beat them, is a notably high level of achievement amongst polio 
survivors. 
Fear and stigmatisation 
63 Thoracic Society News, November 1992, p.63. An A.M was awarded in 1992. 
64 Interview B. pp.21-22. 
CHAPTER 9: Memories of polio 382 
Vivienne Overheu, a polio survivor of the 1954 epidemic, records 
that she and her family were stigmatised because of the polio she 
had when twenty-two years of age. While she was still in hospital 
in Perth, friends and acquaintances in her home town "tended to 
cross the street" rather than come in contact with her parents, and 
"even the public telephone was disinfected after they had used 
it" .55 Stigmatisation was not confined to country areas. Overheu, 
who had to use a wheel chair, records that during a visit to Perth 
with her mother she had great difficulty in finding a hairdresser 
who would accept the job of cutting her hair. 66 The sight of her 
entering the premises was enough to prompt whispered conferences 
amongst the staff and declarations of full appointment books. 
Fear of polio which resulted in the stigmatisation of survivors is 
recorded by eight interviewees. It is clear from this sample that the 
age at which the subject had polio affected their likelihood of being 
sttgmatised, and also the the memory of the experience. Fear and 
stigmatisation is evident among family members, and the public, 
65 Overheu, V. ( 1984). It Pays to be Stubborn, Perth: St George Books, p.34 
66 Overheu, V. ( 1984). It Pays to be Stubborn, pp.73-4. 
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as well as hospital and medical staff, and it was not left behind at 
the end of the polio era. Parents who indicated that as a result of 
their son's polio in 1951 their friends "sort of dropped off a bit" 
reported that in recent years their son, who is able to "dance quite 
well", was refused by a woman on the grounds that "she wouldn't 
dance with a cripple". The refusal was deeply felt -
He broke down on the phone . . .  he was really upset. We 
thought things had come a long way really over the years, 
but when you hear that, some people haven't come any way 
at all.67  
Sadly, stigmatisation was sometimes felt within families. The 
woman referred to in chapter two, who at school found herself 
rejected by the members of her basketball team, is a case in point. 
She recalls how her mother, in particular, felt that polio had 
brought shame and unwanted attention to the family, with 
obvious consequences for the sense of guilt and shame she herself 
accumulated. She said -
... the biggest sin was to draw attention to the family and in 
some way make us . . .  you know ... [ other] children didn't get 
these things, but I did. And, of course, it implies . .. neglect . .  
which was I think why my mother accentuated how 
mollycoddled I had been ...  It was not her fault, either way. 
You can't blame her. It was the nurse; it was the hospital, 
or it was God when I was bom.68 
Interpreting childhood memories is made more difficult because 
stigmatisation was not always expressed directly. When asked if 
67 Interview A. p.8. 
68 Interview C. p.3 1 
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he found people treated him differently after he had polio a 
survivor said 
It would be hard to tell that I think, because . . .  I suppose 
there was a difference. I don't remember any sort of, any 
discrimination against me, on the grounds of "that family's 
unclean because they've had polio". I don't remember 
anything like that at all. I may have been too young to 
notice, or may Just have been unobservant, but I don't 
remember anything like that. It is true that vecy, vecy few 
people, apart from my family, came to see me in hospital. 
We had one old chap who worked on the farm, occasionally 
hired by my father as a labourer. He was vecy fond of me 
and I remember him coming to see me once, but by and large 
I can remember vecy, vecy few people coming in to see me in 
hospital. 
I think there was some suggestion that some of the cousins -
my mother had a brother who lived in the same town.. .  he 
had a largish family . . .  They wouldn't come near our 
household, about the time of the infection, but I don't think 
it lasted vecy long.69 
A similar lack of direct personal experience of stigmatisation is 
recounted by an adult survivor. He knew that others had 
encountered stigmatisation and, with humor, is able to show that 
it did exist not far from him. He said -
I can't say that I had any . . .  experiences that made me feel 
that I wasn't welcome in their company. . .  Others have 
talked about that, but no, I can't say that. .. The only thing 
that I heard I think, was that an old gentleman that had 
been contact with me prior to my going down with polio . . .  he 
said something like he wished he had known, because he 
was one of those that if he went out he used to always gargle 
with something, salt and water, or some old fashioned 
remedy . . .  He wished he had known, because he would have 
gone home and done that but he didn't know and he didn't 
get polio so I don't know what he concluded from that. But, 
no, I can't honestly say that I encountered anyone whose 
reaction was .. . reluctant to be in my company.10 
69 InteIView D, p.37. 
70 InteIView K, p.95. 
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On the other hand the doctor who had polio as an adult stated he 
did not experience stigmatisation or ostracism. If it was present, 
he obviously refused to accept it. 
I suppose if you look hard enough for it, you'd find it, but 
that doesn't apply solely to polio. There are some people 
who don't like dealing with people with disabilities. That's a 
perfectly general phenomenon. I regard those people as 
having a curious attitude. Certainly there are such people, 
but, in general, I either ignored such attitudes or they 
weren't very apparent in most people I dealt with. But there 
are some people who don't like dealing with the paralysed. 
They used to call them cripples. You're not allowed to use 
the word cripple any more. It's supposed to be one of those 
forbidden expressions - let's not drift into that. 1 1  
The schoolyard was the most obvious place for children with polio 
to feel the presence of stigmatisation. Even school children are 
remembered as basing their attitude towards of polio survivors on 
fear and the uncertainty that surrounded its cause and means of 
transmission. One survivor recalls that, as a schoolgirl she was 
upset by the taunts in the school yard. 
I know I used to get teased a lot at school. . .  because I had a 
caliper on my right leg... get called names and that, get a lot 
of teasing ... "Football boots" , "Limpy" , "Hopalong Cassidy" ... 
I remember ... names like that, yes. 
I don't think anyone really knew how you caught it, and 
[ they said] ... "don't play with her 'cos you might get it as 
well" - and all sorts of things like this. 
Not all her experiences were negative. Being victimised also 
brought out the help and protective influence of others, even if its 
effect was temporary . 
. . there was this other boy who was younger than me, his 
7 1 Interview B, p.23. 
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sister also had calipers, or [ was) disabled, and he used to 
come up and say "Oh, leave her alone ... " He knew what it 
was like, because his sister was similar. And I think the 
teachers used to tell them to leave me alone, but when the 
teachers weren't around it all started again. 12 
A similar experience of protection is recalled by a male interviewee 
who, as a teenager became involved in a school yard fight.. 
... after my hospital experience of course I went to ... high 
school like any other child ... The very first day I was there, I 
was thirteen years of age at the time, I was still in hospital -
I went to high school from hospital - and I got into a fist 
fight with a boy ... someone rushed up to this boy and said 
"Cut it out John. Don't hit him, he's in hospital, he's a 
polio sufferer ... So John, whom I still remember quite well, 
stopped the fight immediately.73 
A female interviewee who came from a close knit rural community 
records no personal stigmatisation, or pity. If it was present it 
was too understated to register. However, on discharge from 
hospital she had to surrender her personal possessions for fear of 
them conveying germs to others. 
I don't think anyone felt sorry for me. I just went in with 
the group of kids that were going. Some of them didn't like 
me because I was slow in keeping up, but apart from that I 
was always involved with them. .. It didn't worry me. 7 4 
Mum bought me a book when I went into Margaret River 
hospital... and they said that I couldn't take it to Perth, 
because it was infected - the book was infected. I can't 
remember but I have a feeling that it did go to Perth 
somehow, and Perth was different - it was all right in Perth, 
but it wasn't all right in the country .. . it hasn't really 
worried me and I don't think the people around me ... didn't 
stick up for me or anything .. . 75 
72 Interview E, p.45. 
7 3 Interview D, p.39 
7 4 Interview I, p. 77. 
7 5 Interview I. p. 79. 
CHAPTER 9: Memories of polio 387 
The male survivor who was hospitalised in Tasmania in 1937 / 38 
had a similar experience. His personal possessions were 
confiscated due to fear of cross infection. 
When I first went in there I'd made some progress with my 
education, so I was able to write and I had with me a set of 
stamps, and some writing paper. And that was taken from 
me and I asked for it after a while and they said "You can't 
have it." . .  .I said "Why can't I have it" and they said because 
it would have "wogs" on it. Well I objected to that word 
"wogs". I thought that was just talking down to me. If they 
had said germs I would have thought that's fair enough, 
but . . .  the word "wogs" . .. I thought was a word you mtght use 
for insects, rather than tiny little bacteria, or . . .  viruses 
And . . .  my mother had bought me . .. a new suit, and I'd worn 
that into hospital.. . Of course that was taken from me - I 
was put into pyjamas - and that suit never materialised 
again. My mother was quite upset about that, because it 
was quite expensive for us . . .  eve:iy penny was pretty hard to 
get, and my mother and father were quite upset that that 
suit disappeared. I asked for it and they said "It's got wogs 
on it and you can't have it". But it was never fumigated and 
given up to them or anything like that. Of course by the 
time I came out of hospital, four years later, I was far too big 
for it anyway . . .  76 
The same interviewee remembers there being an embargo on travel 
between Victoria and Tasmania77 and recalled an amusing stoiy, 
current in Tasmania at the time, which even if it is apociyphal 
reflects how people felt about polio at the time. 
There was a lot of superstition about.. . before I went into 
hospital a stoiy appeared in a newspaper that someone had 
sent a pound note by mail from Melbourne to a person in 
Tasmania, but the person didn't know there was a pound 
note inside the envelope, and put the envelope inside the 
76 Interview D. p.38. Bearup, C. (199 1). Outcomes, pp. 27, 30, reports the 
destruction of one polio survivor's toy, and another who, before her return home 
was bathed in phenyl, along with all her effects. 
77 Interview D. p.39. 
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kitchen range, in the oven space, to disinfect it. . .  The thing 
caught fire and the pound note burnt, and my mother was 
vastly amused at that . . .  a pound was a fair bit of money. 
You didn't bum a pound note, no way. 78 
The testimony of a woman who had polio as an adult in 1946 
reveals that, even if the doctor was not afraid of polio, he allowed 
for the fact that others might have been . 
. . . the doctor came and said "We're moving you from the 
ward, but you've had this long enough now that it shouldn't 
be contagious" .. .  I was put down in a room and he said "just 
don't say anything to the other patients because you've got 
infantile paralysis, and it could cause panic, but I'm sure 
that you're past the contagious stage". 79 
A woman, who had polio in 1948 at eleven years of age, has clear 
memories of the fear and stigmatisation present at that time. 
Nurses were given the choice of caring for polio patients while she 
herself encountered stigmatisation during walks in the streets 
around PMH. 
I have the feeling when I went into hospital that they asked 
the girls, the nurses, who would be prepared to look after 
me, because the two people that did are still friends of 
mine ... and I get the feeling that they had to volunteer to do 
that job . 
. .  .I know people didn't like to be around you, because when 
we were at the Golden Age .. . once we got back to walking a 
bit we were allowed to walk around the block, ... people 
would see us coming and they'd all cross the street. So 
what we used to do was, the ones that were able to walk 
would cross the street and walk on the same side as the 
other lot, so they either had to walk in the middle of the 
road, or something like that. A bit nasty when you think 
about it. 
And even after I came home, when I was . . .  better, after the 
78 Interview D, p.38. 
79 Interview H. p.65. 
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three years, people would say - because I still had my 
crutches sometimes then - "oh, what's the matter with her" 
and Mum would ... say "oh well, you know she's had polio" . . .  
You could see them sort of taking a few steps back.BO 
Given the uncertainties about modes of infection that existed until 
the the late 1940s, and the comparison that could be made with 
Tuberculosis, such fear and stigmatisation may have been 
reasonable, however uncomfortable for the polio survivors. On the 
other hand, there were occasions when polio survivors were treated 
kindly with positive result. 
There was a Launceston Gymkhana and we were taken 
[ there] in cars by people from The Society for the Care of 
Crippled Children . . .  some of the children were sitting up like 
walking wounded and it was obvious to the crowd in the 
streets of Launceston that we were a special group. . .  as we 
were driven along the street in Launceston, all these people 
on either side of the road.. .  cheered us, because we were 
crippled children. I suppose they thought they should do 
something to show their sympathy ... There were occasions 
like that. We had great kindness shown to us and we 
appreciated that. s 1 
The culture of denial 
A corollary to the stigmatisation and ostracism of polio survivors 
by others was a level of denial that they themselves, and 
sometimes those around them, exercised in connection with their 
condition. Denial has been another element that has maintained 
the silence around polio. Evidence suggests that a strong culture 
of minimising or denying the effects of polio has existed, as it had 
done for other forms of disability, and that this is part of the 
80 Interview J,  pp.85-6. Emphasis added. 
8 1 Interview D. p.4 1. 
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strong desire to overcome the effects of the disease, even to the 
point of living as though no physical or other deficits have been 
created. In his autobiography, I Can Jump Pu d dles, Alan Marshall 
wrote 
The word "crippled", to me, suggested a condition that could 
be applied to some people, but not myself. But, since I so 
often heard people refer to me as crippled, I was forced to 
concede that I must fit this description, yet retained a 
conviction that though being crippled was obviously a 
distressing state for some people, with me it didn't matter.82 
At the time of writing his biography Marshall remembers that, as a 
child, being a cripple is not something he associated with 
himself.83 He gtves further examples of his refusal to take notice 
of his condition and considers that such a perception does not 
come from within the afflicted one, but from people who categorise 
in this way. 84 While there is no reason to doubt his childhood 
experience, it is clear that his outlook includes his reflection on 
this subject as an adult. 
Evidence also suggests that the attitude of some members of the 
medical profession encouraged those with a disability to overcome 
their deficits and become part of the mainstream of life. The West 
Australian orthopedic surgeon, the late Sir George Bedbrook,wrote 
in the Foreword of polio survivor Vivienne Overheu 's 
82 Marshall, A.  (1955). Puddles, p.71. 
83 His disease was polio, but a similar attitude can be detected in connection 
with other forms of disability where it was believed the effects had to be 
overcome, minimised or denied to ensure social and personal success to the 
survivor. See for example Humphries, S. and Gordon, P. ( 1992). Out Of Sight: the 
experience of dtsabUtty 1900-1950,  Northcote House.Plymouth, p.42 "For David 
Swift the ultimate aim was to hide his disability altogether and to make himself 
appear exactly the same as other children". 
84 Marshall, A. ( 1955) Puddles, pp.99-100, 195. 
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autobiography -
39 1 
Throughout the narrative, it is her ability that shines out 
rather than her disability and this, indeed, is the goal that 
all disabled people are striving for.85 
After her paralysis in 1954 the author battled with the 
consequences to live a full life which included marriage, children, 
and duties as a farmer's wife. The title of her book, It Helps To Be 
Stubborn, was chosen because of the particular brand of 
determination - the "cussedness" - the which gave her the will to 
fight. 
A heroic style in the face of difficulties, reflected in strong willed 
behaviour, stubbornness, denial and, often, an outstanding level of 
achievement, is common amongst polio survivors. The evidence 
suggests that once a person became paralysed the prevailing social 
and medical culture trained them to overcome their difficulties, an 
attitude that often led to what could be described as 
overcompensation. As a result many drove themselves to reach the 
same level of achievement as those living without a disability. The 
following report on the 1981 West Australian People's Marathon 
provides a case in point. Although the official maximum time 
allowed for the race was five hours the time keeper left the timing 
gates open a few minutes longer to allow the last competitor, Tony 
Parnell, a polio survivor, to cross the line. Parnell -
. . .  whose right leg is completely withered with virtually no 
muscle structure, . . .  uses it purely as support while he drives 
with his good leg. A magnificent effort . . .  he took up running 
because his doctor told him he couldn't do it, and he decided 
85 Overheu, V. (1984). It Helps to Be Stubborn, p.5. 
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otherwise.SB 
392 
The biographies of polio survivors frequently chart the course of 
one who exercised rigid discipline in order to restore lost 
capacities. If regained these capacities can be retained, at first, 
because polio is not a degenerative disease. Many survivors 
describe themselves as having "had" polio, and have difficulty 
acknowledging the legacy of special needs the disease created. 
Indeed, some have gone out of their way to ignore them. 
After surveying several biographies, Macy Westbrook summarises 
the experience of polio survivors as governed by "ignore your 
distress: hard work and cheerful acceptance will overcome polio".87 
Denial and hard work was the salve applied to wasted muscles and 
twisted lives. "Use it or lose it" was the programme instilled into 
many polio survivors, and by this means they built up their 
strength, overcame the effects of their affliction and moved into 
the mainstream of life.SB Unfortunately in the long term this has 
proved to be the reverse of the strategy needed to care for and 
preseive weakened muscles and twisted bodies. For some survivors 
the dividend is now being paid in significant psychological 
distress,89 and the curtailment of activity at an earlier age than 
might otherwise have been the case. As understanding of PPS 
86 Western Australian Marathon Club, Newsletter, Spring 1981, p.12. 
87 Westbrook, M. (1996). Early Memories of Polio-Survivors: Memories Versus 
the Official Myths, Proceedings. International Post-Polio Conference, NSW, p.5-6. 
88 Scheer, J. and Luborsky. M.L. (1991). Post-Polio Sequelae: the cultural 
context of polio biographies, Orthopaedics, Vol. 14, No 11. pp.1178-9. 
89 Conrady. L.J . .  Wish. J.R. . Agre. J.C., Rodriguez, A.A., Sperling, K.B. ( 1989). 
Psychologtc Characteristics of Polio Survivors: a preliminruy report, Archive of 
Physical Medical RehabUltatton, Vol. 70, p.462. 
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develops polio survivors are learning they must "conserve or lose 
it", a program that involves them in a complete reorientation in 
life. Conservation means having to recognise and face their own 
special needs, refusing to deny or minimise their difficulties, and 
letting go of the pretense that they can perform as people without 
a disability. This is the challenge facing polio survivors in the 
1990s. 
Amongst these interviews denial was at times part of the personal 
style of the interviewee,90 was present in the form of not expecting 
to get polio, 9 1  or not mentioning the subject, even amongst close 
friends.92 Sometimes the polio patient was denied any knowledge 
of what was wrong with them, even when the infection had first 
struck. A young girl's febrile illness, followed by her complete 
collapse, was left entirely unexplained by family and medical staff. 
She later recalled 
. . .  nothing else was said about it and nobody told me what it 
was I had wrong with me, they just took me to hospital and I 
used to think it was really funny that nobody would come in. 
Mum and Dad weren't allowed to come in. And I had two 
nurses that used to just come in and do what they had to, 
all dressed in white with masks, and heaven only knows 
what. And I used to think "well, this is really awful", but 
nobody would say why I had to be like that.93 
The wife of a severely paralysed male survivor records that she got 
caught up in her husband's denial, expressed in his attitude 
90 Interview H. p. 72. "I can't take empathy, I can't take sympathy, I like people to 
understand that". 
9 1  Interview F. p.53. 
92 Interview I. p. 77. "I don't think . . .  and I ever talked about me having polio. We 
were just friends and that was that". 
93 Interview J, p.85. 
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toward living a "normal" life -
394 
. . . the way he dealt with it was to pretend that it was entirely 
normal to live the way he was, with the disabilities that he 
had. And in hindsight, looking back now, I can see that that 
influenced my attitudes as well and we lived as a family 
completely as if it was perfectly normal to have a permanent 
tracheotomy, to have the bedroom set up like an intensive 
care unit, to have oxygen cylinders on the verandah and to 
live in a wheelchair and so on. And all the other things that 
went with it. And when I think now, back, it was really very 
abnormal to be living the way we were, but we pretended that 
this was perfectly normal. And that was the way he coped 
with it.9 4  
Others also tried to hide their condition and carry on as "normal" 
even though there was a cost. This approach, learned in the polio 
years, persisted in later life to reveal the denial and determination 
that enabled polio sufferers to become polio survivors. A mother of 
two recalls -
The tears I shed trying to get the washing done, trying to 
cook the meals, trying to do those things for the children 
and act as a "normal person", because it didn't show... they 
don't see the brace on your back and I always wore slacks so 
that I hid the caliper and people expect you to do everything 
that a normal person does. And I'm afraid I did right 
through until I packed up. All that a normal person that 
had not had polio, I had done that and more. I pushed 
myself to prove that I was able to do it, that I was capable. I 
was not going to let it beat me.95 
You know I don't like people doing for me. I have the 
community home care car coming to pick me up and they 
want to open the door. I say to them "don't take my 
independence away", and I think all polio people have this, 
"we're going to do it". I've seen it in them. . . .  where other 
people will say "Oh, my arthritis is so bad", well we've got 
arthritis too, osteoporosis too, but we don't tell people. They 
say "How are you?" and we skip the answer. Ask them how 
they are, or .. . If they ask me how I'm going I say "on my legs, 
9 4  Interview G. p.60. 
95 Interview H. p.69. 
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but only Just" .  So polio people don't make a big issue. I 
haven't found any of them that make a big issue.96 
The most deeply rooted account of denial recounted by these 
interviewees came from the family of a woman who was affected at 
four years of age. Their shame at having polio in the family caused 
them to cover over the fact through offering a variety of stories 
about what happened. She recalls a changing understanding of 
polio, and herself, over many years. The unwillingness of the 
family to discuss the subject caused deep seated issues for her in 
her adult life . 
. . . my understandings around me having polio . . .  changed over 
time, because I'd initially . . .  been told different things. One 
was that I was born with it and the other . .  that I got it when 
I was four . .. in hospital having my adenoids out . 
. . .  sometimes I actually denied I'd had polio. but then when I 
was. . .  ten I had to go again for physiotherapy and so it 
became obvious that . . .  I had had polio . . .  At that stage my 
mother told me that . . . I was born with it... I knew that 
wasn't true, but. . .  it seemed better . . .  than having got it for 
myself. 
When I was about sixteen . . .  I asked my mother again about 
it, because it had come up somehow or other in conversation 
and I realised that I hadn't been born with it, that I had 
actually got it when I was in hospital. 
I do know that it was never discussed; I mean it was never 
talked about, except at really strange occasions like when I'd 
go to buy shoes, my mother would always say, much to my 
shame - which is sort of interesting now - that I'd had polio, 
which explained . . .  [why] the muscles had collapsed in one 
foot . She would always say it and I used to beg her not to 
say this to these salesmen - that I had polio. . .  it's really 
taken me a long time, and. . .  it was only after the polio 
program on TV97 that . . .  she volunteered the information 
about getting polio. I. . .  knew unless it came from her I 
wasn't going to get accurate information. If I asked her she 
96 Interview H. p. 70. 
97 ABC 1V Social History "TIME FRAME - Polio Days", March 1997. 
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would fudge it and I assume I know that because of past 
experience, and because of these different messages . 
. . . when she was talking about it she was very angry .. .  about 
it and said "I've always blamed the nurse" because her story 
was that . . .  my mother thinks that the damage to my leg was 
caused by the nurse pulling my legs down when I went into 
anaesthetic, because I was curled up in a ball. But she was 
angry the whole time she was telling me about it. 
None of my mother's story has any medical grounding. It's 
just that from it you can work out what happened; that the 
reason I was probably in hospital . .. was because of the 
incredibly sore throat that I would have had from having 
polio . . .  When I came out of the anaesthetic I was 
complaining about my leg aching and my mother said "that 
was the first we'd known about it" . . . Then this story came 
out that when I had gone in under the anaesthetic .. . I had 
been all curled up in a ball and they had had to straighten 
me out and strap my leg.9s 
I've always felt ashamed of it. It's taken me 40 years not to ... 
I mentioned it in the first 35 years of my life to maybe one 
other person, other than my friends at school. After that 
experience I never mentioned it. And I would hide my foot, 
which I'm doing now. I. .. always hide my foot. 
The thing that is most memorable for me at the time was 
fatigue . . .  I was constantly tired, and I was never allowed to 
say that I was tired. We lived at the top of the hill and ... 
would walk down to the shops, we would walk down to the 
shops with my mother, and I.. . remember being so tired that 
I just didn't know how I was ever going to get back, even as a 
little child. I used to say to my mother "I'm tired, I'm tired" 
and she used to say, "You can't say that" . So I used to say 
"'I'm tidy, I'm tidy" . I was never allowed to be tired . . .  That 
fatigue is for me, the thread that runs through all my life, 
and has been a really debilitating force for me . . .  I link that 
to the polio . . .  the lack of treatment, the lack of being able to 
rest, and to recover, and to recuperate, and to be treated 
with sort of respect, in a way that a serious illness 
demanded.9 9  
None of those interviewed referred to death from polio, though the 
98 Interview C. pp.26-27. 
99 Interview C. p.29. 
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mortality rate was recorded during an epidemic, and deaths were 
reported in the press. The argument from silence would suggest 
that the deepest level of denial amongst polio survivors and their 
families may have been reserved for the fear of death. 
The will to overcome disablement 
The stories of polio survivors witness to their strong determination 
to overcome the limitations of their disability. Susan Sontag 
refers to the German philosopher Schopenhauer when she asserts 
the power of the mind in overcoming the body -
"The will exhibits itself as organised body" . . .  Recovery from a 
disease depends on the will assuming "dictatorial power in 
order to subsume the rebellious forces" of that body. I oo 
For many their discharge from hospital would be testimony enough 
to their strength of will. But stubbornness, a heroic style in the 
face of difficulties, overcompensation and, often, an outstanding 
level of achievement, is common amongst polio survivors. IO I 
While many drove themselves to reach the same level of 
achievement as those living without a disability, high levels of 
denial can also be found. The following testimony from a 
respiratory patient provides evidence of the medical culture that 
prevailed in the 1950s, and further evidence of fear and repugnance 
shown towards the iron lung. 
I must tell you another terrible thing that was done, because 
it still concerns me. Owing to the imperfect understanding 
I 00 Sontag, S. ( 1991 ). Illness as Metaphor, pp.44-45. 
I O I A wide range of achievements is evident amongst this sample of interviews, 
including "Citizen of the Year" and an AM. 
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of muscular paralysis, there was a tendency to say that, if 
you were taking too long to recover, you were becoming 
psychologically dependent on, say, the ventilator. This is an 
outrageous way of treating someone who is severely ill, and 
of course, in my case, desperately desires to get out of such a 
coffin-like machine. It is like a coffin - just the head 
protrudes. And to help overcome this so-called psychological 
dependence, they used to tum off the respirator at night. 
When they did this, I promptly woke up and couldn't sleep. 
So in the end I had to say to the physician in charge ... 
"look, it is unphysiological to interfere with someone's sleep, 
who's exercising during the day. If the respirator is left on 
during the night and I have a proper sleep, I am confident 
that within another week I'll be free of the machine". So he 
gave my instructions to the staff and they stopped turning 
the respirator off during the night. A week later I was free of 
the machine. But not free of the problem of recovery, by no 
means. 
The process of rehabilitation was long and arduous, but the 
determinative moment is unambiguously recognised. 
It took three months before I could lift my right arm off the 
bed. My right arm was the most severely paralysed, because 
that's the arm one uses in serving when playing tenn1s. 102 
You see the severity of paralysis depends, at least partly, on 
the amount of physical activity during the period the virus is 
multiplying in the body, because it's easier for the virus to 
get into the nerve terminals when they've been active. 
The problem of rehabilitation is revealed when the day 
comes and the patient, or subject, realises that he isn't 
going to get much better unless he does something about 
it himself. It's no good leaving it to physiotherapists to 
wave your legs and arms around. You'll never get any 
stronger doing that, only one's own efforts can lead to 
recovery. Others can help, but they only help. No-one can 
do it for you. 
So the morning I realised that I wasn't going to get any 
better unless I did a lot about it myself was the crucial 
period in rehabilitation. I made it my ambition to get out 
of hospital before a year had passed, and I think I 
succeeded . . .  the alternative is worse. I think that it is true 
102 He had been playing tennis at the time of his febrile illness, consequently his 
right arm was most severely affected. 
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generally of people with severe polio paralysis - If they 
recover it's through the determination to keep going and 
make the most of what abilities are left. I 0 3  
The mother of two who battled to recover sufficiently to be 
discharged from hospital so that she could see her children again 
was equally resolute . Repatriated to Holland with her husband, 
who was a Dutch citizen in Australia during the conflict with 
Indonesia, she was determined to appear to her relatives as if she 
was able bodied. 
I was determined I would have my photo taken in Holland 
and I would put a pair of shoes on and hide the caliper, and 
then, of course, we never thought we'd be able to come back 
so quick and I'm on a ship with this jolly caliper again . . .  and 
I thought I can't let my mother and [those who] were going 
to be there to meet us [see me in this] so out went the 
caliper - out the window for King Neptune and his flock, 
because I had to walk without it, and I was determined to 
hold myself erect and walk off that ship - but you know you 
can't really. 
The life that followed the return home continued to be marked by 
the same expression of strong will. She kept moving, and living, as 
if she had no disability and was rewarded, for a time, with the 
appearance of being able bodied . 
. . .  we got a job on a farm . . .  I had to take [my son] to school 
three and a half miles a day, over a gravel road . . .  I would 
push the bike pedal with the right foot, but the left one 
would only tap it as it got to the top, but I managed. . .  I did 
that for one year, summer and winter, but I knew I couldn't 
do it the next year, because it was a man's bike and [my 
daughter] had to go to school, so we went to Fairbrtdge 
Farm and I worked as a cottage mother, with my husband . . .  
I was still battling, but I kept going. I didn't give in. I've 
never given in to the polio. And then I seemed as if I got over 
I 03 Interview B. pp.20-2 1 .  Emphasis added. 
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it and I even got away from even having a limp. 1 04 
Polio survivors in this sample were not deterred from the tasks of 
giving birth to and raising a family and sharing the work of house 
and sometimes farm. For some the choice was deliberately made 
while others expected to continue as those before had done, 
without any alternatives being brought forward for consideration. 
A woman survivor who, after three years in hospital as a teenager, 
returned to grow up and marry into the dairying district that was 
her home said -
I don't know what was the normal situation and what wasn't 
the normal situation. I just did what I wanted to do ... I 
know when we had our babies, like most people you carry 
your baby around in your arm. I never found that good. I 
always had to have baby sitting on my hip. Of course you 
couldn't run after the little villains when they took off, but 
basically I think the kids get to know what you can and can't 
do, and they sort of compensate for things as well. 
We had a dairy farm; we worked really hard at that and we 
had our three children. I was helping him in the dairy and it 
was very hard work. . .  we were saying the other day "Isn't it 
great that we don't have to do that now". It would be 
freezing cold and pouring with rain, icy morning, you've got 
to get three little kids organised and you'd go out - I always 
did the calves and all that sort of thing - you'd be up to your 
knees in water and it would be a real disaster. 
I found it very, very hard, but it's not until now when I look 
back on that ... I didn't realise everybody didn't think the 
same thing. I didn't realise everybody wasn't finding the 
going as difficult. But it was very difficult for a while ... 
things that I can't do I find a different way of doing it. If I 
can't do it one way, you can do it another way, so I can't 
say that I've not done things because of polio. I o5 
Other survivors who returned, particularly to farm work, were 
I 04 Interview H, pp.66-67. 
105 Interview J, pp.88-89. Emphasis added. 
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forced to find alternate ways of performing tasks because physical 
strength would not allow them to continue as before. A farmer 
was able to negotiate a reallocation of tasks . 
. . . because I was in a partnership . . .  my brothers were good, 
they did the heavy work. I was able to do my bit I think, but 
I did mostly ploughing up work and that sort of thing, where 
they did the heavy bag lumping . . .  We were in partnership 
until 1 962 and then I was able to gradually - see when I went 
home I was on crutches and calipers on both feet to keep my 
foot up - but I was gradually able to work with using just a 
walking stick. In fact, a lot of the time I didn't need a stick 
at all. I only used a walking stick for long walks. I always 
carried it with me on the truck, in case we had a breakdown 
or something. I 06 
The families of polio survivors required a similar strong sense of 
determination, and sometimes this was tinged with deeper 
emotions and a sense of the struggle being a spiritual matter. A 
mother reflected -
I always knew - I don't know how I knew - that love would 
win out. I.. .  knew that one day it'd all be right and I don't 
know what would be right, I don't know how it would be 
right, but I just knew that whatever I did; I mean I never, 
ever, for one minute gave up . . .  something, some power 
would keep me going. And I did and it worked out. 1 07 
Not everyone was as able, or as willing, to reveal the way in which 
they had made sense of their experience of polio. 
Rehabilitation and after care 
The occurrence of polio epidemics created a need for expanded 
I 06 Interview K, p.93. 
1 07 Interview A, p.14. 
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rehabilitation selVices in Australia and gave impetus especially to 
the development and professionalisation of physiotherapy and 
massage. I 08 0 btaining sufficient trained staff to meet the new 
demand was problematic, especially during an epidemic, as the 
process of rehabilitation called for periods of intensive care 
followed by a regular programme of after care. Those intelViewed 
for this study remember being put in iron lungs, splints, and 
receiving physiotherapy, hydrotherapy and massage as part of their 
rehabilitation and after care. 1 09 
The item most feared in connection with polio and polio 
rehabilitation was the iron lung or tank. Those who required 
respiratory treatment in a lung may not have sulVived without it, 
but this did not diminish the horror it aroused, or the discomforts 
it brought. And there is evidence to suggest that the nursing staff 
themselves feared the iron lung due to the stringencies it imposed 
on their work. An iron lung patient remembers playful attempts by 
himself and others to ameliorate the situation . 
. . .  in those days too, the nurses were pretty scared too. That 
was when they used to do their training in the hospital. 
They would send the girl into a room full of three iron lungs 
and of course they used to be scared out of their wits and we 
didn't realise, of course, that they were frightened. They 
tried hard to be self confident and sometimes we played a 
trick on them. . .  they were told that those lungs were 
keeping us breathing and that if they stopped, we'd stop 
breathing, and it was a bit scary for them - you know, about 
1 08 Detailed accounts of these developments can be found in two so far 
unpublished works; Martyr, P. ( 1994). The Professional Development of 
Rehabilitation in Australia 1870-1981, PhD Thesis. History, University of Western 
Australia, chapter 5, and Martyr, P. ( 1996). A History of the Victoria Hospital 
(Infectious Diseases) ro the Royal Perth (Rehabllltatton) Hospital, 1893-1993. Perth, 
chapter 5. 
1 09 For example. interview K. p.92; I. p. 75; L, p.98. 
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an eighteen or nineteen year old girl. On one occasion three 
of us - I said ''You've got to watch me, I'm liable to choke". I 
said "Philip over there, he's liable to have a flt" and there 
was another guy, Alec "he might do something else" and I'd 
give them the signal and we all started to perform, so the 
poor girl Just put her head out the door, and yelled out 
"Nurse". That's when we realised that they were so 
frightened. But generally the nurses seemed to enjoy 
working With us and of course the whole ward was full of 
iron lungs at that period, that's when all the people in iron 
lungs came. I believe there was about fifteen died. 1 1 0 
The doctor who was a respiratory patient had strong feelings about 
the experience -
I might say that being treated in an iron lung is a fate 
almost worse than death. Total paralysis means total 
dependence. In those days, that is 1953, patients were put 
in the lung, as they called it - very few of them came out 
alive. And the reason for that was the primitive treatment. 
There were no measurements of anything to do with 
respiration. Management was entirely based on clinical 
Judgment, which is a very blunt weapon for anyone who is 
totally paralysed and requires assisted ventilation. 
It was only years later that I discovered... the man in the 
tank respirator before me, died as a result of vomiting and 
aspirating his stomach contents into his lungs . . .  
. . . once you . . .  were placed in an iron lung, it was miraculous 
if you ever came out of it and survived the experience. I I I 
And miracles did happen. Despite its horrors the iron lung allowed 
many to achieve respiratory independence and return to as normal 
a life as their recovery from paralysis would allow. 1 12 Of the three 
who record being placed in an iron lung one, although mobile, 
requires the respiratory support of an iron lung at night and has 
1 1  O Interview F. pp.50-51. 
1 1 1  Interview B. p.17. 
1 1 2 Public Health Department reports do not compare the number of deaths from 
polio with the number who required iron lung treatment. 
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continued to live in hospital for twenty seven years. 1 1 3 He 
recounts his own slow progress back to mobility after severe 
paralysis in February 1956 
.. . for the next two or three months it was pretty grtm . . .  I 
lost that much weight that I had bed sores on my elbows and 
shoulders. They used to tum the head of the tank down so 
all secretions would flow out from the lungs and, with the 
head being down, you tend to slide up to the head of the 
tank, and my shoulders would rub on the end of the tank. 
So I had four bed sores, one on each shoulder and my 
elbows, plus a carbuncle on my back. I think the thing that 
saved me from dying was penicillin. I was gtven six hourly 
injections of penicillin in my bottom, which was pretty much 
skin and bone and that was pretty painful. 
From then on it was just a matter first of all of trying to 
learn to breathe. I couldn't breathe at all - I don't know how 
long this was after, about two months I suppose - with 
breathing exercises they used to open up the lid of the tank 
and say "breathe", and you try and breathe, whatever muscle 
you've got. You might go for about two or thee minutes and 
that was it, just couldn't breathe at all. . . .  it took months 
and months to build up my breathing . . .  I can't be sure of 
the exact time, but about four or five months I could breathe 
for an hour or so, and that went on until about . . . August 
. . .  the first time they stood me up at the side of the bed. I 
had sufficient power in my legs so I could lock my knees 
[and) . . . stand. I said to the physio, "Can I tiy and walk?" 
He said, ''Yes". I took about one step and that was it - I was 
exhausted and they just put me straight back in the lung. 
And then it was just really months and months of physio. 
They couldn't work us really hard because our breathing was 
that bad. You couldn't do any physical effort, because you'd 
just get short of breath. On one occasion I was walking from 
one room to the next, without a physio, and I got half way 
and my breathing just packed up all together so they just 
picked me up and put me straight back in the "tank", which 
fixed things up of course. 1 1 4 
The need for ongoing respiratoiy support added burdens which 
those survivors had to contend with on a daily basis. The wife of 
1 1 3 Interview F. 
1 1 4 Interview F. p.50. 
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the man who had respiratory difficulties and a high level of 
residual paralysis revealed how demanding everyday life could be 
Because of his breathing problems, his tracheotomy and so 
on, it took about three hours for him to get his breathing 
organised sufficiently to be able to leave the house in the 
morning, so it took a lot of physio and suctioning, and so on 
- a lot of which he did himself - to get things organised. You 
couldn't ever get up and get dressed and go out. It took a lot 
of time and different things. 
We tried getting up earlier. It didn't make any difference. 
He still wasn't ready until around the same time . . .  daylight 
saving caused a problem, because he ended up being an hour 
later for work, because he still couldn't get his chest 
organised, even though he got up an hour earlier, it still 
took that particular time of the day before he was rtght. 1 1 5 
The amount of time it took to "get going" meant that, although he 
had been present for the birth of their first child, when the second 
child was born the circumstances were such that he was unable to 
make the hospital in time. 
Other forms of rehabilitative care were equally intrusive, absorbed 
huge amounts of time, and placed great burdens on health services 
and families alike. The parents of children too young to manage 
themselves were taught how to maintain their after care regime. 
The mother of a small boy records 
.. . when he was sent home they told me that it was up to me 
if he ever walked again. That was pretty horrendous stuff 
you know. I had five hours a day of exercises to give him.. .  I 
had to go back to Princess Margaret three times a week to 
see the physios there and they would show me what to do . . .  
we didn't see friends, we didn't go out, our complete life 
changed. We didn't do anything but help this lad ... 1 1 6 
1 1 5 Interview G. p.6 1. 
1 1 6 Interview A, p.5. Original emphasis. 
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Those able to self manage their recovery were required to do so. A 
teenage girl was sent home for a break with a set of exercise 
directions carefully written out by her physiotherapist. 1 1  7 Another 
was required to practice her walking daily. Her family insisted she 
do her exercises in the hallway of the house, while everyone else 
was having dinner, due to the shame they felt over her polio. She 
said, "I was. . .  separated, . . .  so that no one would ask any 
questions" . 1 1 8 
A young boy spent two years in a general hospital and a further 
year in an after care home, elected to stay on an extra year to 
allow for his schooling. He said -
I was supposed to sleep in a splint, and I had regular 
massage. It was called massage in those days, it probably 
amounted more to physiotherapy . . . the people who applied 
the massage were called masseurs or masseuses, because 
they were all female . . .  1 1 9 
Children were assisted with their education, and a different of 
measures were relied upon to occupy them while in hospital. 
Excursions ware also enjoyed by those able to participate. A 
variety of programmes were in place at PMH during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s as the following testimony reveals . 
. . . we had our schoolwork to do in the daytime - well, for a 
few hours - with [the teacher] who was at Princess Margaret. 
She ... was a small lady that used to buzz around and make 
sure everybody was doing their reading. We had tables that 
used to sit over you and came up to a height wh,ete you 
1 1 7 Directions for Dorothy Shepherd, in the possession of the author. 
1 1 8  Interview C, p.28. 
1 1 9 Interview D. p.36. 
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could put your books and things on. You couldn't do a lot 
of writing because of the position you were in, but she used 
to ask questions on what you'd read . . .  
At Princess Margaret on a Saturday morning they had their 
own little radio programme, where you could ask for 
requests . . .  When we got out to the Golden Age we had our 
own schoolroom, which anyone who was able could go along 
to . . .  
And there was . . .  a little green ambulance . . .  painted green 
and on the side Princess Margaret Hospital for Children . . .  
written on it. . .  About once a week, evecyone used to get 
loaded up and we'd go some place. The ones that were lying 
down laid on the stretchers on the side and we'd go for a 
picnic, or a morning out; we'd go to the circus; we went to a 
few things at His Majesty's Theatre and we'd go down to 
Fremantle. I remember one day we had morning tea on one 
of the big boats at the Captain's table. Quite a lot of 
outings. We'd go down to the beach. In the summer we 
used to go down to Hamersley Pool and evecyone would have 
their swim in the water, their exercises in the water instead 
of being stuck at home.120 
The continuing uncertainties surrounding polio may be one reason 
medical staff chose to improvise, or rely on old methods to achieve 
a result. A mother of two recalls -
... the doctor said " . . .  you're going to ... have physio". So they 
brought . . .  a physiotherapist, and she came with a car battecy 
and connected it up to my legs and my arm and tried to get 
the muscles to work again, but see they wouldn't. It didn't 
do anything and doctor said "No, we'll have to tcy to get you 
up, but you mustn't tcy to get out on your own". But can 
you imagine a mother not tcying to get up on her feet? I got 
out gradually, bit by bit, but it was an awful feeling. But I 
was determined to get up and walk. It took a while and my 
foot dragged, but I managed. As I left hospital I'd had a 
collar made. I had a surgical corset made and I had a 
Thomas splint made. It was one went that from the heel to 
the hip and it didn't bend at the knee, they were straight 
up. 1 2 1 
1 20 Interview J, pp.86-87. 
121 Interview H. pp.65-66. 
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And a male survivor records that his doctor resorted to an 
unorthodox method to assist his recovery. 
I had completely lost the use of my bowels and bladder and I 
was being catheterised all the time and the bladder part of it 
was a concern, because of infection ... the doctors came up 
with the idea of injecting curare, which is what the Red 
Indians used for tipping their arrows - muscle constricting 
poison. They got the dose right. It didn't kill me . .. , They 
told me it was what the Indians used to use on their arrow 
tips to kill ... whatever they wanted to catch for dinner ... that 
was one of the treatments. 1 22 
The impact of Post Polio Syndrome 
Amongst the present cohort of polio survivors the coming of Post 
Polio Syndrome has caused a complete reassessment of life and 
contributed to them achieving a new identity. The onset of fresh 
difficulties arising from the original destruction caused by polio 
radically reshaped their vision of their past, and their future 
prospects. Because of the shock brought about by PPS their 
stories are now available to us in a way they may not have been 
prior to the 1 980s. 
The identification of PPS came slowly. At first the difficulties 
indicated by polio survivors were dismissed by their doctors as 
being an element of the aging process. But as evidence 
accumulated from the cohort of polio survivors it reached a critical 
mass of information that could no longer be ignored and in the 
1 980s research commenced. 
1 22 Interview K. p.92. 
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In this sample responses to the news about PPS varied widely, even 
within the same person's story, a reflection of their own 
adjustment to new conditions. For some it came as a relief, 
because it put a name something that was going on but had no 
diagnosis. For others relief only came later, after they had worked 
through the evocation of their worst fears arising from the past 
and projected into the future. Some expressed the view that 
handling PPS was more difficult than dealing with the than 
original bout of polio because they knew their age was against 
them. 
The woman married to the man who was severely paralysed and 
had respiratory difficulties testified that, from 1969, her husband -
. . .  was deteriorating from about ten years after I first knew 
him.. .  and for the next ten years he deteriorated quite 
dramatically, and ended up in intensive care a number of 
times. We heard whispers that something was going on with 
post polio, but it was so rare that it couldn't possibly be 
what was wrong with him ... but we were looking for more 
information. It wasn't until 1989 that we eventually found 
it and realised that it was very significant to the problems 
that he was having, but unfortunately he died two weeks 
after we found this information. 1 2 3  
PPS curtailed the career of the doctor who had polio. He described 
the condition, and the discomfort it brought him. 
I returned to an appointment at the University of New South 
Wales ... in September 1964. Except for a year at Harvard, I 
remained there until the end of 1992, when because of 
increasing weakness I had to resign - what's referred to as 
the post polio syndrome, but really is the accelerated loss of 
power that is partly aging and partly because one had lost a 
lot of one's motor nerve cells. One is apparently more 
1 23 Interview G. p.62. 
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susceptible to the effects of aging, whatever that is, and for 
this increasing weakness there is no treatment. You all get 
weaker as you get older, but if you've had polio you get 
weaker faster, and it's very trytng. 1 2 4  
The farmer who returned to the land expressed real difficulties at 
the coming of PPS, which he found more taxing than having to 
deal with the ortginal polio. 
The hardest part of rehabilitation was going downhill again, 
not knowing what post polio syndrome was. That was 
harder than getting polio. 
For several years we used to come down to Busselton . .. for 
our annual holiday... while the kiddies were young and 
growing up. I found that each year going home was getting 
harder. That was taking place .. . in the late 1970s and 
certainly into the early 1980s, and I was coming to the 
realisation ... that I wasn't looking forward to going to 
another year's work. It was getting hard. 
[My wife )  was in her prime and enjoying life ... she enjoyed 
farm life and had a social outlet with pottery and one thing 
and another ... That was the difficult part because [my wife I 
was enjoying it so much and I was getting so I wasn't 
enjoying it. And, of course, I was the one that took her there 
in the first place . . .  
But. .. because I was realising that it wasn't my age, i t  was 
just something was happening and I didn't know what. We 
went to Perth and had an assessment, but this was before 
post polio was known .. .  although the doctor that assessed 
me did refer to it, but I don't know whether she wasn't 
familiar with it . .. because no-one was, but she must have 
been hearing something about it. Her assessment was that 
she could find nothing... So, of course, you come away 
feeling that you're giving up ... 
[My wife) and I went to a meeting up in Perth, where it was 
explained, .. .  it was still only in the early stages. But . . .  you 
could see it was a terrific relief, not only to me, but people 
around the hall... that it was... a load off your mind, 
because you couldn't help but feel that you [ had been) 
letting yourself down as well as everybody else. 
1 24 InteIView B. p.24. 
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That ... was a bigger emotional strain than actually getting 
polio ... When I first got [polio] I never believed I wouldn't get 
right because I suppose at that stage in your life you can't 
see why you shouldn't. But at the other end of the spectrum 
you know that ... your age is against you and fighting back is 
not going to be as easy. But we've learned to live with it, 
because now that we know that it is a real complaint. The 
first decision I had to make, of course, was about the farm ... 
It became increasingly obvious that I couldn't carry on, so 
that was a major decision ... a lot of heartache .... [ because] 
our son was working on the farm and [my wife] was enjoying 
it, and I was the odd man out. 
It was probably the hardest decision of our lives. I wasn't a 
very popular guy. 1 2 5  
The view that knowledge about PPS was bad news is evident in the 
testimony of another subject, this time a woman who felt it drew 
her back to the horrors of the original, distasteful experience, 
which kept her hospitalised for three years. Her transition, from 
initial feelings of dismay through to recovery of the familiar spirit 
of determination, is evident from her story . 
. . . I'd been getting more tired and finding life a bit more 
difficult, and... we knew they were having their meeting in 
Bunbury ... so we went along to see what all this was about. 
I can honestly say that I felt worse finding out about post 
polio than I did polio in the first place, because I had these 
horrible visions of getting back to how I used to be before, 
especially when one of the doctors said that people that were 
between the age of ten and thirteen age group when they got 
it, ones that took a long time to recover, were going to get 
the worst of the post polio syndrome. I felt devastated, 
honestly. I just didn't know what to do. It took me .. . 
months . . .  to actually get it into my head that ... with what I 
do, if I'm careful, I will not get back to that stage. But even 
now sometimes, I something think "it can't just be 
happening - not again!" I think that ls worse that the first 
time around. But I beat it the first time. It's not going to 
get me the second, I can tell you. But now I can look at it 
and think - if I have to do things differently again, and \{ I 
1 25 Interview K, pp.93-94. 
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get to the stage where I can't walk to do what I want to do -
I'm going to ride. He's still healthy - (points to husband) -
he can push me! . . .  But I'm not going to sit home and let it 
get me beat. If I want to go somewhere I'll do it. If I can't 
walk, I'll ride. But it has taken . . .  a long time to actually 
think that way. 1 26 
Others were filled with the same sense of dread when the news 
about PPS broke, 1 27 and some testify that it made them wony 
about all their petty ailments, such as increased tiredness, 1 2s 
aches and pains. 1 29 The most dramatic sense of relief is evident in 
the testimony of the survivor whose family coped with her original 
polio by denying its existence. 
When I first came in touch with literature about post polio, 
that was a really profound experience. Because I was having 
enormous pain with my foot and my leg when I walked, and I 
was terrified by this. . . .  It was to do with the fact that I'd 
just started walking mornings and. . .  would be in quite 
considerable pain, and still am, if I don't tie my shoe up 
properly, do all the right things. 
So I just cried for about 3 days when I read this 
literature, because it just made - I could make sense of 
my life. I could make sense of the fatigue. I used to 
complain about this the "psychic fatigue". I couldn't 
describe it in any way except to say that "my soul was tired" . 
And I had always experienced it . So by getting this 
literature. . .  I understood that polio . . .  was actually quite 
serious. I'd always been taught to dismiss it, it was nothing. 
"Don't make a fuss; don't make a fuss of her" . . . .  I had to 
reclaim my polio experience as something that had 
happened, that had consequences. I [had dealt with the] 
psychological, but at this time I was dealing with the 
physical. And so I had to almost relive my life and factor in 
polio, all the way through . . . .  That was a devastating 
experience and that took me. . .  two or three years to not cry 
every time I heard the word Post Polio . . .  every time I'd go to 
1 26 Interview J, p.89. 
1 2  7 In my own experience the news aroused depression, fears for the future, and 
worries about any kind of fatigue or aches and pains. 
1 28 Interview L. p.100; E. p.47. 
1 29 Interview D, p.39. 
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ring [ the Post Polio Network] .. .I would just cry, I couldn't 
talk. I'd have to hang up. I finally got their newsletter and I 
just used to get it and cry, so I never actually got to read it 
very much. It was like I had a different life that I'd denied 
and never been able to acknowledge this incredible thing 
that had happened in my life .. and had impacted on my 
children . .  on my ability to . . .  raise them [as] their mother. 
It was huge . . . having done that, I feel like I have reintegrated 
polio back into my life, and now ... it's radically different in 
that now . . .  I factor that in. It has affected me. I do 
experience fatigue. I do [have] inability to keep warm and I 
do have pain in my foot and my leg. It's like I denied it all 
those years as well, even though it had all these incredible 
effects . .. [an] it profoundly affected my whole life. 1 30 
The formation of the WA PPSG (Bunbury) and the WA PPN 
(Perth) 
A feature of PPS has been that it has generated a vast amount of 
self-help amongst polio survivors, principally through the 
formation of networks and support groups. Conferences, at which 
updates of medical and other forms of professional information 
are offered alongside opportunities for personal sharing, are now 
held regularly in Australia and New Zealand, and other parts of the 
world. 
The first moves towards gaining support for polio survivors in 
Western Australia was made by a group in the south west regional 
town of Bunbury who, in June 1988, formed the Western 
Australian Post Polio Support Group (WAPPSG). 
The next year, in August 1989, the Perth based Western Australian 
Post Polio Network (WAPPN) was commenced by the nurse who 
1 30 Interview C, p.32. Emphasis added. 
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married a polio survivor. 
4 1 4 
The first night we had the big meeting I got 110 
questionnaires back from the 230-odd people that had 
attended, which showed me that there were a lot of other 
people having similar problems . . .  and there was a need for 
something to be done about it. 
We've now got 1400 people that have had polio registered in 
WA. Ninety percent of them are having further problems and 
the research we're doing is coming up with a lot of answers 
that is benefiting people. I really feel that I served an 
apprenticeship during my [marriage] and it would be a waste 
of that experience not to be putting it back into helping 
people that I can help. 1 3 1  
The two groups function separately and according to different 
guidelines. The WAPPSG offers monthly meetings at which 
information is shared and for polio survivors offer support to one 
another. 
The WAPPN offers a regular clinic where polio survivors may have 
their needs assessed, conducts some research, and provides 
information for polio survivors. 
Some political tensions exist between the two groups, but this is 
limited by their different orientation and geographical base. Both 
are lively and expanding groups which have met an important need 
amongst polio survivors in Western Australia. 
*** 
1 3 1  InteIView G, pp.62-63. 
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The title Fear, frustration and the will to overcome, emerged from 
this research and accurately encapsulates many people's knowledge 
and experience of polio. There are several layers to this histocy 
and the presence of the disease in the community evoked varied 
and ambiguous reactions. I have examined the discussion the 
virus generated amongst members of the public, researchers, 
health professionals and polio survivors, in order to draw 
conclusions about the relationship between disease and society, 
especially in Australia. 
This thesis is a narrative social history- investigation of community 
responses to poliomyelitis, and the impact of the disease on those 
who experienced it, particularly during the epidemics that occurred 
in Western Australia between 1938 and 1956. In this enquicy I 
have been concerned with the relationship between memocy, 
history- and polio and through this work I have attempted to allow 
space to more voices than have previously been heard in the 
official polio stocy Western Australia. 
Until recent years there has been little ongoing discussion of polio. 
The vaccination programme eliminated the public profile of the 
disease, and it is evident that polio survivors were inducted into a 
culture of denial in which there was little or no validation for 
telling their stories. Many polio survivors have remained silent 
about living with the consequences of the disease and more would 
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have done so had not the late effect of polio itself revived their 
memories. While many polio survivors won't go so far as to write 
their story, a consequence of the emerging post-polio support 
systems is that they are being asked to articulate their experience, 
to doctors, support group workers, and their fellow polio survivors, 
and the field is available for the researcher who is willing to enter 
into it. 
Reworking the collective memory of the polio era in Western 
Australia in this way has allowed a richer narrative of this period 
to begin to emerge. The reader, and future researchers may now be 
able to see that there are many nuances to consider in this 
history. The voice of polio survivors themselves have been left out 
of the official record and within the context of this enquiry I have 
endeavoured to allow them plenty of space to speak for themselves. 
The commentary of the newspapers has largely been missing from 
earlier accounts, and the archives themselves have warranted a 
more thorough examination than they have previously had for this 
purpose. The official history, as it existed in the form of Annual 
Reports from the Public Health Department, and in books such as 
that written by Snow, are bereft of the experience of the people 
who suffered from polio and received support from medical and 
health authorities. It is evident from my research that the official 
version of the polio is very different from the one that is 
remembered by polio survivors, and at times it is difficult to 
reconcile the two. The "memory jolt" caused by the coming of Post 
Polio Syndrome is only now being absorbed by polio survivors and 
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historians. There is much more of the polio story to emerge, and 
given the amount of material obtained through this small sample 
of interviews, compared with the number of people there are with a 
story to tell, there is plenty to occupy historians for some time to 
come. 
I began this research with the whole of Australia in view but the 
abundance of material available led me to concentrate on Western 
Australia. Limiting the scope in this way has meant the possible 
loss of insights that may have been gained by being able to 
examine the response to polio across different states, but where 
possible I have made comparisons within Australia, and with New 
Zealand, while chapters two and three give an international 
context through the medical and social history of polio. If similar 
resources on this subject are available for the rest of Australia, as 
Anne Killlalea's work on Tasmania suggests they are, there is a 
profitable field of research yet to be explored which could 
eventually lead to a general history. 
Fear, frustration and the will to overcome, encapsulates the 
argument of this thesis. The opinion that polio was a disease 
greatly feared in the community, mostly articulated by experts, has 
been shown to be true in this case. Beginning with Dudley Snow's 
assertion that "few diseases are capable of evoking as much human 
emotion as polio", I I have shown that polio attracted a great deal 
of fear, more than it may have deserved, when compared with other 
diseases which had far higher mortality rates, such as diphtheria, 
I Snow, D.R.J. {1981). Progress, p.66. 
CHAPTER 10: Conclusion 418  
whooping cough, heart disease and cancer. It is evident that the 
fear of polio was genuinely felt amongst the medical fraternity, and 
that it was not confined to that group. From an early date, health 
and medical experts in Australia spoke of polio in language which 
reflected their fear of the disease, and expressed dismay that the 
press drew attention to it in ways that exacerbated that fear in the 
community. There is evidence that in Western Australia, and New 
South Wales, health authorities attempted to curb the press in its 
reporting of polio, in an effort to calm the community down. Such 
actions have affected the history of polio, and the type story that 
has survived in the public memory. But during the 1948 epidemic 
in Western Australia the Public Health Department had to learn a 
lesson the hard way. Its bumbling manner and its policies of 
persuasion resulted in being severely criticised. The authorities 
feared polio itself, and it is clear that they also feared the negative 
criticism it could bring them from the public realm. 
The power of polio to render a child disabled was an important 
reason it was so feared. Being crippled was associated with being 
worth less in the economic struggle for life, and it meant that the 
polio survivor might have to face the prospect of life-long reliance 
on the state for support. Evidence of stigmatisation and ostracism 
experienced by polio survivors is a clear sign that disability, and 
the polio that caused it, was greatly feared in the community. 
Conversely the strong drive amongst polio survivors to overcome 
their disability and enter the mainstream, often with the 
encouragement of their doctors, also demonstrates the presence of 
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Lack of accurate information about the polio virus, particularly in 
respect of its means of transmission, was a source of frustration 
both for health experts and the community. Uncertainty led the 
Public Health Department to impose a number of protection 
measures, in the hope of casting the net wide enough to stop the 
disease. The press and the public viewed the protection policies as 
inconsistent and contradictory and the nature of the measures 
themselves contributed to the level of fear and frustration 
connected with polio. The practice of imposing quarantine 
restrictions on children while allowing adults to continue to travel 
and mingle freely was an example of this inconsistency, as was the 
recommended ban on the congregation of children from different 
areas, while allowing picture theatres to remain open. These 
practices helped exaggerate the negative publicity polio received, 
undermined confidence in the Public Health Department, as shown 
by the cartoons of Saw and Davies and numerous letters to the 
papers, and made the public frustrated and anxious. Community 
response to some of these policies was at times equivocal, but it is 
evident from the call for bans on children entering WA from 
interstate, reports of the Swan river being deserted during a 
summer heat wave, the letters of protest concerning the proposed 
YAL tour of country districts, and the letter from a mother who 
complained that a known polio contact should have been 
prevented from working on her husband's farm, that people 
earnestly sought to avoid contact with the virus or its potential 
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carriers and were frustrated by the way the Public Health 
Department chose to respond to the epidemics. The public debate 
that occurred in the lead up to the 1954 royal tour to Western 
Australia revealed that people at all levels of government and 
community were afraid of the consequences that might result from 
the gathering of such large crowds, and some called for the tour to 
be cancelled. Under the circumstances it was a bold act to allow 
the tour to proceed, but it helped prove a point about the faecal 
contamination theory of polio transmission. And so strong was 
the desire to participate in this event, the public willingly 
conformed to the protocols designed to ensure their own safety and 
that of the royal couple. Despite the shock of the "Cutter" 
incident the fact that 97% of Western Australians consented to 
have their children immunised with Salk vaccine. Nearly all 
resistance was overcome by a strong level of community acceptance 
combined with a dread of the alternative. 
If health experts were frustrated by the slow progress made in 
understanding polio and finding a reliable prophylactic, they were 
less impressed by the level of understanding of the disease abroad 
in the community, as manifested in the weird and wonderful 
suggestions members of the public offered them. While the 
response to these gestures was generally polite, and occasionally 
some points were taken seriously, at heart they were treated with 
disdain. The public were trespassing into a world where scientific 
knowledge had become the technical preserve of an elite caste, and 
it seems many had not read or understood the information about 
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polio the experts had provided for them. Occasionally suggestions 
received a severe rebuff, or were ignored entirely. Hints of how the 
health experts really felt about them are gained from Snow's 
outburst against the anti-immunisation movement, and in the 
curt reply that some of the suggestions received from the 
Commissioner. Health experts may have felt they kept the public 
well informed but it is evident from the oral testimonies examined 
here that ignorance of the facts remained amongst the medical 
profession as much at the public. And for all their weaknesses, 
the suggestions offered demonstrate how members of the 
community continued to be concerned and involved in the search 
for an answer to polio, and shared the frustration of not knowing 
what to do for the best. 
The will to overcome the ravages of epidemic polio is as noticeable 
amongst medical and health experts as the remarkable 
determination to overcome their disabilities is amongst polio 
survivors. The search for a reliable vaccine is an international 
story of the will to overcome polio, in which Australians, such as 
Sir Macfarlane Burnet and Dame Jean Macnamara, have had a 
significant part to play. The will to overcome polio in Australia is 
also demonstrated by Bazeley's commitment to learn how to 
produce Salk safely in this country, and the Commonwealth 
government's approach to the mass immunisation of the 
population. These, along with Dudley Snow's careful and 
ingenious planning, are but a few elements in what was widely 
touted as the "war against polio". The implementation of the 
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immunisation campaign, and the high level of public response to 
it, is another indication that the defeat of polio was something 
nearly all members of the community were resolved to accomplish. 
The testimonies of the polio survivors have clearly shown that 
amongst them there was an intense determination to triumph over 
the devastating effects of the disease. A similar strong 
determination can be found in Sister Elizabeth Kenny, whose work 
was damned by the Australian medical establishment. The heroic 
representation of polio survivors in the press expressed another 
side of the will to overcome polio, and gave encouragement through 
showing some were already winning the battle. 
The polio virus has not waged its war through Australian summers 
since at least 1962 but many people have a polio story to tell. 
There is a significant number of people who still live with the 
effects of their contact with polio, as long as sixty years ago. The 
emergence of Post Polio Syndrome has presented at least two new 
challenges to be considered. In terms of changes to the present 
needs of polio survivors it has faced them with important issues to 
work through as they confront the increased pain, loss of muscle 
strength and misunderstanding by the medical profession. And, as 
has been shown here, it has sometimes meant that, for the first 
time in their lives survivors have had to confront the pain of the 
original impact of polio, and address the losses it brought, but 
which have so often been denied or ignored in their drive to live a 
normal life. As polio survivors affected by PPS are now required to 
confront some painful changes, so there is a role for historians to 
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rework and transmit the new history that emerges from this 
profound jolt to the collective memory. 
*** 
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APPENDIX 
ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW RELEASE FORM 
- PROJECT TITLE -
Fear, Frustration and the will to overcome: 
a social history of polio in Western Australia 
by 
John B Smith 
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NAME ..... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..... . . . .... ....... .... . . ... .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .... . . . .... . . 
ADDRESS .. . . ... . . .... ...... . . ..... . . . . . . ... .... . .. . .. . . .. . . . .. . . ... ..... . ... . ... . ..... ... . . 
TELEPHONE ... . .. . .. ..... ...... . . ... . . . .. . .. . .... . . . .... . . . . .. . . ...... ... . . . . . . . . . ... .. . .  . 
I consent to the information that I give relating to my experience of 
poliomyelitis, in interviews conducted by John Howard Smith for 
the above project, being used, without personal reference, for the 
purposes of research and publication. 
I understand that the information gamed will assist the writing of 
the history of the polio epidemics in Australia, and especially 
Western Australia. 
I also understand that any part of a research report, which is 
placed in the Battye Library, or elsewhere, will be lodged there at 
the discretion of the Doctoral Studies Committee of the Edith 
Cowan University, and will be placed on restricted access. 
Should the process of recollecting my experience of poliomyelitis 
evoke emotional reactions that need to be addressed, I understand 
that suitable professional help is available, at my expense, from 
Susanne Howlett, The Wasley Institute, 563 William St, MT 
LAWLEY WA 6050, TELEPHONE 328.3300. 
SIGNED .. ..... . ........ . . . . . .... . .. . . ... . . . . . ........... . . . . . . . ... . .. . .. . . . ................. . 
WITNESSED . . .......... . . . ....... . .. . ... . .. . .... . . .. . .. . ............. . .. . ... .... . . . . . . ... . 
DATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
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ORAL HISTORY QUESTIONS 
- PROJECT TITLE 
THE POLIOMYELITIS EPIDEMICS IN AUSTRALIA 1895-1962 
with special reference to Western Australia 
1. Name 
2. Age 
by 
John H Smith 
3. When did you have polio (When were you associated with 
polio)? 
4. Where did you live at that time? 
5. How did you get polio? (How did the member of your family 
get polio?) 
6. Were you hospitalised - at what stage - how many times -
for how long? 
7. How did having polio affect you (the member of your family) 
physically? 
8. What do you remember feeling about yourself: 
- when you got polio? 
- when you were admitted to hospital? 
- when you were in hospital? 
- when you were discharged? 
9. What anxieties/uncertainties do you remember feeling? 
10. Once you had polio were certain forms of behaviour 
expected of you? 
11. What do you remember about how others regarded you - did 
you feel included/ excluded? 
12. How did having polio affect your relationship - with your 
father, mother, siblings? 
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13. How did you having polio affect the way your family 
understood itself? 
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14. Did you or your family experience any ostracism because of 
your polio? 
15. What do you remember of how people felt about polio? 
16. What myths/ legends/ traditions do you remember were 
associated with polio? 
17. Was information about polio readily available? 
18. What precautions or practices were recommended as safe­
guards? 
19. What forms of help or support were available? 
20. How have you been able to make sense of your experiences? 
*** 
